But it may also lead to unicorns — Tom Storm

Ha. Not that I agree (e.g., there is no one universal exemplar of the perfect unicorn), but, if so, it can then likewise also lead to unicorn based technologies we all live by and universally agree upon.

Nice. I hear you but i don't think this is all that useful a formulation. We can find any number of minds to agree and visualise a unicorn but it still doesn't make it true. In this way we can also have objective accounts of ghosts and UFO too. Not sure what the word objective adds to this understanding. — Tom Storm

Just wanted to point this out:

All can however only provide the exact same example of what a perfect circle is epitomized by. And from this universality of agreement in understanding among all sapience then gets derived things such as the number pi. — javra

By entailment: If a perfect circle is no more objective/true/real than is a unicorn, then the number pi is no more objective/true/real than is a unicorn. If the number pi is no more real than is a unicorn, then neither is the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (which in part relies upon use of pi) any more real than is a unicorn. If the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (which is a fundamental concept to quantum mechanics) is no more real than is a unicorn, then much if not all of quantum mechanics is no more real than is a unicorn. And, if the latter is true, then all technology reliant on quantum mechanics is no more real than unicorns.

I know, it might be hard to follow - but it's not oriented at convincing you of anything.

Unless evidenced wrong, the just mentioned argument appears to me quite sound; in brief: If a perfect circle is no more real than are unicorns, then the reality of our quantum mechanics based technology is on par to the reality of unicorns.

Since unicorns are commonly taken to be fully fictitious/unreal, something then is quite amiss with claiming that perfect circles are not objective in a way that unicorns can never be.

OK. Thanks.

Glad to hear. :up:

IMO, the comparison case for all these theories should be the best/most popular theories in other camps, not naive realism, which is more a strawman than a real position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can get that, but then can you clarify what you make out of this statement - or else whether you find it erroneous - with emphasis on the highlighted portion:

In recent years, direct realists have wanted the perceptual relation to be entirely unmediated: we don’t achieve perceptual contact with objects in virtue of having perceptual experiences; the experience just is the perceptual contact with the object (Brewer 2011).This is the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the subject’s standing in certain relations to external objects, where this relation is not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent. — https://plato.stanford.edu/Entries/perception-episprob/#DireReal

I so far interpret it as expressing that our perceptions are in no way mediated by or else analyzable in terms of the agent's specific (even if this is only a perfect representation of the its species-specific) relations of "physiological senses - CNS capacities - resulting states of awareness" - these relations of themselves constituting the "inner states of the agent". I'll try to decompress this if needed, but I'm currently hoping it will make general sense to you as is. At any rate, how do you interpret the quoted statement?

I don't disagree with anything you wrote. However, contemporary versions of direct realism, intentionality theories, and phenomenological theories all explain the same phenomena. Each of these have their own problems, but it doesn't seem readily apparent that some have significantly worse problems than others. The result is that I would tend to say that "indirect realism can be made consistent with the empirical sciences," rather than "the empirical sciences confirm indirect realism," which would seem to imply that we can eliminate competing theories based on the empirical sciences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This seems to me to hinge one what one means by "direct" and "indirect" realism, and I acknowledge that opinions can vary greatly. It's a bit lengthy, but here is an excerpt from SEP on the matter:

2.3.3 Direct Realism

Proponents of intentionalist and adverbialist theories have often thought of themselves as defending a kind of direct realism; Reid (1785), for example, clearly thinks his proto-adverbialist view is a direct realist view. And perceptual experience is surely less indirect on an intentionalist or adverbialist theory than on the typical sense-datum theory, at least in the sense of perceptual directness. Nevertheless, intentionalist and adverbialist theories render the perception of worldly objects indirect in at least two important ways: (a) it is mediated by an inner state, in the sense that one is in perceptual contact with an outer object of perception only (though not entirely) in virtue of being in that inner state; and (b) that inner state is one that we could be in even in cases of radical perceptual error (e.g., dreams, demonic deception, etc.). These theories might thus be viewed as only “quasi-direct” realist theories; experiences still screen off the external world in the sense that the experience might still be the same, whether the agent is in the good case or the bad case. Quasi-direct theories thus reject the Indirectness Principle only under some readings of “directness”. A fully direct realism would offer an unequivocal rejection of the Indirectness Principle by denying that we are in the same mental states in the good and the bad cases. In recent years, direct realists have wanted the perceptual relation to be entirely unmediated: we don’t achieve perceptual contact with objects in virtue of having perceptual experiences; the experience just is the perceptual contact with the object (Brewer 2011).This is the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the subject’s standing in certain relations to external objects, where this relation is not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent. Thus, the brain in the vat could not have the same experiences as a normal veridical perceiver, because experience is itself already world-involving. — https://plato.stanford.edu/Entries/perception-episprob/#DireReal

I then take the highlighted portion of this text to imply that the yellow flower's uniformity of hew as seen by humans is (for emphasis) the one true reality of the object - this such that a bee's experience of the flower as having a pattern of different hews is then incorrect / bad / illusory ... if not also somehow hallucinatory.

If what I experience is a direct access (one that is hence "not mediated by or analyzable in terms of further, inner states of the agent") to reality as it truly, objectively is, then the just mentioned conclusion so far seems to me entailed. If so, this then contradicts our scientific knowledge of reality/the world.

In which way would you find the just expressed to be inaccurate?

Lower animals certainly have the second type of concept, but it seems doubtful they have the first. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There's plenty of scientific evidence that some of them do. As one example I quickly found online:
Can Dogs Learn Concepts the Same Way We Do? Concept Formation in a German Shepherd

This not to even start discussing studies on the great apes.

I just wanted to illustrate that theories all have significant problems AND can be made consistent enough with empirical evidence that none of particularly "confirmed" above others — Count Timothy von Icarus

My use of the term "confirmed" was likely inappropriate. I meant in the sense of "strengthened" rather than of of "having an assured accuracy". That mentioned, contingent on the issue of what "direct realism" entails, as previously expressed, our scientific knowledge does contradict our human perceptions being the be-all and end-all to what the objective world consists of (edit: to be clear, this perceptually). In this sense, I then yet find our scientific knowledge to evidence, hence support, the view that direct realism as just described in this post is erroneous. Be it "quasi-" or otherwise, this then results in science supporting an indirect realism.

But maybe I've got my definitions wrong.

Spaciotemporal properties are aspects of the phenomena for Kant, or aspects of what we intuit. — frank

This is very unclear to me.

What I expressed in relation to Kant's take on space and time is simply that neither space nor time are of themselves phenomena for Kant. They are instead for him "pure (rather than empirical) intuitions". Here's an excerpt from IEP:

The most basic type of representation of sensibility is what Kant calls an “intuition.” An intuition is a representation that refers directly to a singular individual object. There are two types of intuitions. Pure intuitions are a priori representations of space and time themselves (see 2d1 below). Empirical intuitions are a posteriori representations that refer to specific empirical objects in the world. In addition to possessing a spatiotemporal “form,” empirical intuitions also involve sensation, which Kant calls the “matter” of intuition (and of experience generally). (Without sensations, the mind could never have thoughts about real things, only possible ones.) We have empirical intuitions both of objects in the physical world (“outer intuitions”) and objects in our own minds (“inner intuitions”). — https://iep.utm.edu/kantview/#SH2c

Phenomena for Kant are appearances - which I so far take to always be in one way or another empirical. And, hence, I so far take it that for Kant space and time - both being a priori representations that are then in no way empirical - are not phenomenal in and of themselves.

Which is not to then say that either pure or empirical intuitions are not representations for Kant.

If you find this interpretation mistaken, can you please back up your disagreement with references.

Do we know if a perfect circle can be realised? — Tom Storm

That's the hitch. A perfect circle is realized in this world by all minds which can comprehend it's, granted non-physical, being and, furthermore, all minds with sufficient comprehension will be able to thus realize an understanding of the exact same geometric form. Such that this understanding is objective. Not so with abstractions proper: ten people will provide ten different examples of what the abstraction "bird" is epitomized by: from a finch, to maybe an eagle, and so forth. All can however only provide the exact same example of what a perfect circle is epitomized by. And from this universality of agreement in understanding among all sapience then gets derived things such as the number pi.

Is pi a realized, actual, number that occurs in the real world? I'd myself say of course: it is not unrealized, nor a mere potential, nor a fictitious construct. In which case, so too must the objectively perfect circle then also be a given that is realized all the time in the real world. For there can be no number pi in the absence of the circle's actuality.

In short, the answer to this quoted question would be "yes", albeit not physically within matter.

But its getting a bit late for me. And, again, I've got nothing to sell. So I'll leave it at that for the time being.

Unless I'm mistaken, I think contradiction

in (non-dialetheistic) logic = necessary falsity;

in modal logic = necessary impossibility; and

in modal metaphysics = necessary ontic-impossibility (e.g. sosein)*. — 180 Proof

Yes, I fully agree with that. I was only addressing the issue that contradictory claims are not necessarily equally fictional ... as per my example of "the Earth is flat" and "the Earth is roughly spherical" being contradictory claims that are however not both fictional.

Have I said that objectively perfect things do not occur? I actually don't think this, so if you can find me saying it, I withdraw it. — Tom Storm

I did say "implicit assertion". Which is corroborated by the following.

My actual point is what evidence do we have and can anyone provide an example in the real world of such a perfect thing? Not an abstraction, not an argument, not a theoretical description: but an actual perfect thing. — Tom Storm

Abstractions are abstracted from concrete givens, and as far as I know there are no concrete examples of perfect circles. If the latter is then true, then perfect circles cannot be abstractions by definition.

That touched upon, whatever they might be conceptualized as being by you, are you saying that (perfect) circles do not occur in the real world, but only in fictitious worlds?

This being a philosophy forum where debates and disagreements unfold, I just find your implicit assertion that objectively perfect givens do not occur, else that there is no evidence for them occurring, to be irrational, that's all. Would have liked to see the reasoning to it. But so be it,

Someone else may buy it. — Tom Storm

I'm not selling anything, you. So to you an apeirogon is not an imperfect circle. Hard to comprehend, but fine. What then is an imperfect circle to you?

The fallacy occurs because the two interpretations of "imperfect circle" are not equivalent. — Tom Storm

Would an oval then be an "imperfect circle" any more than any polygon? Why, when both are clearly not circles but yet resemble circles each in their own way?

Poetically addressed, an octagon is very much roughly circular when looked at from afar, and hence can be construed to be an imperfect circle - this just as much as an apeirogon can. Only that the apeirogon, being far nearer in shape to a perfect circle than an octagon, is then far less imperfect by comparison - but is imperfect (edit: as a circle) nonetheless.

Yes, what a great question! Wouldn't that be interesting? Imagine if there were a Platonic category of perfection - an instantiation of perfection that operates above and beyond any human criteria of value. The way the Platonic realm is said to work. Wouldn't that be something? Do you believe in this category? — Tom Storm

I thought you were only interested in perfection's application to morality; that perfection being one and the same with Neo-platonic, if not also Platonic, notion of "the Good", which you've stated you find unwarranted. At any rate:

Placing aside interpretations and/or misinterpretations pertaining to the metaphysics of Platonism, and here addressing objectivity as that state of being which is fully impartial relative to all coexistent sentience (let me know if you have a better but incongruous definition of “objectivity”), here’s an argument for the occurrence of objective perfection:

p1) There either can occur or cannot occur such a thing as an objectively perfect circle (this in contrast to the subjective perfection of a circle which my five-year old niece has drawn on paper).

p2) If there is no such thing as an objectively perfect circle, then neither can there be such thing as an objectively imperfect circle.

p3) If there is no such thing as an objectively imperfect circle, one can then objectively have a circle which takes the shape of an octagon.

p4) A circle in the shape of an octagon, however, is not a circle when objectively addressed - as is commonly confirmed by all sane humans.

c1) Therefore, there is such a thing as an objectively perfect circle.

c2) Ergo, objectively perfect givens can and do occur.

Is it a problem for "impossible" or contradictory claims to be considered equally valid?

No. They are equally fictional. — 180 Proof

As a minor contention, while contradiction necessitates that something is fictional or else false in any non-dialetheistic system of logic, contradiction does not necessitate the fictionality or else falsity of all givens which contradict. For ease of expression, I'll here use the adjective "false" rather than that of "fictional".

If A contradicts with B, the three following possibilities then strictly unfold: a) A is false and B is true, b) A is true and B is false, or else c) both A and B are (equally) false.

As an example, that the Earth is flat contradicts with the Earth being roughly spherical. This, however, does not entail that Earth is thereby neither flat nor roughly spherical (needless to add, Earth in fact being roughly spherical).

↪javra
I like it. — AmadeusD

Cool. :smile:

A tentative comment i'd make, at risk of upsetting some of the more stringently critical here, is that its entirely possible we in fact do have an electrical sense of some kind, — AmadeusD

I can respect the hypothesis. Since it concerns a possible human physiological sense, it is then open in principle to scientific investigation via which validation or falsification could be obtained.

But, for the record, this is often not as easily done as it is said. Take the possibility of human pheromones for example. At least some scientific experiments seem to indicate that humans might have such a physiological sense (below is provided one example of such (1) and a general history or the research (2) which also addresses the complications involved with it). But, if we do in fact have this sense in any capacity, it would obviously be largely, if not entirely, subliminal—this in contrast to how it appears to be in many a lesser animal (e.g., their Flehmen response, which by all accounts appears to be a consciously enacted behavior aimed at a greater pheromone perception).

Still, there so far are a number of problems with such studies on human pheromone perception; (3) provides a succinct abstract of them. So, to date, neither are human pheromones confirmed by science nor are they falsified by science. This despite the scientific investigation that has gone into the matter.

----------

1) Pheromones and their effect on women’s mood and sexuality

2) Chapter 19: Human Pheromones - Do They Exist?

3) Reproducible research into human chemical communication by cues and pheromones: learning from psychology's renaissance

-----------

It's one subject of interest to me that in some ways relates to your post, so I thought I'd share.

You do realize I was kidding? :joke: — Gnomon

:up: Yes, that was my best hunch. :grin: All the same, not being then fully certain, I stated what I stated as a general fact (it should be noted, without any explicitly given value judgment concerning this affirmed fact).

The statement was aimed at those - including some hereabouts on a philosophy forum - which are antagonistic toward metaphysical enquiries period, to include investigations into the nature of causation, time, space, and identity, among others issues of metaphysical concern. And to me it goes hand in hand with what I've said here.

To be blunt, upholding ignorance as a virtue to be pursued and safeguarded - or maybe worse, that the status quo perspectives of today accurately appraise in full all that there is to know about the nature of reality (e.g., regarding causation, time, space, etc.) - is not my cup of tea. But, to each their own.

↪javra

The indirect realism* which the empirical sciences confirm—

Do they? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's why I so far uphold the statement which you've quoted (any and all metaphysical implications of such perspective being to me irrelevant to the science involved):

Humans are known to be highly visual animals, so I’ll address our awareness of objects via sight. Birds, bees, and other lesser animals are know by science to visually perceive the world in drastically different ways relative to the average human. We see a flower as uniform yellow. A bee will see it as having different shades and shapes of ultraviolet. What the bee sees is no more (in)correct or (in)accurate than what we see. Yet the two species will see different things, that nevertheless yet hold the same spatiotemporal properties.

The spatiotemporal properties of objects, of the world in general (as difficult as this subject matter is), will nevertheless be commonly apprehended by all animate, hence sentient, beings—from bacteria to humans—which in any way causally interact. All else which is apprehended of objects and the world is indicated by scientific findings to be relative to, by in large, the species of sentient being concerned.

It should be noted that whatever we perceptually know of ultraviolet and infrared is, for us, yet perceived via neither (we view technologically interpreted ultraviolet and infrared only via what is relative to the human species visible light; we however have no clue of what a bee or snake experiences … other than that whatever they experience holds the same spatiotemporal properties as what we experience).

We infer there being gravitational fields, but we do not perceive them via magnetoception as objects of awareness in the world. We infer there being electric fields, but we do not perceive them via electroreception as being objects of awareness in the world. The list is by my account expansive.

Here’s an overview of non-human senses currently known to science. And I deem it very presumptuous to uphold that we have via science now discovered all the physiological senses that can possibly occur.

In short, science confirms what whatever that objective object we term a yellow flower is, it is neither in fact of a strictly uniform hew that is thereby devoid of patterns within petals nor are its petals it in fact of a complex pattern of hew. The flower is not perceptually both at the same time and in the same respect (although it is both at the same time in terms of its spatiotemporal properties which allows for both human-relative visible light and ultraviolet light to reflected from it). It is of uniform hew to one species of life and comprised of patterns of hew to another. This, again, because what the flower is as objective (fully impartial) object in the world will be interpreted differently by the different physiological senses of different species of life.

As to objects being mediated via concepts, consider the following scenario: one sees all the colors, shapes, angles, and lines which would otherwise constitute a house but, maybe because one hold’s no conception of what a house is, one then nevertheless does not see a house. Then there is the scientifically known disorder of agnosia, wherein—as in the example just provided—one sees all the specific concrete attributes of an object without being able to recognize the object. Taken together, these two examples serve to illustrate how the objects we all (typically) recognize in the world are all mediated via concepts—and science does evidence that perception via physiological senses can well occur in the absence of object recognition.

So that yellow flower that is actually out there in the world as a yellow flower would in fact not be were it not for the mind-dependent concept(s) of “yellow flower”.

Although all of this is a summery of sorts, I do take it to evidence that our scientific knowledge confirms that, for one example, the yellow flower which all of us humans can effortlessly agree occurs out there in the world independently of our senses and concepts is, in fact, fully contingent on our senses and concepts—this in all, or at least nearly all, respects other than its spatiotemporal properties (neither of which are phenomena in Kantian terms). To some other species of life, the very same spatiotemporal object which can be apprehended by all coexistent sentience will then be neither yellow nor a flower.

And this outlook I've just addressed which is confirmed by our current scientific knowledge I further take to be a variant of indirect, rather than direct, realism.

I'm of course open to being corrected, though.

What's so important about broader understanding? Does it make the world any more predictable & controllable? Why not just go with the flow? :joke: — Gnomon

In other words:

Ignorance is strength. — 1984 (as told by George Orwell)

... to which can also be added, "ignorance is bliss".

All this epitomizing philosophies which argue against an examined life

Let’s just lose the work perfect if all we mean is fit for purpose. — Tom Storm

And take all the Dionysian fun out of the term’s usage? I don’t know. — javra

When someone I'm enamored with tells me they'll see me at 10 o'clock, I'm gonna reserve the right to reply, "perfect". — javra

You would be using the word metaphorically/poetically. — Tom Storm

While I’ve got no issues with the use of metaphor/poetry in speech, wanted to point out the following:

The usage of the adjective “perfect” would in the case specified be in full keeping with “fit for purpose” - as in, her meeting me at 10 would be fully fit to the purposes/aims I (and maybe she as well) hold in mind. Hence, her meeting me at 10 would be perfect in non-metaphorical/non-poetic manners going by the term’s one translation of being “fit for purpose”. Plus, the term “perfect” in this standard (not even figurative) dictionary sense I’ve previously linked to is both more succinct and more aesthetic sounding than saying “that fully fits my/our purposes/aims” - tough they here can only be implicitly understood to mean the same thing.

Which is to in part say that, while one can deem that any philosophy of life should be Apollonian, the living of life is often best done in Dionysian manners. And, imo, in order to be honest, the Apollonian ought to fully account for what is Dionysian in life rather than prohibit those good-natured aspects of it not yet analytically understood. This, specifically, apropos to the usage of the term “perfect” in the sense of “fit for purpose”. But it could also apply in cases such as that of lovingly telling an infant “I’m gonna eat you up” (which I acknowledge would be fully metaphorical/poetic).

At the end of the day, though, whether it’s taken to be metaphorical/poetic or not is not that big of an issue for me - even though I don’t find its stated usage to so be for the reasons given. Heck, all language, regardless of how analytical, can well be interpreted as foundationally metaphorical/poetic in some deeper sense.

All the same: going back to "losing the word perfect when all we mean by it is fit for purpose", I find no reason to not reserve the right to use the term in cases such as that here mentioned.

[...] what is your best description of Metaphysics? — Rob J Kennedy

To put this as colloquially as I can, metaphysical enquiry is the attempt to figure out what reality is really all about.

Then there’s those who look upon it thus: If there’s nothing broken with the status quo metaphysics of today, why try to fix it?

Because, for one example, there’s nothing wrong with a bunch of lemmings actively swimming their way toward a climate change catastrophe in today’s status quo metaphysics of a meaningless universe.

Let’s just lose the work perfect if all we mean is fit for purpose. — Tom Storm

And take all the Dionysian fun out of the term’s usage? I don’t know.

When someone I'm enamored with tells me they'll see me at 10 o'clock, I'm gonna reserve the right to reply, "perfect".

Which then takes us back to more pragmatic relationships with ideas. How does one describe a 'fit for purpose' morality? Sounds sinister. Fit for whose purpose? — Tom Storm

A tangential topic to the OP, but isn’t that what any system of objective morality is founded on? A goodness which is universally applicable to the underlying purpose(s) of all co-existent sentient beings without exception. Yes, as you've mentioned, this would require adopting some variant of the Platonic ideal/form of “the Good” - but is in no way sinister in and of itself. It only becomes sinister when upheld in partial manners; as in, “good/beneficial for my purposes/aims but not yours” kind of thing. But then, if so, it wouldn’t be an objective good to begin with. Same potential sinister perversion can equally apply to the notion of “the greater good”, for an added example; but being “of benefit to more people than oneself” likewise is not in and of itself sinister, being instead a standard for the reduced egotism requisite to a functioning society.

I so far take it you're not big on objective morality. That's fine. Here just illustrating that the objectively perfect (i.e., "fit for purpose") goodness which an objective morality entails is not of itself sinister ... of course, this were it to be non-hypocritical (as previously described).

I’d just call that fit for purpose. — Tom Storm

Which happens to be different wording for this one standard definition of the adjective "perfect"

2. Having all of its parts in harmony with a common purpose. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/perfect

Yet the conundrum remains due to comparative thinking when it comes to what constitutes perfection, sure you might have seen a beautiful perfect goal be executed in sport or purchased a perfectly crafted chair but there is always something better which leads me to think that so called attained perfection is purely subjective on the taste of the subject rather than a thing in itself.

Any other thoughts ? — kindred

My two cents worth:

There’s an expression I’ve always found humorous: something being “better than perfect”. A superficial look might deem the expression self-contradictory and absurd, but it can make plenty of sense:

Suppose I need an item which you then build, and I then declare it to be better than perfect. What I’m here expressing is that the built item not only completely adheres to, else fits, its intended, or else wanted, purposes but that it surpasses these very same.

In keeping with what expressed, this to me illustrates that perfection is always fully relative to the either concrete or else sometimes rather abstract purposes involved. And purposes always involve aims, goals, teloi.

A perfect goal in soccer fully satisfies the purposes of the game, the purposes for which one is watching the game, and so forth. As is also the general case for a perfect chair.

Can there be any type of perfection that is fully divorced from any and all notions of purpose? I so far cannot find any example of this.

A circle comes to mind, which is perfect by implication. Any imperfection of a circle would make it other than a circle: an oval maybe, or maybe a circular shape with waves in its circumference, or else a “C”-like form. None of which are circles proper. This, though, hearkens back to notions of the ideal, wherein the ideal is perfect - the perfection of some given set of attributes. And the purpose of any ideal is to serve as a standard: as that by we compare and measure or else aspire toward in our efforts. When we seek to draw a circle, then, we will always hold the (perfect) circle as the ideal we seek to emulate. (A circle is then always perfect as circle, but a circle will not always be the perfect object of awareness in many a context: it will for example be imperfect when one seeks to go from A to B in the shortest trajectory possible. So a circle might not then be deemed objectively perfect in at least this sense.)

So too then with any other ideal: such as one person’s ideal of perfect goodness and their aspirations to get near it or another person’s ideal of perfect mischievousness which they crave to enact; one person’s ideal of getting closer to perfect objectivity of judgment and another’s ideal of best becoming a tyrant over all others. It is these ideals, all of which are a perfection of one type or another, we hold that in large part determine how we then choose to behave so as to best approximate these very ideals that call to us, that pull us toward them.

The ideals we ourselves actively hold then, in one way or another, always being aims we seek to fulfill.

My main point here is to evidence that perfection is meaningless outside of notions of purpose.

As to perfection being subjective, in one sense it always will be, for it will always be in relation to the interests of one or more psyches and their strivings, their purposes in this sense.

As to whether perfection can ever be objective, this will depend heavily on the metaphysics one adopts: any system of nihilism will affirm no, for it will likewise deem the universe to in fact be purposeless; whereas, for example, at least some interpretations of Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism will affirm yes: the “Unmoved Mover” and ‘the One” which was also known as “the Good”, these (among other examples) can be interpretable as perfect being and the proper aim of all of us imperfect beings - this same objective perfection as goal however arrived at from, and defined by, different scaffoldings of thought.

So, long story short: Whether or not there can be such a thing as objective perfection – one which is absolute - will fully depend on the metaphysics one subscribes to. “No” in a purposeless universe, and “yes” in a purposive universe. Notwithstanding, the occurrence of perfection will always be contingent on the occurrence of purpose.

I think the concept of an abstract object comes from Frege. — frank

Thanks. I'll look into it. :up:

And do smells necessarily have extension in space? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've struggled with this. I've no decisive answer to give. But I think it noteworthy that lesser animals (or even humans) with a heightened sense of smell can - or at least seem able to - discern direction by it. If so, this would entail notions of space. Come to think of it, its what a snake's forked tongue is there for: directionality of smell. But any such spatial aspect of smell would seem to simultaneously require temporality.

I'm mainly antagonistic to the Cartesian take on "res extensa" being utterly severed from mind stuff due to the former having extension in space but not the latter.

To be honest, I toy seriously enough with the idea that noumenal thought - which I take to be in no way perceptual (hence, phenomenal in the Kantian sense) - holds spatial relations: For example, we all know that a paradigm is larger than any one idea it is composed of. This to me then signifying the very real possibility of non-perceptual spatial relations. Or, more difficultly, the concept of "dog" is closer to that of "cat" than to that of "rock". Here again, there to me seems to be all indications of non-perceptual spatial relations.

If so, then even non-perceptual thoughts would require some conceptual notions of space and spatial relations.

Critiques are of course welcomed.

The question of time being a necessary component of imagining is very interesting though. It gets to the inherently processual nature of experience, which, as a fan of process metaphysics, I find underappreciated — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can very much relate to that.

"Abstract object" has a specific meaning in philosophy of math. It's not a physical object, but it's still something that transcends the individual. So an abstract object (in this sense) is not a kind of mental object. — frank

Not at all surprising. Although, as a personal pet peeve, I do dislike the way mathematics-specific concepts sometimes overtake more mainstream philosophical concepts. Mistaking the purposive, hence teleological, notion of function for the mathematical notion of function comes to mind as one example of this. But be that as it may.

To your knowledge, does the history of this particular mathematical concept of "abstract object" extend beyond this:

Abstract object theory (AOT) is a branch of metaphysics regarding abstract objects.[1] Originally devised by metaphysician Edward Zalta in 1981,[2] the theory was an expansion of mathematical Platonism. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_object_theory

At any rate, I agree that such a formalized metaphysical notion was not around in Kant's time (other than maybe via basic Platonism, which I'm sure Kant was familiar with.)

I don't think they distinguished between mental objects (what you're thinking about now) and abstract objects (things like numbers and propositions.) — frank

Interesting. Its been a while sine I've read the likes of Lock, Hume, and Kant. Still, I so far take a visualized unicorn, for example, to be a "mental object" of one's awareness which is in some way perceptually concrete (i.e., has a specific shape, size, color, etc. when visualized), whereas abstract objects (quantities included) I take to be those mental objects of one's awareness whose delimitations are abstracted from - but do not include - concrete particulars. The concept of "animal" or "world" being two possible examples of the latter, among innumerable others.

I guess the basic idea was around, but not analyzed out? — frank

Without now doing research on the matter, that seems to be about right.

Is this true though? I feel like I have a pretty easy time imagining abstract objects without having to attribute extension to them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To imagine something perceptually--such as by visualization--there is needed both duration (time) and distance (space) to that thus imagined. Abstractions per se are by their very nature not perceptual but purely conceptual.

I'd be interested in counterexamples, but I so far greatly doubt that such can occur.

The idea of an abstract object didn't exist back then. — frank

Weren't they termed "concepts", also sometimes termed "ideas"?

Predicative logic and truth statements produce arbitrariness in the form of contradictions, because they fail to understand the grounding of their terms in a background mesh of contextual relevance that gives sense even to the irrational. Causal empirical models produce arbitrariness and skepticism for the same reason. — Joshs

I'm not disagreeing with what you wrote in the previous post. But I want to point out that there is a subtle difference between what one believes (consciously, unconsciously, or both) to be true and what in fact is true. This, for example, as per my definition of truth here. One can then, at least in theory, honestly affirm a truth while the truth affirmed is at best a partial truth and at worst an untruth altogether.

I'll uphold that truths always cohere to other truths when in close enough relation. It is only deceptions or else falsities, be these whole or partial, be they directed toward others or else unknown self-deception, which can result in contradictions.

But this does in part presuppose there being such a thing as ontic (rather than psychological) certainties as previously described by me. And I'm not yet clear of your metaphysical stance regarding these actualities/realities.

Fallibilism, allowing for uncertainty, is not self-refuting, but the statement that all claims are ultimately arbitrary appears to be. — Count Timothy von Icarus

In fully agreement with this quote, and considering the metaphysical issue of truth's occurrence:

Let truth be here tersely understood as: awareness’s conformity to that which is ontically certain—hence, that which is ontically, rather than psychologically, fixed or unvarying (such that this fixedness of being can be fully relative to a set of changes within a temporal and spatial fame; e.g., a ball having moved from A to B is ontically certain, i.e. ontically fixed and unvarying).

Argument/assertion: There is no such thing as ontic certainty; therefore, there is no conformity to ontic certainty to be had by any awareness.

Rebuttal: Were there to in fact be no such thing as ontic certainty, then this in and of itself would be ontically (rather than psychologically) certain; resulting in the following logical contradiction: at the same time and in the same respect there both a) is no ontic certainty (entailed by there occurring no ontic certainty whatsoever) and b) is ontic certainty (entailed by there occurring the ontic certainty stipulated in (a)).

Conclusion: either 1) dialethism is valid or else 2) there needs to be some ontic certainty/certainties to which awareness can either conform to or deviate from. Moreover, if (1) is stipulated to in fact be the case, then one would likewise stipulate (1) to of itself be an ontic certainty—thereby either again falsifying the argument/assertion provided contra the occurrence of truth(s) or else resulting in a total disarray of thought.

Fallibilism does not affirm wrongness but the ever-present potential of being wrong (such as on account of not being omniscient). As such, although one in principle could be wrong in upholding the occurrence of truths, because there is no valid reason to doubt either that ontic certainty/certainties occur or the occurrence of awareness (which can of itself be one ontic certainty), an epistemological system of fallibilism can then only uphold there in fact being such as thing as truth(s).

And this conclusion, of itself, in no way contradicts constructivism in many, if not all, of its forms.

For science, phenomena are more than enough, and they are by no means inferior to the noumena (on the contrary). — Jamal

Though I’m not sure how to parse this in Kantian terms, awareness per se is in no way phenomenal: it has no look, no smell, no sound, etc. But then nor is it strictly or primarily “an aspect of thought” as noumena are here primarily described. Contingent on metaphysical construct, it could however be deemed a thing-in-itself (here being very liberal with the term “thing”, this by contrast to the notion of “nothing”).

That mentioned, the OP seems to express the following gist:

The indirect realism* which the empirical sciences confirm—and of which Kantianism is one version of—in no way undermines the validity of scientific knowledge.

Yes: true.

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* For general reference:

Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_and_indirect_realism

The question of the esoteric, may involve so much about the contexts and framing of meaning. — Jack Cummins

Which is why I find the esoteric can only always be fallacious by default to those who fall back onto the belief that they live in a fundamentally meaningless world. Here is one example to help illustrate the point:

All the various empirical sciences would unravel into worthlessness, into lack of authority, were the notion of objectivity to be eliminated from their practices—scientific knowledge at that juncture becoming nothing more nor less than yet another person’s or cohort’s purely partial and biased opinion regarding that which is inductive. And yet, the very notion of objectivity—of a complete lack of partiality and bias—is itself an esoteric subject: It is an ideal striven for in the sciences, in journalism, in jurisprudence and the very act of judging cases (this at least in democracy-aspiring societies). Yet what this ideal of a completely objective awareness or of a completely objective judgment (both of which pertain to the inner workings of consciousness rather than to a commonly accessible physicality) is supposed to be—for emphasis, an ideal of objectivity toward which we can then either be closer to or further from—is anything but exoteric knowledge. Yet I don’t see how one can in the same breath uphold in non-contradictory manners that a) objectivity as concept/ideal is a meaningless construct and that b) the empirical sciences are any form of genuine authority regarding the physical world.

How one frames the meaning of the term “objectivity” will then greatly determine how one discerns good from bad (or pseudo-) science, good from bad journalism, and good from bad judges (etc.).

Yet, for lack of better terms, the notion of objectivity as here mentioned remains strictly applicable to spiritual rather than physical realms: to the psyche and many of its so far esoteric aspects—to include the potential of ego becoming completely impartial and unbiased awareness and, thus, fully egoless. (As an apropos: which can for example bring to mind esoteric notions such as that of ego-death.)

Trying to reorient this from the quagmire of defining genocides which have yet to be fulfilled …

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Israel paints Palestinians as 'animals' to legitimize war crimes: Israeli scholar

This seems to be common knowledge to all but us Westerners. But, then, this portrayal of Palestinians as animals far precedes the current conflict, and is old news. For example:

Ben Dahan has made controversial remarks about Palestinians. While discussing the resumption of peace talks in a radio interview in 2013, Ben Dahan said that “To me, they are like animals, they aren’t human.” — https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-deputy-defense-minister-called-palestinians-animals/

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It shouldn’t be forgotten that the extermination of animals is not to be confused with the extermination of humans. Animals, be they technically human or otherwise, are after all by definition sub-human. Lest it becomes forgotten, “Untermensch” was the term commonly used prior to WWII, and it means no more and no less than “subhuman”.

Can one commit genocide against animals? Definitely not. So say those who deny other humans the claim to an authentic humanity.

Irrespective of what’s now taking place being genocide, attempted genocide, or something other, it’s still unjustified mass killing of a peoples sponsored by supremacist views, if not outright ideology - which as history shows can only lead to calamity if not nipped in the bud sooner or later. Such as in the unpleasant possibility of a WWIII … in which quite blatant genocides might readily occur (this, at least, according to those who are and will remain humanists).

Thanks much for the reply.

Amen my Daoshi brother or sister or they, choose your delusion. — Chet Hawkins

:grin:

I’m myself a perennialist, meaning I choose to belief that most mystical experiences—from the globally shamanic to those strictly contextualized by either Western or Eastern thought—and the multitude of various religions these have often enough brought about, address a universally applicable but hard to express truth, what has sometimes been simply termed “the Real”. And that interpretations of what’s been said of these experiences often enough get polluted by inappropriate projections—such as can be exemplified by Westerners construing the light and dark of the yang and yin to signify goodness and badness, respectively. To not here get into the unscrupulous use of such esoteric knowledge (or, maybe better yet, understanding … either way, this being an aspect of direct awareness) for authoritarian purposes by others that lust for power; needless to add, this without having the given awareness concerned: wherein unscrupulous ignorants present themselves as infallible authorities regarding such knowledge, infallible authorities which deem that they are to be blindly obeyed at risk of an otherwise incurred grave pain and suffering. (To me, one blatant example of this is that JC the peace-loving mystic in comparison to too many a pope and priest serving the role of the unscrupulous ignorant who lusts for authoritarian power.)

Perennialism is quite the expansive topic and, ever the fallibilist, I don't claim to have any infallible knowledge regarding it. But getting back to the quote, while I don’t mean to here argue for perennialism, this nevertheless being my chosen belief, I view Daoism as one more path upon the same mountain toward the mountain’s universally applicable zenith—this traveled toward zenith at the same time being the very ground which all religions have in common, though each religion/path interprets this same zenith in sometimes vastly different manners.

Basically, while I acknowledge Daoism, I don’t deem myself to be a Daoist ... in the strict sense of the term at least.

And as to my label for my own gender, I’ll add that I'm an old-school “male”. :smile: Closest I can get to more modern libertarian views on gender in regard to my own self is to consider myself a butch lesbian stuck in a male’s body. :wink: No complaints with that. :razz:

Maybe all this is much ado about nothing, but I thought it worthwhile to express all the same. :grin:

Still, any arrangement of the entities is fine so long as real wisdom is the goal. — Chet Hawkins

:100:

Question for you (and anyone else):
How do you see the relationship between good / evil… and Yin / Yang? :chin: — 0 thru 9

From what I take to be the Taoist perspective, or at least my own take of it, the good is found in harmony between yin and yang which then serves as a return to Wuji—Wuji being in the Taoist cosmology the nameless Tao which produces the One, from which is produced the Two, from which is produced the Three, from which all things are produced. Bad, and by extension evil, for me is then a discord, or disharmony, between yin and yang.

To say that good is a harmony between yang-as-good and yin-as-bad, or similar takes, to me so far makes no sense. As though too much good is then bad? But good is a balance between them?

And I so far interpret these latter type of interpretations to be heavily influenced by western or else westernized thought: wherein light (hence yang) symbolizes good and shadow/darkness (hence yin) symbolizes bad.

But consider snow blindness—or, more technically, any condition where one would witness only whiteness/light in the complete absence of darkness/shadows. This creates an inability to see just as much as complete darkness does. So understood, neither light/yang nor darkness/yin would of itself be bad when balanced with the other: in balance, they are good together. This while both become bad (and by extension maybe evil … such as in causing temporary blindness) when out of balance with its dyad.

Sorta gets back to the notion of the metaphors one lives by.

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I see this is in rough agreement to 's comments.

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ps. made a number of typos in haste. Corrected what I've found.

Wisdom is the most esoteric mystery that there is. — Chet Hawkins

Interesting. I find this in some ways directly speaks to what “love of wisdom” – i.e., philosophy – was initially intended to be about. I can also relate to a number of other concepts you’ve evoked. But I won’t now get into discussing them.

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Aldous Huxley makes a distinction between knowledge and understanding. Here's and overview:

Knowledge is acquired when we succeed in fitting a new experience into the system of concepts based upon our old experiences. Understanding comes when we liberate ourselves from the old and so make possible a direct, unmediated contact with the new, the mystery, moment by moment, of our existence. The new is the given on every level of experience — given perceptions, given emotions and thoughts, given states of unstructured awareness, given relationships with things and persons. The old is our home-made system of ideas and word patterns. It is the stock of finished articles fabricated out of the given mystery by memory and analytical reasoning, by habit and the automatic associations of accepted notions. Knowledge is primarily a knowledge of these finished articles. Understanding is primarily direct awareness of the raw material. Knowledge is always in terms of concepts and can be passed on by means of words or other symbols. Understanding is not conceptual, and therefore cannot be passed on. It is an immediate experience, and immediate experience can only be talked about (very inadequately), never shared. Nobody can actually feel another’s pain or grief, another’s love or joy or hunger. And similarly nobody can experience another’s understanding of a given event or situation. […] — A. Huxley

In relation to this, to me, something like the Jeopardy show illustrates a great quantity of knowledge regarding the world that does not exhibit, nor necessitate, any significant understanding regarding the world. The two are not the same.

Won’t contribute much due to time constraints, but I thought this distinction between knowledge and understanding fits in rather well with what you’ve expressed.

Does that mean that at least some of what you claim [the Buddhist claims] the Buddhist knows about reality that the rest of us do not know is not something known by the Buddhist after all? — Fooloso4

In trying my best to understand this question, I'll say yes: Fallible knowledge can be wrong in principle. But this question strikes me as addressing the epistemological issue of fallible vs. infallible knowledge. And, although it currently seems to me to be the elephant in the room to all this, it is not a topic I currently want to engage in.

Where have I said that? — Fooloso4

Where have I said that you said it?

Actually my questions are in response to the question you asked. — Fooloso4

Yes, but they do not answer the question I asked.

If that worldview is based on knowledge of reality then why not a single unified view or description of reality? — Fooloso4

Because the knowledge of reality the worldview is based on (this being different than being equivalent to) will not be perfectly comprehensive of all aspects of realty and, by my appraisal, it certainly can’t be infallible. As a brief justification, this because no human can be omniscient, if this notion is even logically cogent to begin with.

Nothing in science is infallible or perfectly comprehensive, and scientific paradigms – from the theory of relativity to the theory of evolution – have variations within them. Yet we don’t thereby conclude that scientific paradigms are not based on (fallible) knowledge of reality.

How can the question of whether there is sufficient justification that it might be when there is divergence with regard to what it might be? — Fooloso4

See the above mentioned.

Unless I misunderstood you, you argued in favor of the benefit of holding "the Buddhist worldview." My point is that there can be different worldviews that are beneficial. — Fooloso4

This is, or at least can be, part and parcel of an outlook termed perennialism. And it does not contradict all such different views being founded upon incomplete and fallible knowledge of a singular reality, superficially incommensurate as these different worldviews might be.

Again, in answering these questions I’m not presenting an argument for why esoteric insights into reality should be accepted by you but, instead, arguments for why it is unwarranted to dismiss the possibility in such a manner that one then claims irrational others who find the possibility viable. And yes, I find that it boils down to underlying suppositions of physicalism vs. non-physicalism. Neither of which can be conclusively evidenced, much less upheld with infallible knowledge.

Lots of questions that don't address the question I asked.

What is that worldview? Is it individual or common to all Buddhist monks? What are we to make of divergent views within and between Buddhist schools of thought? — Fooloso4

That worldview is Buddhism. Just as physicalism is an umbrella concept to many a variety, so too is Buddhism.

What do they say about the nature of reality? Why should we accept that what they describe is actual knowledge into the nature of reality? — Fooloso4

What Buddhism in general upholds. My previous post was not about you accepting it; it was about sufficient justification to uphold that it might be, if not in fact being. Hence, justification which presents the case that while you can uphold your rejection, others can be quite warranted in accepting the possibility.

That a worldview has benefits for those who hold it only shows that holding this worldview has benefits, not that the worldview corresponds reality. An unrealistic or false worldview might also have benefits. — Fooloso4

Something fishy about this affirmation. Many, if not all, unrealistic or false worldviews, or views in general, will lead to unwarranted suffering if not untimely deaths (the issue of climate change comes to mind as just one example of this). It to me is what generally makes unrealistic or false perspectives unfavorable. But this can open wide a can of worms, which I don't currently want to get into.

Currently short on time so I'll leave it at that.