We determine the meaning of a word by referring to how it is used in our society. This mean that the colloquial conception is the correct one. If mathematics is using a conception of "infinite" which is inconsistent with the colloquial conception, then this is an indication that they have not properly represented "infinite"? — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem is the word is not used in one single way. The way you prefer is inconsistent at times and at others only vaguely understood and has limits in both application to mathematics and in just straightforward analysis (e.g. understanding the divisibility of time and space). The notion of a definition being "incorrect" because it diverges from colloquial usage is absurd. It captures most or all of the features of that usage but without any contradictions at all.

Zeno's paradoxes were adequately resolved by Aristotle's distinction between actual and potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a claim there is no reason to accept. Aristotle believed actual infinities were impossible but they are not. So the entire justification for his distinction between which infinities were possible is empty this side of Cantor. You cannot study a variable which does not exist within a fixed domain. For there to be a potential infinity, there has to be a predefined set of values that can be occupied otherwise the domain is precluded from study as it can change arbitrarily by an arbitrary amount. That domain is actually infinite. And so to understand that domain you need to understand and apply the mathematical regimentation of the concept of infinity.

The principles of modern mathematics do not resolve Zeno's paradoxes because the philosophers of mathematics have simply produced an illusory conception of "infinite", which is inconsistent with what we are referring to in colloquial use of the term. That's sophistry, and Platonic dialectics was developed as a means to root out and expose such sophistry. The sophists would define a word like "virtue" in a way which suited their purposes, and then profess to be teachers of this. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just an outright misrepresentation. Mathematicians did not simply redefine infinity to mean something contrary to its colloquial usage to disingenuously prove things about it. And hold this thought, I'll come back to it later when you say something inconsistent with the above.

This is not true. What I am arguing is that if we change the defining features of a thing, then we are not talking about the same thing any more. Therefore we ought to give it a different name so as to avoid confusion. This is not a case of correcting a misconception, it is a case of introducing a new conception. We cannot say that one is a correction of a misconception, because they are distinct conceptions, having distinct defining features. The new conception ought to be named by a word which will not cause confusion with the old conception, or any sort of equivocation. For example, if the defining feature of parallel lines is that they will never meet, and someone says that they've come up with a new geometry in which parallel lines meet, then we ought not call these lines parallel, but use a term other than "parallel" in order to avoid confusion and the appearance of contradiction. They are distinct conceptions, not a correction of a misconception. Likewise, the new conception in mathematics, which is called "infinite" ought to bear another name like "transfinite" so as not to confuse the conception with what we commonly call "infinite". — Metaphysician Undercover

There is so much wrong here that it shows a deep lack of understanding of mathematics. "Defining features" are, ironically by definition, established by the definition in use. Otherwise we would never had words whose meaning varies across context and circumstance due to the resemblance in those varying contexts. Contrary to your geometry misunderstanding, the reason parallel lines can meet is that the reason they cannot meet in Euclidean Geometry is because of how space is understood there (as planar). In Riemannian geometry, Euclidean space is understood simply as a space with a curvature of 0. But if space is curved then the provably such lines do intersect, such as on the surface of a sphere (i.e. lines of longitude). The actual Euclidean definition of what a parallel line is does not say the lines will not intersect. It's that if you have some infinite Line J, and a point P not on that line, no lines passing through P intersect with L. This does not hold if the space is different. It's only when one misstates the Parallel Postulate that it sounds contradictory to have intersecting parallel lines. You are forgetting that these notions are defined by the geometry, not separate from them.

That's ridiculous. I am saying no such thing, and I resent that because I have great respect for mathematicians, they are as far from "idiot" as you can get — Metaphysician Undercover

So you say this, but remember what you said earlier?:

The principles of modern mathematics do not resolve Zeno's paradoxes because the philosophers of mathematics have simply produced an illusory conception of "infinite", which is inconsistent with what we are referring to in colloquial use of the term. That's sophistry, and Platonic dialectics was developed as a means to root out and expose such sophistry. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're not calling them idiots, you have respect for them, but you're calling them (or at least certainly comparing them to) sophists? Ok man. Alternative views of math are fine but you're muddying the waters by suggesting the idea is "illusory" simply because you don't think it completely preserves the intuitive idea of infinity (which is contradictory and fails to solve paradoxes). If a paradox arises in some domain of discourse then something has to change to resolve the paradox. Aristotle unwittingly required assuming the existence of the actual infinite in order to deploy the idea of a potential infinity (because the possibility space must be predefined to have any meaning, and indefinite segments are only possible in an infinitely divisible or extensive space), and the intuitive notion of an actual infinity is inconsistent.

So we looked to the mathematicians (Cantor, Bolzano, Dedekind and co.) who gave a concrete, comprehensible theory of the infinite that removed all contradiction while retaining most of the natural ideas about infinity. That's called success, not illusion and sophistry.

I am not talking about potential vs. actual. I am talking about "infinity" as boundless (philosophical conception), and "infinity" as completed (mathematical conception). The two are incompatible — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not a philosophical conception, that's as much the colloquial conception as anything else. The two aren't incompatible either since in a sense even standard math has infinity as boundless. After all, take some arbitrary infinite set and new members can be added to it.

Choosing one conception and rejecting the other does not resolve the incompatibility. Nor does it resolve the paradoxes involved with the one conception, by choosing the other conception. That's simply an act of ignorance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes it does. These are competing theories of what infinity is and this it is not a debate that it fundamentally any different than any other disagreement in philosophy regarding how to define or conceptualize something. Zeno's paradoxes are not resolvable under the colloquial understanding of infinity, but they are resolved by appeal to modern mathematics (calculus) which requires the hierarchy of infinities. It's not an act of ignorance, it's then use of a better theory of infinity because it's both usable in mathematics and it resolves issues that existed previously. Under your view absolutely nothing can ever replace a previous misconception because to change ones accepted theory of a concept entails just changing the subject.

On the other hand, I reject the mathematical conception because I believe it was created solely for the purpose of giving the illusion that the issues involved with the philosophical concept of "infinite", as boundless and incomplete, could be resolved in this way, by replacing the conception. Despite your claims about how calculus and science rely on this conception of "infinite", I believe it serves no purpose other than to create the illusion that the problems involved with the philosophical concept of "infinity" have been resolved. In reality, mathematics could get along fine without this conception of "infinity". It would just be different, having different axioms. And, since this conception of infinity is just a distraction for mathematics, mathematics would probably be better without it. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is like rejecting nominalism because one thinks it was created to give the illusory victory of overcoming issues with platonism or something. In reality, mathematics cannot get by without the conception of infinity it uses. Otherwise you're doing something like constructivist mathematics which is more limited, using different tpea of analysis (e.g. smooth infinitesimal analysis and the like) and is significantly more limited in the proofs that can be made since Excluded Middle cannot be placed inside the universal quantifier. Virtually all science uses the ZFC set theory which includes the axiom of infinity. If the math all worked out without that axiom it would not be asserted as an axiom. You're essentially supposing all mathematicians are idiots who don't realize they have an unneeded or useless axiom despite the many criticisms of the formalism (including Cantor's work on infinity) of a century ago.

Nah, it was directed at the other guy.

The fact that philosophy has a different definition of infinite which is inconsistent with your mathematical definition of "completed infinity" is clear evidence that philosophy does not make recourse to mathematics for its understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophy does not have a different definition of infinity outside the colloquial ones which are inconsistent. A potential infinity is just that: potential, as in not an infinity. Check out any relevant excerpts from mereological and ontological work that relate to infinity and in virtually all of them infinity is understood based on the long-standing mathematical definition of it. The reasons for this should be obvious.

All this demonstrates is that you are very selective in the philosophy which you read. Cantor's representation of "infinite" was confronted by Russell, and hence replaced by Zermelo-Fraenkel. But any thorough reading on the subject will reveal that the issue is far from settled. — Metaphysician Undercover

There was opposition to Cantor early on, to be sure. But that was gone in relatively short order. The Cantorian understanding of infinity is the understanding of infinity in modern mathematics, any claim that ZFC is markedly different from Cantor is just false. It's completely settled in current mathematics. In fact, check the paragraph immediately before the one you quoted from the IEP:

Finally, by the mid-20th century, it had become clear that, despite the existence of competing set theories, Zermelo-Fraenkel’s set theory (ZF) was the best way or the least radical way to revise set theory in order to avoid all the known paradoxes and problems while at the same time preserving enough of our intuitive ideas about sets that it deserved to be called a set theory, and at this time most mathematicians would have agreed that the continuum had been given a proper basis in ZF.
[...]
Because of this success, and because it was clear enough that the concept of infinity used in ZF does not lead to contradictions, and because it seemed so evident how to use the concept in other areas of mathematics and science where the term “infinity” was being used, the definition of the concept of "infinite set" within ZF was claimed by many philosophers to be the paradigm example of how to provide a precise and fruitful definition of a philosophically significant concept. Much less attention was then paid to critics who had complained that we can never use the word “infinity” coherently because infinity is ineffable or inherently paradoxical.

Notice specifically, "..there is always the worry that the replacement is a change of subject that has not really solved the problems it was designed for". This is my argument. By redefining "infinite" mathematics is not even dealing with what we generally refer to as "infinite'. It has created a completely new concept of "infinite". It has put aside the true concept of "infinite" which derives its meaning from continuity, in favour of an illusory one, a completed one, in order to create the illusion that it has resolved the problems of infinity. I — Metaphysician Undercover

All you're proving is as I said, that some colloquial definitions conflict with others. Who cares? If those definitions lead to insoluble paradoxes and cannot be applied where they ought to (in mathematics) then they need replacing. With the proper understanding of infinity and a developed calculus, we solves Zeno's paradoxes when philosophers could not because they did not have a workable definition of infinity outside the vaguely defined one. Mathematics does not wholecloth redefine infinity, it still has most of the properties it intuitively ought to have (continuously extendable, for instance), but has the unique benefit of being perfectly and probably consistent.

And it's funny that you mention constructivism and such from the IEP. The problem is - ignoring that constructivism does not eliminate all infinities - is that those are in the extreme minority, even in philosophy. Worse, the quote you mentioned is talking about the continuum, not infinity in general. Thats the size of the real numbers, not of the set of natural numbers which is still completed in intuitionistic mathematics (constructivism). Ultrafinitism is widely regarded as just above crankery, funnily enough because they argue similarly to you that we should reject infinity and essentially pretend that the counter-intuitive properties of infinity should be treated as if they are contradictions even though it's not even arguable because we have formal proofs that infinity does not introduce any inconsistencies in standard mathematics.

It's as I said, I have no arguments against the conclusions drawn by mathematicians from their concept of "infinite", what you call the "results". I do not even know these conclusions, or results, and I have no interest in them. I am arguing against their premise, their concept of "infinite". This is not contradictory, just a simple statement of fact, I am not arguing against the results (conclusions), I am arguing against the premise (their concept of "infinite"). And, I have no interest in these results. — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't argued against it save to say that it's different than the colloquial one in *some* respects. So if the definitions cannot be agreed upon, we need only look at the results. Your view of infinity neuters mathematics because then calculus goes out the window as that requires several sizes of infinity (you're dealing with the real numbers, for one) and science since it is predicated on ZFC and uses calculus everywhere (not to mention all current spacetime theories that aren't mostly speculative (e.g. Lopp-quantum gravity) explicitly assume space and time are a continuum). That's just a useless definition at that point, especially as it then runs counter to other colloquial views on infinity.

Indeed, Peirce independently invented quantification; and he disagreed with Cantor and Dedekind about the real numbers comprising a continuum, because he viewed numbers of any kind as intrinsically discrete. He was primarily driven by a philosophical interest in true continuity, rather than a mathematical interest in infinity.
— aletheist

Right, tell that to MindForged, who seems to think that mathematicians have resolved the philosophical problem of "infinity". In reality, mathematicians have redefined "infinity" to suit their own purposes, neglecting the real problem of infinity, which is associated with continuity. And this might lead some naïve philosophers to think that mathematicians have resolved the problem of infinity. All they've really done is created a new problem, a divided concept of "infinity". — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce was writing in the exact time that Cantor and Dedekind's work on infinity was contentious. It's just dishonest to pretend that has any bearing in the status of that work among philosophers and mathematicians today.

That's fair. I don't know much about Pierce outside vague recollections of semiotics as an undergrad, and a somewhat obscure fact that he discovered/created classical logic at almost the same time as Frege did (although even Frege didn't get the credit initially, despite Russell emphatically crediting him for it).

In English we know that pairing infinite numbers is impossible, just like we know that counting infinite numbers is impossible. The way that we use and define "infinite" and the way that we use and define "pairing", ensures that this is impossible. if mathematicians want to define these two terms in a different way, so that it is possible to pair an infinite number, that's their prerogative. I am not here to police mathematicians. However, we ought to be clear that this "mathematical" language is inconsistent with common English, and also inconsistent with how "infinite" is represented in philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

You make a big deal out of an unimportant point. No one ought care about how these are defined in natural language because the meaning is often in flux, is context sensitive and still has multiple definitions. Sometimes we say "infinite" and mean Aristotle's potential infinity , sometimes we mean a completed infinity (as in the cardinality of an infinite set) and other times we just mean some arbitrarily large number that we leave unspecified. Philosophy always makes recourse to.mathematics in understanding infinity, I don't know why you think otherwise.

You may have noticed that I have no arguments against the mathematical results relating to infinity, although others like Devans99 do. I really don't care about the mathematical results relating to infinity, because what "infinity" means to a mathematician is something completely different from what "infinity" means to me, a philosopher. And, I think it's quite obvious that the mathematicians have it wrong, (they've created an illusory "infinity"), so I'm really not interested in the conclusions which they might derive from their false premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you not see the contradiction between "I have no arguments against the mathematical results of infinity" and "I think it's quite obvious that the mathematicians have it wrong"? It's one or the other, either you're not arguing against it and thus you cannot say it's wrong, or else you're saying it's wrong and thus have some argument against it.

The actual understanding of infinity is the one that came from mathematics courtesy of Cantor and Dedekind. Philosophers almost uniformly appeal to this rigorous understanding they gave us because it let's us come to grips with understanding this intuitive mathematical concept that we only vaguely understand in natural language. It caused many paradoxes in philosophical areas (e.g. Zeno's paradoxes) that were banished once mathematicians (not philosophers) gave a real regimentation of the concept. So of course we should privilege the mathematical understanding, which philosophers do. It's applicable to many areas of philosophy, mathematics, science, you name it. And it still accords with many intuitions about infinity, though not all of them (which doesn't matter since the intuitive understanding of infinity creates paradoxes).

Quantum computers, and classical computers possess the same repertoire of functions. Quantum computers merely render certain algorithms tractable, somehow. Also, the brain can't operate by maintaining quantum coherence. It is too warm and wet. — Inis

I definitely didn't say the brain was a quantum computer (it's a macroscopic object, any such effects would have decohered). If anything I expect it to be akin to an analogue neural net. I was giving examples of non-Turing computation, although upon looking into it I find myself more confused. A lot of people saying quantum computing could be simulated on a Turing machines, if inefficiently. So the complexity is different, not the computational model (I think that's what you were telling me).

Neural nets are typically implemented on an ordinary computer. — Inis

As far as I know the best current computers can do with *analogue* neural nets is to give an approximation of them, but they cannot truly simulate them in a strong sense because using floating point numbers will not allow one to precisely represent infinite numbers on a finite Turing machine. It's analogous to how my calculator can approximate infinities when I'm doing calculus but it's just that: an approximation, certain case logic holds for a large class of integrals. It's sufficient for most normal applications but strictly speaking only mathematical induction let's me really handle the actual thing. The brain appears to be analogue - it's certainly not digital, the weights are not discrete - so that might make it a candidate example of some type of non-Turing computation.

Claiming that the brain is capable of super-Turing operations is tantamount to attributing a soul to it. If the matter is not special, and other matter is capable of following the same rules, then a machine may exhibit identical properties to the brain. That sort of machine is a computer. — Inis

That doesn't require a soul. If it operates according to a different models of computation that might be how you get consciousness out of it as opposed to an ontologically distinct type of substance. I didn't say it couldn't be replicated, just that it probably cannot be done on current computers based on the turing machine.

If you have a problem with my terms (they are English), then address my posts and tell me where the problems are. If my terms are not related to mathematics, then don't worry about them, they pose no threat to this field which you hold sacred. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the exactly what I was talking about . The issue is you're misrepresenting what is being said. It should be patently obvious mathematicians do not define mapping (pairing) and infinity so as to make them jointly inapplicable. Just saying "I'm speaking English" isn't even beginning to honestly address this obvious fact. If your terms are not related to mathematics then you have absolutely no argument against the mathematical results relating to infinity. You're simply talking about something else.

As I said, it's a simple and clear case refusing to simply read how the terms are defined and then pretending to have discovered a problem because some colloquial definitions of some words conflict with the colloquial definitions of other words. Mathematics is formal, our definitions need to be stated up front/known beforehand and remain consistent throughout the calculation. If there is a contradiction, show the formal contradiction. Prove the system to be trivial.

We know all Turing machines are equivalent, and what they are made from has no effect on this equivalence. For a brain to be capable of fundamentally different type of operations to a computer, then, peculiarly, the specific stuff it is made from matters and this stuff is capable of performing non-computable functions. — Inis

Well, no... Lemme try to reset this bit. My point is that not all computation is Turing computation. Quantum computing (possibly, physics is unsettled), analog neural nets (theoretically, if reality is continuous and depending on a host of other concerns), protein regulation, etc., are non-Turing computation.

It's not what the structures are made of per se, but by which rules these complex systems follow. If the brain is such a non-Turing system - and there's a case to be made here, though that's well outside my wheelhouse - then that might well be the reason a (classical) computer cannot have bona fide intelligence. Of course, I'm not sure how this would settle the hard problem of consciousness. To recognize a mechanized mind I suppose we'd have to understand how mechanisms can result in a mind to begin with. And that's a helluva lot harder to figure out than any of this formal stuff!

What do you think is the physical difference between a brain and a computer, that permits intelligence? — Inis

This is just my off the cuff thoughts, and I'm not a cognitive scientist of any sort, but an obvious starting point is that there's a difference in structure between a (classical) computer and the brain. Current computers are based on a two-valued Boolean logic, but the brain is far more flexible in what kind of processing it allows one to do, it's not strictly linear or discrete. How do the differences give rise intelligence? No clue, that's the hard problem.

As explained in my last several posts, pairing infinite numbers is contradictory due to the definitions of "pairing" and "infinite". — Metaphysician Undercover

Tell me the exact formal definition of a mathematical mapping and infinity within the context of form mathematics and prove the contradiction. Don't do this BS where you talk big but repeatedly leave crucial terms undefined by implicitly assuming colloquial vagueness of the terms when you know full well that's not how definitions work in formal disciplines. You don't have an argument, this is pure bluster on your part.its been known for about a century that the Axiom of Infinity does not add any contradictions to ZF set theory, which on all accounts appears to be consistent. Formally derive the contradiction from the actual definitions used in mathematics or just admit you're straw Manning mathematics.

Not only is there no contradiction entailed, if there were your proof that there was would ensure that you received the Fields Medal. But curious that it will forever be beyond your grasp, almost like you're making fundamental missteps.

That's not true. For example, in QM the position and momentum of particles are continuous. Spacetime is also taken to be continuous, time is always taken to be a continuous parameter everywhere in physics. For all the effort out into making space or time discrete, such theories always turn out to be inconsistent somewhere. All (or nearly so) quantum mechanical theories treat spacetime as a continuous parameter, you'd have to go to something much more speculstive like loop quantum gravity to get a discrete structure.

I hold my point is both valid and important. Both theists and atheists make all kinds of propositions about the nature of god in their arguments. Yet I know of no rationale argument that supports we have the ability to make any such claim — Rank Amateur

Define what God is. If this cannot be done then it's both pointless to believe in it and pointless to discuss it at all. If it can be defined - and many people do define the nature of God, from being omnipotent to being part of a Trinity - then that definition can be analyzed and criticized, as I did earlier.

The Christian is free to believe in the trinity as long as it is acknowledged that this is a belief based on faith, not fact or reason. — Rank Amateur

That's all well and good, really it is. But then proselytizing must forever be acknowledged by its practioners as an attempt to appeal purely to the emotions of others (from fear of hell to desire of an eternal love) and not something where one really defends their faith. Rather, it's just defending the permissibility of having faith of some sort. And that's just a boring discussion IMO.

As I have argued on other threads, I know of no reason based argument that says we as humans have any basis at all to say anything about the nature of such a thing as God — Rank Amateur

Then there is no argument to be had. You're not articulating a viewpoint that can be defended at all. So why even talk about it ever, much less believe in it? After all, if I have no basis (Hah!) on which to point out the notion of the Trinity is incoherent then the Christian has no basis to say it's coherent. You wouldn't accept this kind of reasoning anywhere else.

I didnt identify what facism is, I just referenced it. You dont have enough information to say whether or not im using the term properly, since I didnt specify what exactly makes them facist. — DingoJones

You said that what these SJWs, believe entails fascism:

There is a systematic effort to not only push the agenda but to remove peoples ability to resist it. I dont want to overstate the case, like I said I do believe it to be a minority, but I dont think its overstating to call it facsim with all that entails. Its about social control and it comes from people in positions of power over young minds. — DingoJones

I didn't call you a fascist nor did I identify your political ideology. I said you're overstating the consequences while insisting you aren't overstating it. Fascists are almost uniformly regarded as being of an extreme right wing ideology, where powerful business and industry are pulled into and operate under the auspices of an authoritarian state. Comparing these are very silly. SJWs are, funnily, somewhat minimally left wing because they most often pay attention only to the social arena and economics comes up only inasmuch as it relates to socially discriminatory outcomes. But they are still left wing and thus I don't see how their views entails the contrary of their views unless you elaborate.

You also implied that I said or at least think that thinking everything is subservient to identity is facist, which I didnt/dont. — DingoJones

No I didnt. For all you're complaining you've misrepresented what I said, not the reverse. I was talking about "SJWs" as being people who make everything subservient to identity, not you. I was saying there are good reasons to criticize those people, but not (as you did) to call them or the consequences of their views fascistic.

You two don't know MU and Devan. They will just insist there is a contradiction. When you ask then to formally show the contradiction, they will just say it's weird, or that it's not possible to actually map two infinite sets or something like that. They won't actually address the point because they've misunderstood some fundamental things, from confusing distinct modalities to the reasons why mathematicians were rationally forced to accept infinity. MU in particular is so off base that he rejects the mathematical definition of a set ("Sets must be constructed by literally putting things together BY DEFINITION").

Well, for it to be coherent the various terms must refer to the same being unless Christians want to be polytheists. By the Identity of Indiscernables if everything that is true of one is not true of the others, they cannot be the same object. And since this doesn't seem to be what they believe - after all, Jesus died but God didn't - I just ended up confused.

One could, I suppose, articulate some theory of identity that isn't transitive and so maybe try and solve it that way (maybe? This is an idle thought). But this is way to much trouble just to salvage this tenet of a religion. There's little gained by going to all this trouble.

There are entire political philosophies whose founders spend hundreds of pages arguing for their own brand of justice. These different kinds of "justices" entail different kinds of political behaviors; just look at Rawls and compare him to Lenin or Che or Hayek or Nozick!

This is why people should first argue over the correct definition of justice before anything else. — Walter Pound

Indeed those exist. And note how they have done little to nothing alleviate people - even political philosophers - from making a snap judgement that some person or movement are unjust. These theories aren't made.in a vacuum. As with most philosophy they more often have views they believe are roughly correct, and then construct a theory which largely preserves these views.

If a Leninist and a Rawlsian are disputing justice theories they're never going to agree because they have fundamental differences. Their argument will only make this more obvious, meaning they'll still just call the other unjust in the end anyway.

That's not remotely what fascism is. Saying it's not overstating it to call it that is both silly and flipping to the opposite ideological side. There are criticisms of those who make everything subservient to identity but that is not what makes a movement fascistic.

sorry about that, I'll just duck out and save the trouble.

If I said, "only leftists do x" then you would have a point. Thank goodness I never said that only leftists beg the question. — Walter Pound

Then as I concluded you are making a trivially true statement that should be so inconsequential that making it as if it mattered is silly. Most people don't say "and since most of them are leftists it is clear that they are politically motivated" and expect others to take that to be directed at anyone but the group they named (leftists, in this case).

When did I say that I was against affirmative action or socialism? If you read carefully, you will see that I point out that social justice is not a politically neutral term and that is why I mentioned affirmative action and socialism- since both can be covered under someone's understanding of social justice. — Walter Pound

I didn't say anything about those two issues. My statement was about you complaining about people "must first defend their definitions before they start arguing over whether their political opponents demonstrate X or Y behavior". This is exactly what you are doing though if your opponents are leftists who do this. You haven't asked anyone to defend their definitions, you're just pointing out their definitions are have a political slant to them: like everyone else. A trivial point.

Can you quote where I ever define justice as opposing socialism, affirmative action or anything else? — Walter Pound

Here's a fun game. Complain about something and call it annoying, and then ask people why they think you are against that thing. That's what you've done here.

It really is embarrassing that you have to make up quotes of things I never said, but if you reread what I wrote, then you will see that I actually think that the definition of the word "justice" must first be argued for before anyone condemns their political opponent for not supporting "justice." — Walter Pound

OF COURSE YOU NEVER SAID IT. I was mocking you not quoting you verbatim, like come on this is obvious. Do you really think people don't ever defend their ideas of justice? Do you really think they can't condemn a political opponent for holding a poor view of justice beforehand?

Like this is thing. If someone thinks or infers that some view entails Absurdity X, its perfectly reasonable for them to discard the view that entails Absurdity X. There can be disagreement and people can hash it out, but the idea that there needs to be a debate before they think their opponent is against justice is stupid. Everyone knows that their opponent doesn't think they are against justice, no one defines themselves as evil or unjust. But just as they don't consult the rapist about whether or not they're doing a good thing before condemning them, so too do political opponents rightly not play a meaningless philosophical game before decrying their opponents as unjust.

"Hang on, fellow Jews. Can we really call these Nazis enemies of justice as they round us up? We need to argue this first." (This is me mocking you again, just to make it extra clear. Yes it's rude, but I'm not dealing with a serious proposal so why not.)

When did I ever say that only the left begs the question with definitions and loaded terminology? — Walter Pound

Joyous day, quote function deploy:

I see, so I state a fact- leftists support a politically loaded definition of justice- and you think that that is an example of complaining?

Oh boy, you got me good. — Walter Pound

That clearly implies that only the left does this and now you're trying to say otherwise. Interesting.

Actually, I believe that people must first defend their definitions before they start arguing over whether their political opponents demonstrate X or Y behavior. — Walter Pound

Besides you, of course. After all, your first post in this thread did argue about your political opponents demonstrating such behaviors:

If you tell people that simply because they are white that they have "white privilege" and that the only solution to ending white privilege is for the federal government to engage in affirmative action or for socialism to replace capitalism, then I would be annoyed too. The social justice crowd is an obnoxious bunch and since most of them are leftists it is clear that they are politically motivated. — Walter Pound

Again, this is either hypocrisy or you're changing what you believe, which is good but don't pretend otherwise.

Actually, its called being logical. — Walter Pound

"Uhg, I can't believe the left has a politically motivated conception of justice because justice obviously shouldn't include social justice, that thing only leftists include in their theories of justice."

How... "logical" of you. I forget that being subject to the exact same criticism while being ignorant of it is the thing rational people try to do. Hypocrisy or making a trivial observation (e.g. everyone does this) and thus it serves no purpose in pointing it out. Congrats.

You are proving the point I made. "Only the left does this" implies you have a particular conception of Justice: a right wing one. And yet you complained inanely about how "obviously political" the left's idea of justice is, ignoring your own implied one (one which excludes addressing social I'll brought about by the legal and economic systems).

If you didn't know, that's called hypocrisy.

No, what "gets you good" is that you are somehow ignorant of your own political assumptions when you say things like:

The social justice crowd is an obnoxious bunch and since most of them are leftists it is clear that they are politically motivated. — Walter Pound

I mean, yeah, I wonder what it would look like for someone to be clearly politically motivated? Again, pathetically ironic. Anyone who thinks their notion of Justice isn't politically motivated is a liar or a fool.

You are parroting, wittingly or not, the most standard far right conservative talking points, pissing and moaning about the Boogeyman terms and ideas like "white privilege", affirmative action and implying that they are somehow hiding their political motivations and that somehow being on the left and wanting these things you fearmonger about makes one inherently more political than you who complains about and doesn't want them. Streetlight summed it up perfectly above:

Ugh, another fragile snowflake complaining about complaining — StreetlightX

I would only alter it to "Uhg, another fragile snowflake politicking about the evils of politicking". You are just as political, and arguably worse since you don't even seem to notice your own political assumptions in how you frame and discuss these things.

You are giving a masterclasses at failing to hide behind your own political slant. It would be hilarious if it weren't so pathetically ironic.

As one example, about this time last year all kinds of men were being done in for sexually harassing women. All PC. — ernestm

Ye old vagueries and universal declarations

I hope so. Previous threads on the matter leave me cynical about them accepting that material.

pointless. Devan will just keep saying infinity is contradictory even when you ask him to show the exact formal contradiction as opposed to a non-intuitive conclusion.

Incidentally, recognizing this is the key to dissolving Zeno's famous paradoxes. — aletheist

Some of them. They do nothing to resolve the paradox of the arrow, so far as I can tell.

Andrew never made the claim that Prof. Plomin was in favor of Prof. Murray's policy recommendations. — Walter Pound

If that's the case then perhaps he shouldn't quote these two passages right after another because that's exactly what the following seemed to imply:

DNA is the major systemic force, the blueprint, that makes us who we are. The implications for our lives – for parenting, education and society – are enormous."

"On the science, Plomin has previously expressed his support for Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s racial premises in their notorious 1994 book The Bell Curve "

Prof. Plomin doesn't disagree with you there either. — Walter Pound

I didn't say I disagreed with Plomin - I've only skimmed his most recent book, but it's not anywhere near as certain as he seems to suggest - but with what Andrew seemed to be saying.

I'm sorry, but no. Plomin's book makes it clear that there are no policy recommendations made on the basis of his work, which is very contrary to Murray's questionable nonsense which does make direct, racially directed policy suggestions. Further, this seems to entirely ignore epigenetics. Genetic expression is just flatly in contradiction to the idea of genetic determinism. Genes (which themselves aren't well understood) interact with the environment. Quoting David Moore from "The Developing Gnome":

So, although I will talk about genes repeatedly in this book, it is only because there is no other convenient way to communicate about contemporary ideas in molecular biology. And when I refer to gene, I will be talking about a segment or segments of DNA containing sequence information that is used to help construct a protein (or some other product that performs a biological function). But it is worth remembering that contemporary biologists do not mean any one thing when they talk about “genes”; the gene remains a fundamentally hypothetical concept to this day. The common belief that there are things inside of us that constitute a set of instructions for building bodies and minds—things that are analogous to “blueprints” or “recipes”—is undoubedtly false. Instead, DNA segments often contain information that is ambiguous, and that must be edited or arranged in context-dependent ways before it can be used.

The idea that you'll reduce intelligence down to some set of genes in isolation is silly. Their akin to a template, a passive one.

No one should ever cite Dawkins in debates like this. The mere existence of epigenetics just nullifies his old selfish gene nonsense. If I were him I'd be be bitter about it and all the impressive stuff coming out of the field, so I definitely don't put much stock on his word on this topic.

Eh, that's kind of a bad comparison. The extent to which 2 of those mentioned make mistakes aren't even comparable to the extent to which Trump does. But really, this error doesn't even require expertise in political theory or economics. Just recognition that the view being adopted is virtually identical to the ideology of the current Democratic party since Bill Clinton and even before, with Hillary running on this idea just two years ago.

You're kind of almost agreeing with the "experts at everything" idea by being shocked a scientist might say something stupid. — Jake

I wasn't shocked that they said something stupid but the level at which it was stupid. Namely, ignoring that it was the political agenda of note for major political figures, including two Presidents and the wife of one who ran for president twice.

Governments which pay the bills of news sources may have a degree of influence over them, you see. Just as governments may have a degree of influence over Facebook or Google for other reasons. I tend to be suspicious of any government influence. — Ciceronianus the White

That's not even comparable. Assume there's direct control over what TeleSur puts out and what the Venezuelan government demands of them. Great, now how is that at all comparable to governments having near unhindered success at making private entities hide or remove content they don't like based on political reasons (e.g. revealing government corruption and malpractice)? It isn't comparable. You're comparing suspicions you have about one entity reporting a certain way, with a certain slant, and on the other hand engaging in censorship and widespread PR for the government.

I understand you don't want to focus on legality. For my part, I don't see the point of merely expressing outrage. Addressing legal remedies and advocating them may be useful, though less satisfying. — Ciceronianus the White

The reason I don't want to focus on legality is because even if it is illegal, it's clearly not stopping the government from doing so. And besides which, the people who often support this reveal themselves to not actuall care about free speech because they're cool with Jones type loons being negatively affected, and they get up in arms when it goes the other way. If I say "Isn't this wrong?" the answer shouldn't amount to "Well it's legal".

"Reasoned Logic" is basically redundant, and it's beside the point. I think one could in principle have "physical evidence and good reasoning" backing up... backing up what you might ask. Well, the very thing this old idea was just I'm hiding from: belief (or disbelief") in God or gods. Just call yourself an atheist, everyone can see the shell game.

I'm afraid I have no knowledge of the law of Israel, or for that matter that of Venezuela, which apparently is the primary source of funds for TeleSur, speaking of government involvement in sources of information and communication — Ciceronianus the White

Who Telesur is funded by is irrelevant to what I was saying.
The issue I raised wasn't "government involvement in sources of information and communication", but rather governments pressuring private entities into censoring or hiding the views of people they don't like.
And finally I suppose we'll just be ignoring the example I gave of the U.S. government being involved in exactly these same things?

There's a tendency to refer to freedom of speech or the right to it as iqere is such a right, apart from the law. There isn't; not an enforceable right, in any case. The distinction between a legal right and a non-legal "right" is significant. One shouldn't be treated as the equivalent of the other. When they are, things get confusing — Ciceronianus the White

Again, didn't I already say I find focus on legality to be besides the point?

Should Facebook, Google etc. restrict access to information? I would say no. What is the remedy if they do? Is there an enforceable right to information? Nope. Should there be? That would require a law. That would require a government. Should government be in control of the availability of information? Will that ensure that democracy (which doesn't exist, really) will obtain? That depends on the government, the nature and extent of the control, and its purpose. — Ciceronianus the White

There may be legal avenues that remedy this, such as classifying them as utilities given their near monopoly status, but you are very blaise where a serious issue involves government attempts (successful ones, given the examples I gave prior) to quash speech and views they don't like by coming down on the premiere private entities on which people get their information. This reeks of the

I mean imagine the post office stops reliably delivering mail from homes who have occupants registered to some political party. Is your response really going to be "Ah well is it against the law for them to be a little unreliable? You don't have a right to flawless mail delivery."

There's nothing weird about it. Private entities may certainly act to restrict speech. You may too. If you do, though, you do nothing illegal here in God's favorite country. The legal right to freedom of speech can only be infringed by the government or its agents. So it may not be good when private persons or entities restrict speech, but it isn't necessarily illegal. That's all being said by reference to private actors, as far as I know. There's the law and not the law. — Ciceronianus the White

I mentioned nothing about legality at all, so this is nearly all irrelevant. I said people here, and evidently you, place greater emphasis on whether or not the the place people are being removed from are privately owned and ignoring the rather obvious fact that these have near monopoly status in their industry. Being banned from them because the decision was made that they don't like these people sets a terrible precedent. Oh, some unthinking folk were ok when it was just a lunatic like Alex Jones, but then they came for people on the other side of the spectrum. The World Socialists Website, irrespective of your own political leanings, is as professional as one could want. And yet Google didn't see it and the type of content (namely, anti-war content) that way, and so changes to the search algorithm last year resulted in traffic to such sites falling by 2/3rds. Or deleting TeleSur's page for a myraid of nonsensical and conflicting reasons (their press releases kept changing).

Google, Facebook and others often times coordinate with each other to remove or demote those they don't like, and worse will work with governments (including the U.S.) and overtly political groups to decide what content has run afoul. For example, Facebook met with Israeli government officials to determine what pages counted as encitement and thus should, in the estimation of the government of Israel, be removed. Quoting TeleSur:

Due to this, far-right Israeli justice minister Ayelet Shaked reportedly boasted: "A year ago, Facebook removed 50 percent of content that we requested. Today, Facebook is removing 95 percent of the content we ask them to." Facebook becoming a willing accomplice for governments seemed to coincide after two events: Russiagate and after Facebook announced in May that they would be partnering with the pro-Nato, far-right neoliberal Washington DC-based think tank the Atlantic Council.

Or if you don't see the problem doing such at the behest a repressive foreign government,how about doing it at the behest of the U.S. government? (from previous link)

But none of that dilutes how disturbing and dangerous Facebook’s rationale for its deletion of his accounts is. A Facebook spokesperson told the New York Times that the company deleted these accounts not because Kadyrov is a mass murderer and tyrant, but that “Mr. Kadyrov’s accounts were deactivated because he had just been added to a United States sanctions list and that the company was legally obligated to act.”

So yes, this goes well beyond whether or not it is directly legal or not. Anyone hanging their hat on that has lost the plot entirely. These entities coordinate with themselves and major governments in the U.S., China, Israel and more as they act to suppress speech they don't like. They have near monopoloy status and given about 66% of people get their news from these sites it represents a danger to democracy as well because people are only exposed to A) What they've been allowed to see (algorithm demotion, page removal etc.) and their own bubble that they naturally create.

You refer to governments doing so in some fashion you leave undefined (the reference to Israel being involved is somewhat ominous). If the federal, state or local governments of the U.S. are involved, then the right to free speech is being restricted.

Well I think I've given a decent amount of evidence for that. Whether or not it's actually illegal isn't clear because the government isn't directly coming down on these individuals. They're "urging" private corporations to do so, and if that Israeli justice Minister is correct it's borderline a rubber stamping process.

It is a dichotomy that still exists in discussion and literature. — Andrew4Handel

The point is it's a meaningless idea now. Epigenetics is in many ways the culmination of this age old topic. Nature and nurture are far from these easily separable things that we can then say play the determinative role in the traits people have. I've seen a lot of this lately, especially in very telling areas (this isn't directed at you) where people go on about "People Don't Like it When You Discuss IQ Research" (Sam Harris even does this crap) and they are just twenty something years out of date. Like, here's a fairly common expression of more recent understandings of this topic (nature vs nurtur, not IQ stuff, lol):

Since the 16th century, when the terms “nature” and “nurture” first came into use, many people have spent ample time debating which is more important, but these discussions have more often led to ideological cul-de-sacs rather than pinnacles of insight.
[...]
As psychologist David S. Moore explains in his newest book, The Developing Genome, this burgeoning field reveals that what counts is not what genes you have so much as what your genes are doing. And what your genes are doing is influenced by the ever-changing environment they’re in. Factors like stress, nutrition, and exposure to toxins all play a role in how genes are expressed—essentially which genes are turned on or off. Unlike the static conception of nature or nurture, epigenetic research demonstrates how genes and environments continuously interact to produce characteristics throughout a lifetime.

http://thepsychreport.com/books/the-end-of-nature-versus-nurture/