Comments

  • Comment and Question
    So the words describe feelings correct? Not chemicals? And those cannot be the same thing. Or else we would not have made words that refer to one and not the other. "Love" refers to a feeling, not a chemical, by virtue of the fact that we came up with the word without knowing what chemicals are. — khaled
    You could say we all are oversimplifying the brain function, and that neuroscientists are incapable of capturing enough signals therein. You could rightfully criticize that we are making conjectures stemming from the materialist explanation of reality, because of its utility to society. But you have very strong impartial commitments on the issue yourself. The synaptic connections that produce the person's neurological attitudes, including the emotion of love if they presently have such attachment, are one thing, and the synaptic connections that describe the person's conceptualization of love in the abstract, removed from their present emotion, in words or as notion, with self-deprecating generality, are a different thing. Feedback and self-learning by circular neurological pathways ("stored-program computer" style, but more elaborate) should be possible, at least theoretically. Another type of self-reference that supplements it is the indirect effect from observation of patterns of behavior and produced results. And finally, these days, inspection of the matter in the brain through artificial devices produces a more literal form of self-reflection through an external auxiliary loop, resulting in neuroscience itself. But the important point is, in principle, the states in the brain describing self-awareness would be distinct from the states that encode the emotions. The emotion, and the notion of that emotion (and conceptualization), could (probably somewhat impatiently we conjecture "would") relate to each other through neurological feedback, but need not have parapsychological mediation in the process. Honestly, we have no reason to think that it does not, but assigning value to different hypotheses in a pragmatic world is a style and an art.
  • Comment and Question
    I say yes to all your assertions. They are reasons to see it as repugnant, but not reasons to reject the theory. — GLEN willows
    I am not rejecting it whatsoever, of course. I consider it, in its strongest form as technically irrefutable and rejecting it is as fallacious as conjecturing it. I was just pointing out that since as a hypothesis it already has consequences, as a conjecture (or more boldly assertion) people will be divided on how strongly they subscribe to that theory. Essentially, I am trying to remain skeptical, but not indifferent, to consistent propositions that we can neither inductively confirm, nor refute. It is a slightly hypocritical position, because honestly, I have my partialities. But I keep them at bay for the discussions herein.
  • Comment and Question
    In the early stages you seem to be arguing that solipsism, for some reason, can't be a tenable approach to life. You say it's a hypothesis, of course it is but so are all philosophical theories. — GLEN willows
    I think the hypothesis doubts the notions of objective empirical world and our community. It is indeed a hypothesis, but for some it is with a high value attached to its potential and cannot be neglected. These are as I said the ethical implications. In the question of solipsism, even the possibility can be seen as the dismissal of the value of life and human effort. It can reinforce nihilism, depending on the view taken. The same way in which dualism is a form of theism for some, not merely a hypothesis.

    I may be mistaking your argument, but I get the sense that you're saying "we can't be the only person in existence, watching a simulation of our life (not mean a computer virtual reality) because it would make life unbearable or impossible." — GLEN willows
    I wouldn't use the needs of the human psychology to substantiate the claim. If you mean, the paragraph about your questions in philosophy classes, what I meant was that no productive discussion can arise from them, since there is something implicitly disparaging to the education in itself if solipsism is right. Therefore, the topic is not going to get priority in class. It opposes knowledge, even if merely tentatively.
  • Comment and Question
    ↪GLEN willows

    I am an armchair philosopher as you remarked in your original post. A software guy by education and a confused person by vocation. My opinions are not very literate. You are warned to be skeptical about my imaginary views. I hope that when I expose the weaknesses therein someone will point them out to me with appropriate arguments.

    I actually agree that solipsism can NOT be argued with, and that a lot of thinkers that have now disproven theories seem to end up in a solipsistic quagmire. I know that's not an original thought, but why is it never mentioned in philosophy classes? It's a bullet-proof theory, as is subjective idealism. After Hume and Locke it seems impossible to prove there is an independent world out there. Yet I feel like a traitor bringing it up with a prof. — GLEN willows
    The institution is there in the first place to school you on what is right and wrong. If you start asking questions like "aren't we all high on grass", the discussion is as comfortable as a castaway asking the local cannibals "what's for dinner". (A vegetarian here, so don't mind the joke.)

    Solipsism is no more than a hypothesis. It cannot be asserted. The lack of certainty in cognisance does not immediately confer ignorance. That is, in a physical world, the perseverance in entropic conditions might have evolved to the passionate pursuit for knowledge and the instinctive conviction in the inductive method, objective reality, etc. The perception of truth would then be compatible with an actual physical environment. (This I believe is close to the Hume style of explanation, modulo the Darwinism part) The correct conclusion to make is, "we don't know". These are hypotheses, not conjectures, not assertions.

    Furthermore, there are multiple styles of inquiry for each scenario. We could ask ontic questions ("what is out there"), epistemic questions ("what are the indications that would reveal it to us"), ethical questions ("what value does it hold to us"), conventionalist/antropological/social questions ("what we agree upon to do about it"). For example, with solipsism, the possibility of being alone in the universe is a distinct case of reality. But it should never manifest as experience, because that it the entire point of the hypothesis. It does matter to us, because we gather motivation by believing to be together with other people. However, we agree not to invest in the idea socially (except in philosophy), because we have no way to refute or validate the hypothesis. It is interesting that solipsism has ethical implications to us even if it is false (merely as a possibility), and no epistemic implications even if it is true.

    Dualism can be admitted in some restricted sense, I think.
    ↪Banno
    might have referred to it, but I had questions about it. For example, a mix between physicalism and solipsism, with some private and some shared physically experience is epistemically indistinguishable (during the earthly phase of life) from meterialism, because solipsism isn't either. The observable difference can show in the post-mortem phase, but would be uncofirmable for the philosophical inquiry and the social convention, where it will rely on culture of faith, based on unrelated socio-political necessities and the ethical consequences of the mere possibility (like solipsism). (It is one of the few views that, if true, may have epistemic fingerprint and no rational conventional consequences.) In contrast, views on dualism that imply (through physically autonomous agency, freedom of the mind) that a transcendent part confers irregular behavior on its physical embodyment, are effectively suggesting miracles. (Even if we are considering determinisation of the QM model of physics.) This is where they differ from pantheism / panpsychism, where the constituent particles of matter follow the usual physical law, but are inherently agent (my take - functionally emergently collectively conscious). If the miracles are not clarified in technical terms, in my opinion, they are ambiguous propositions and can only be tenuous devices of philosophical discourse, ideas, but not proper hypotheses. If clarified, they can either be empirically refuted or confirmed (inductively validated), or this will be impossible, forcing them to remain hypotheses. (Same for physical sciences. Obscurity to measurement is not the empirical justification of assertions. The criteria here is Occam's razor. That is, minimalism over redundancy. Speculations, i.e. hypotheses get a free pass in my book.) On a slightly tangent note, my first question on the forum investigated eliminative materialism. But the underlying reason was that I couldn't grasp the difference between materialism and pantheism in general. If consciousness exists, I still think that any non-eliminative materialism should be panpsychic or pantheistic, or just methodological (uninvolved with the questions of the mind). But that is discussion for a different time. Continuing with dualism, there is the remaining possibility that the transcendent features are passive witness of the physical form. This position is infalsifiable during the earthly phase of life, but it is also incompatible with certain ethical positions. The mind would either bare no personal responsibility or the personal responsibility would be (rather convoluted) function of the divine omnipotence. Some theistic views as Leibniz monadism are not dualistic and are more akin to inter-subjective pantheistic idealism, which are again, epistemically indistinguishable from materialism. This naturally continues to my stance on theism, which is similar. I accept different ideas as hypotheses for discussion, but not as assertions. For example, I would like to discuss the consequences of dystheism, polytheism, alien origin, etc. (That is, I am a possibianist.)
  • Comment and Question
    ↪GLEN willows

    I generally steer away from metaphysical discussions. I made entry in the forum with a question of some such nature, but there are certain things that I find can never be settled, unless the criteria is agreed upon. I don't think that I can argue against subjective idealism, or solipsism, or some kind of Leibniz monadism. I am myself partial towards panpsychism and pantheism. But in metaphysics, approaching the discussion from the point of view of modern positivism, where the only factor is the observable physical reality, little can be argued for the private subjective experience. Except for dualism. It tries to connect the physical and transcendent worlds and exposes itself to empirical criticism. Or so I think.
  • Comment and Question
    But there can be no evidence of this isomorphism, and so the only direction the argument can go in is from the fact of communication to the supposition of isomorphism. That we talk of love leads us to think that we are talking of the very same thing; but that conclusion is misguided. Indeed, I'd go a step further and say that there is no "thing" to be isomorphic, that all we have is the communication... — Banno
    I am probably being technical, but is this dualism or idealism? I thought so far that the whole point of dualism is that the physical world is temporarily bonded with the person's consciousness or any transcendent reality. Either the mind is merely a witness, or acts as compelling force that produces miracles (or in the context of QM, could be producing determinacy, which is a kind of miracle). If the mind starts minding its own business (pun intended), what is the point of being submerged in material substance? What would be then the difference from subjective idealism?

    It is probably tangent to the discussion, but I'd like to point out that some people are incapable of being in love. Or at least they don't show any signs of it. Neurological differences. The psychopathic form of APSD is linked strongly with variations of the amygdala volume under brain scans, and the people diagnosed also have differences in the action of their neurotransmitters. The problem I see with dualism is that we know we can alter the act of a human being by manipulating their brain function. So, if the mind doesn't act independently from the person's elicited response, which to me starts to approach subjective idealism (unless dualism is contented with a passively witnessing mind), I can't understand what room we leave for transcendent agency. Again, one can argue for determinisation in the context of QM.

    Btw. Sorry for the interject.
  • How and Why
    ↪Pantagruel

    I wanted to respond to some questions here, about the presuppositions of science (QM for example). Since I lack the command of written English necessary to do so, I refrain. But I realized the relevance of that subject to your earlier suggestions about the precedence of the kinds of truth.

    Notably, if we ask, what verifies the soundness of logic, objectivity of empiricism, utility of statistical reasoning, effectiveness of inductive reasoning, eventually those questions cannot be answered by analytical or empirical arguments alone. They can be elaborated, of course, meta-scientifically, but not given fundamental explanation. My view on this question is that those beliefs are indeed a kind of pragmatic truth. They are shaped by choices. Given the opportunity to use the various available faculties, we have successfully employed forms of those mechanisms to a rewarding conclusion. So, the justification of those instruments appears neither rational, nor measurable. Again, I would claim that the underlying process of justification of existence is Darwinian. In retrospect to your comment that pragmatics can be self-aware, I can now better answer that this is possible through cross-inspection between different kinds of pragmatics, but also each type of pragmatic truth can reflect on itself according to its own chosen system of values and language. Logic and science have concerns to their validity and soundness. Religion, for example, can have theistic concerns of itself. Some humanities, like philosophy or history involve complex interplay between different pragmatic values, original to them or imported from other fields. Mathematics for example, debates whether real numbers are manifest, or whether the axiom of choice is sound. We have questions regarding the deduction used therein - should it be classical or intuitionistic logic. A lot more scientific questions can be raised reflectively. People (I dare claim reasonably) express doubts on the nature of statistics - is it discovered or is it pignistic, or does it matter at all (which is not just a philosophical proposition, but also a quantitative logical inquiry). These are self-reflections.

    I agree that every question "how?" follows an underlying question of "why?". Correspondence arguments are a variant of pragmatic arguments. I myself would claim that unambiguousness, falsifiability, reliability, are the metrics of the scientific method and that these qualities should be presently our priority as society. The justification would be pragmatic hand-waving about the state of evolution we are in. I claim it, because I live it. Aside from a social debate, there is also the question of whether subjective idealism is right that the world is not empirical, or maybe the empirical reality happens to be absurd and not analytical. I dare to believe that for practical matters, i.e. all intents and purposes, this is not so.
  • How and Why
    ↪Pantagruel

    In all honesty, I am challenged to define my take on pragmatics. Contrasting it with correspondence truth, I would say that the latter is about knowing and the former is about being. Correspondence is revised through empirical (and analytical) refutation, and pragmatic value is revised by gaining or losing presence in life. In other words, pragmatic statements are true, because we exist and believe them to be true, and corresponding statements are true, because they describe the empirical world accurately, to the extent that they enable us to anticipate and alter the environment.

    I don't necessarily mean that changes in value occur only through personal finality. Shifts in various spectra of life (culture, politics) can produce them too. But something has to lose ground and something else has to gain prevalence, reshaping "truth" in the process.

    The instability of pragmatic truth for me stems from its relative independence from permanent natural factors. Some things "just are" and then they "just aren't", because of systemic volatility. Pragmatic value is Darwinian in my opinion and evolution doesn't care about whether you are right or wrong, strong or weak, clever or stupid. It cares about "is" and "isn't", then shuffles the cards periodically and examines the new correlations. Pragmatics conforms to the limits imposed by nature ultimately, but its path involves fluctuations in the admissible state space, macroscopic entropy, which is the essence of being alive.

    I don't see that this is necessarily so. Pragmatics can be more or less self-aware, like anything. — Pantagruel
    Depends on what you mean. First, certain humanities investigate the validity and soundness of our customs and practices using analytic methods, or in reference to the claims of sciences. This is the application of correspondence truth to pragmatic truth, simply by being analytic and objective, even if it is not concerned with the fundamental physical law. Second, a person can be pragmatically skeptical about pragmatics (and about a lot of other things). This is a way to reconcile our personal values and empiricism, without feeling completely guilty of insincerity. And finally, there are studies, which do not discover, but define what pragmatism should be. These definitions ultimately are provided "as is", with some analytic arguments in some cases and reliance on consensus.

    On the other hand, instability is not necessarily a bad thing. Systems frequently evolve because of inherent instabilities, or meta-stabilities. — Pantagruel
    This is one justification for the everpresent instability in our social fabric. Considering the trial and error approach that is needed for survival, in the long run, involatility is a dying proposition. Nations and empires need to decline after their energy have become spent, the political spectrum needs to reorganize when the socioeconomic forces require it, shifts in perception have to occur when our ethics are challenged. In other words, when it comes to pragmatism, which is, for the time being (possibly for a longer time than we have left), unavoidable part of reality, tragedies, conflicts and some chaos are useful. The question is, can a grounded methodological analysis of pragmatics say anything of merit, aside from examining its internal consistency, like humanities do. Other than that, the only venue worth exploring that I can think is the relationship between pragmatics and nature.

    Edit --- Stylistic changes
  • How and Why
    Exactly. And that...is...life. Not the portion we intellectually amputate, the whole thing. It's why social scientists like to use the term "irrational" when what they are really talking about is "supra-rational" in my opinion. Everything that isn't reducible to causal descriptions, art, ethics, teleology. — Pantagruel
    You exclude art and ethics, which may mean that you intend something truly uncomprehensible by this term. How do you define it? I could speculate that some kinds of value are apriori, whilst others are derivative and empirical, refined using scientific methods. But there still needs to be some clarification of the independence of the categories of intrinsic value.

    Philosophy constantly contends between the correspondence and pragmatic theories of truth. I ask however, how do they interact, how do they actuate, what is their point of convergence if any, how stable are they. Even if taken on their own merit, philosophy should investigate the interdependence and relative qualities of those phenomena.

    Analytic thinking is too slow and technically limiting to accommodate life. Inefficiency is dangerous for survival. Pragmatics (biases, aesthetics, ethics, group thinking, etc) are robust within the scope of their intended function. But the problem is that they are catastrophically unstable. They fail to sustain residue of their original form in the long run. Correspondent truth evolves, by the very nature of fact retention after discovery, incrementally. Furthermore, it is sometimes unclear how values actuate, since there might be no guide for their appraisal rooted in permanent external reality, and nothing intrinsic to them to establish consensus. Another problem is that pragmatism is inherently conservative, because change requires surrendering something, and the effort is a reduction from the appeal and value of the alternative.
  • How and Why
    Yes, I followed that. My contention is that there is always a why somewhere. And that the notion of a purely objective how is always an abstraction from the holistic natural context. — Pantagruel

    I now see better what was the meaning behind the last two paragraphs you quoted, but I am still not grasping their scope. In fact, reviewing this remark...
    Philosophers have too long concerned themselves with their own thinking. When they wrote of thought, they had in mind primarily their own history, the history of philosophy, or quite special fields of knowledge such as mathematics or physics. This type of thinking is applicable only under quite special circumstances, and what can be learned by analysing it is not directly transferable to other spheres of life. Even when it is applicable, it refers only to a specific dimension of existence which does not suffice for living human beings who are seeking to comprehend and to mould their world. — Pantagruel
    Physics is actually a prime example of the intention dependence of the cause and effect relationship. As you said, holistically speaking, the task to define laws that determine whether an event is admissible presently in our universe with respect to the complete knowledge of its full historical state isn't ill posed, at least probabilistically. But we can never infer such colossal cause dependence, operate with it, and we would never find occasion to reproduce it. But given only the precursor events that have been witnessed locally in the recent past, various laws define constraints on the possible near future outcome. Such laws are easier to infer, operate, actuate, and apply, and are deliberately in the scope of the physical sciences. Even the second law of thermodynamics, may be deterministic globally, but we are interested in its probabilistic local form.

    Material sciences at least attempt to resist biases (only partly successfully, and only to the extent to which it is feasible), but more anthropocentric planes of life involve a lot more coercion when deciding the interpretation of the facts, making them fit to the presuppositions and objectives of the observer. This is why I cannot conclude what the paragraph suggests for the inquiries in those areas, when social, economic, political, etc, factors are involved. The truth becomes value-based and not rooted in empirical reality and any mechanical explanations are consequently disrupted. I am not sure whether this isn't just a crutch solution though, which will be relegated to stricter methods as our species becomes more enlightened about their own condition.
  • How and Why
    Meaningful information theoretic way of describing causes exists, I suspect. — simeonz

    I'd agree with this.     — Pantagruel
    What I meant was that there are definitely two distinct questions, when it comes to the causes of an event. One is about the ordinary causes and another about the particular causes. I tried to define probabilistically what a particular cause would look like.

    For example, if we ask "Why was the pedestrian in a traffic accident?", we could answer "Because they were jaywalking." This does not imply that jaywalking necessarily causes a traffic accident, or not even regularly does so. It does increase the chances, but not definitively. Even more so, it does not imply that every traffic accident is the result of jaywalking. But given a rush hour's urgent traffic and no known traffic hazards at the time, by principle of elimination, one can eventually infer that the cause was jaywalking, and that had the pedestrian obeyed the traffic regulations, there would have been no accident.

    I think that frequently "why" and "how" are questions that are conflated linguistically. There are certainly two different inquiries in there, but the language does not convey them at all times, and the words are sometimes used interchangeably. I assume you were asking about the underlying investigations, and not the ambiguity inherent in the vocabulary.

    Edit:

    A "how" question to me is about the generic causes. It does investigate the conditions treated with generality. In contrast, "why" questions can suggest that in the specific circumstances, a set of particular conditions became an unlikely triggering cause for an unexpected outcome. As I said, there is ambiguity in the language and possible interchange of meaning, but distinct types of inquiries underneath.
  • How and Why
    ↪Pantagruel

    I claim that asking about reason involves sets of circumstances. With respect to some universal established order, the event was likely for the given the apriori conditions, but different conditions would've resulted in a more ordinary outcome. We inquire the deciding circumstances, the usual circumstances, the usual outcome.

    In the language of probability, I think that we are looking for C, such that given the outcome O and the arbitrary knowledge of the circumstances N (N and C are independent):
    P(O and N | C) = 1 - epsilon
P(C and N | O) = 1 - delta
    We also would like to show that C is unusual:
    P(N | C) = delta
    or equivalently, that O is unusual:
    P(N | O) = delta
    Not all questions are posed in a way, which guarantees that one of the last two criteria can be satisfied. "Why does life exist?" is a question whose answer requires C, such that (not C) is a more likely choice, given all context information, and behaves as a cause of life in the above sense.
    Edit:
    Meaningful information theoretic way of describing causes exists, I suspect. And physically, causality is confined to the light cone of an event, if one wants to deal with this narrower view of the subject.
  • Why am I me?
    ↪Ori


    There is a philosophical stance called relationism, which considers time and space like relations, or in plainer terms, "sortings" of objects. In this theory, there is no preferential sense of being in the present moment, because the past is not lost and the future is not unformed, but the reason we think there is an "absolute" present is because each version of our brain in each moment in time is relationally distinct with the other slices from its chronology and believes itself as independently existing. In this same sense, space is relative, and your mind is confined to your grey matter and my mind is confined to mine, but why each of us believes to experience a life of opposition to the other is not because we are ordained fundamentally distinct consciousnesses, but because of the way in which our embodiments are separated with relation to each other. For reference, octopuses have multiple brains in their limbs, each thinking separately, yet they act as a single sentience when it comes to the action of the octopus. Think of us like an octopus who has a split personality disorder. I am not saying that we are not independent personalities and we that shouldn't clash with each other and defend our different points of view when it is necessary, but that this is just nature's game to experiment with the mix of the soup, so to speak.

    P.S. Url was leading to the wrong article
  • Language and meaning
    If you ask me language isn’t just separate from the biological mechanics of the body. — Benj96
    I don't think that language is essential aspect of intelligence, but it is believed that evolution of human beings in terms of their communication and mental apparatus transpired at about the same time. Might have been in a causal manner, with communication coming first, although evolutionary processes are staged and it makes little difference. You are probably right that we have a lot hardwired into us that predisposes us to receptiveness of elaborate communication patterns, although genetics are likely no more than potential that activates by the environment, including social environment.

    Noam Chomsky is, I believe, a major proponent of the hypothesis of genetic predisposition to language. I'll see if I can dig some videos later.

    Edit:
    Noam Chomsky interview on Language and Knowledge (1977)
    This one is interview with Bryan Magee, where I remember that Chomsky elaborated his views on the innate drive of human beings for linguistic expression.
    Language Design - Noam Chomsky / Serious Science
    This interview contains some sketching of the relationship between language and intelligence in historical terms.
    The Concept of Language (Noam Chomsky)
    This interview contains Chomsky describing how language emerges organically through micro-cultures, political events, etc. It emphasizes that the official language is consequent phenomenon.

    This one I just skimmed through now:
    Noam Chomsky - Language and Thought
    The statement made here is that language unlike animal signalling is inclined to form more abstract correspondence with reality, more suited for mental processing.

    This one I could not understand in detail, but it appears to be about some feedback mechanism that language facilitates and its parallels with some particular forms of insect signaling:
    Noam Chomsky - The Function of Language
  • Language and meaning
    ↪Benj96

    I agree with
    ↪Banno
    (and Wittgenstein). The idea can be taken a bit too far, if one implies that consensus on definitional meanings and their consistent use by the community are not part of the system of language. But only part, and the rest is practice first and linguistics after the fact. Lack of technical rigor in the definition of words or robustness in their use is not always objectionable. The important part is their application, which can be to convey sentiment, intent, signal a social innuendo, etc, and not necessarily unambiguously. Words are not described in encapsulated definition, but by their relationship to other words, eventually to those, that the user has encountered in their experience with the language.

    I wanted to remark something else. Inaccurate expressions are assumed risk of communication and can represent their own phenomena. Many factors determine the use words, which aside from circumstances, can be micro-cultures, regional specifics, etc. The application of language in an obtuse fashion or use of dialects that deviate from the "literary standard" can later be incorporated into the official vocabulary and become proper language usage.
  • What is the purpose/point of life?
    ↪Book273


    Indicating as I did earlier, the hypothesis may lie outside of our current frame of thinking, but I am not against exploring it. Especially when one takes such objective view. I am not sure that it will give us meaning, but that is presently unknown. Basically, I mostly agree.
  • A Technical Definition of Time
    ↪Enrique

    I am not sure that I understand. You mean that any process that coordinates the progress of other processes is the embodiment of time? I fail to see periodicity here. I know that the definition is intentionally abstract, but time is very essentially endowed with periodicity, in our universe at least. Also, no distinction is made between time and space coordination here. Time has asymmetries, particularly in connection to the thermodynamic, weak force, and spatial indeterminacy qualities of matter, which have no equivalent for space. Thus, for example, we are making choices for the future based on past experience, and not choices for the past, based on future experience. We have no preferred orientation in space. Another distinction between time and space is that, spatially, the "wave packets" of particles are identical for each type of particle with the same momentum in a given reference frame, yet, the temporal form of any particle is unrestricted and potentially indefinite. Lastly, matter acts in innate natural periods. The frequency of electromagnetic emission from an excited electron that recedes from a higher to a lower energy level is the same for those energy levels, independent of the location in which this occurs. Meaning, that the clocks in nature are tied to fundamental rhythmic qualities that define temporal distance, even if various forms of synchronization to other events are not obviously related (daylight, a traffic conductor signal). I am not sure if I am picking up the scope and intent of the definition. It appears to be divorced from the physical origin of the concept of time. You want to maximally abstract, but it seems to me that you are defining coordination, not temporal synchronization.
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    Alice can't decide that a little suffering for Bob now is worth it for the much greater pleasure that Charles will get later. Whether Bob's suffering is worth it is up to Bob to decide. — Pfhorrest
    Well, this is about blame and the extent to which utilitarianism applies, I think. I meant to ask, as per my last post, whether on collective or individual level, the end result implies disregard for the past, if it has no future consequences, or does the happiness tomorrow make no difference to the suffering today.
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    ↪Pfhorrest

    What I mean to say is, how much of the past is ignored to achieve a good end result? If a person dies happy as a result of their life choices, but they have been unhappy most of their life, is this a good result from the teleological standpoint, or is it a failure? Or is the argument supposed to apply to infinite timelines and sustained results, which individuals cannot afford (offspring not considered)?
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    Inasmuch as teleological means concerned with ends at all, but not necessarily to the exclusion of all other concerns, sure. — Pfhorrest
    But what is considered the "end result"? If some act causes suffering at the time, but the eventual outcome is the furtherment of happiness, teleologically speaking, do we consider this act to have negative ethical component as a hypothetical act, if noone is to ever find out, or do we see the "end result" in entirely positive light?

    Edit: I am suggesting that there will be no negative effects for society in the form of change in attitudes, culture of violence, etc. No implicit effects not recognized at the time. For example, the person who commited the act kept it a secret or killed themselves or something like it.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Strawson goes on further to distinguish between sentences and statements. — Andrew M
    This sheds some light. But when do we consider a sentence truly "complete". Is the sentence's encapsulation related to us by the author? Do we realize that the author had no presuppositions by being at a vantage point that simply allows it? Better yet, is any sentence ever complete? We make statements from sentences all the time, by pivoting our reading of the author's intent as necessary.

    I think Strawson is just saying that such a statement isn't propositional (due to a false presupposition), rather than interpreting in the intuitionistic sense. — Andrew M
    I am sorry to quote out of order. So sentences have no corresponding statement, and statements have no corresponding proposition. That is a lot of relativism. I can speculate that Strawson considers certain statements deliberately relativistic as per the author's intention? How does he know which ones, especially when, if I understood his taxonomy correctly, the sentence has no unique corresponding statement.
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    ↪Pfhorrest

    It also occurred to me, that considering the entire timeline may not be consequentialist, but it would still be teleological in essence, shouldn't it?
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    However, coming at this issue from an attitude that recommends choosing the lesser of two evils, intensionalism seems a better bet than consequentialism for, as I said, we have less control over the consequences of our actions than our intentions and, before I forget to mention, what the consequences are is entirely a matter of where along the causal chain one wants to stop and look. — TheMadFool
    I think that in the sense in which
    ↪Pfhorrest
    described it, those are different ethical aspects. That is, how you should judge your actions versus what are your objectives. Consequentialist do indeed rely on accurate predictions of the consequences, which I do also see as inadequate, if the burden of making such predictions is placed on the individual. On the other hand, it is impossible to make the individual the only carrier of all ethical responsibility, so there has to be some kind of exterior force that compels and advises them, in the form of government and rules, again as Pfhorrest stated.

    P.S. And the latter are going to have to balance between considering the impact of the rules and authority on the person's character in itself, on the effect it has for society, and on its admissibility on its own.
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    Consequentialism definitely only seems to consider the future; that's the whole point of ends justifying means, only the ends count, doesn't matter what you have to go through to get there, in their view. — Pfhorrest
    I asked because, even though your separation of ethical concerns into aspects resolves some of the contentions, it appears to me that a view of having scruples over the past (not due to understanding of its future consequences, but on its very own) and being interested only in the consequences are truly irreconcilable.

    I don't think that characterization is entirely accurate. — Pfhorrest
    I was trying to shoehorn some ideas very hard. Because some ethics in practice incorporate tradition and innate sense of aesthetics (having social and instinctive component). For example, we make ethical statements like "it is good to be courteous", "it is good to be kind and strong", or even "it is good to be create beauty in the world".

    The core aretaic tradition, the Aristotelian one, basically concludes that the highest virtue is reason, and other classical virtues like courage or temperance are just reason prevailing over irrational things like fear or desire. So characterizing that as human instinct isn't very accurate. — Pfhorrest
    I was extrapolating virtue ethics. I was seeing virtues like kindness, beauty, strength (not of prevailing reason, but all strength) as virtues. Obviously, those can be seen rationally by social and genetic Darwinism, but I don't think that it is always explained in any way. Seen through the prism of its Greek roots, I can understand why virtue ethics is rational, but I still wonder if generalization are misplaced. And it also begs the question, can the choice of reason be a rational choice.

    The core deontological tradition meanwhile, the Kantian one, likewise concludes that the single overriding duty is to do what is logically consistent to universalize of your will (or rather, to do whatever doesn't result in a contradiction of your will if you universalized it, i.e. don't do something you want to do that you wouldn't want everyone else to do too). So likewise characterizing that as based on tradition isn't very accurate. — Pfhorrest
    Ultimately, even if you can do it easily conceptually, wont universalizing be a matter of politics and tradition in practice. How would the theoretical ethics be implemented? How is consensus reached?

    Consequentialists on the other hand generally turn to empirical evidence for their determination of what actions are more likely to result in good consequences. And pragmatists are generally empiricists about most everything, and so rely on experience to judge what has or hasn't been working, and thus what is likely to work or not in the future. — Pfhorrest
    For consequentialists, I felt, the adamancy on making correct projections of the future is imperative, whereas pragmatists would easily profess eventual failure to project and just adapt. That is why I thought consequentialists as being more so analytical, and pragmatists as genuinely empirical. But I can see that both have empirical roots and vary in their concessions.
  • What is the purpose/point of life?
    Barometric pressure should not be an issue if the weights were done within minutes of each other. — Book273
    I realized what you mean by this - that the measurements will be done only deferentially. The counterforce from the atmosphere is irrelevant, because it will be approximately the same before and after death. I concede on that point. But again, if sweat evaporation and other gasses need to be captured, with absolutely the same buoyant force, you will need a hard walls hermetic container. I am not saying it has to be under vacuum inside, just sealed. You can't move terminally ill patients, so you need someone on life support, and his signed agreement.

    I also thought, how do you know that souls, if they presumably existed weigh the same? Also, how would you prove that what escapes in this field is an organized energy (that captures any intelligence or memory) and not high entropy energy?
  • What is the purpose/point of life?
    The changes of pressure would not affect overall weight of the body, only gas distribution. Clarke should have known that. — Book273
    Clarke only stated that the sweat would have evaporated. I tried unsuccessfully to indicate by stating that "I assume" that it was my speculation that the pressure of the gasses, i.e. their temperature before they exit the colon, would be raised. I wanted to link this to the overall picture. Meaning, the effective weight of the expelled gasses in the presence of the atmospheric buoyant force might change if they get warmer right after death.
    Also, Clarke's theory of a body's exterior surface partially inflating right after death is erroneous. A body deflates slightly as gases and liquids are expelled due to atmospheric pressure being allowed to compress the tissues as internal pressures from being alive are no longer a factor. — Book273
    Again, this was my clumsy addendum. I meant that if some gasses were blocked in the colon, it would inflate it and push out the tummy of the person to some extent. In retrospect, the change in volume of the human corpse would probably be very small to warrant significant change in buoyancy.
    ICU beds are now quite capable of weighing patients accurately, there is no need to arrange anything. One could program the cardiac monitor to relay a "weigh patient" signal at 30 seconds after asystole begins. There would be no need for outside intervention. Additionally, anyone participating in such a study would be palliative, and therefore, resuscitation and intubation would not apply anyway. — Book273
    First, I doubt that ICU beds are designed to capture gasses and I doubt that the hospital would design their beds in any way that is not primarily interested in the health care of the individual. If they are on life support, I can see better chances of this happening. The measurements would have to deal with barometric pressure if they are not performed simultaneously and presume to be completely accurate.

    It also occurred to me that 21 grams is a lot of energy. Around 525 GWh to be precise, which is more then the electrical consumption of New York city for a month. If this energy is detectable as loss of mass, it means that 525 GWh leave the body without any physical trace on it. I understand that the soul may be speculated to exist in a different unknown energy field, but apparently it interfaces with our weight measurement instruments, so it has to have some impact on ordinary matter.
  • What is the purpose/point of life?
    Not at all difficult to do today, were the experiment to get past the ethics board. I believe what was done back then was the patient was placed on to, essentially, a large tray and weighed. — Book273
    The wikipedia article includes a critical remark which was made by physician named Augustus Clarke, one of the MacDougall's contemporaries, according to whom right before dying the body releases heat, which affects the liquids in the body, turning sweat into gas and I assume, affecting the pressure of the internal gasses as well. If the pressure or state of the body's own liquids changes right before the person dies, when they are released/evaporate, the buoyant force exerted on those liquids would be different or otherwise, I speculate that the body's intestines and thus the exterior surface would partially inflate right after death, resulting in greater buoyant force on the corpse. According to Clarke, this could account for the 21 grams, although I understand that we are talking about a lot of weight. It seems to me that if Clarke is right about the heat release anyway, to be fully accurate, the experiment would have to place the subject in a hermetically sealed hard surface container that is weighted with compensation for the barometric pressure.

    I would be willing to do this experiment. Providing the subjects gave informed consent prior. Methinks the ethics board would never approve of it. Neither would the church if they had any say in the matter. — Book273
    There are multiple issues. First, as society, we insist that even the dying receive palliative care, or at least sedation. In principle, even if you have the consent of people that know that they are going to be on life support eventually, they will also have to sign an order to "not resuscitate" and "not intubate". With dying patients that have vital functions, you will be suspected in trying to arrange the time of death of the patients.
  • What is the purpose/point of life?
    However, sweat, gas, etc had been accounted for. — Book273
    How would they have been accounted for, given it would be difficult to do even today?
    Additionally, if the soul exists, then it is energy of some sort, and would there for have mass, recognizable as weight, which would, lacking a physical, recognized substance, qualify as insubstantial. — Book273
    Energy is a form of matter, because you can create a particle with rest mass from the collision of high energy photons.
    Would that in effect make the concept of the soul irreconcilable to you? Because it has a measurable weight? — Book273
    No. It would be reconcilable with me if it had completely materially transparent or unknown material nature.
  • What is the purpose/point of life?
    Something to consider: there is more to life than meets the eye. At the turn of the 20th century (1900-ish) an experiment was conducted to weigh people at their exact moment of death, in order to determine if there was a soul — Book273
    Each person weighed had the same discrepancy. — Book273
    Apparently, in the experiment 6 people have been weighted in total, with the measurements of 3 being discarded, the remaining three varying. One lost weight, one lost weight and regained it, one lost weight in multiple stages. Meaning, only one patient exhibited the precise result. Even if I put too much trust in the description of the wikipedia source, sweating, gas release and other factors have to be accounted for. I am not saying that there is certainly no soul, but that experiment was butchered. Furthermore, some beliefs don't afford the soul material expression. I am open minded to any form of existence of the soul if it is proven, but the result would be also irreconcilable if the weight was attributed to an insubstantial part of the person.
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    ↪Pfhorrest

    Do you think that different ethical systems, speaking of them as distinct and not as aspects of one total framework, differ in this regard? Do you think that some of them consider the entire timeline while others emphasize the future?

    And because the ethical standards need to be established without knowledge of the consequences, it appears to me that the different systems will use different predictive methods in this regard. Consequentialism prefers rational, analytic means, virtue ethics relies on human instincts for right and wrong, deontology relies on tradition, and pragmatic ethics on experience. Those will fuse eventually, but the emphasis is probably different.
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    So rather than addressing normative ethics as its own field, I prefer approaching those four questions corresponding to four kinds of normative ethical theories as equally important fields: teleology (dealing with the objects of morality, the intended ends), deontology (dealing with the methods of justice, what the rules should be), the philosophy of will (dealing with the subjects of morality, who does the intending), and the philosophy of politics (dealing with the institutions of justice, who should enforce the rules). — Pfhorrest
    Very nice. This gives a much better structure to the question. And from this angle, the different ethics theories emphasize some aspect, depending on which one they believe should take precedence for the best possible outcome. I made an addendum to my earlier post, but I want to add a variation of it here, and maybe read your opinion on it.

    One question occurred to me, of whether events from the past should be used to determine the effectiveness of the ethics. Does the unhappiness of the population during the industrial revolution detract from the achieved prosperity after the fact. A consequentialist may still involve the past to some degree as it will shape the structure of society in the future. But even if we could completely erase it from our consequences, some would argue that the misery caused then deserves condemnation, despite the achieved merit, because our morality should be concerned with the entire timeline, not just the distant future.
  • Intensionalism vs Consequentialism
    ↪TheMadFool

    But isn't consequentialism focused on intended consequences. No sensible ethics can blame people for unforseeable consequences. I think consequentialism is usually contrasted to deontological ethics, in the sense that the latter prefers consistency. For example, under consequentialism, being just may not be as important as being constructive, but under deontological ethics, being just is more important. Then again, an opinion on quora argues that ultimately all ethics theories are interested in the consequences, the difference is which methods are used to promote the outcome. The closest to your definition of intentionalism appears to be virtue ethics, which tries to teach people to align with certain model criteria for moral superiority, not based on consequences or rules, but on aesthetically pleasing conduct. And again, another alternative appears to be pragmatic ethics, which takes an evolutionary approach or trial and error.
  • What is the purpose/point of life?
    So I ask you.....what do you think? Is there an actual purpose or point to life or living? — Mtl4life098
    Just like every of our physics theories, my opinion lacks the complete information and thus may be inaccurate. I don't support mind-body dualism presently, which will become evident as you read the expose. I am not denying that the ego is real, but I can't find enough evidence for its transcendence. Therefore, I don't believe in transcendent ethical arguments for the answer to your question. I am in support of the idea of consciousness in the flesh.

    A particular type of dynamically organized collections of physical objects try to sustain themselves. By which I mean, to retain behavior and dynamic equilibrium. This is not of great import in the scheme of things and to choose to expire is not objectively inferior, but then your existence becomes hermetic. You leave no fingerprint in nature. Not wanting to sustain becomes self-defeating, and trying to sustain becomes self-fulfilling. Disinterest in life is a transitory trait and terminates soon after. Single organisms can be the end of entire communities, so don't think of it as a personal quality. The sustenance aim of life is not surprising, but the complexity of life is more so the exception. It is apparently the result of many coincidental circumstances, such as enough energy, low entropy, appropriate star matter, supply of information, and time. For your question to come to surface, evolution needs to have carried the drive to sustain to the point where fundamental choices becomes neurologically viable inquiry and seemingly valuable enough to reflect on in terms of the accrued personal and collective experience. Ironically, your heritage of a long collective struggle against the challenge to be a complex lasting organism compels you to ask further.

    Why is asking what is the "point" meaningful? In attempts to be lasting, your ancestry evolved from basic reactive systems to intelligent systems. The latter utilize neurological processes to maintain a degree of correlation with the physical environment, current and projected, to make choices for the least expensive and most probable outcome in support of its sustenance, given the present information. But how does the plan form? How do we know to eat, reproduce, socialize, avoid pain, struggle for power. Those are obviously not deliberately planned. Genes, culture, and environment synthesize your innate survival skills. This is your long term memory and a bond to the bigger picture of life. Your survival starts from a collection of irrational impulses.

    However, as useful as intelligence is, it has a flaw. Being intelligent means that you try to castrate prejudice and to seek absolute correctness. Which implies many deeper questions such as what is justice, freedom, duty, virtue, entitlement, meaning. Those are practical questions. You are trying to make long term assessment of your decisions and clear yourself of distortions. But in a sense, your whole plan is a data processing error. Your physical and psychological traits are contradiction with the erratic condition of the universe. Nature opposes your very existence. Fighting prolongs it, but to no end. You and your surrounding life are slowly turning to dust in an agonizing struggle. You dismantle the illusion of integrity. "And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you."

    In emotional agony, or in complete indifference, the brain can recede into a purely rational state. The virtues of choices are futile and your existence stalls.

    On your question, I have a defeatist attitude. I entertain pantheism or panpsychism and possibilianism, but this is not the question here. My inclination appears to be towards absurdism. I am aware of two other avenues. One, to adopt attitude of least resistance and to be utilitarian Darwinist. You can opt between various views, aiming satisfaction of the natural program with least amount of suffering, according to some specific measure of suffering that varies between variants. Or, you could adopt individual ethics, based on the manner in which you have been upbrought and your convictions. And then exude your influence on others if you are politically inclined. Long rant. Dissatisfying ending.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Yes, my translation would just be the first. The background to my original comment was Russell's analysis of definite descriptions and Strawson's criticism of it:

    P. F. Strawson argued that Russell had failed to correctly represent what one means when one says a sentence in the form of "the current Emperor of Kentucky is gray." According to Strawson, this sentence is not contradicted by "No one is the current Emperor of Kentucky", for the former sentence contains not an existential assertion, but attempts to use "the current Emperor of Kentucky" as a referring (or denoting) phrase. Since there is no current Emperor of Kentucky, the phrase fails to refer to anything, and so the sentence is neither true nor false. — Criticism of Russell's analysis - P.F.Strawson     — Andrew M
    Actually, if Russell meant something more akin to
    Exists P (KingOfFrance(P, Now) and Bald(P, Now))
    which will be rephrased back into ordinary speech as "exists a bald king of France", its opposite would have been
    ForAll P (KingOfFrance(P, Now) implies not Bald(P, Now))
    which in ordinary speech is "all kings of France have hair", not "there exists no king of France". If Strawson wants to interpret claims of ordinary sentences in the intuitionistic sense, as indicated from the "neither true nor false" remark, the two statements above are not complementary, but "there exists no king of France" is still not the opposite of "exists a bald king of France" and doesn't prevent Russell from inferring (however frivolously) that there is some implicit existential quantifier in the original sentence.

    P.S. I would have quantified the time instant also, if I wanted to make the claim meaningful. It is common sense to reject it as such right now. But this would be a second-order translation, between the original and the present context, not between the ordinary language and formal language counterpart in that original context.

    I feel that the ambiguity is not a matter of a fixed choice of interpretation. Reading an old newspaper report stating that "the president initiates a lockdown" implies that some president was in charge of some country at some moment in time and that he/she had issued a lockdown, as opposed to the institution having tendency for issuing lockdown orders. On the other hand, for a textbook making examination of an institution, stating that "the president commands the army" does not guarantee that the model of government was ever implemented and was not just proposed at some point. The binding of terms (not simply as referring phrases, but universals, existence claims) depends on the precise context. The sentence about the king of France we can heavily infer from knowing that France has no king, and that prescribing the baldness attribute to a general group of people is improbably useful. But such suggestion lacks rigor, and cannot be argued strictly. In my opinion anyway.

    So my view here is that ordinary sentences require actual application to be true (or false). The issue is not so much one of meaningfulness (i.e., we know what the sentence means, as your spaceship example shows) as one of usefulness (i.e., if the sentence is non-referring, it doesn't have a use). My view is similar for so-called vacuous truths - they also fail to refer to anything and so are also neither true nor false. — Andrew M
    Fair enough. This makes an interesting point that mathematical and ordinary language have different objectives, which result in different kinds of senses of the word "useful".
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    Yes, so context matters. That sentence had an obvious use in a time when a French King existed. But it doesn't have that use now. — Andrew M
    Actually, I failed to convey my remark. Meanwhile, I have also reviewed and revised my original position. What I meant was that the sentence, independent of when it was said, was actually ambiguous on its own terms, without knowing the particulars of the context in which it was delivered. If we tried to translate it in a formal language, such as first order predicate logic, to allow encapsulation of its meaning, the translation would be ambiguous. For example:

    BaldAsPredicate(PresentKingOfFranceAsNamedConstant)
    Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
    Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
    Even the rather exotic:
    Exists PersonAsBoundVariable Exists InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Exists BaldAsBoundVariable Condition(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable, BaldAsBoundVariable))

    Imagine the following paragraph:
    We came to earth on our spaceship. There was a description of a person that the people here used to obey and was called their king. In one particular territory, called France, the person had no hair on his head. He tried to hide it, but all his subjects knew it and it was obvious. The present king of France is bald.

    Only later, I realized that not only existential, but also universal quantifiers could apply:
    ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))
    ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable ForAll InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable) and Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))

    Maybe the first translation to predicate logic would satisfy your objections (edit: because existence is not entailed by it, just material implication in case of actual existence). I am not sure. Obviously, I could invent context that indicates such meaning. But altogether, my point was that our everyday language does not produce encapsulated sentences with individual semantics, a la mathematical logic. We could only guess what the most probable meaning was as we anticipate the surrounding context.

    Later I realized that there was another angle. That, in terms of my take on the problem, even if the translation to a formal statement was somehow made, the result could have required a logical framework that was not classical logic. Something akin to intuitionistic logic. Since the law of excluded middle does not apply there, a person could end up being neither the king, nor not the king. Thus, for example,
    not Exists PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant))
    does not infer automatically that
    ForAll PersonAsBoundVariable (KingAsPredicate(PersonAsBoundVariable, NowAsNamedConstant) implies Bald(PersonAsBoundVariable, InstantOfTimeAsBoundVariable))

    The question may have been about soundness vs validity in ordinary language and I may have misunderstood. About whether ordinary sentences require actual application to be considered meaningful or can they have vacuously correct meaning.

    P.s. Either way, I realize that this is detour. But decided to mention my view.

    Edit: Found some duplicated predicate names in the logic formulas.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    We cannot discuss with the chimp what it believed, or how it formed that belief, or in what terms it would express it. In terms of the question, "the content of belief is propositional" - we are no further along. — counterpunch
    Either way, depends on how fundamental the question wants to be. On whether the debate assumes a point of reference of "human beliefs as commonly practiced presently". For me at least, acknowledging the limitations of the discussion is still a result.

    Fundamentally speaking then, it seems to me that beliefs are possible as dispositions, intentions, attitudes. I don't see any reason why they should only form in an explicit structured mental language. I claim that even the structured statements boil down to attitudes, if observed closely and reduced to elements. Using surprise as impromptu verification principle, can it not form as the result of simpler, inarticulate neurological and psychological states? I am not talking about acting surprised, which can happen due to all sorts of non-sense, but about being confounded from contradiction between your experience and your current attitude.

    Edit: As to where this would lead. Lets assume that beliefs are not articulate (merely) by definition, which could be argued for or against on taxonomical grounds, observing how the term will be used for a mental state that maps meaningfully to behavior patterns, as you alluded to in your response above. Then the speculation would indicate that dispositions are the basis for beliefs and not propositions. The latter merely correlate.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    If the purpose of this debate is to decide if the content of belief is propositional, how can we possibly examine that question in organisms incapable of articulating a belief? — counterpunch

    When you say "organisms incapable of articulating a belief", you seem to imply that having a belief requires the bearer to be able to articulate what it believes. In fact, I think you might be suggesting that believing and articulating beliefs are the same at some level. Am I correct? Why do you think that that is the case? Or is it a definitional matter.

    P.S. It seems to me that this is what the original debate was about.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    That is, on Russell's view (and yours) the sentence entails that there is a present King of France. The entailment is false, therefore the sentence is false. — Andrew M

    Again, rather out of cuff interjection. How do we know which parts of the sentence are existentially bound and which refer to particulars. The sentence could mean that one well known presently ruling king of France is bald. It could mean that such a king presently exists and is bald. Or in some point in time (prior to reading the statement), a king of France existed and was bald. In fact, it could mean that a country named France existed at some point, that country had a person acting in a particular capacity, called king, he had a condition, which for lack of a better term was named baldness, and that person had it. It seems to me that the battle for revealing propositions behind isolated sentences is obscured by linguistic inadequacy, if we are talking about ordinary language and without context that implies the intent of the author. The result is speculation.
  • Debate Discussion: "The content of belief is propositional".
    I suggest that belief is belief about the self. — counterpunch

    Sorry for interjecting and mentioning, but I will propose something related. I can speculate, without being animal behavior specialist, that at least in animals, the matter of fact may be divorced more strongly from their mental attitudes. They might possess intent and not knowing about "states of affairs", as was previously mentioned. In other words, the cat might acquire stimuli to perform a certain action, to initiate a process of some kind, mental inertia of some sort, starting from the image of a running mouse, which then continues to compel it to chase for food-object behind the tree, This implies that there is pursuit of the object, which means that it moves, as well as its location, because this is where we will chase the object, but the cat probably does not fully conceptualize that there is mouse running behind the tree and hence the pursuit, or at least has a very vague abstract awareness of its motivation. There is some implicit mental correlation, because the action associated with the prompting motivation is indicative of the current state of affairs, but not directly tied to it. I argue, that even in human beings, belief may be about intent, not about states of affairs. States of affairs just strongly correlate with some types of intent.

    A hypothesis.
  • What if you dont like the premises of life?
    A lot of people think that by enduring this, that it enriches their life when they make it through. I don't know, for me, it just dulls life that much more that on top of the everyday dealings with other people, BS in general, societal maneuverings of the daily kind, there is the pain and suffering of being struck by enduring illness, injury, and the like. — schopenhauer1
    I didn't mean to overcome discomfort through self-improvement, but to suffer through discomfort resiliently (as if stoically, but not really.) In other words, a possible solution is a non-solution.

    As far as romantic love, how does this ameliorate anything? Building a loving relationship, and keeping one, are even more difficult these days than back in the day when it was an expectation (though leading to much unhappiness for staying in bad relationships). Besides, even the best of relationships can lead to pain from differences in expectations. — schopenhauer1
    I offered love as motivation, not relief. To remedy the sense of purposelessness, not the sense of helplessness. Love will definitely increase the actual hardship many-fold.

    But anyways, in this more recent climate of shallowness, self-absorption, and short-sightedness, intimate partners are harder to come by these days. The whole caring about someone who is particularly special to you and you to them is diminishing as the years move forward. Increasingly, you're on your own in sickness and health, except for perhaps your immediate family (if they are still alive and well and in communication). — schopenhauer1
    I agree. This probably steers into a politically and culturally focused topic, but indeed, people appear to be living isolated. I suspect that there are far reaching consequences - lack of empathy, no sense of responsibility, etc. But I may be over-dramatizing. It certainly doesn't apply to everybody.
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