If you're of the mindset that all mental states are brain states, then psychological solutions are material solutions.

OK, I was thinking more in terms of answers to questions, but in any case, "learning to accept my intrusive thoughts and not fight them" is a material change of behavior isn't it. I mean instead of sitting or lying there and ruminating, don't you go and do something else? — Janus

Distracting can help, but mostly it's a process of telling the intrusive thought (something along the lines of): hello irrational thought, I'm not going to fear you.

Learning to accept my intrusive thoughts and not fight them went a long way in solving my rumination problem.

If pain hurts, you're not a zombie.

All solutions to problems are material solutions. What other kind(s) of solutions can you offer an example of? — Janus

Psychological solutions, or are therapists completely worthless?

The point of course would be, how you could you tell the mental state apart from a programmed response? I don't think, in theory, you could. — Sam26

Maybe not but that's an epistemological point. It seems to me that P-zombies can exist iff there are no actions caused solely by mental states.

Yes, and this is why I said, "...they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self," which was meant to mean they are not conscious. It's difficult to know if such a zombie would really act like a conscious being. It seems that you could in theory make them respond just like us. It would be like playing a game, say, World of Warcraft, and not knowing if you're talking with a real person or not. — Sam26

I don't think they could act entirely like a conscious being because conscious beings' actions are sometimes caused by their mental states.

If we're not conscious in the way that philosophers like Chalmers claim we are, then qualia would count as such a word in our universe. Idealism would be another. Platonism would be yet another. Not to conflate those three terms, but it demonstrates that if the world is physical, it doesn't prevent us from coming up with non-physical words. — Marchesk

Doesn't coming up with words for mere possibilities require imagination?

One possible answer, is that the zombie is just programmed to say these kinds of things. If, for example, our reality is a kind of program of sorts, then it's quite possible that some being (what we refer to as a person) might just be part of the program. They act like us, they talk like us, but they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self. It's certainly possible, but unless you were able to remove yourself from the program, it would be difficult if not impossible to tell the difference. — Sam26

Except the zombie is supposed to be identical to me except for being conscious. I don't talk about my mental states due to any programming; when I talk bout being in pain, say, it's because I want to inform someone about my mental state.

Actually Chalmers touches on this because, if his zombie-twin has an "inverted spectrum" of any conscious experience, for example, (sees blue where the other sees red i.e.) then there necessarily will be different "causal histories" of that type of experience, even if the experiences themselves are the same. So isomorphic mapping of history can be problematic. — Pantagruel

I'm wondering how P-zombies could have a history that involves the development of words that refer to conscious experiences they don't have.

Would Chalmer's P-zombie twin also have the same evolutionary history as Chalmers?

:100:

This just anecdotal, but I see a lot more articles and videos on consciousness than I used to. I think materialism/physicalism is waning.

I'll say no. Will you answer my question now? — InPitzotl

A physical description of photons would suffice if physical stuff actually exists. If idealism is true, however, describing photons as physical things that exist independent of mind(s) would be false. A physical description of photons can only work if A) idealism isn't the case and B) they're not conscious.

You said that before. Do you mean something besides "pain is painful"? — Srap Tasmaner

Pain hurts. Do you agree? If you want to say pain is painful, I'm fine with that. When you unpack that, you're going to get something like: pain feels bad. So then, any definition of pain has to mention the fact that pain hurts/feels bad/is painful, otherwise it's incomplete. Agreed?

Are photons conscious? — Marchesk

:up:

That sounds to me like you're saying it's painful to be in pain. Were you hoping to say something more than that? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm saying that a purely physical description of pain is incomplete. The mental aspect of pain (that it hurts) is far more relevant to people than the fact that nerves are involved. Wouldn't you agree?

But even if we grant that, is it an argument against some sort of naturalism or physicalism? Is there no difference between the brains of people who have read about swimming and people who have done it and know how to swim? That seems crazy, doesn't it? And only people who have done it know what it's like to swim. Knowing what it's like is a function of memory, isn't it? — Srap Tasmaner

It's an argument against the kind of physicalism that claims that everything is physical. If everything is physical, then a complete physical description of something should be necessary and sufficient to define it. Would a purely physical definition of pain work? Or would it be incomplete by virtue of the fact it doesn't mention how pain feels? I think purely physical descriptions of experiences are lacking in a obvious way: the salient aspect of pain isn't that it involves nerves and brain states x,y,z, it's that pain hurts. It feels bad. If purely physical descriptions of phenomena are not complete descriptions of said phenomena, that's a big problem for physicalism.

That would seem to be a problem for physicalists. How on Earth can you convey to someone the experiential nature of pain and anger with just a physical description?

I don't think emotions are feelings, but rather are felt. — Varde

Sure, but a complete definition of pain has to include it feels bad, wouldn't you agree? Isn't that the salient fact about pain? That it hurts?

Learning about colours causes changes in the parietal-temporal-occipital region, the hippocampus, the frontal cortex... Seeing colours causes changes in the V4 and VO1 regions.

I can't for the life of me work out what this has to do with challenging physicalism. — Isaac

If you were blind from birth, and you studied all the changes happening in the brain when someone is seeing something, do you think you would learn what it's like to see? I think the answer is obviously no.

Can we pinpoint a difference in the structure or functioning of the brain of a person who has been to the moon from the brain of a person who hasn't? Is it conceivable that those differences could be written down and read about? Is there any sort of ability or acquaintance not describable as a physical fact about the person? — Srap Tasmaner

Knowing all the physical facts about the brain states of people having experience x (e.g., seeing red) won't lead to knowing what experience x is like (e.g., what it's like to see red).

And there's the fly in the ointment: the knowledge of color was not complete without (before) seeing color. Jackson's thought-experiment fails because of this incoherent premise and therefore implies nothing about physicalism. — 180 Proof

The argument doesn't require "complete knowledge" to illustrate the problem with physicalism. If Mary learns 90% of the physical facts involved in seeing (or any percentage), her knowledge of the experience of seeing red should increase by the same amount. But of course it doesn't. No matter how many facts she knows about the physical process of seeing red, she remains totally ignorant about the experience of seeing red until she sees red for the first time.

They are. Anger is: *insert the physical explanation of what's happening when you're angry here* — khaled

If you were trying to explain what anger is to an alien, would you consider that a complete description? I think it fails because it doesn't capture the essence about anger, pain, happiness, etc.: emotions are feelings. They are things we experience.

:100:

Yes. I only stress that I think consciousness is what we are best acquainted with out of everything we know. I'm saying it's physical.

But it's an assumption, your absolutely correct.

If dualism is true then we can have the argument your presenting, which is more clear to me. — Manuel

We should consider Mary's room without making any ontological assumptions.

If she knew "everything about the physical aspects of sight", that would have to include colour experience. — Manuel

You're assuming physicalism is true. If dualism is true, then Mary could know everything about the physical aspects of sight and still not know what the experience of colour is.

I would do a bad job. I don't really understand it much.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/#NoPropKnow1AbilHypo

The lack of explanation for why brains are conscious but hearts aren't is a problem.

I think if she learns something new, physicalism is in trouble. I think she learns something new. I would like to see someone defend the ability argument.

A pragmatist would say that a fertilized egg is not a person. And also what James Riley said.

What's the problem? — Varde

Why are brains conscious but hearts aren't?

Could you learn to ride a bike just by reading about it? No. Experience is required. Same for seeing (in general and regarding specific colors). People blind at birth don't know what seeing is like. They don't know what it's like if they learn 1% of the physical facts involved or 10% of 100%. Their understanding of what it's like to see red doesn't increase with respect to their knowledge of the physical facts involved. A neuroscientist born blind at birth has the same understanding of the experience of seeing as a caveman born blind at birth: zero. Neither has any idea what the experience is actually like.

Does Mary gain new knowledge from seeing red or a new ability?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/interactive/2021/1-in-500-covid-deaths/

Maybe, but for something that's not intelligent, they sure do wipe the floor with our best players. Soon, we'll have non-conscious computers that can have intelligent conversations with us. It will reach a point where it's obvious to everyone that there's some kind of intelligence at work, even if it's artificial.

Can a non-conscious computer play an intelligent game of chess/go?

What about locking down the entire hospital in an effort to contain the virus? I think you would agree with that too. What about locking down the local community in a last ditch effort to contain the virus? It sounds like you support some kinds of lockdowns if the stakes are high enough.

Suppose a patient walks into a hospital complaining of abdominal pains. Doctors discover he has a virus that he is immune to but which is highly communicable and kills 99% of those infected. Doctors ask the patient to stay in the hospital, but he refuses to. Is it ethical to then forcibly keep the patient from leaving the hospital?

The mind/body problem is meaningless, unless we know what "body" is. — Xtrix

If all life in the universe died, would there still be a universe with stars, planets, galaxies, etc.?

Just like last time, you assume dualism in your questions. — khaled

I'm an idealist. I think there is only mind and thought. That makes more sense than assuming there is only physical stuff. You can be wrong about physical stuff existing. I cannot be wrong about mind and thought existing.

What makes you think that there exists a subjective experience, a “mental stuff” of being angry?

Are you denying mental states and subjective experiences exist? That's absurd.

No, the certain configuration IS what we refer to when we refer to an experience. It’s not something that “brings about an experience”, it is it. This configuration = Anger.

Think of a sunset. Is there a sunset in your brain? Then mental states aren't the same thing as brain states. When you were a child, and you didn't know anything about brains, you knew what anger was. Do you think an alien race that can't feel anger can know what it's like to be angry just by studying our brains?

Any time we say “He was angry” it can be translated as “He had this specific physical configuration”. Usually including shallow breaths, frowns, and other things.

That's a poor translation, since anger is also a feeling. When you're angry do you feel a certain way? Of course you do. Isn't the essence of pain not nerves firing, but rather it feels bad? Pain hurts? Isn't that what makes torture so bad? Because someone is experiencing intense suffering?

Is electricity necessary?
— RogueAI

Seems that way. Considering the ones that don’t have it display “dead” not “angry”.

Why is electricity necessary for experience? What is it about moving electrons that is required for the feeling of pain to exist? Of course you don't know, so there are two moves you can make: there's no such thing as the "feeling of pain" or "we don't know but we'll eventually find out". Both are unsatisfying answers. Your theory produces absurdities and suffers from explanatory gaps.

So, how does that work? How does configuring matter a certain way give rise to the subjective experience of being angry? Is electricity necessary?