I think what’s happening here is that the bar for “necessity” is being set so high that no theodicy could ever clear it. You’re asking for a proof that no possible alternative form of agency could preserve moral seriousness while eliminating extreme suffering. But omnipotence doesn’t require that every imaginable design be realizable, only that logically coherent ones are. Saying “God could have done better” isn’t an argument unless a coherent alternative is actually spelled out.
On the “serious agency” point: I’m not claiming catastrophe defines moral responsibility. I’m saying that a world where consequences are always capped, reversed, or preemptively blocked is not just a safer version of ours, it’s a fundamentally different kind of moral environment. Things like prisons, safety nets, and error correction only make sense against a background where irreversible harm is possible. They mitigate risk; they don’t erase moral finality. If final devastation is structurally impossible, agency loses depth in a way ordinary safeguards don’t touch.
You keep appealing to alternative “designs” of agency, but none are actually described in a way that preserves everything at once: meaningful choice, deep responsibility, transformation, and real stakes, without allowing catastrophic misuse. Pointing out that the human model involves vulnerability doesn’t show that vulnerability is optional. It might be doing essential work. Until a clear alternative is on the table, appealing to omnipotence just becomes hand-waving.
On epistemic distance: this isn’t about certainty versus uncertainty in general. It’s about whether the world clearly advertises a supervisory intelligence that steps in whenever things get too bad. A reality that reliably prevents extreme suffering, corrects outcomes in real time, and neutralizes catastrophic harm wouldn’t just be “nicer” or “more informed.” It would obviously be managed. At that point, belief wouldn’t be freely formed, it would be the default inference. Trust would turn into compliance. That’s not a slippery slope; it’s a predictable consequence of systematic intervention.
And I agree that faith and trust don’t require specific horrors like cancer or genocide. But the claim was never that each instance is necessary. The claim is that a world with genuine freedom must allow the possibility of horrors, and once that’s allowed, their actual occurrence follows from creaturely action and natural processes, not divine micromanagement. Treating suffering as if it were individually selected misses the level at which the theodicy is operating.
So I don’t think the dilemma comes back unchanged. The real disagreement is whether moral depth, free trust, and non-coerced relationship can exist in a world that’s systematically engineered to prevent extreme loss. You think yes. The theist thinks no, because agency, epistemic distance, and moral finality hang together. That’s a real disagreement about values and metaphysics, not a proof that classical theism is incoherent.