An omnipotent being can do anything and thus they can commit any immoral act. Why do you think she would not be able to commit any immoral act? — Bartricks

Sorry, forgot about this. What kinds of immoral acts are possible in realities consisting of just one mind? Who could be the victim, other than the victimizer? A cosmic mind could harm itself (be a victim of itself), I suppose, but self-harm is not immoral. If I, the one mind, choose to self harm and torment myself with unpleasant thoughts, it is my right to do so as an autonomous agent. Nothing immoral has taken place.

Well, it seems just as clear in this case that you did not acquire knowledge that there was a pie in your oven from those cloud shapes, just a true belief. — Bartricks

Yes, the justification is missing. However, what if this kept happening, even by fantastic coincidence: clouds keep spelling out true statements about the world to this one guy. Wouldn't he eventually be justified in assuming there's an agent at work with all these true cloud messages, even if he's not sure there's an agent at work?

There is a type of idealism that posits one mind/cosmic mind/universal mind exists. I thought it was called monistic idealism. In any case, suppose this cosmic mind is God. What would omnibenevolence be like in a reality of just one godly mind existing? How does morality even exist if only one mind exists, except as factual statements about morality?

What would omnibenevolence look like in monistic idealism? How can there be morality if only one cosmic mind exists? What possible immoral act could a cosmic mind commit? I guess an omniscient cosmic mind could know of moral truths even if immoral acts are metaphysically impossible, but that would fall under omniscience.

But aren't the events of the last five years a little too strange? If you went back to 2015 and tried to sell the story of what America's actually gone through, you would be laughed out of the room. Nobody would take you seriously. I think reality has been trying to hit us over the head with a certain lesson:this (Trump) is what happens when you devote your life to chasing idols like fame and money and power. This is what naked ego looks like. Take a good hard look. I think there's design to it all.

Well, is there a limit to how many computations God can do in a second?

I don't agree with a lot of that, but I appreciate the time you put into those responses!

Where did I say that God was infinite? Quote me saying it. — Bartricks

Is God finite or infinite?

That's not an explanation. It explains absolutely nothing about why I'm having that experience and not some other. — Kenosha Kid

OK, so instead of a dream, let's pretend this is a simulation, and you notice a cup in the simulation. Why am I seeing a cup? you ask. Because the simulation is programmed that way. Do you accept that as an explanation?

In fact, "What it was like for me to watch Fight Club the last time" isn't even *a* thing, it's lots and lots of events. — Kenosha Kid

This is unclear. Let's look at the following conversation:
"I went skydiving."
"What was it like?"
"It was scary and fun."

What part of that conversation is unclear or "not a thing"?

Solipsism has no explanation for why I experience no cup on the table rather than any of the infinite other experiences I might have. — Kenosha Kid

You experience no cup on the table because you're dreaming there's no cup on the table, and you're experiencing what you're dreaming. That's an explanation.

Also, you earlier stated that there is no "what it is like to be red". So if you go and do x and someone asks you "what was it like to do x?" do you understand what they're asking? Do you think it's just a language game going on?

A property isn't for a particular event. The single-objective-universe hypothesis has it that the cup has the capacity to emit light without the evolution of conscious observers, and, if provided with energy, will emit light whether it's seen or not. — Kenosha Kid

It sounds like you think the cup still exists if no one's observing it. I was going to ask if it's conscious, but you seem to answer that:

But... putting aside minds for the moment, my view is that no photon is created that is not destroyed, that is: a photon's final destination is a boundary condition of its existence. From a panpsychist point of view, whatever that destination is, that is a conscious observer. So there's that.

You're claiming that whatever a photon hits is a conscious observer?

Of course, I personally have no direct evidence of any cup that I am not seeing. If I look away, I cannot see it. The opposite of objectivism (in the above sense, not the Randian sense) is solipsism: the belief that only my conscious experiences are real. Solipsism cannot explain why the cup appears the same when I go back to it, or why it disappeared after I heard a meow and a crash. This is why the single objective universe is the best explanation for our conscious experiences. Science is the test of that: the hunt for exotic phenomena that puts that hypothesis through its paces (falsification, null-hypothesis). — Kenosha Kid

Solipsism can explain the behavior of the cup by positing that you're creating the reality you're experiencing (i.e., you're dreaming all this). It can't prove this explanation, but the "it's all a dream" explanation does explain why reality is the way it is.

We see the cup, so it has the property of being seeable, which we now know means that it is a configuration of bound charged particles. — Kenosha Kid

Is the existence of the cup dependent on mind(s) in any way?

But you have to say something about what kind of stuff physical stuff is. It has properties, I assume. Is its existence dependent on mind(s) in any way? Is the stuff conscious? Would the stuff still be around if there was no one to perceive it?

No such issue with "physical": either it regularly interacts with other physical stuff such that it can be indirectly observed, or it doesn't. — Kenosha Kid

What is "physical stuff"? I'm assuming some kind of mindless stuff that exists independently of and external to our minds? Do you believe that if all minds in the universe disappeared, the universe would change in any way (except for the fact that there are no more minds)?

:up:

Say you go skydiving and your friend asks you "what was it like to go skydiving?" Now, you have said that there are no "what it is like to do/feel/be statements" (e.g. "What it is like to see red"). What exactly do you mean by that? Are you claiming you can't understand questions like, "what is it like to do/feel/be x?"?

I don’t think so, but it’s fine if you do. Hell.....I don’t even know what a mental state actually is. — Mww

So we'll state simple. You know what the experience of a toothache is, right?

How would I know it, such that it couldn’t be anything else?

You know the experience of a toothache is different than the experience of listening to your favorite song, so then the experience of a toothache can't be the experience of listening to your favorite song.

I never said anything like that. Never mentioned a mental state. That’s a knowledge claim, and I’m showing that particular knowledge is not available to us. — Mww

The knowledge of mental states is not available to us?

Well, I know this is a big ask but how about giving the opposing argument an airing rather than just claiming it to be true, calling others crazy, and doubting their motives and prospects. — Kenosha Kid

I'm not calling you crazy, I'm saying your claim is crazy. I didn't mean any offense. Idealism is completely out there, so I know about making crazy-seeming claims.

I've given a pretty comprehensive explanation as to why there is no "what it's like to see red" and you're not presenting any specific problems with anything I've said. Park that, and make a compelling case for:

there IS "what is it like to see red/be in pain/lose a loved one"
— RogueAI

Look at a red thing, stub a toe, lose a loved one (though hopefully not). I'm looking at a red object in my room. I'm having the experience of seeing red. There is something that is it like for me to see this red object: me seeing this red object. That is a mental state I can access through introspection. I assume all this is true for you as well, so when you say "There is no "what it is like to see red," and I also know that you, like me, can have the experience of seeing red, I honestly have no idea what to say. We're at first principles here. I can't wrap my head around denying the existence of "what is it like" statements.

There is no "what it is like to see red", that's idealism." — Kenosha Kid

I think it is trivially true that there IS "what is it like to see red/be in pain/lose a loved one" and denying the reality of that is crazy, but we're at the axiomatic level here, and your claim is similar to the move some materialists make when they try to deny consciousness (or claim it's an illusion). I think it's just totally obvious that such moves are not persuasive and are doomed to failure.

You agree then that experience is necessary to answer "what is it like?" questions? For example, you would agree that Mary needs to experience seeing red in order to know what it is like to see red?

Well let's see... Is that what I said? — Kenosha Kid

I wasn't clear on what you were saying, hence my question. Can you answer it? Is Mary's Room meaningful?

we are permitted to say we have no idea how the brain causes experience — Mww

Three points to make:

Your claim is dualistic. You're saying that brains cause experience, which is to say that for any mental state, there's a causal brain state. Brain states and mental states aren't the same thing; one causes the other. So, if brain states and mental states are different, how are they different?

We're permitted to say "we have no idea how the brain causes experience" because it corresponds to reality (i.e., is true): we have no idea how matter can cause experience.

Suppose we're still in the dark about the Hard Problem 100 years from now. How damaging would that be to physicalism? What about 1,000 years from now? Or do you think physicalism can survive an infinitely long explanatory gap?

Again, the dualist will admonish against claims regarding insight into ourselves, for which there is a plethora of justifiable speculation, in juxtaposition to claims about the mechanistic origin of ourselves, for which there is barely any insight at all. In short, we have been given what’s necessary for insight into ourselves (brains/matter), but not yet what is sufficient (causality). — Mww

What is the causality you're talking about? How matter causes experience?

Nonetheless, many (most?) people insist without compelling justification that there is an additional thing: the so-called hard problem of consciousness, such that if all of the physical barriers to knowing what it is like to be a bat were overcome, we would still not know what it is like to be a bat. This is just proof that sentences can be valid without conveying understanding or meaning imo. — Kenosha Kid

Are you claiming Mary's Room is meaningless/devoid of meaning?

I agree with you that good looks grease the skids and make life easier, but it doesn't make a person any happier. Also, if you are beautiful and are emotionally invested in your beauty, aging is going to be a bitch. And you're also going to attract people that are only after you because of your looks. Those kinds of relationships aren't fulfilling.

No , all there is to life is looking beautiful, the rest will take care of itself. — Wittgenstein

Are you being serious?

Idealists cannot rule out supernatural explanations, whereas materialists can. — Pinprick

That's a good point, but simulation theory provides a foundation for modern day materialists to seriously consider some pretty improbable events. For example, thirty years ago, I don't think any materialists would have given much credence to the possibility of the stars in the night sky rearranging themselves to spell out a message, but if this is a simulation, and that's what the simulation creators want...

Although, even in that case, the explanation for the stars rearranging themselves would still not be supernatural. I agree that idealists should be much more receptive to supernaturalism.

:up:

Yeah, that made sense. Perhaps an objective math formula can bring about a state of synesthesia in a blind person so that their processing of the equation brings about a mental state that is similar enough to seeing so that they know what seeing is like. Although, in that case, some kind of experience is still necessary for knowing what seeing is like- the formula, if there is one, would simply act as a bridge allowing the blind person to make a "what is it like" realization about seeing without ever seeing. I don't know how much sense that made.

Yeah, I agree with a lot of that. I love Kastrup! My personal "journey" away from materialism is similar to his. I don't think he really has anything knew, and I don't think he's thought through the theological implications of the existence of a cosmic mind. I think if you explore the idea of just one mind existing, you're going to wind up with a god eventually. Kastrup is great at explaining, though. I would love to listen to Harris interview him. I also thought Rupert Spira was great on Harris's show:
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=sam+harris+debate+consciousness

The short answer (to your questions): I don't know.

The long answer: I'm working with the hypothesis that consciousness is some kind of pattern, to take a physicalist stance, in matter-energy. We already have a pretty good idea that matter-energy and mathematical patterns are connected in a very initmate way (physics, chemistry). I then just put two and two together and came to the conclusion that consciousness could one day be expressed as a formula. Speculation of course, nothing definitive. — TheMadFool

Personal incredulity aside, I think this runs into a Mary's Room problem. If an experience can be expressed mathematically, then if a blind person knew the right maths/numbers, they could deduce, from the math alone, what it's like to see (and also what it's like to be a bat, if they know the right math). Doesn't that seem wrong? I don't see someone blind can know what it's like to see without having the experience of seeing.

And then of course, there's the issue of what kind of substrate the pattern is being run on, and how would you go about verifying if it's substrate-dependent or not? How would you test that mathematical pattern X,Y,Z is a conscious moment? I can see how you can claim that a conscious moment has a mathematical correlate, because we can express the physical brain state assosciated with the conscious brain state mathematically, but then you're back to the causal problem.

But I will grant you that you can correlate mental states with numbers. That is significant.

keeping my fingers crossed that consciousness turns out to be a mathematical pattern — TheMadFool

How on Earth can mathematical patterns be consciousness? Why should someone take that as a serious possibility? Also, if that's the case, there should have been evidence of it by now. Consciousness and mathematical patterns have existed for a very long time. Why has there not been any proof the two are causally connected (or the same thing)? I don't think any proof will be forthcoming and this problem is just going to get more and more acute.

Sure, I agree we know mind exists. But it rests on matter - the brain. Without a brain we'd have no mind. — Manuel

There is correlation between brain states and mental states. Causation has not been established. I think the failure to come up with a causal explanation for how brain states lead to mental states, at this point in 2022, is catastrophic to materialism, which is evidenced by the recent popularity among materialists of panpsychism. You even have Mex Tagmark, out at MIT, claiming the universe is made of math.

My point is that the Explanatory Gap is evidence that we have a situation where brain states are correlated with mental states, but are not causing mental states- if brain states are causing mental states, we'd have at least some idea of how that happens, but it's still a complete mystery.

Unless someone would say something like "we don't know that mind depends on brain" or "the brain is mental stuff too". I think we can say that the first option here is too plausible. — Manuel

I think idealism is the most plausible (second option). It certainly is the most parsimonious. Positing the existence of mindless external stuff creates problems, solves nothing, and is unverifiable.

On the other hand, if you say brains are a construction of mind, then yes this makes sense. What doesn't would be to say that brains aren't matter. — Manuel

Under idealism, brains aren't matter, they're ideas, just like when we dream of physical objects- they only exist as ideas. Idealism simply posits that what happens in our dreams is also happening right now. I have no evidence of that, of course, but at least it's a case of going from the known to the known: dreaming. Materialism goes from the unknown (mindless stuff) to the known (mind) via an unknown (and possibly unknowable) mechanism. That's not parsimonious.

I know you have not been suggesting this at all, I'm just pointing our some options that would follow from the argument. — Manuel

I'm an idealist, although I don't know if I've suggested it in this particular thread.

When I talk to idealists I don't say "You can't prove mind exists so you can't say anything". — khaled

"Mind exists" does not need to be proven. We know for a certainty that at least one mind exists. That is not the case with matter.

Come on now. Matter existing is a given. Or else you're not talking to a materialist. — khaled

Matter existing is not a "given" when I'm talking to a materialist any more than Christ rose from the dead is a "given" when I'm talking to a Christian. I didn't find your other answers compelling, either. Sorry.

I'm excluding those 2. When I say materialist or idealist I mean a purist, IE not a dualist in either case. — khaled

You think mysterianism is the same thing as dualism?

Yes he can. Because consciousness to a materialist is a certain pattern of matter. You can easily tell when things follow said pattern. — khaled

It depends on the materialist. Some believe that mental states are identical to physical states. Some are property dualists. Some are mysterianists (materialists who think we'll never figure out consciousness).

A materialist cannot say anything about consciousness* with confidence because A), there's no way to prove that matter exists in the first place, and B) even if matter does exist, if consciousness is patterns of matter, why does pattern A give rise to the feeling of stubbing a toe, while pattern B gives rise to the beauty of a sunset, while pattern C gives rise to no experience at all? How does that work? Why are we conscious in the first place? If pattern of matter XYZ gives rise to (or is the same as) experience ABC, and that machine over there looks like it's an instance of pattern of matter XYZ, how do we verify it's having experience ABC?

Since the answers to those questions are all unknown, any claims materialists make about what consciousness is and how it arises from matter cannot be made with confidence, at least at the moment. Agreed?

You seem to already have in mind a particular effect called "consciousness" that we cannot detect that arises from matter. — khaled

I think we can detect it, but only in ourselves. I cannot be wrong I'm conscious, but I ultimately have no idea whether you are or aren't and if you are if your consciousness is anything like mine. If you disagree, then explain how a scientist would go about detecting consciousness in a machine.

That's not how a materialist would put it. To a materialist, again, consciousness is a pattern, not a seperate "secret sauce" added to things that have matter (usually). That's dualistic.

Again, it depends on the materialist. Let's take you. Do you believe that mental states are identical to brain states? If so, how is it that I can have a song playing in my head, but there's no music in my skull? If mental states are identical to brain states, then my mind weighs a couple pounds and is about the size of both of my fists. Do you really think your mind weighs anything? Isn't the idea that your mind is double-fist sized pretty absurd? And if you don't believe that mental states are identical to brain states, then how are they different?

Consciousness is to a brain what a program is to a PC for a materialist. The program is not a seperate entity that acts on the PC, it's a specific configuration of the PC. — khaled

This assumes there is a material thing called a brain that exists outside our minds. You need to prove that first before you start talking about what kinds of programs this hypothetical brain can run.

*I think IIT has some interesting things to say, but only at a trivial level.

What’s something a materialist cannot say about the world that requires they be an idealist. Or vice versa — khaled

A materialist cannot say about the world (with confidence) that consciousness can arise from non-conscious stuff. They can assume and believe it's true, but there is (currently) no explanation for how that can happen, why we evolved to be conscious, or indeed why we should even assume mind arising from mindless stuff is possible in principle. The materialist, again, simply assumes there's not a category error going on.

The materialist also cannot say (again, with confidence) that non-conscious stuff exists at all. There is no way to verify it. It's simply a belief.

For an idealist there is two different kinds of things, "mental stuff" and "physical stuff" — khaled

That's dualism. Idealists believe only mental stuff exists.