Since we know consciousness exists
— RogueAI

We do?

Do you see the absurdity of your question? This is why I don't waste my time with Dennett or his followers. They inevitably end up doubting really obvious stuff like their own consciousness, and then it devolves into a semantics game. No thanks.

How do you know that the work I've linked doesn't tell you how non-conscious stuff produces conscious experience?

Because the Hard Problem hasn't been solved. Ergo, the book you linked doesn't solve it.

"Look, the means by which this non-conscious stuff produces consciousness must, if it exists, be some process or mechanism that is a property of this non-conscious suff. It just seems really odd to me that you'd claim interest in such a mechanism and then refuse a study of the exact non-conscious stuff you would need to know about in order to ascertain if the production of consciousness was among their feasible properties."

I don't think neuroscience is going to solve the hard problem. The idea that you can mix non-conscious stuff around in a certain way and add some electricity to it and get consciousness from it is magical thinking. Since we know consciousness exists, we should doubt the non-conscious stuff exists. We have no evidence that it does anyway. Why assume it exists?

You are confusing the easy problem (neural correlates of mental states) with the Hard Problem (how does non-conscious stuff produce conscious experience). Chalmer's paper is a great place to start. This is also good: https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

The pain is to some degree quantum superposition, and that is what "qualia" can refer to. The what it is like is a property of physical matter (maybe a quantum field phenomenon?), as unintuitive as it seems to our wiring mechanism corrupted brains. The matter brains are composed of is intrinsically thinking/feeling stuff, just like it has a shape, size and texture. There are more than ten thousand kinds of neurons in the human brain and their electric fields interacting with different combinations of glial cells, probably explaining much of the variety.

This sounds like panpsychism. The matter that makes up the brain is intrinsically thinking/feeling stuff? I assume you mean neurons? What about the matter what makes up the neurons? Is it thinking/feeling too?

If we're making astonishing progress, shouldn't somebody have seen something that points the way to a mechanism by now? What's your timeframe on how long we should tolerate the lack of progress on the mind/body problem before we start questioning fundamental assumptions?

I've always wondered that too.

Talk of qualia muddies the water. Take something simple, like the pain of stubbing a toe. How does the feeling of pain emerge from non-thinking/feeling stuff? Science has no answer. Science has had no answer for a long long time. I expect science to continue to flounder.

I ask the people who still hold out hope that science will explain consciousness: what do you base that hope on?

I said it was a hypothesis, not a particularly good one!

In these discussions, I really am at a loss to explain how the Dennet's and Churchlands of the world actually the believe the stuff they're saying. I think it has less to do with how they experience the world and more to do with a certain mindset that views consciousness (and everything associated with it) as "woo".

Have you heard of "aphantasia"? There are people out there who are really and truly different from other people when it comes to mental experiences. I don't see why different/lack of mental experiences can't be a hypothesis for why disagreements about stuff like qualia get so heated.

I'm sorry, I totally misread what I quoted you as saying. Must be euphoria hangover from Biden winning. I read you as saying: if science can given an explanation like evolution for why life changes, why can't it do it for consciousness and why is it taking so long?

Anyway, the reason to be maudlin about progress is because there hasn't been any (on the hard problem). We're really good at finding neural correlates to mental states, but on the questions of how are we conscious and why are we conscious, the theories are all over the place: panpsychism, mysterianism, it's-all-an-illusionism, computationalism, etc. There's no consensus on anything. The only other place this shows up in science is the lack of consensus to explain what's going on with quantum mechanics.

Yes, a person from long ago wouldn't be able to figure out why there's lightning. It may be that we're in that position regarding consciousness, and in another thousand years we'll have it nailed down, but as Isaac said

If I ask "why do we have noses" an evolutionary, or physiological account suffices as an answer, but for some reason such an account is insufficient for the 'hard problem' enthusiasts. I've yet to get clear on why.

He's right. Why is consciousness so hard for science to figure out? Why have we made essentially no progress on an explanation?

It may be that there is no answer to that question.

If materialism is right, and inanimate matter exists, there's an explanation for how it gives rise to conscious experience. We might never KNOW the explanation, but that's different than there not being an answer.

The Hard Problem isn't about explaining how consciousness arises from inanimate matter. The "easy" problem is explaining how the functions of consciousness work, easy in the sense that science already has the tools to do that. The Hard Problem is about explaining experience. It's not clear that science does have the conceptual tools for that.

What an odd thing to say. How does consciousness arise from inanimate matter? If that's not a hard problem, I guess there should be an answer to that question, right?

ETA: I see Khaled beat me to it.

That was my avatar on a politics forum!

Also, I saw a rainbow this morning for the first time since April (I live in the desert). I swear to god, there was an actual rainbow about an hour after they called it.

This is what it's like talking to these Dennet types:

Does it hurt when you stub your toe?
Qualia is incoher-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
When we talk about reporting-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
The neurological states invol-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
Define-
No, does it hurt when you stub your toe?
....................yes.
How does the brain produce that feeling of pain when you stub your toe?
It doesn't hurt when I stub my toe.

Failed at what? Was the universe required to produce life?

No, by "failed" I mean the universe would not have been life-permitting had the constants been different. I should have been clearer.

If we assume those fundamental constants could have differed, then this universe (which happens to be life permitting) is low probability - but the exact same low probability as every alternative. Each of the n possible universes had a 1/n chance of winning, so it was a certainty that the winner would be that low 1/n probability.

Setting aside issues of infinity, the set of non life-permitting universes is vastly larger than the set of life-permitting universes, so if we were surveying the multiverse (and it contained universes where the constants were different), we would very very rarely see any universes with life. Therefore, the odds of a universe being life-permitting are not the same as the alternative, as you claim.

Every lottery winner is surprised when he wins, but it's not the sort of surprise that should lead anyone to think the lottery was rigged for that outcome.

It depends on the lottery. Suppose there was a brand-new lottery created, just for you. The odds of you winning are a quadrillion to one. You win on the first try. You're going to conclude it was rigged.

The problem with the firing squad analogy is that it treats life as a target.

In the firing-squad analogy, YOU are the target. Your continued existence is surprising because it is so implausible that so many people would miss you at point-blank range. The conclusion that your execution was rigged follows from Pr("marksmen miss by chance") <! Pr("marksmen miss on purpose").

So if you assume God wanted to create life, it implies he had to finely tune the constants to meet that goal. So as an argument for God's existence, it's circular.

The firing-squad analogy isn't an argument for God. It's argument that you can, in certain situations, be surprised by discovering you're alive.

"My tablet, since you didn't like the multivariate argument, could have tipped the scales in favor of life. "

Your tablet? I have no idea what you're saying here.

Well, first you need a definition of consciousness that is distinct from unconscious, otherwise you're not making a meaningful claim. Then you study the object of doubted consciousness for whether its behaviours, which correlate to its properties, are consistent with it being conscious or unconscious. If you cannot distinguish then, again, it's a meaningless claim.

I have no idea what you said here.

Right, there is no evidence that aliens exist. So we cannot rationally discuss aliens as if they do exist.

This is different from saying, "Maybe aliens exist," and then looking for evidence that they exist. The people I've been chatting with aren't saying, "It could be that all of physics is wrong and consciousness could exist as something separate from the brain,". I would have no disagreement with that. Having an idea of what could be and looking for it are great. We would never advance our understanding of the world otherwise.

The posters that I have been discussing with are claiming that consciousness IS separate from the brain. Not a maybe, but that it just can't be from the brain. I have asked for evidence that would show this to be true, and none has been provided but speculation. Asserting the existence of one thing, and the refutation of another thing without any evidence that can be shown in the real world is a fantasy world framework.

Nonsense. The statement: "aliens, if they exist, aren't made of chocolate and don't have candy cane brains" is not irrational. It's true.

How does empiricism tell you that non-conscious stuff exists? Is there a hidden anti-panpsychist proof in empiricism?

What is your justification for assuming physical non-conscious stuff exists?

For example, lets say I proposed that all sentience was non-physical, but consisted of a substance called sentisia. I could write a complex paper that details exactly how it works, and it would be incredibly logical and work within the framework. But if I can't find sentisia in reality, if I can't demonstrate its existence and use, all I made was a fantasy world framework.

The bolded doesn't follow. Just because you can't find something in reality doesn't mean you conclude it doesn't exist, or you conclude that everything you thought about it was a "fantasy world framework". It depends on how well you search and how competent you are at searching. That's the mistake you're making.

For example, there is no evidence that aliens exist. We haven't "found any aliens in reality". Are all the papers on exobiology a "fantasy world framework"? Are all the proposed solutions to the Fermi Paradox mental masturbation? Is SETI a big waste of time? Maybe. Maybe not. We're not justified in declaring the non-existence of X just because we can't find X in reality. String theorists would certainly agree with me on that one.

To my knowledge, this matter was settled a long time ago with the aid of the ubiquitous game of chance - lotteries.

The chance of winning the jackpot in an average game of lottery maybe arounf 1/10,000,000. You have a better chance of getting hit by lightning I guess. Anyway, the point is someone always wins.

It's shocking for the winner for the simple reason that the odds of winning are near-zero. However, given the number of players, a winner is assured.

Let's take the lottery example. Suppose someone wins the lottery. No big deal. Suppose that same person wins again next week. Big deal, but it happens sometimes. Suppose they win again. And again. Eventually, you're going to conclude they're cheating or the game is rigged.

Here's another interesting example: suppose a new lottery is rolled out. On the first draw, the lottery numbers spell out the first 10 digits of Pi. That lottery would immediately be shut down because it would be obvious someone rigged it, even though a Pi result in a lottery is perfectly within the realm of chance. The reason you would shut the lottery down in the Pi example is because
Probability("fair lottery") <! Probability("rigged lottery").

The point is, the longer the odds get, the more the "cheating" hypothesis becomes viable. Another example: suppose someone shows you (what they call) a "fair coin". And they proceed to get 20 heads in a row when they flip it. That outcome COULD be chance. But nobody would believe it.

Well, if we CAN be surprised by our existence, and a life-permitting universe (any kind of life) is highly highly improbable, then the fact that we find ourselves in a life-permitting universe is surprising and needs an explanation. So far, that explanation is multiverse theory, but it's interesting that some scientists have taken umbrage with multiverse theory, claiming it's not really a theory.

No, I don't think it's any gods. The point is that your own existence CAN be considered surprising, in the firing squad scenario. Agreed? Or would you NOT be surprised to find yourself alive in such a situation?

I don't see how. Are you suggesting that logging to working memory is not a 'mental activity'?

That is logically equivalent to: you are not conscious when you are not doing reporting activities. Is that the claim you're making?
— RogueAI

Yes. That's right. You have read my explaination of what I mean by 'reporting activities'?

Of course you have an explanation of reporting activities. Reporting activities can't possibly mean reporting activities. We're talking about "reporting activities". I'll pass on that rabbit hole.

I guess I'll take you both at your word that you're not prepared to discuss it seriously and leave it at that. I wish you would've saved us some time and not engaged.
— fdrake

In what field other than the whole consciousness/qualia field is this...

no matter what arguments they give or evidence they show, you're not going to conclude you're unconscious. That would be absurd. Do you agree? Or could you be persuaded into thinking you're a zombie? No, you couldn't! You know you're conscious. How can you not know that? This is why these discussions are frustrating. You know you're not a zombie. You know nothing anyone can say to you will convince you you're a zombie.
— RogueAI

...considered an argument?

There's something I find so odd about all this. The counter-arguments to any questioning of what's going on is "but we know X, you can't deny it", and yet it's apparently the 'hard' problem? We both unquestionably know it and simultaneously find it the hardest problem in philosophy. Is God messing with us?

Isaac, do you believe it's possible you're not really conscious right now, as you're reading this? Do you think you can be talked into the belief "I am not conscious right now"? If no, then I guess what I was saying about Searle makes sense, doesn't it? There's just no evidence or argument that can persuade someone they're unconscious, is there?

If yes, and you really think it might be possible you're a p-zombie, all I can do is say, wtf? And you wouldn't be the first (self-described) p-zombie I've run into in philosophical forums. The things some people talk themselves into believing...

I said 'reports of mental activity', not 'reports of consciousness'.

OK, you're conflating mental activity with reports of mental activity. The point is the same: consciousness/mental activity is different than reports of same. Agreed?

"Are you ever conscious when you're not doing any reporting activity?"

"No, it doesn't seem so."

That is logically equivalent to: you are not conscious when you are not doing reporting activities. Is that the claim you're making?

fdrake, referencing an authority like Searle IS taking the discussion seriously (I can't find the exact quote-I think it was a Ted Talk). The point is germane: no matter what anyone says to you, no matter what arguments they give or evidence they show, you're not going to conclude you're unconscious. That would be absurd. Do you agree? Or could you be persuaded into thinking you're a zombie? No, you couldn't! You know you're conscious. How can you not know that? This is why these discussions are frustrating. You know you're not a zombie. You know nothing anyone can say to you will convince you you're a zombie. That was my entire point in paraphrasing Searle.

And I also tried to discuss this with you seriously. I'll repost:

OK, let's start with this one. I said:

" You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely"

Do you think reports of consciousness are the same thing as consciousness itself? That's absurd. What more needs to be said against that? Obviously, you can be conscious without reporting about it. Do you disagree with this?

Would you care to comment on this? Are reports of consciousness the same thing as consciousness itself? Obviously not, so Isaac's claim:

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity

is wrong, isn't it? There's more to consciousness than "just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity".

I was listening to a philosopher (I think it was Searle) who said (paraphrasing), "Imagine scientists come out with a report that says, "You know how you thought you were conscious? Turns out you're not. Here's the proof." You wouldn't believe it, no matter how good the evidence is".

That's where I'm at. There's no argument or evidence that is going to get me to think, 'Hmmm...maybe I don't have qualia after all..." Consciousness/qualia deniers are like flat-earthers. They even argue the same way, retreating into stuff like "well, I don't know what that means" when they get pressed into a corner. As I said, it's frustrating talking to such people. I probably shouldn't.

Yes. It is obviously true that reports of consciousness and consciousness itself are different things. In fact, this is so obviously true, I suspect that people who conflate the two aren't arguing in good faith, and it's frustrating.

OK, let's start with this one. I said:

You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely

Do you think reports of consciousness are the same thing as consciousness itself? That's absurd. What more needs to be said against that? Obviously, you can be conscious without reporting about it. Do you disagree with this?

You said:

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity and it's caused by the neurons which produce language, movement and other awareness-mediated responses being stimulated by the neurons constituting the processing of sensory inputs to which that awareness relates.

That's a terrible definition of consciousness. Consciousness is more than "just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity". You're conflating being conscious with reports of consciousness. They're not the same thing. Not even remotely.

You said "Reporting on mental activity isn't even a necessary condition for consciousness, let alone a sufficient one."

That claim is self-evident. Again, reporting consciousness is not the same thing as BEING conscious. Do you think it is??? What an absurdity.

To make such a claim requires (as far as I can tell) an empirical data-set which includes people being conscious but without any reporting activity going on.

Are you ever conscious when you're not doing any reporting activity? Are you ever in pain without telling anyone about it? Yes, you are.

In order to acquire that data-set you'd need a measure of consciousness so that you can tell the people with no reporting activity are nonetheless conscious. I just wanted to get clear what that measure is you're using, otherwise I can't have any real understanding of what you're saying.

You need a data-set to tell you that people are conscious even if they're not reporting it? No, you don't. That's silly.

I don't really know what 'first-person subjective experience' is in this context.

Lame.

Hundreds of years of lack of progress on something so fundamental as consciousness wouldn't be a problem for physicalism? Obviously, at some point (e.g., 10,000 years from now), lack of progress on the Hard Problem would be catastrophic for physicalism.

OK, when does the lack of progress become a problem, in your opinion? Suppose we still don't have an explanation for how brains produce consciousness 100 years from now. Is that a problem for physicalism?

I have absolutely no idea. All anyone can do, whether it's within physicalism or any alternative, is produce untestable hypotheses (guesses).

Shouldn't we have some idea, at this point? The mind-body problem has been around since Descartes' time. What progress has physicalism made in solving it?

What measure of consciousness are you using then?

We were talking about definitions, not measures. Any definition of consciousness is incomplete if it doesn't include first-person subjective experience (qualia). I'm not saying first-person subjective experience is a sufficient condition for a definition of consciousness, but it is a necessary condition. Agreed?

Consciousness is just the tendency to be able to report on mental activity and it's caused by the neurons which produce language, movement and other awareness-mediated responses being stimulated by the neurons constituting the processing of sensory inputs to which that awareness relates. I'm genuinely dumbfounded as to how or why anyone finds this in the least bit difficult to imagine.

That's an incomplete definition of consciousness. Reporting on mental activity isn't even a necessary condition for consciousness, let alone a sufficient one. Any definition of consciousness has to include first-person subjective experience.

This thread is a reading group? What do you mean?