Ditto :up:I prefer series over films for the opportunity to develop personalities and plot intricacies — jgill
I guess you didn't run down all these rabbit holes...How do we explain comprehension withmolecules and their structures? — Agent Smith
↪Agent Smith
From a Metzingerian perspectiive, "self" is a (persistently embodied) phenomenal illusion re:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/626347 — 180 Proof
You take it as a given but you don't know. I agree it's a handy heuristic, and maybe that's all it is.Of course, we have subjective experiences. — Jack Cummins
... and your / my own "mind" too – since it's also "subjective" – perhaps an introspection illusion ...We can make some guess at others' minds ...
Yet if another didn't have "inner experiences" but acted or spoke as if she did, you wouldn't – couldn't – know. It seems to me, Jack, that's not a reliable way of knowing.We know that other people have inner experiences because we are able to talk about them in a comparative way. — Jack Cummins
If by "inner experiences" what you mean is subjective, then I don't see what about them can possibly be called "common" (i.e. public, objective). :chin:... common aspects of such experience.
Tell me how do you know that any other human being than yourself has "inner experiences". None of the concepts in the OP make clear how you (or anyone) can know that.... the inner experiences of human beings — Jack Cummins
Equivocating non sequitur. :roll:If I rubbed two sticks together and consciousness emerged that would be an emergent property but it would also be magic and inexplicable like neurons firing creating consciousness. — Andrew4Handel
The article offers a further reading reference, not an argument. I gave an example of how 'a whole greater than the sum of its parts' is the most ordinary, least mysterious thing (again, such as semantics of a sentence). It's a mystery to me, Andrew, how any numerate person would find emergence – nonlinear dynamic (i.e. chaotic) processes or systems – "mysterious".↪180 Proof You didn't cite any of the article.
So tell us what you think ...The issue which I am trying to think about is how these concepts emerged and inform thinking, especially in relation to human consciousness. — Jack Cummins
Just as this sentence consisting of individually meaningless letters conveys meaning. :roll:How can a group (the brain) consisting of stuff that can't understand (neurons) understand? — Agent Smith
I don't think so. 'Future self' is 'present self's' handiwork (or wreckage). Insofar as there's a "blueprint", it's the 'past self' that both enables and constrains the 'present self' – that genetic-existential hand each one of us is dealth at birth when "into this world we're thrown".In other words, does future self exist from the beginning as a blueprint? — Jack Cummins
Well, aren't facts (non-tautologous) truth-makers?I'm uncomfortable with the word truth. — Tom Storm
There's no good reason to think 'suffering' is not a moral fact?I don't have good reason to think there are moral truths or moral facts ... — Tom Storm
... moksha :fire:Cancel my subscription to the
Resurrection ...
Isn't each one of us simultaneously and fluidly a 'past-self, present-self, future-self' imbedded in, or enabled and constrained by, some 'past-population, present-population, future-population' – a heteronomous rather than autonomous agent (i.e. existent)? Consider this old thread ...The question of a stable sense of 'self' for philosophy or living is an interesting dilemma. — Jack Cummins
"Who" you are is constituted by your personal and social relationships. Self-identity (ego) supervenes on self-continuity (embodiment). And, like an orchestra after the final encore of an evening's symphony performance, your (everyone's) identity's constitution dissipates due to entropy into oblivion "postmortem". Anicca —> anatta, no?Who am I and what happens to me (postmortem)? — Agent Smith
Kant's idea is that phenomena – representations – "conform to" categories of reason (not "things" & "thoughts", respectively). If you understand it, it undercuts idealism.To me, the absolutely crucial thing about Kant is his recognition that 'things conform to thoughts' rather than vice versa. I still think very few people really get the significance of that. If you understand it, it completely undercuts 'scientism'. — Wayfarer
:fire:the subject/object dichotomy is the private/public dichotomy dismantled by the private language argument. — Banno
It's not an "argument"; Schopenauer takes his extension of Kant's 'phenomena-noumena' distinction (à la Plato's 'appearances-forms' & Descartes' 'subject-object' / 'mind-body') as axiomatic and stipulates this 'idea' in the first sentence of the World As Will and Representation (vol. one): "The world is MY representation (Die Welt ist MEINE Vorstellung)."I do not understand this argument. — KantDane21
:rofl:... practical applications of philosophical concepts. — Gnomon
:clap: :smirk:... you have just labelled YOUR 'god-model of Enformationism,' confirming that your proposals are modelled on god posits. God of the gaps imo. — universeness
:100:Nothing in 'material' science, is accepted 'meekly,' or 'without question,' that only happens in theism or mysticism. We observe intent and purpose in lifeforms like humans. We observe 'natural processes' in spacetime that happened due to very large variety combining in every way possible, over a very large timescale.
If by "democracy" you also mean economic democracy, then I agree. :up:If you 'don't believe' in democracy, then you must never be given any political power.
:lol: Too much woo for me.Have you read Capra's Tao of physics?
If you have, was it worth reading? — universeness
