Fuck you, 3017. — tim wood
Abandon hope of reason — tim wood
cannot make myself think in a way that is not what i'm now. — substantivalism
apply further aspects of your worldview without elaboration as to how they do apply to me lest a straw-man is created. — substantivalism
no i've just seen later examples of William Lane Craig in his arguments or snippets of debates along with external knowledge as to his character that haven't exactly made me appreciate him as much. Perhaps in years previous he wasn't as much so. — substantivalism
Back when I wasn't alive and William Lane Craig didn't seem as much of a dunce. — substantivalism
It's arbitrary what axioms you accept and the conclusions you draw given a previous system within which to do so. — substantivalism
I was talking generally about the categories of our experiences, the nature of them, and the abstractions covering them in which perhaps a contradiction does reveal itself to one but not to all nor pervades an entire category. Though, it isn't too far a stretch to say that other conscious experiences could be so distinct to the point that even the logical structure of them was different (different axioms are accepted). — substantivalism
Okay. — substantivalism
All right. Assuming that time is in nature, how is it a paradox? — tim wood
Might as well, it's all you seem to want or understand: Fuck you, 3017. — tim wood
Yes, descriptions of our reality and further arbitrary abstractions to model its behvaior. — substantivalism
In all cases IF a true paradox exists in one that may not mean that it exists in another. — substantivalism
In all cases IF a true paradox exists in one that may not mean that it exists in another. — substantivalism
Ahem, are we on repeat now? — substantivalism
state it and believe what i've stated so it's objective. . . what would make it subjective? — substantivalism
Experiences are what they are. . . recall the mirage of palm trees out in the distance with a pool of water. Whether or not our abstract models makes such an experience consistent with previous ones and the meanings of the words involved the experience of said mirage is as real as you'll get. What gives rise to experiences is truly unknown but the experiences themselves and the relationships they have to each other are not. It's just as real to experience an imaginary friend as your actual friend but while they are just as "real" it would be a rather large lapse in judgement to designate them as the same experiences simpliciter. — substantivalism
Non-sequitor, fool. No one asked you about time. — tim wood
Challenge: Paradox and uncertainty are not the same thing. What is an example of a paradox in nature? (Noun, not adjective.) — tim wood
Might as well, it's all you seem to want or understand: Fuck you, 3017. Glad to engage at your level. LOL. — tim wood
I'd also preface that you do not seem to note the difference between that which is merely undecidable and that which is paradoxical with both being rather distinguished ideas. — substantivalism
What laws of nature? You mean the regularities or patterns in our experience because if that is what we value to navigate our experiences then contradictions explicitly would put a wrench in doing anything if we didn't pay attention to what predictably occurs or is. — substantivalism
The model would be contradictory or incomplete but to say consciousness is paradoxical or doesn't abide by formal laws of logic would be childishly over the top nearly violating the explicit wall there is between our experiences and the nature of what gives rise to them. — substantivalism
What have I been saying this whole time? That our experiences are the only data we can use and speculate about the experience of the unexperienced (skeptical scenarios) will result in arbitrariness. Only that which informs us of what may happen next or what happens in the case of this collection of experiences or questions about or within our abstract models themselves are all that seems to matter here — substantivalism
It seems that way but we're (especially you) asking meta-questions about our system and we can only remain within this system to ask questions with the system — substantivalism
Why you would add anything as such is up to you and your arbitrary/restricted preferences. — substantivalism
It's right now (however we've defined it to be) and if I didn't give rise to them then what isn't me did. — substantivalism
Only what I experience as all that gives rise to our experiences or is those experiences I consider natural. — substantivalism
Paradox and uncertainty are not the same thing. What is an example of a paradox in nature? (Noun, not adjective.) — tim wood
And nothing natural about Godel's undecidability proof. He described systems that meet certain criteria and proved that within that (those) systems it is possible to create a proposition, often called G, that from within the system neither it nor its negation are provable, thus undecidable from within the system. This is, however, far from being undecidable, and indeed G is easily decided, from outside - it's true. — tim wood
Godel's ideas, then, or those that make it to public awareness, are for the ignorant, apparently yourself, a kind of snake oil/voodoo in the same sense that many other difficult ideas are for people who cannot or will not understand them but like to ignorantly use them to attempt to prove nonsense.
So, no. I am not trolling, but rather calling out the ignorant troll, you! Lol. — tim wood
You persist in mentioning Godel (among other things). However, caveat-warning, based on what you say, you do not understand him or his argument. — tim wood
ask yourself why hold onto this model if it contradicts it or postulates the existence of experiences not yet had (nor presently capable of being shown possible). — substantivalism
If you are to fudge a model to allow for your Jesus then you most be truthful about the application of said model to other similar entities while respecting core meanings. Further, it's a wonder of mine of whether what you could say ontologically/metaphysically through your christian existentialism I or anyone else could just as easily translate (language wise or theory wise) into a form of physicalism/panpsychism/objective idealism/subjective idealism/process philosophy/etc. Is metaphysics so conventional? — substantivalism
Only that it does and correlates with certain experiences (there is no reason to postulate its independency from external factors or its dependency but there are strong correlations). — substantivalism
Don't know the true nature of these experiences — substantivalism
Abstract models merely are further combinations of concepts that we possess now and continue to learn formulated in such a way that they are implied to be certain aspects of our experience. Giving the three letter word red to the experience of seeing such a color. — substantivalism
isn't platonism and it was never meant to be deductive but inductively/abductively strong. — substantivalism
You experience wonderment but I do not have a feeling of creating it directly only one of passive interaction when the right set of experiences arise. — substantivalism
fact that I don't know means there is something beyond me that gives rise to such experiences. — substantivalism
The idea of constructing better abstract models of reality and waiting for them to break. Acknowledging their success but aware that they merely describe a black box and that their time could be up at anytime.
Going back to the actual reply the first thing covered was an explication of semantics. We can or could define natural in such a way that it precludes such supernatural distinctions. The second was just me clarifying the other common philosophical position on natural laws. Not sure you got this or not. — substantivalism
Did you create your knowledge or gave rise to these foundations? If the answer is more or less univocally no or probably no then it had to come from that which isn't "you". From outside. . . from experience. . . from the reality's interactions with itself or what was to become "you". — substantivalism
I've given rise to myself so what is likely is that the nature of my existence comes from outside (not me). — substantivalism
I still await to see a full conclusion that it isn't our concepts or abstract models which confuse us (give rise to contradictions) and it's the nature (the thing that's inaccessible) is fundamentally contradictory. — substantivalism
I was talking about how some may define natural differently in such a manner that they wouldn't require the label supernatural. There I was clarifying that experiences alone aren't what's natural but what is natural is an umbrella term covering those experiences and what gives rise to them. It's just different ways of approaching the definition of the terms here.
For natural laws here or laws of nature i'd take a regulative stance and merely state that certain features of cognitive awareness/connection to insinuating experiences/having said experiences retain many numerous experiential correlations. — substantivalism
You can only use your own experiences; what else would there be? — substantivalism
I can only conclude to holding a form of epistemological idealism with pragmatic/scientific methodology to guide me from general experiences to other general/abstract conclusions made from them. — substantivalism
Again, as i've said numerous times before, we CANNOT know the true nature of our experiences (this includes a sort of Berkley idealism in which experiences in of themselves are all that they are) as we are only aware of the affects that such experiences have on "us" and the abstract conclusions made thereafter. — substantivalism
For example, the implication is often that the concept of nothing existing is somehow self-inconsistent, and therefore a physical universe must necessarily exist. — Mijin
natural experiences but what gives rise to and are experiences (what they do or how they do it) are what is natural. — substantivalism
Not to mention this experience would have to be replicated and investigated to rule out other possible factors as well as whether it was entirely "psychological". In that if we replicate it with numerous bystanders would he be the sole one experiencing it and all others at a loss? — substantivalism
Natural is what exists and either is or gives rise to our experiences. — substantivalism
Historical figures (assuming were talking about real ones here) = "potential" encounters not unlike other people we've experienced. — substantivalism
Though, others have defined natural in such a manner that dealing in the supernatural (using such a term) would be redundant or useless as a distinction. — substantivalism
you saying that a person talking to another person is equivalent to imagining they are talking to a person? What is that you are trying to say here. . . was Jesus a "real" person or not (not purely a fictional one but a potential "human" experience the same as talking to a friend of yours). — substantivalism
We are stuck to our pragmatic empirical methodologies however and thusly cannot answer said question as only questions about experiences themselves as well as their relations can then be taken seriously. — substantivalism
So can you argue through a pragmatic scientific investigation of your experiences that there was a potential possibility in the past of having held an experience of a human being called Jesus? Imagining talking to an acquaintance and "actually" talking to an acquaintance are two different experiences which we can distinguish. . . which one is Jesus (the purely imagined or the purely "real"). — substantivalism
It is humanistic values coupled with advances in knowledge that makes people's lives better.
6m — JerseyFlight
True purpose. — TheLeviathanKing
) zero is useful, but nothing — Gregory
Nothing’ is only meaningful as the negation of ‘something’. If nothing existed, then ‘nothing’ would be meaningless. — Wayfarer
Perceptions of reality. phenomenon seems to fit the bill. — TheMadFool
is that systems of this kind will be either incomplete or inconsistent. — Janus
for racism in varying circles of Trump supporters, I cannot find any connection, ideological or otherwise, to Trump’s agenda, and I think that’s the reason many of the racist activist types are disillusioned with Trump. In the end they’ve been duped by the Dems and their media wing. — NOS4A2
I was never concerned about the alt-right. I was more concerned about the free press they and other such groups were given. — NOS4A2
So without the object being apperceived, it’s not that nothing happens, rather it’s that nothing is understood to happen - except perhaps an unexplained feeling or emotion. — Possibility
and the imagination of a possible aesthetic idea is not contingent upon understanding of any determinable concept. — Possibility
You’re applying Kant’s theory of aesthetics to a human subject reduced first to appearance, to the status of mere object, which then becomes the concrete form in which this ‘something abstract’ is expressed. — Possibility
When you recognise that this initial judgement of ‘beauty’ has nothing at all to do with realising a human potentiality for Love, then get back to me. — Possibility
No empirical statements (propositions proper) can be proven to be true, but we can, in principle at least, check to see if they are.
Also I think you are misusing Gödel. His Incompleteness — Janus