Thank you for all your contributions in attempting to find greater clarity on this issue, It feels, however, if we are still only busy to encircle the problem - and I, myself, being in one of those circles.
I've considered everything said thus far and want at this point to propose another approach. I must immediately mention that you might find me guilty of trying to oversimplify things and it might be true, but it has always been my view that professional philosophers tend to make issues too complex, thereby alienating many people from this subject. My objective has always been to try and make philosophy as accessible as possible to as many people as possible, but thereby not denying that there are issues in this subject which are really complex.
(a) The realism / anti-realism distinction: this should be viewed as a distinction belonging to metaphysics, and more specifically to ontology: the emphasis here is after all on the "existence" of things. Therefore, the more mind-dependent a thing becomes for it to exist, the more anti-realistic it becomes for it to retain its existence status. Moving in the opposite direction things are becoming more realistic as far as their existence status is concerned.
(b) The constructivism / anti-constructivism distinction: this is more of an epistemological type of distinction: the emphasis is here on a-priory knowledge of the knower of a subject / experience and how much this a-priory knowledge influences his view / understanding of the subject / experience. Therefore, the greater the impact of his a-priory knowledge, the more constructivistic his view / understanding becomes. The opposite situation in this case will lead to knowledge which will be more anti-constructivistic.
What do you think? How far can we get with this one? Can it be, perhaps to some extend if then not fully, or is it doomed to sink as a whole? One thing that bothers me here is: am I not busy here trying to make out a case for metaphysics being dependent on epistemology?

Yes, I think that its necessary that I give you some background about the origin of this question. Quite a number of years back I did courses in Religious Studies. One of the compulsory papers was "Mysticism and Religion". Fairly recently I decided that a reread of some of the text books used in these courses could be of some value to me. It started with reading "Mysticism, Mind and Consciousness" by Robert Forman. In this book Forman takes an anti-constructivistic position in regard to so-called "mystical experiences - events experienced by people belonging to the different religions of the world. Forman's opponents, including people like Wainwright, Smart, Hick, Penelhum, Gill, Proudfoot and especially Steven Katz is viewed by Forman as "constructivists". Forman defines "constructivism" as follows: "Constructivism is the view that in significant ways the mystic's conceptual and linguistic scheme determines, shapes, and/or constructs his or her mystical experiences". I think that it is clear from this definition that "constructivism" refers to experiences which are all in some way or another mind dependent. Opposed to this view is Forman's defence of his own anti-constructivistic position. I think that
the closest that Forman comes to explaining this position, is by his reference to "pure conscious events". This, according to him, happens when consciousness becomes aware of itself, it is becoming conscious of being conscious.
However, please bear in mind that the above is just to give you some background and not to argue for or against Forman's position - enough has already been written on this topic. After having read the book, my thoughts returned to "constructivism" and the possibility of applying this concept to other fields of philosophy, especially epistemology and also to some extend to metaphysics, instead of limiting its usage to mysticism. Thinking about knowledge, how, why and what we know, took me back to the old controversy between empiricism and rationalism and how Kant reconciled these two positions with his transcendental idealism. What Kant is saying is that we can know phenomena by means of perception and reason although we cannot know phenomena as they are in themselves. In other words, our minds plays a part / is involved in our knowledge of phenomena and is this way "constructivistic" in obtaining knowledge of the phenomena that we know. So far, so good?
My mind goes along avenues and arrives at the realism / anti-realism distinction. I open my "Oxford Companion to Philosophy" and read Timothy Williamson's article on this topic. The most important point which I think Williamson is making, is his view that both "realism" and "anti-realism" are not positions, but directions: The more mind-dependent a thing becomes for it to exist, the more anti-realistic it becomes. Let's take the contents of our dreams when we are sleeping as an example of moving quite strongly in an anti-realistic direction, Looking with others at a concrete object like a tree and agreeing that it exists to some extend independently of our minds is an example of moving in a realistic direction.
Perhaps I've succeeded with this explanation to make it clear why I have a problem with the nature of the relationship between "constructivism" and "anti-realism" Your views/comments to make this clearer to me will be appreciated.

I must apologize for submitting this question twice: to "general philosophy" as well as to "metaphysics & epistemology". Thank you.

Jack, I must congratulate you, because I discern something of the true philosophical spirit in your writing, the one taking us back to Socrates where he declares that he knows nothing and wants to learn, in other words a spirit of humbleness. This example set by that great mind is today still just as valid as it to used to be when he was still alive, but, alas, how do we have to search to find it in our contemporary world!
Regarding psychology: it is one of many of the newer sciences that developed out of philosophy and its origin can perhaps be traced back to Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) with his pragmatic approach to human behaviour / conduct viewing it as a phenomenon which can be objectively measured.
However, in an attempt to comment on some of the aspects raised in your question on human nature, I will have to refer to anthropology, and more specifically philosophical anthropology. In this branch of philosophy the emphasis is not on empirical-factual scientific data about certain aspects of a human being, eg medical science, specific social customs of various groups of people, but rather on trying to understand man as man in distinction of other existing things.

Let's take a few examples from the history of philosophy where attempts were made to answer this fundamental question about man. Please take note that this is nothing more than a superficial attempt to point out certain different positions - of course it does not pretend to be anything more.

1) Naturalism: man is nothing more than a segment of nature, a highly developed animal in spite of the fact that he is intellectually so much more/higher developed than the highest developed animals.
2) Idealism: man is a conscious thinking being, essentially rational.
3) Existentialism: a being caught up in a never ending "religious" struggle in freely choosing and becoming what he can be. Related key themes: anxiety, subjectivity, alienation, absurdity, authenticity.
4) Marxism: man is primarily a labourer: physical labour being the only way leading to the fulfillment of his physical needs with all other needs being denied or rated as inferior.

Thank you, Jack, for this thread - think it is a very important one if I understand your use of the concept of "human nature" correctly. Are you asking the following question: what is man in his unity and totality? What is his origin, essence and destiny? What is his place within the whole of reality? If this is your quest, you have succeeded in pointing out the major theme of philosophical anthropology. Is this what you actually have in mind with your question, or do you, perhaps, have something else in mind?

This is a very interesting line of thinking. Lets keep it in the Christian vein to make it clearer. We go back to the creation of man as described in Genesis. What we have, is man being a perfect being. "God" looks "down" at him/her and finds it impossible to accept this perfect state of being of man. Why? This perfect being is self-sufficient, has no need for "God" and is actually nothing less than a god unto himself. For "God" this won't do - he needs to be needed. The only way "to be needed" is to bring in / create an event which will put man in the position where his situation is changed fundamentally: changed to a situation of being permanently in need of "God". How is that to be done? Confront him with evil and give him the "freedom" to choose for or against it. But in his omniscience, "God" knows in advance what man's choice will be: he will choose "evil", thereby fulfilling "Gods" need. Now man is a lost being doomed to be condemned forever. This drastically different situation of man now makes it possible for "God" to come forward and to declare that man needs to be saved / redemption. Now God can intervene even further by sending his "son" to die for our sins so that those of us who believe in him can have everlasting life! And all of this, because "God" is such a "merciful" being! But, also, all of this, because "God" needed this - that we need him. Therefore, "God" had to make use of evil in order to accomplish what he wanted to accomplish. So "good" use can in fact be made be implementing evil - at least in some (exceptional) cases? The only remaining questing is: why did "God" need man's need for him? I think we can only speculate on this one: was everything just too boring for "God"? Is he like us: we all have the need to be needed by others in order to exist meaningfully? Was he perhaps in a way jealous when he saw the self- sufficiency which had been created by him? I keep wondering about this one, because of the implications, should this possibly be true!

Pfhorrest, "stuff" is too materialistic to limit things to that. But, then, the material can, of course, never be excluded. SohistiCat and bongo fury: too much syntaxis: once you get stuck into this there's no chance of escape - the ways and means of the analytical school must be applied more prudently. Possibilty, you've really impressed me with your approach. I like your idea of viewing "things" in terms of "dimensions". It seems to me that what you are doing, is to provide us with a model of reality. (With a "model" I mean a representation of reality, and not reality itself - yes, Kant's old "noumenon".) The way in which you describe your "dimensions" shows a clear interdependence between the "dimensions" and reminds me very much of Buddhism's "interdependent origination" of all things. Therefore, we can perhaps add a seventh "dimension" to your scheme of "things" and call it "interrelatedness".

Thank you Antidote. On your first point: I have to agree with Heidegger that our arrival in this world is one of being "thrown" into existence - without being given the option of non-arrival. Your second point: the empirical element must always be borne in mind when we think of how we acquire knowledge. But, on the other hand, the important role of rationalism in this process can never be ignored - Descartes' "res cogitans" is just too strong for that!
I get the impression that you are suggesting that "things" should be restricted to include only (concrete?) objects known by means of empirical perception. Is that what you are in fact suggesting or am I getting you wrong on this point?

Seagull, thank you, quite a brilliant move you are making here! You seem to be attempting to turn Sartre on his head: we are before we are anything - existence precedes essence. You know, Sartre remains one of my heroes in philosophy - like my old time heroes in western movies, actors like John Wayne, Clint Eastwood, Charles Bronson et al. Sartre may be gone, but never ever forgotten. Or, perhaps, you are excluding human subjects in your reference to things. If that is the case, we have one "thing" which is not a "thing": the human subject. But, if this is true, it implies that "things" are in a way that put them beyond the grasp of logical laws? I refer here specifically to the law of non-contradiction, unless we admit that there are different types of things. But in that case we will need a classification system for "things". If you agree, do you have any ideas on how to approach such a system? Or is such a system perhaps slightly beyond us - implying that our "cognitive closure" is rising on the horizon, or maybe not yet?

If that is the case, that fictitious things exist in the form of ideas about things, then it can be asked why it is that these ideas are not "things"? Example: a psychologist listens to the "ideas" of green dragons his patient is experiencing. In exasperation he says: "we must help you to get rid of all these funny "things" happening inside your head". Isn't it perhaps a matter of being able to distinguish between different types of things? And that therefore, an idea is a type of thing?

TheMadFool. I think you don't understand what I am trying to say. I will make another attempt and approach it slightly differently. On the one hand it is possible to distinguish a person's history. That is what a biographer will do when writing the biography of eg a well-known politician: he will record all the important events of this person's life and present them as facts, mostly objective ones, in a chronological sequence. In this sense the term "history" is used in a way where it can be "distinguished" in the subject's life and people will be talking about his history - in other words referring to him/her as "having" a history. The main point here is that although a subject's history can be "distinguished" theoretically as in a biography, this way of looking at history is a superficial way of doing it and creates a false image of what a person's history really is at a more fundamental level. Although the subject's history can be distinguished, it can never be "separated" from him/her, because it is intrinsically a "part" of him/her. It is in fact so close to him/her that this person cannot be the being who he/she is without this history. This "history" is what has "made" him/her the person who he/she is. (And I'm not using the word "made" in a deterministic sense.). To express this extremely close relationship between subject and history we can state that the subject is what he/she has become in his/her history. Therefore he/she is his/her history. In this sense (human) being is identified with history, emphasizing history's role in the nature of human being. I hope this attempt has contributed at least something to make my position clearer? (Bearing in mind that it might be that I haven't succeeded in my attempt.)

Charles, I agree. Sartre can be very confusing and even self-contradictory. Sorry than I am not able to give explicit answers to your questions. However, there's one thing about Sartre I always remind myself of when struggling to understand him: everything he says about consciousness, being, nothingness, the subject, objects and others always presupposes (sometimes only implicitly) "being-for-itself". There's never a chance for him getting away from this "fact"!

It sounds as if some of you are attempting to ban "G/god" from this forum. But, once you try this, you will soon find how futile such an attempt can be - it will be equal to nothing less than trying to ban death from life! (Irrespective of your belief / non-belief in such a reality / non-reality.)

It can be helpful to bear in mind, when discussing this distinction that we are moving within the field of existentialism - although Sartre never wanted to be known as an existentialist. What Sartre is attempting here is a distinction between "thing" (comparable to Kant's noumenon) and subject.
Being-in-Itself (the "en-soi") refers to all non-human entities / objects / material things. This category of being represents real / actual existence: these "things" are what they are. In other words, the are not what they can become. Their existence coincide / is identical with what they are at any given moment. Although these existents represent actual (full) existence they are not aware of this being the case as they lack consciousness of anything, also of their being in existence. In contrast to this category of existence Being-for-Itself (the "pour-soi") is aware / conscious of their being in-the-world. These existents (subjects) are not what they are, because they are forever what the can become. Not being fully existing means that in the awareness of the full existence of any "thing", there is at the same time also the awareness of not being that thing. For this consciousness of not being this or that thing Sartre uses the term "neantisation": in my being of awareness of a thing I am at the same time also "neantisitating" that thing by affirming my being not that (thing).
In making a deeper analysis of this Sartrean distinction you will definitely find that it becomes problematical - so much so that its validity can be questioned. Hope my attempt to give this short overview of the distinction gives you a better idea of what it entails.

"Cogito Ergo Sum". According to prof John Cottingham (Reading) in the "Oxford Companion to Philosophy" this is perhaps the most celebrated philosophical dictum of all time. Perhaps someone on this forum feels like doing a master's dissertation on the topic - especially if the era of the Enlightenment is what turns you on!

Yes, bring in the "kielbasa"!
There's just one thing, before you do that, to bear in mind. Ancient philosophy - west and east - had its beginnings with the appeal to the Rational in man - and that has never changed! (If you try to change that the whole discipline collapses - full stop

aRealidealist. (1)"Thus no presumption, but immediate perception". Immediate perception here is strongly subjective and Descartes must have realised this; therefore his attempt to construct a more rational and objective proof for existence.
(2) ".....it is impossible that he should think without existing". Exactly. Therefore - because thinking without existing is impossible - thinking proofs that we exist! (With all its further implications …..)

Terrapin Station. It seems, if I understand you correctly, that proving P is like proving A, M, Y and Z. If that is the case and P is equal to existence, it seems that a category mistake is being made, because P is the prerequisite for any other attributes like A,M,Y and Z to exist and therefore belongs to a different logical category. I fail to see why it is needed "that one must doubt that P is quite the false dichotomy". Some clarification on this point will be helpful.

With our creations "limping" all the way - can that be a case of creating "god" on earth? Aren't we rather creating the opposite?

Yes, its just that I can't find that address right now. (Just between you and me, are you working with her?)

Bronson. In stealing from Descartes you are making the same mistake that he made in his "Meditations". The "existing I " whose existence needs to be proved, is used as a premise to prove its existence. In other words, its a logical fallacy - the "petitio principii". (But, granted, superficially viewed, it looks like a perfectly valid argument.)

Banno. The reason to doubt your existence is a consequence of the difficulty to proof your existence. Even old Descartes felt this to be a prerequisite for going anywhere - only after achieving this "certainty" was he ready for "conquering" greater things.

Also bear in mind, at the back of your mind, that any certainty about really "existing" (i.e. self-existence) might be less certain than we think. We might, after all, be nothing more than non-existents.

Wayfarer. I want to thank you - for bringing the "supernatural" element in Buddhism to my attention. It is, alas, the case that the existence of these elements cannot be denied. You know, in the academic study of this religion the emphasis is so strong on its philosophical aspects: themes such as the "emptiness" of all things, the no soul doctrine, the reconciliation of the "no soul doctrine" with the need for liberation from "samsara", the interdependence of all things and others. This involvement in the "higher levels" of Buddhism unfortunately leads to a neglect of aspects which belong to the level of personal "spiritual" experience which is also important, because of its providing us with a fuller picture of the true nature of this religion. I, therefore, have to change my position as far as Buddhism is concerned and view it as a religion. But, we are still in the process of seeking criteria which can be used to distinguish a philosophy from a religion. Perhaps you have more ideas in this regard which you want to share.

Thank you for all your constructive reactions so far, and, of course, the further one goes along with this line of exploration, the more complicated it seems to become. The one criterion which I think is a "sine qua non" for any set / system of coherent ideas to qualify as a religion is that a "Supernatural Element" must be present in that system. (This, of course, doesn't imply that any idea or concept which is merely supernatural constitutes a religion - much more is needed.) You may be able to indicate e.g. "prayer", "revelation", "authority" and others as key elements of a "religious system", but without reference to a supernatural element you don't have a religion. That is why, in the case of Buddhism, I feel more inclined to view it as a philosophy, because, in studying Buddhism, I could never detect anything supernatural in it, especially if one goes back to its original ideas in Theravada which is most probably the closest you can get to the Buddha's teachings. (I realize that I'm attempting to walk on "thin ice" by stating this, but so be it.)

Philosophy is serious business and especially so in the case of the Krishnamurti thread / threat. But, sometimes, a bit of humour can't do any harm. Therefore, I want to refer you to the second Krishnamurti, if you don't know about him. He is known as U.G. Krishnamurti. There are a number of posts about him on the net. Please read and enjoy!

BrianW. Exactly, the abyss cannot gaze into you without your being there to be gazed into - no abyss possible without you. So "you" are needed twice: to gaze and to be gazed into - how central "you" are in this situation!

Wayfarer. Thank you for your comments. About K's being a philosopher and his subjectivism: although he never claimed to be a philosopher it is impossible for him to escape from an "underlying, implicit philosophy" which become clear in an evaluative and critical study of his thought. Why "subjectivism"? If you take a careful look at this "dissolving" of the subject, it is an attempt to "dissolve" the ego from being an entity separate from itself. In other words, overcoming the dualistic sense of self constituting it as being monistic in its essence, but then still being nothing more than a subject - therefore my emphasis on the "subjectivistic" nature of all his teachings. Don't know if you will agree with me on this one?

For what's it worth I can tell you something about my own experience with Krishnamurti. It was many years ago, between 30 and 40, that I met him in my local library. The title: "The First and Last Freedom". I was impressed, deeply impressed - here, at last, was the answer to so many questions - a writer able to penetrate to the very core of life's issues and mysteries! After that I started with his "Notebooks" completing all three of them. At that stage I developed what I want to call a "Krishnamurtian method of thinking" which lasted for a few years. Now, years later, looking back, the question is, what was it about this man that made him so special at that stage of my life. The first, and the last thing about him to always bear in mind, is that he has an almost "uncanny" ability to draw you into his way of thinking doing this in a psychological way which is so convincing, because it is pretends to be nothing else than pure philosophical thinking. The key concept which is always implicitly present in all his writings is "subjectivism": everything about which he argues in his "dialogues" is eventually reduced to some type of subjectivism. This element features so strongly in all his writings that I doubt if objective reality plays anything more but a very minor role in his thought. Finally be warned: the spell that he casts can be a strong one and once entangled escape may be a harder one than you think!

The pity of this discussion: all the "Ad Hominem's". The most elementary of all the informal logical fallacies to understand, yet so easily the most difficult one to avoid. Old Jiddu most be laughing in his grave / ashes reading this!

Thank you for all your constructive contributions to this conversation. We must remember that any conversation about "God" is nothing more than an attempt to find an "opening" - fortunately finalisation remains out of the question - a 100 years from now this discussion will still be continuing and running strong!

Fooloso4. What you are saying is interesting. With my reference to a special Being, neither singularity nor plurality is important, because the attempt is to point out existence - modes of existence are of secondary importance. (I am fully aware of the polytheism of, for instance, the ancient Greeks and Romans.) I'm not sure that I understand what you mean with "an assumption based on a notion of agency". What we do find among the ancients is an obsession with death and the search for immortality. Allow me to give you one example of this: the well-known "Gilgamesh Epic" - probably written around 2100 BCE. According to Jastrow (Jastrow, M. 1971. Religious beliefs in Babylonia and Assyria.) the whole poem can be summarised as follows:
"Gilgamesh, whereto are you going in such a hurry?
The life that you are seeking you will not find.
When the gods created man,
they determined death for man.
Life they took for themselves."
To me it is clear that one of the roots of this psychological need man developed for such a special Being can be found in his sense of own mortality.

Yes, the Tao - another example of a highly abstract idealistic metaphysical theory. (Perhaps a possible way to approach it: naming / indicating everything under and above the "sun" and, after having done this, to assume that none of them indicated can ever be the Tao, the Tao being that which is not part of "everything", being beyond it.)

Perhaps the issue that I've started to discuss here should not be approached by attempting to proof or disproof "God's existence". We all know the arguments for and against and it never leads to any real insight. My view is to start with the "condition" of man and making an attempt to develop this along existential lines. This "condition" I'm referring to, needs no proof, but instead only to be pointed out / indicated: it is either clear to you when pointed out, or, if you are lucky, never to be the case for you. Starting with Camus, I think, will be appropriate: on the one hand, there is man with all needs: from his basic physical needs for pure survival to his spiritual need for intrinsic meaning in life. On the other hand we find the "world" in which man has to live: a universe which is "cold" and completely indifferent towards these needs of man. This situations constitutes, what Camus calls, "absurdity". We have different options to react to this. For Camus it can be suicide - either literally or philosophically - or accept this as a challenge to go forth and create the meaning ourselves that we need to live meaningfully. If you read his "Myth of Sisyphus" it will give you a better idea of his views on this issue. Then, there is Kierkegaard who with his "leap of faith" turns to the Christian God in his attempt to overcome this fundamentally absurd condition of man. For Sartre with his distinction between the "for-itself" and the "in-itself", essence is preceded by existence, meaning that we already are before we are anything specific placing us in a position to continue choosing what we are to become while at the same time being reduced to nothingness, because in my being-conscious-of- whatever thing, I am also conscious of my not-being-that. However, for Sartre, we are in being always confronted by choices, "doomed" to freedom - there is never any possibility of escaping it, and this is the cause of our experiencing life as filled by "anguish". The last example is Heidegger. Let's focus briefly on his view of the nature of our fundamental existence: being "thrown" into existence, because we have no choice in wanting to be born / not to be born, we are "nullified", because we cannot have to bear any responsibility for anything we do / not do in our lives. This "nullification" goes even further, because we have to face the inevitable possibility of our own death / mortality, being our ultimate possibility because, in the realization of this possibility all other possibilities for us are forever cancelled / nullified. This ultimate possibility is faced by us with dread (Angst), because we experience it with "discomfort" of an extreme nature. We have no other choice, but having to face all of this!
With the exception of Kierkegaard, with his "leap of faith", which I view as an example of "creating God", all the other philosophers point out different ways in which we can "handle" our fundamental condition. One thing that all these "different ways" have in common, is they are hard / tough ways to face what we have to face - indeed very hard / tough! If this is the case, doesn't it make it so much more likely / probable than man will choose in favour of "God"? It has this one big advantage that in being able to create Him in the way want to, we can create Him in such a way that our existence can be meaningful in a very fundamental sense?

TheMadFool. I agree with what you are stating in your last post. But there's one thing that remains baffling and amazing to me. It is the way Christians view this state affairs. When misery / tragedy strikes, they argue that they deserve nothing better - this is what they truly always deserve. When they, on the other hand, manage to avoid negative events in their lives, it is always the result of God's "mercy". In other words, even our best efforts / deeds in live are only worthy of God's punishment / damnation if based on merit. "Mercy" is something which can never be deserved - something to be bestowed upon us only, and only if God "wills" it. What the condition is for God "willing" this is always unknown!

My personal view. I don't think its possible. I agree with Colin Mcginn where he says that we suffer from "cognitive closure". There are some things that we don't understand now which we will understand later as we make progress. But then, there are things which. I believe, we will never be able to fully grasp / understand eg. what consciousness is; complete self-understanding; infinity and quite a few others, including a full understanding of the "complexity" concept. So, I subscribe to mysterianism (and, please not "mysticism".)

Bartricks. I can't see how, for one moment, the element of "contingency" can be ignored / side-stepped when moral principles are at stake. To concept of "morality" cannot be restricted to being an abstraction, because it has to find some application in practical reality, and this is the point where "contingency" is entering.

PoeticUniverse. But, the outcome would matter, because this is the moment of determining who the scapegoat is - if there is one. And, what is applicable to Eve here is also applicable to Adam.

It seems to me that this problem is described in a way where the reality on which moral principles are based, is a fixed one, especially if its nature is subjective. As soon, however, as you start to allow for objective reality to play a roll in moral decisions things change and moral principles are no longer as "fixed as they used to be and start to get relative. Example: as a moral principle it may be a good thing to give a poor beggar some money, but if you do this in a vicinity where crime statistics are high you may find yourself under physical attack by robbers after having done your "good deed" by giving money to the poor beggar. This moral principle of helping others in need loses its absoluteness, because it has become clear that this principle cannot / should not only be based on a "fixed subjective reality" - objective reality needs to be taken into account with its relativizing effects.

TheMadFool. Yes, my friend, it has always been like this when trying to solve this problem - all explanations leading to "new" problems. My attitude: let us not retreat and confirm with TS Elliot that, "we shall not cease from exploration …." My next question in Eve's context is how free is "free"? It has always seemed to me that "freedom" is never absolute, because we always feel the impact of "influences" when making choices. A truly free choice between two options can only exist if, in my situation of having to make a choice, the impact of the opposing "influences" is equal to each other. The heavier the impact of influences become on the one side in relation to the other side, the less free I become in having to make my choice. Isn't this exactly what happened to Eve?
But, of course there are other options also to try understand and make sense of this problem. One of them is that Eve was far from being a perfect being. Having to do with an imperfect being makes it so much easier to understand why she made the "wrong" choice. The implication of this assumption is that not being responsible for her own "imperfect" creation, she cannot be held responsible for her choice. Therefore, her punishment can in no way be justified. So, was all creation perfect in the beginning as the Bible wants us to believe? Or was this "mythical account" the result of searching philosophical minds trying to find a sensible explanation for all suffering in this world?