I don't know what your point is.

Er, no. I am saying that there are reasons to do and believe things.

Again, it is not the content of the belief that matters, but whether the explanation of why we have the belief mentions the reality of what it is a belief about.

You keep mentioning the belief in God - I don't know why. Again, you seem to think that I am saying that belief in God is debunked. NO!!

It is belief in reasons that is debunked by an exclusively evolutionary explanation of those beliefs.

I have outlined the argument above. There's really no way of making it clearer.

Schools are incredibly stupid and barbaric institutions. But certainly if we're going to insist children waste years and years in these places we should teach them philosophy, which would include learning the basic valid argument forms.

As it stands schools are almost entirely a waste of time and worse, a source of great harm. They are expensive open prisons for children that teach them almost nothing worthwhile. THe problem is that they are really for teachers, not children. That is, schools teach children what the teachers are trained to teach. Thus children are subjected to courses on all manner of things that are of no use to them and will probably bore the majority. I was bored the entire time and learnt next to nothing. TV taught me far more.

Better to get rid of them and let the market determine what will be taught. Philosophy will thrive (as it did in Ancient Greece - Plato's academy wasn't state funded).

Carry on. — Agent Smith

Well, if an unassisted evolutionary story about our development implies that there are no reasons to do or believe anything in reality, then that story is wrong, isn't it?

There are reasons to do things. One can't make a case against their existence without assuming them. It is hard to see how something's existence can be more certain than that.

What does this tell us? It tells us that some form of 'assisted' evolution by natural selection is true. Why? Because:

1. If unassisted evolution by natural selection is true, then there are no reasons to do things
2. There are reasons to do things
3. Therefore unassisted evolution by natural selection is false

And assuming that this premise is true:

4. Evolution by natural selection is true

And that this is also true:

5. Evolution by natural selection is either assisted or unassisted

Then this follows

6. Therefore assisted evolution by natural selection is true

Well, what would assist it? We know that reasons to do things exist, for their existence is as certain as can be. What we need, then, is a theory about what reasons are, that would actually predict that we would have a faculty of intuition that would tell us that we have reason to do what we seem, intuitively, to have reason to do.

Why? Because that's how you get a vindicatory explanation. For then our explanation of why we believe we have reason to do this and reason to do that will make mention of our actually having reason to do this or reason to do that.

An unassisted evolutionary account of how we have acquired our beliefs in reasons to do things makes no mention of any actual reasons to do things, and thus debunks all of those beliefs.

So, what we need is an account of how we have acquired our beliefs in reasons to do things that 'vindicates' those beliefs (at least approximately).

Those definitions are incorrect.

Holism is a view about how features behave. It is not a theory about what something is made of or how it arises.

Note, one can be an emergentist about a property and yet deny holism about that property. There is no logical connection between the two.

For example, imagine you are an emergentist about mental properties - that is, you believe that mental properties emerge from, but are not reducible to, physical states of the brain.

Well, that doesn't mean that one is a holist about mental properties. For one could, entirely consistently, maintain that certain arrangements of physical matter invariably give rise to mental properties.

I suggest those definitions have been cooked up by those in a discipline other than philosophy or some well meaning ignorant fool on the internet. (And yes, having clicked on it, it is clearly the latter. Blogs are not peer reviewed. In fact, it seems to be YOUR blog. Theyhave the same name, anyway. Somewhat misleading if true, don't you think!? To quote yourself and not say that that's what you're doing?).

Do you think not allowing new persons to be created harms the Universe? — universeness

Er, no. What a silly question. The universe is not a person. Do you think the universe has feelings? Do you think the universe is a bit miffed today? Do trees talk to you?

'Deserve,' is a judgment call, a human judgment call that probably has no relevance outside of humans and lifeforms like them. — universeness

Bollocks. So, your view is that if enough of us judge you do deserve to die, then you do? And if enough people judge that members of a racial or sexual minority deserve to die, then they do? Absurd. Think it through!

We make 'judgements' about whether a person deserves blame or not. That does not mean that whether a person deserves blame or not is determined by our judgements. That's obviously fallacious. Yet that'll be your only argument for thinking that moral desert is collectively subjective. It isn't.

Whether a person deserves harm or not is not a matter our judgements determine, rather it is a matter we make judgements 'about'.

And it has nothing to do with humans. It has everything to do with persons or minds. A newly created Spock would not deserve to come to harm either, even though he's not human. Persons - subjects of experience, minds - do not deserve to come to harm (not until or unless they have free will and use it to do terrible things), regardless of what kind of body they're encased in.

You're comparing apples and oranges. The opposite of reductionism is non-reductionism. The opposite of holism is atomism. There may be connections between the two - that is, perhaps atomism might imply non-reductionism about some matters. But they're concerned with different matters. Crudely, reductionism is about what something is made of. By contrast, holism is about how a property behaves.

So, a holist about normative reasons, for instance, is someone who thinks that whether or not a particular feature gives rise to a normative reason to do something always depends on the context in which it is present. For example, if you have a funny joke about death up your sleave, then whether this gives rise to you having reason to tell it to someone depends on the context you're in. If you're at a funeral, then you have reason not to tell it. If you're in a bar, then you do.

An atomist about normative reasons would be someone who held that at least some features give rise to normative reasons regardless of context. Atomists and holists disagree, then, about the behaviour of features. (And needless to say, one can be a holist about some features and an atomist about others).

But anyway, the point is that holism and atomism are theories about the behaviour of features.

By contrast reductionism is about what something is made of (not how it behaves - though of course, that can have implications about what it is made of). A reductionist about normative reasons would be someone who thinks normative reasons can be reduced to other features. That is, they do not believe that normative reasons are basic constituents of the universe, but are composed of yet more basic materials.

So, holism is not the opposite of reductionism. That's not to deny that there may be tensions between the two views - as I say, how something behaves can have implications for what it is made of - but the point is that they're completely different kinds of theory, not opposites of each other.

Just to give a more direct answer to your laboriously hyped question. NO, I don't think innocent people deserve harm — universeness

It's a very simply question. Your answer is 'no'.

So that means that all the harm they suffer is undeserved. That means it is unjust.

Don't then just blurt stuff that doesn't in any way engage with the argument. Saying something doesn't make it true.

Another question for you - see if you can just answer it rather than blather on about unrelated matters.

If an act will create great injustices that another person will suffer, does that imply that it is wrong to do it, other things being equal?

It's been there all along. At no point have I asserted that there are no reasons to do or believe things. As I said in the OP, only a fool or a scoundrel thinks there are no reasons to do or believe things.

Their reality - and the fact our belief in such things is not of a sort that can be debunked - tells us something. It tells us that a purely evolutionary account of our development is false.

Correct. So, this premise is true:

1. If the correct explanation of a belief that p does not invoke the actual existence of p, then the belief is debunked because we do not have to posit p.

And to that we add this premise:

2. A purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things does not have to invoke the actual existence of any reasons to do things

From which it follows that:

3. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is correct, then our belief that there are reasons to do things is debunked because we do not have to posit any actual reasons to do things.

Note, that conclusion does not assert that there are no reasons to do and believe things or that our belief in such things has actually been debunked. It says 'if'.

This premise is also true:

4. There are reasons to do and believe things and the correct explanation of our belief in reasons to do and believe things does invoke the actual existence of such things.

From which it follows:

5. Therefore, a purely evolutionary explanation of our belief that there are reasons to do things is incorrect.

One example (theism) of a debunking belief is sufficient to prove the claim that the belief there are reasons to believe is a debunking belief. — Agent Smith

No. It is how the belief was acquired that does the debunking. It doesn't matter what the belief is.

My belief that there is a cat in the garden is debunked if I acquired it through hypnotic suggestion.

That doesn't mean that beliefs in cats have been debunked! It means THAT belief - my one - was debunked.

Again: it is how the belief was acquired that debunks it. Any belief - any belief - that has been acquired in a way that did not involve its object, is debunked.

The fallacy of argument by example you've committed is this : John, an American, is a good musician (the example); ergo (???) Adam, another American, is also a good musician — Agent Smith

I have no idea what you mean - I have said nothing remotely like that.

Do you agree that if the correct explanation of a belief does not mention the actual existence of the belief's object, then that belief is discredited?

Don't get me wrong - I like the argument you're proposing, I'm a skeptic you see and nothing gets me stoked as much as an attack on reason, the be all and end all of epistemology. — Agent Smith

I'm not attacking Reason. I think there are reasons to do things. You can't make a case against them without presupposing them. So if you don't believe in reasons, you're stuck. You can't defend your disbelief, for the instant you do that you'll be appealing to the very things you think do not exist. And so all you can do is assert: all you can do is declare that you disbelieve in things that appear to exist both to you and everyone else who possesses a faculty of reason.

To reiterate your point, there are no reasons to believe there are reasons to believe. — Agent Smith

Where is that my point?

My point is that a purely evolutionary explanation of us will discredit our belief that there are reasons to do things, for we do not have to posit any to explain why we believe in them.

Note, I think reasons to do things exist. I am not arguing that they do not exist. I think they exist. I think a purely evolutionary explanation of us is demonstrably false. Demonstrably, because if true it implies there are no reasons to do things. But there are, so it is false.

1. R →→ B
2. R
Ergo,
3. B (1, 2 MP) — Agent Smith

What? English please.

My issue is that an example supports but doesn't prove until and unless you want to reduce the scope of your argument to some beliefs are of the debunking kind rather than the vindicatory kind. — Agent Smith

What? You don't know what you're talking about, yes? I can't understand what you've just said. Some beliefs are discredited by how they were acquired. WHen that happens it's called a 'debunking explanation'. Some beliefs are vindicated by the explanation of how they were acquired. Those are called vindicatory explanations. Now, if I give an illustration of the former, how the f is that to commit a fallacy?? To give illustrations of beliefs that are debunked by their explanations and illustrations of beliefs that are not debunked by their explanations is not to commit a fallacy, for it is not to argue anything. Illustrations are not arguments. A fallacy is an error in reasoning. When I illustrate a point with an example I am not arguing. I am trying to help you understand.

Do you agree that if the correct explanation of a belief does not mention the actual existence of the belief's object, then that belief is discredited?

First off all, you provided us with an instance of a debunking kind, which oddly is (belief in) god, the very thing you say in your conclusion is necessary. Isn't that self-refuting? — Agent Smith

That was to illustrate the point. Sheesh.

Here's the principle I am appealing to: if the explanation of a belief that p does not have to posit p, then the belief is debunked.

Now, it does not matter what 'p' stands for. Most of you lot are atheists and incredibly poor reasoners and you can only recognize a good argument when it leads to a conclusion you endorse. So, I take it that most of you can recognize the truth of the above principle if we make the belief in question a belief in God. For then it will be clear, even to you lot, that the principle is true: if the explanation of a person's belief in God makes no mention of God himself - so, the explanation just mentions the adaptive properties of the belief via the psychological benefits that accrue from it - then the belief is discredited.

It might still be true. But the mere fact a person is disposed to believe it does not, in itself, constitute any kind of evidence for its truth, given that we can explain why the person believes it without having to suppose that God himself exists.

Now, we can provide an evolutionary explanation of our disposition to believe that there are reasons to do things.

SO the same applies. We do not have to posit any actual reasons to believe things in order to explain, in a parsimonious manner, why people believe there are reasons to do things. Thus, the belief that there are reasons to do things is discredited if, that is, the evolutionary explanation is true.

It's called an 'evolutionary debunking argument'. If one can provide an evolutionary explanation of a belief or intuition, then - other things being equal - that explanation debunks the belief in question.

Why? Because we do not have to posit the object of the belief in order to explain the belief. And thus there is no reason to think the belief is true. For if one does not have to posit the object of the belief in order to explain why the belief is occurring, then it violates Ockham's razor to posit it.

Coming to the fallacy of argument by example you commited, it's like this: If I say some Americans are presidents, I could prove it with n number of examples e.g. Washington, Roosevelt, etc. However, this doesn't imply that some Americans are not presidents. — Agent Smith

What? No, don't just describe a fallacy. Where did I commit a fallacy? If I use an example to illustrate a point, that's not a fallacy. A fallacy is an error in reasoning. Outline my argument and show where the fallacy occurs. If you can't do that, then you don't know what you're talking about. You're just randomly throwing mud in the hope that some of it sticks.

Likewise, yes, there are beliefs of the debunking kind (god :chin: ) but that doesn't mean the belief that there are reasons to believe is also one. You need a different argument for this. — Agent Smith

It is how the belief is acquired that debunks it. And stop begging the question by insisting God does not exist! He does. Christ, you go on about fallacies entirely oblivious to all those you are committing. The fact that some beliefs that P are debunked by explanations of how they were acquired does not - not - imply that all beliefs that P are false!! That some As are Bs does not imply that all As are Bs!

Now, I am going to give an example to illustrate my point. Try and understand the point. Imagine I have been hypnotized into believing there's a cat in my garden. Now, don't ask me about my garden or about hypnotism. It's not about that. It's just an example, Okay? So, again, imagine that I have been hypnotized into believing there's a cat in my garden. That's the whole story about why I have that belief. I have the belief that there is a cat in my garden solely because I was hypnotized into it.

That explanation of my belief discredits it. Can you see that? There's absolutely no reason to think there's actually a cat in my garden. Why? Because the entire explanation of why I believe there's a cat in my garden makes no mention of any actual cat (or any actual garden).

Does that mean that all beliefs in cats in garden are debunked? No. I would have thought that was blindingly obvious. It means that that particular belief - the one the hypnotist implanted - is discredited. It does not imply that any belief in a cat in a garden, no matter how it was acquired, is debunked. Yet you think it does. Or at least, you think it does when it is a belief in God that we're talking about.

Some beliefs are discredited by how they were acquired. It doesn't matter what the belief is about, what matters - what does the discrediting - is how it was acquired. If the belief was acquired in a manner that did not involve the object of the belief, then the belief is discredited, no matter what the belief is about. It's the fact the object of the belief does not turn up in the explanation of how it was acquired that discredits it.

Now, an evolutionary explanation of how we have acquired our belief in reasons to do things will discredit those beliefs.

The other problem with your argument is that if there are no reasons to believe anything, why on earth are you trying to offer reasons to believe you? — Agent Smith

OMG. I think there ARE reasons to do things. I could not have been clearer. I said only an idiot or a scoundrel thinks they do not exist.

They exist.

The PROBLEM - for you, not me - is that an evolutionary explanation of how we have acquired our belief in them will discredit them.

So guess what? That means that an exclusive evolutionary explanation is FALSE. It does not mean that evolution by natural selection is false. It means that it can't be the whole story.

If I am mental, you are fucked. — Daniel

No, that doesn't follow.

Why don't you read the OP?

There are reasons to do things. YOu believe in them. I believe in them. Everyone who's sensible believes in them. Indeed, everyone who possesses reason believes in them, for to possess reason is to recognize that there are reasons to do things.

So, they exist.

But - and here is the problem - an evolutionary account of our development implies they do not exist.

That's a problem, yes? They do exist. There can be no doubt about it. Yet an evolutionary account of our development implies they do not.

I explained why.

For example, it used to be the case that the appearance of design was thought to be good evidence that the world and its contents were indeed designed and thus that there was a designer of them.

But the theory of evolution by natural selection can explain why the world appears designed without having to posit a designer.

That raises a problem for those who believe the world is designed by a god or God, yes?

We can explain the appearance of design in a parsimonious way - that is, we can explain it without having to posit a designer.

Thus, the theory of evolution by natural selection would appear to undercut the so-called 'design' argument for a god.

I use this example because most of you here are atheists and you will be more able to understand a point when it leads to a conclusion you endorse.

Exactly the same point applies to reasons-to-do things. An evolutionary account of our development can explain why we believe in such things without having to posit any.

But that's a huge problem. Because they do exist.

I asked you if you believed in reasons to do things.

You said yes.

So you know what a reason to do something is, for you believe in them yourself.

They are not causes. When you believe - as you do - that there are reasons to do things, you are not believing that things are being caused to occur, for clearly we can have reason to do something that we do not and never will do.

So you - you - know what a reason to do something is. For you believe in them. And they are not equivalent to causes of things.

When you say "the reason he died was flu" the word 'reason' is operating as a synonym for 'cause'. You are not saying that he had a reason to die. You are talking about the 'cause' of his death.

This is everso slightly complicated due to the ambiguity of the word 'reason'. This happens with words over time. They tend to become ambiguous. The word 'reason' is ambiguous. Lots and lots and lots of words are ambiguous. Indeed, the word 'lots' is ambiguous, isn't it? It can mean 'a large number' or it can mean 'items in an auction'. See? Lots and lots and lots and lots of words are ambiguous.

The word 'reason' is one of them. It can be used to denote a faculty - our faculty of reason. It can be used to denote a reason-to-do something (that's called a 'normative reason'). It can be used to denote a cause of something. That's called a causal reason. It can be used to denote the explanation of something - they're called 'explanatory reasons' (and some would argue that causal reasons and explanatory reasons are the same). And it can be used to denote where reasons-to-do things are coming from. And no doubt there are other meanings to the word too that I can't think of.

Same word, different meanings.

A 'reason to do something' - which, remember, you believe exist - is a directive to do something. That's a more substantial definition. But you already know what they are, for you believe in them.

And if we give a purely evolutionary story about how we have come to be, we won't have to make any mention of them at all.

And that's a problem.

Address the OP.

Argue something.

Yes, I believe there are reasons to do things. — Daniel

So why the f-ing hell do you keep asking me what one is and to provide you with a bloody example of one? Again: are you mental?

You: what's a chair?

Me: do you believe in chairs?

You: yes

Me: well one of those then you.....

answer the question. Do you believe there are reasons to do things? A simple yes or no.

It's a reason to get some food.

Like I say, this exchange is like this:

You: what's a chair?

Me: well, what are you sat on?

You: a chair

Me: right, so one of those

You: I just don't know what you mean by a chair though. Can you give me an example of a chair?

Me: I just did. You are sat on a chair, are you not?

You: yes.

Me: so that's a char

You: so do you mean a lamp?

Me: no.

You: I don't know what you mean then. Do you mean a cat?

Me: no. I mean a chair. Do you know what a chair is?

You: yes.

Me: so one of those.

You: but what's a chair?

And on and on and on.

Look, are you auditioning for the mad hatter's tea party or something? Don't ask me what a reason to do something is when you can't be bothered to read the reply.

So you do not yourself believe there are reasons to do things?

In other words, I think I am alive not because there are reasons to be alive but because by being alive I have come up with reasons to believe I am. — Daniel

You're just not getting this.

This is not about causes. It's about reasons-to-do things. You are just going to continue talking about causes, yes? You're attacking a straw man. I am not arguing that evolutionary explanations force us to conclude that there are no causes.

The kinds of reasons you talk about are being caused. They are outcomes. That which you call a reason to do something is an outcome of a process and not what initiates a process. They are ends. — Daniel

Irrelevant.

The molecular machinery that keeps cells alive gets worn with time. It does not last forever and needs to be replaced. New molecules are made of nutrients obtained from the external world (or recycled nutrients). How do you know that the molecules needed to keep your cells alive are getting old and that you need to replace them? how do you know if you have enough nutrients to replace those old molecules? how do you know if you need to acquire nutrients from the external world? How do you think you get that sensation of hunger? — Daniel

Irrelevant. I refer you to my earlier reply.

The opposite of holism is atomism, not reductionism.

No. You are confusing different meanings of the word 'reason'.

Sometimes the word reason can operate as a synonym for 'cause'.

But that's not what it means when we use to denote a reason to do something.

A reason to do something is called a normative reason. The normativity is the 'to do-ness'. It's sometimes expressed by saying that normative reasons direct. That is, to have a reason to do something is to be in some sense 'directed' to do it.

Note, these statements do not mean the same thing; "I have a reason to get myself some food" and "I am being caused to get myself some food".

An evolutionary explanation of how we have come to be will make no mention of any normative reasons. And thus it is self-undermining. But it will make mention of causes. So I am not arguing that an evolutionary explanation debunks the idea that there are causes of things. I am arguing that an evolutionary explanation debunks the idea that there are reasons to do things.

This answer is quite clear. It implies that you agree that innocence/guilt is a concept created from the human condition. — universeness

Er, no. That simply does not follow and it is not my view. But anyway, you're not focusing on the argument.

Do you think a newly created person deserves to come to harm?

Your accusation that I am lying is offensive. — universeness

What are you on about? Where did I accuse you of lying? I said that it is wrong to lie but that it does not follow that we are obliged to stop others lying. So, the point is that an argument for the wrongness of Xing does not imply that we are obliged to stop others from Xing. Thus, an argument for antinatalism is not an argument for stopping others procreating.

Once again, to deserve something does not mean the same as 'obliged to provide it'.

The fact a person deserves something can, sometimes, generate an obligation to provide it. And sometimes it won't.

Sometimes it will.. Sometimes it won't. Sometimes it will. Sometimes it won't. And sometimes it will.

Thus, the property of 'deserving something' is not the same as the property of 'being obliged to provide it'.

So, when I say that innocent persons do not deserve to come to harm, that it not equivalent to saying that others are obliged to prevent harm from befalling that person. Those are quite different claims, even though the former will often give rise to the latter.

We unproblematically have children. Most people consider it perfectly moral, yet most people consider creating an injustice immoral, and most people think children deserve happiness, therefore most people do not consider it creating an injustice to create someone who deserves something they're not going to receive. It clearly is not a shared moral intuition. — Isaac

You're quite inconsistent, aren't you? One moment you're skeptical about the probative value of intuitions and the next moment you're appealing to them!

We all have to appeal to intuitions. All arguments for anything appeal to them. The validity of an argument is itself something we are aware of intuitively.

But that does not mean that intuitions are infallible and that all we have to do to find out if an act is moral or immoral is conduct a survey. You are confusing intuitionism with conventionalism or conservatism. Some - many - intuitions are worthless. Just as there are visual and other hallucinations, there are also hallucinations and illusions generated by intuition as well.

For example, imagine there's a cult that believes it is wrong to procreate and they promote this idea to their members from birth. So, there are lots of people who have been brought up on this cult and have had it reiterated to them again and again that it is wrong to procreate.

Now, would it be remotely surprising if those brought up in this cult consequently started to intuit that procreation was wrong?

No, of course not. It's what one would predict. It's precisely why people indoctrinate others - it works.

Does that intuition have probative value? If someone is a member of that cult and has the intuition that procreation is immoral, does it count for something? And would it matter how big the cult is? (The answers are 'no' and 'no')

Argue something.

Yours is an argument by example which, if memory serves, is a fallacy. — Agent Smith

What fallacy? I'm illustrating a point. That's not to commit a fallacy.

If the explanation of why you hold a particular belief does not make any appeal to the actual existence of the object of that belief (so, what the belief is 'about'), then the belief is debunked by the explanation.

I then provided examples of this to illustrate the point. For example, if the explanation of why people believe in gods is that a disposition to believe in such things made them more reproductively successful, then those beliefs are debunked, for the explanation of why people are forming them makes no mention of any gods.

So, once again: if an explanation of a belief does not appeal to the reality of what the belief is about, then the belief is debunked.

Another example, this time of a vindicatory explanation. The explanation of why I believe there's a cat in my garden is that there's a cat in my garden. That explanation makes mention of the object of my beilef. Thus the belief is not discredited by the explanation, but vindicated.

If the explanation of why I believe there's a cat in my garden is that I have just been hypnotized into believing it, then the explanation makes no mention of a cat in my garden and thus in this case the belief would be debunked.

It, however, is self-refuting if you notice, as it undermines all reason and hence, even your own and out the window goes your theistic conclusion. — Agent Smith

No, what I am doing is showing that an exclusive evolutionary explanation of our situation is self-undermining.

You're just describing processes.
You asked for an example of a reason to do something - I provided it.
An unassisted evolutionary story about how we have come to be, will not make any mention of any actual reasons to do anything. The disposition to believe in them, yes. Their actual existence, no.
Thus, an evolutionary story undermines itself. It needs assistance if it is not to do that.

So, you're saying an evolutionary explanation for rationality is of the debunking kind i.e. that we're rational doesn't mean there are reasons (for believing/disbelieving things). — Agent Smith

No. I am arguing - not saying, arguing - that a purely evolutionary account of our development will debunk our impressions and beliefs in reasons to do and believe things. (Note I do not know what you mean by rationality and I did not mention it; I take 'rationality' to involve a disposition to recognize and respond to reasons. If that's correct, then someone can be rational even if there are no reasons, for it is sufficient to be rational that one 'would' have recognized and responding to any reasons that there were).

And I argued this by showing how we can explain how creatures who got the impression of such things would be selected for by a process of evolution by natural selection without having to posit any actual reasons to do or believe anything.

If you explain why a person believes something without positing the object of the belief, then the explanation debunks the belief.

I gave you examples of this. If we can explain why a person believes in God without positing God himself, then the belief is debunked if that explanation is correct.

So if you want the argument laid out more formally, here it is:

1. If the correct explanation of why a person believes x does not involve positing x, then that person's belief in x is debunked.
2. If a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then the correct explanation of why any person believes there are reasons to believe things does not involve positing any reasons to believe things.
3. Therefore, if a purely evolutionary explanation of our development is true, then a person's belief in reasons to believe things is debunked.

What is a reason here? — Daniel

This is us:

Daniel: can you provide me with an example of a donut

Me: yes, you see this plump quoit of sugared dough - that's a donut.

Daniel: but where's the donut?

Me: er, I have just shown you a donut. The donut is the plump quoit of sugared dough I just placed in front of you. Let's try again, shall we? Have you ever had a donut?

Daniel: yes

Me: well, that's what a donut is. A donut is one of those things you had when you had a donut

Daniel: but I just want an example of a donut

Me: are you mental?

There's your example, then.

A reason to do something - such as get yourself some food - is an example of a reason to do something. And a reason to believe something is a reason to do something, namely believe something.

If you are hungry, do you have reason to get yourself some food?

What are your thoughts on my view that though, at times, it might be to our advantage to believe falsehoods (e.g. belief in god) — Agent Smith

I don't know why you added "e.g. belief in God". That belief is TRUE. It's called begging the question: your question assumes the very issue under debate.

THe only solution to the problem I am raising involves positing God.

But anyway, ignoring the question begging bit in the brackets: is it sometimes to our advantage to believe falsehoods? Yes, of course. And it is sometimes moral to believe falsehoods too. I don't see the relevance to the point I am making.

evolutionary success (passing down one's genes) is best achieved by being in touch with reality (truths), which is precisely what reason evolved for? — Agent Smith

But I just explained why that's not true. Some true beliefs will be selected for, and some false ones will be selected for.

Again: if one gives a purely evolutionary account of our development, then approximately accurate beliefs about the lay of the land will be selected for (for those with systematically false beliefs about the lay of the land will get eaten by lions or wander into lakes, which isn't good for one's reproductive chances). But completely false beliefs about reasons to believe things and reasons to do things - such as that there are, in fact, reasons to believe things and reasons to do things - will also get selected for.

Note too that you do not understand what I mean by a purely evolutionary process is you think such a process is 'for' anything. It isn't. It's blind.

You are confusing the basis upon which we have a reason to believe something with the reason itself.

So, I have the rational impression - or intuition, if one prefers - that I have reason to believe there is a thinker if there are thoughts. And I have the introspective impression that there are thoughts. I conclude that I exist.

None of that was an example of a reason to believe something. it was an example of impressions of reasons to believe things.

A reason to believe something is the 'accuracy' condition of an impression of a reason to believe something (or - and this will be the same - the 'truth condition' of a belief that one has a reason to believe something).