So you offer a third option. A zebra can appear in your room. Now what? — Haglund

What are you on about? Are you following anything I am saying at all? Anything?

You agree that simultaneous causation is possible - you said that a few posts ago, though no doubt your views change moment to moment - and that thus self-creation is possible. So you agree with me. THere's nothing more to be said. Why are you now asking me about zebras in my sitting room? You don't seem to be getting any point at all.

I didn't claim that, nor implied that, nor suggested that. I took into consideration the notion of "God" when talking about existence preservation, not self-creation. — neomac

Yes you did. First, you are the one who thinks that if X simultaneously causes X to exist then X is preserving X not creating X. That's not my view - it makes no sense whatsoever. If X causes X to exist, then X has caused X to exist. Really not hard to understand.

Then you suggested that somehow something I was saying was hard to reconcile with God's existence. No, nothing I am arguing poses any difficulty for God at all. As I explained. If you think there's a problem it is up to you to articulate it and to articulate it clearly, not vaguely gesture at things and then leave me to try and fathom what the hell you are on about.

What?! If cause X and effect Y both simultaneously exist and X=Y, there is no creation of Y by X, precisely because the existence of Y is granted by the identity between X and Y so there is no need of whatever causal-thingy between them you are raving about. — neomac

What on earth are you on about? You're just begging the question. You keep banging on about identity. X causes X to exist. The only reason to think that X has not caused X to exist is the erroneous belief that a cause must precede its effect. If a cause does not have to precede its effect, then it can be simultaneous with it. And that means that X can cause X to exist.

Again, if you think events don't even need causes then I'm at a total loss to understand why you are having difficulties with this.

Why does "popping into existence" without cause is incoherent?! — neomac

Because events have causes. Odd that you think causes must precede their effects, but think effects don't have to have causes!

I think causes do not have to precede their effects. You think I'm wrong about that (or do you think I'm right, in which case you agree with me but don't realize it). Yet you think effects don't need to have causes! Your view is just bizarre and wholly unmotivated. I mean, I could understand someone having a problem with self-creation if that person believed - correctly - that all events have causes. But I can't understand what kind of troubled mind would have trouble with self-creation at the same time as being fine with the idea of something coming into existence out of nothing. I can only assume that you are one of those who thinks if Bartricks says it, it must be false regardless of where sane argument leads.

No I don't.

1. How do we know X exists? — Agent Smith

You know something exists when you believe it exists, it does exist, and you have epistemic reason to believe it exists.

And we can know that God exists.

If you think we can't know that God exists, you either think there's reason to think we can't know that God exists, or you think there's no reason to think we can't know GOd exists but you believe it anyway.

In the latter case - that is, if you think there's no reason to think we can't know God exists, but you still believe we can't know God exists - you're just being dogmatic. That is, you're just asserting something you can't defend.

In the former case, you acknowedge that reasons exist. Well, those can't exist unless God does. So God exists.

No he didn't. Try and do some philosophy - try engaging with an argument rather than just asking unbelievably dumb questions the answers you which you have precisely no interest in.

God just became me. — Jackson

No he didn't. God's maximally intelligent.

Okay. Cannot debate myth. — Jackson

YOu can't debate at all mate.

No, as in God did not manifest in physical form as Jesus? — Jackson

What? Why are you mentioning Jesus? I don't know. God could make himself into a cat if he wanted. My point is a philosophical one. An omnipotent being can be physical, for an omnipotent being has the power to make himself physical if he so chooses. He wouldn't be omnipotent if he couldn't.

No. I am referring to omnipotence. An omnipotent person could make themselves into a physical thing if they wished to. Why? Because they can do anything.

So, someone who thinks an omnipotent being is essentially non-physical is confused. They clearly don't understand what they're talking about.

I can't follow what you're saying.

I believe in God. That is, I believe there exists an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent person. Those are the essential attributes.

But it is not essential that God be non-physical. To be clear: I think God is non-physical. But it's not essential to being God that God be non-physical. God is omnipotent, so if God wanted to he could make himself physical. No theist worth their salt should believe that God 'must' be non-physical. God can be physical if he wants to be.

Also you seem to be conflating sensible things with physical things and then thinking that if something is not physical it is not detectable.

Non-physical things are detectable. I can detect my own thoughts, for instance, yet they are not physical things but states of a non-physical thing - me.

Idealists do not believe any physical things exist. But they're still aware of apples and trees and so forth. That's becuase they think that apples and trees and so forth are made of sensations (as well as being detected by means of them).

Plus, even our senses are powerless to enable us to detect anything without the assistance of our reason, and so it is really by reason - not sense - that we detect things. And we can certainly detect non-sensible things by means of our reason. Reasons themselves, for instance, are not sensibly detectable, yet exist and we are aware of them.

Point missed. I put the ball in front of the goal so that you can get a point, but what do you do? You try and eat it.

I mean that literal self creation is coherent. That means I think it can happen. Whether it has is another matter.

Read the OP! I am arguing that literal self-creation is possible. It is possible for something to be created by something else. It is also possible for something to create itself. There is nothing problematic in the idea.

If someone says such things they are not thereby asserting that anything has actually created itself.

For instance, it is possible there's a zebra in my sitting room. The idea is a coherent one. Have I just asserted that there is a zebra in my sitting room? No.

Ah, the concept is coherent. Yes, I could have told you that from the start. — Haglund

You absolutely couldn't.

You didn't even understand that that was the issue under debate! It's not like it isn't clear. It's there in the OP!

When did I say that? I am arguing that self-creation is coherent. I am not saying anything about what has, or has not, created itself.

I don't know for sure - these are all matters left open. The point is just that it is no part of being omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent that one have created oneself or anything else, much less a universe full of ignorant gits.

But I just made that point in passing. The point here, in this thread, is that self-creation is perfectly coherent.

It is often thought that where existence is concerned, the options are that some things have always existed and that from these other things were made, or alternatively (and incoherently) that everything that exists has been created by something else. I am pointing out that there is another option: some things have created themselves.

You think a morally perfect, all powerful, all knowing person would create a universe like this?!? Christ almighty! You are clearly not a person of discernment.

I agree that naturalism is incompatible with free will, at least of the kind required to make us morally responsible agents.

Most of the debate over free will focuses on a side issue - the issue of whether free will is compatible with determinism or requires indeterminism. Naturalism is neutral on whether determinism or indeterminism is true. And it seems beside the point. For regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism is true, if naturalism is true then everything we do is a product of external causes that we had nothing to do with. And that seems sufficient to rule out free will.

To have free will one needs either to have created oneself or at least to have not been created by anything external to one's self. And neither of those conditions will be satisfied if naturalism is true, for if naturalism is true then I'm my brain and my brain was caused to come into being by factors external to it. Thus, if naturalism is true, then I don't have free will.

Besides if you are talking about your god, why does your god need to preserve itself into existence? He is all mighty and perfect, so he would not suffer from any decaying process, nor need to preserve itself into existence. — neomac

I haven't mentioned God once in this thread so it is not clear to me why you are doing so. I think it is fair to say that most theists and atheists alike think that literal self-creation is incoherent.

I believe in God - by which I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being - on the basis of an argument that has nothing to do with the origins of the universe. Indeed, given the nature of the universe it seems quite unreasonable to me to think that God had anything to do with its creation. (And if things can create themselves, then that provides a good explanation of why, despite God existing, there also exist a lot of gits).

Similarly, whether God created himself, or exists uncreated, or was created by alien forces, seems neither here nor there. God exists. How or whether he came to exist is another matter.

You seem to think that if God created himself, then he wouldn't be God. I don't know why you think that. To be God a person simply needs to be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Why do they need 'not' to have created themselves? Odd.

"Contingent" in the case of a contingent object means dependent on something else — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. A contingent object is an object that 'can' not exist (as opposed to a necessary object, which is an object that can't not exist).

Once more: if an object exists at a particular time, what's to stop it existing at all times?

The point is that the inductive reasoning tells us that all such things come into being in time, therefore there is necessarily time prior to them. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think it does, but I don't need to dispute that for my purposes here. Do try and focus on the relevant issue. Note, if self creation is coherent, then even if all things come into being, some of those things could have created themselves. Indeed, one would have to draw that conclusion, for otherwise one would have to posit an actual infinity of causes - which is incoherent.

So, you are thoroughly confused. It is not the case that everything has to come into being. But even if it was, all that would do is prove my point. For not everything can be created by something else, for then we have an actual infinity of other things. Some things must create themselves.

That's called an 'argument'. Address it.

The time at which an object exists, is a property of the object, just like the space, or location where it is. And each individual object has its own unique set of properties, which makes it one and the same with itself only, by the law of identity. Therefore by the law of identity, if an object exists at one particular time, it cannot exist at another particular time without being a different object. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are extrinsic and intrinsic properties, and intrinsic properties are those properties that are essential to an object's identity. Temporal properties are extrinsic, not intrinsic. I am clearly the same person I was a second ago. And my mug is the same mug it was a second ago.

Anyway, all this is beside the point. You seem to have serious difficulty focussing on the relevant issue.

Then it's not self-creation as normally understood ("the act or process of making something that is new, or of causing something to exist that did not exist before" source: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/creation?q=creation) but at best it's existence preservation like when a person feeds herself to survive, and nobody would literally take self-feeding as a form of self-creation. — neomac

Yes it is self-creation as normally understood. It is an act of causing something to exist that did not exist before. How is it not?

In a case of self-creation, X causes X to exist. Prior to that act of creation, there is no X. So, X brought itself into existence.

No, I'm talking about ontological dependency between properties/relations and the entities they are predicated of. If X is taller than Y, "taller than" as a relation is predicated of X and Y while X and Y are existing. It's possible that the relation holds simultaneously to the existence of both terms and the terms can not exist without being in such relation (this is the case for internal relations). The issue is that if one of the terms doesn't exist then relations/predicates can not be instantiated while if all terms exist there is no bringing into existence from non-existence as "creation" is normally understood. — neomac

You don't seem to understand what simultaneous causation involves. The cause exists as does the effect. You seem to be thinking that in a case of self-creation, the thing doing the creating does not yet exist. No, it exists simultaneous with its effect, it is just that in this case the effect is itself.

Once more, you are simply assuming that causes must precede their effects and thus that for self-creation what's required is that the entity that is doing the creating exist prior to the entity it creates. That's precisely what I am showing is false.

If they simultaneously exist, there is no bringing into existence from non-existence (as creation is normally understood) but at best preserving into existence. — neomac

The only reason to say what you've just said is the mistaken view that causes precede their effects. If a cause can be simultaneous with its effect, then there is no reason to insist that the object has not created itself. Why are you saying that we have 'preserving into existence'? I don't even know what that means. The object does not exist prior being caused to exist. So it has been created. It's just it has been created by itself.

Engage in the following thought experiment. Imagine something just pops into existence. It didn't exist. Then it does. What happened? Did nothing bring it into being? Well, that seems incoherent: something doesn't come from nothing. So, it caused itself, then. It brought itself into being. That's perfectly coherent if simultaneous causation is coherent (which it is).

You're just confused. You think that contingent things have always 'come into being'. That's just false. There's nothing in the idea of an object existing contingently that implies it has come into being.

You have no argument. All you're doing is insisting that what I am saying is incoherent, even though it demonstrably isn't.

For instance, you seem blithely unaware of the fact you've been refuted. If an object exists at a time, then what's to stop it from existing at all times? You have no argument.

There is nothing incoherent in the idea of something existing for eternity. And it is the mere coherence of the idea that my case requires.

Not when the things involved are contingent objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? If an object exists at a time, what prevents it from existing at all times? Explain.

What I've explained to you a number of times now, is that there is incoherency in the idea of a contingent object (like a ball), which has always been there. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I have explained to you numerous times why this is false. There is nothing incoherent in the idea of a contingent object existing for all time.

You are committing a fallacy known as the fallacy of affirming the consequent. If an object exists necessarily, then it always exists. But it does not follow that if an object always exists, it exists of necessity. YOu think it does which is why you think that contingent objects can't always exist. That's just fallacious reasoning on your part. Contingent objects can always exist. They will be existing contingently, but anything that exists at a time can exist at any other time, and thus can exist for all time.

No, that's not true. If self-creation is understood as a form of simultaneous causation then the same entity X would be simultaneously existent (as effect) and non-existent (as cause). — neomac

Er, no, they would be existent as cause and existent as effect.

Besides properties and relations presuppose the existence of the terms they are predicated of, so if causality is a relation or a property it would require the existence of the causal factor to already obtain. — neomac

You've just made the 'the cause would need to precede the effect' objection - the very one that's undermined by the coherence of simultaneous causation! Do keep up!

Therefore non-existing entities can't cause anything. — neomac

I didn't argue that they could. But existing ones can and they can cause themselves to exist. As I said earlier, the claim is not that something can come out of nothing - it remains true that nothing causes nothing. The claim rather is that something can cause itself. And so although this means that there can be nothing and then something, the something's coming into being is not being caused by nothing, but by the thing itself.

There is nothing incoherent in the thought experiment.

Everyone must admit that it is possible for something always to have been the case. And thus it is coherent to suppose that the ball was always on the cushion.

I agree with Cuthbert that the ball is causing the depression as an on-going matter even if there was a time when it came to be on the cushion. However, the problem is that it is then open to the objector to insist that this is not the case and the depression was caused by the ball coming to be on the cushion (and the spring-back when the ball is removed is caused when the ball is removed). And thus that variation on the thought experiment would not 'force' the believer in the dogma that causes precede their effects to abandon their position. By contrast, if we stipulate that the ball has always been on the cushion, then we have an undeniable counterexample to the claim that causes precede their effects.

Now, perhaps you think there is something incoherent in the notion of eternity. That's all I can think. But that's confused - eternity just means 'for all time'. That, anyway, is the notion of eternity that the example needs. And whether one believes time has a beginning or that it stretches back infinitely, there is nothing incoherent in the idea of something existing 'for all time' and thus for two things to have been in a certain relationship for 'all time'.

It's better to live the peony life! — Haglund

No it isn't.

No, you're just plain wrong. Things are more basic than events as, like I say, there can clearly be things without events, but there can't be events without things. And when it comes to an event's 'properties' these can all be reduced to the properties of things, as an 'event' is just a word we use to describe some change in a things properties or relations.

You just don't understand the argument.

The only reason to think self-creation is impossible is the idea that to create one's self one would have to exist 'prior' to one's own existence. And the only reason to think that is the idea that causes must precede their effects.

So, once again for the umpteenth time, if causes do not have to precede their effects, then there is no reason to think self-creation is impossible.

Try and argue that self-creation is impossible 'without' appealing to the idea that a cause must precede its effect.

There is no temporal preceding. Again, you're just adjusting the example so that it no longer illustrates the point it was designed to illustrate.

Once more: when does a substance cause its effect?

The ball does not come to be on the cushion. It is on the cushion from the beginning. It's causing the dent in the cushion.

You are just changing the example so that it no longer illustrates the point it was designed to illustrate.

Again: the ball does not come to be on the cushion. Both ball and cushion exist - and have always existed - in that arrangement.

The point Kant is making is that the ball is causing the dent regardless of whether it came to be on the cushion or was always on it.

Yes - specifically because of the softness (ie. 3D variability) of the cushion in relation to the ball. You can’t extend this same quality of softness to an eternal entity - if there is no 4D variation (it never changes), then there is no 3D variability (no softness). Case closed. — Possibility

What on earth are you on about? If a cushion exists eternally it is not soft? What?

I accept that there comes a point in our relation to events where ‘cause’ is a meaningless term - I’d say it’s about where we posit an infinite, either as quantity or quality. — Possibility

That's not what I said. Again: there aren't actual infinities in reality. So, there is not an actual infinity of past events. That's got nothing to do with causation. It's got everything to do with the fact there are no actual infinities. Thus, we can conclude on this basis that not all events have other events as their causes. Again, there's no pressure on the notion of causation here, there's just the rational observation that it follows that not all events have events as their causes. Thus, some events have 'substances' as their causes. That is 'things' initiate causal chains, not changes.

I’m going to be pedantic for a sec: aren’t events still things? — Possibility

No. I am not being imprecise in my language. The problem is that others use language in a sloppy way.

A thing - or substance or object - is a bearer of properties. An event is an occurrence. A happening.

Note, you can have a thing without there being any events. My mug is not an event. It is a thing. And things do not depend on events. You can't, however, have an event without any things, for events always involve things. Happenings happen to things. They undergo a change or initiate a change or whatever. But the dependency is clear: events depend on things, things do not depend on events.

Substance causation is philosophically respectable. Indeed some would argue that all causation is substance causation. That's actually my view. Events are manifestations of causation, but all causing is done by substances. That's a controversial view, but I think it is correct. But anyway, even if one rejects that view and allows that events can cause events, the simple fact is that one is going to run into serious difficulties if one insists that all causation is event causation - you'll have to posit an actual infinity of events.

So, substance causation - causation by a thing rather than by a change - is, must be, coherent.

And substance causation is simultaneous causation. Indeed, I think event causation is too, for any event has been caused at the time at which it occurs, not before. But I think it is clearer in the case of substance causation that we have simultaneous causation.

But it'll make you rich. And you'll be able to put up shelves and fix a car.

Again, you're not engaging with my arguments.

I don't know what you mean by a 'mechanism'. I'm assuming you mean that there needs to be some kind of intermediary between cause and effect. How does that change anything?

So, I'll just keep repeating myself until you answer: if A, a substance, causes B, when does it do so?

I still don't know what you mean.
And anyway, you're missing the point. All you're doing is introducing an intermediary. Now, consider teh questions I asked.

The speed of light is finite i.e. the mechanism can't be instantaneous. In other words, cause and effect can't be simultaneous — Agent Smith

I don't know what you mean by a mechanism.

If A causes B, when does it do it? If you imagine the causation itself to be a third event - a kind of intermediary between A and B, when did A cause that intermediary event?

When it occurred - yes? And when did that intermediary event cause B? When it occurred, yes?

So, it seems if A causes B, it does so simultaneously. A causes B when B occurs. That's simultaneous causation.

I don't know what you're asking.

Also (and related) - why is this topic so important that you spend hours debating it? If this is merely for fun and/or intellectual stimulation I get it - there's no harm done and there are many worse ways of spending your time. But given the level of intensity and vitriol in these conversations, it appears that this topic is really important to people. Why? What difference does it make? — EricH

The sneer of the peon. Answering these questions - fundamental questions in philosophy, that is - will make you wealthy and happy. Happy?