But, essentially, no, it isn't a pain. It's not as if you are around to experience your own death. Leading up to dying may be painful, but not death itself. Pain is a neurological phenomenon, and death is the end of neurological phenomena. — Garrett Travers
You're appealing to a different version of the argument, one that is even less plausible.
One version of the argument appeals to the 'experience' condition (that to be harmed, you need to experience the harm in question). The other appeals to the 'existence' condition (that to be harmed, you need to exist at the time). The experience condition is not plausible: you don't have to experience something to be harmed by it.
No, I don't think so. All you need is knowledge of the function of the brain. It's crazy to think that he was thinking on this level almost 3000 years ago. He really was right. — Garrett Travers
He just assumes the mind is the brain. Or rather, that the mind is made of soul atoms (he didn't believe our minds are our brains, but rather that they are nevertheless material entities composed of invisible soul atoms - the difference is moot, however).
He infers that sensible things are made of atoms. But the mind is not a sensible thing. We do not see, hear, smell, taste or touch it. Thus he simply assumes - on the basis of no positive evidence - that our minds are also made of atoms and that they cease to exist when the atoms disperse. That's just an assumption.
My point also was about arguments. If you have a deductively valid argument that leads to a highly counter-intuitive conclusion - that is, a conclusion that our reason tells us is false - then that's prima facie evidence that at least one of the premises is false. Unless, that is, denying either premise would be even more contrary to reason than affirming the conclusion. (Sometimes highly counter-intuitive conclusions are correct - or we have reason to believe them to be - but this is when denying them would commit one to affirming something
even more counter-intuitive).
This is Epicurus's argument for the harmlessness of death (the strongest of the two he gives):
1. If you do not exist at time t1, then you cannot be harmed at time t1.
2. You do not exist at the time of your death
3. Therefore, you cannot be harmed by your death
The conclusion flies in the face of what our reason tells us: our reason tells us that death
is a harm - the gravest of all harms. That's why we use it as a penalty for the most serious of wrongdoing, or at least consider it a candidate punishment. That's the main reason why killing others is wrong - it harms them. That's why suicide is irrational under most circumstances: it is not in your best interests unless you are in unending agony or something. And so on. Our reason really couldn't be more clear on the matter. Thus 3 is about as contrary to reason as the proposition that 2 + 3 = 8.
That means at least one of the premises is false, unless, that is, rejecting either would be even more contrary to reason than embracing the conclusion.
Well, what's more manifest to reason, that death is harmful or that you do not exist when you die? THe former, obviously. THe latter is just an assumption, not something we have any rational support for believing.
Premise 1 is self-evident to reason. It is to mine and it was to Epicurus's and it is to many people's. So, it does have some rational support and we should not reject it lightly. However, it does not have greater self-evidence than the proposition that death is a harm. And so if push comes to shove, one should reject 1 rather than embrace 3. It would be irrational to do otherwise. However, as 1 has some self-evidence and so should not be rejected arbitrarily, and 2 has no self-evidence whatsoever but just expresses an unjustified belief about what happens to us when we die, it is 2 that should be rejected. Someone who insists upon keeping 1 and 2 and drawing Epicurus's conclusion shows only that they are a dogmatist or irrational.
So, Epicurus has not shown us that death is harmless, but rather that we do not cease to exist upon dying.