The word 'necessity' doesn't have a single meaning, and the meaning it has in 'necessary for rational discussion' does not denote metaphysical necessity of the kind I deny.

I don't think it is necessary for rational discussion even in that non-metaphysical sense (and this is demonstrable, for there are philosophers who deny the actual truth of the law of non-contradiction and they do engage in rational debate over the matter). But putting that aside, I affirm the law of non-contradiction, I do not deny it.

What I want to know from you, however, is how you know the law of non-contradiction is true. Even if you are correct and its truth has to be presupposed as a condition of being able to engage in reasoned debate, that is not how you can know it to be true.

For an analogy, let's say you claim to know that God exists. I ask you how you know this. You answer that belief in God is a precondition of going to church being rational.

Well, that's questionable, but even if it is true, that wouldn't be an answer to the question. Pointing out that belief in X is a precondition of the rationality of a certain practice - be it reasoning or going to church or anything at all - is not an answer to the question 'how do you know it to be true?"

So again, how do you know the law of non-contradiction to be true? I think it is true and I have my own answer to the question, but I want to know what your answer is.

I don't just think it. Don't tar me with your brush. I 'concluded' it. Big difference. You are just pronouncing. But until or unless you show there to be something wrong with the reasoning that led me to my conclusion, why would I care what you think? Thoughts are ten a penny. Arguments for interesting conclusions are scarce. I give you a diamond, you give me worthless pebbles.

I didn't argue that one's mental states are incapable of affecting one's moral value. I think they clearly can do. One can lose one's moral value depending on what one freely does or thinks or desires. So I agree that mental states can alter one's moral value, even to the point of eradicating it altogether or making one disvaluable. So, some - some - kinds of mental state may be sufficient for having no value or disvalue. But no mental state is necessary for possession of moral value.

So our mental states are not the source of our moral value, even though they can affect it. I can use my teeth to destroy a bun, but that does not mean the bun came from my teeth.

My example was of undeserved pain. That's a mental state an innocent person can be in. And it seems thoroughly bad. Yet it does not follow that the person undergoing it is bad. Yet it would follow if the value of us derives from the value or otherwise of our mental states.

I have arrived at the 'conclusion' that my mind is immaterial, based in part on the argument in the OP - an argument you have not addressed. Stop pronouncing and try arguing something.

But the point is that you would have to ground the moral difference - that is, the vast difference in moral value between a corpse and a person - in those biological differences. But that's already been shown to be implausible, for all those differences are sensible differences. I mean, corpses smell in a way that living persons do not, but it would be implausible to ground the moral difference in that olfactory difference. I am morally valuable irrespective of my smell. And so on for any sensible- and thus any biological - feature.

You seem to be attacking a straw man version of libertarianism.

So, for instance, one might think, a la Locke, that the state is not entitled to do to us anything that we would not be entitled to do in the state's absence. If there was no state, you and your friends would not be entitled to extract payment with menaces from me so that you can build a hospital or educate your children. So the state is not entitled to do these things either.

In this way we arrive at a minimal state, perhaps with a minimal safety net welfare system (for if I have a large surplus of food, then intuitively the starving would be entitled to take some without my consent).

But bestiality is immoral if there's no state and furthermore it is something others are entitled to use force to prevent, and so the state can stop it too. I mean, any right to property is grounded in a moral claim, yet it seems clear to most that there is no moral right to engage in bestial relations.

No it doesn't. There are no insults in the OP. You did not address the OP.

One can know what something isn't, without having to specify what it is. Detectives would be in trouble if they had to know who did the crime 'before' they start their investigation. For instance, if John has a cast iron alibi, then I can rule him out even if I don't yet know who, specifically, murdered Mary.

I am doing what a detective does: I am discounting candidates. I am morally valuable. Why? Well, not because of any of my sensible features, for they seem clearly irrelevant (I am not morally valuable 'because' of my size, but regardless of it, and so on for any sensible feature whatsoever).

And not because of my mental states either, for they can all be morally bad without it following that I am morally disvaluable.

So that leaves my mind - the object, not its states - that bears moral value. That still leaves open the possibility that the mind could be a material object. But we can test that. For if it was the material object itself, rather than something distinct from it that was or is inhabiting it, then it would be obviously bad to destroy that object. Yet a corpse or corpse brain is something that it is not obviously bad to destroy. I mean, there seems a world of difference morally between cremating uncle John's body before it becomes a corpse and cremating it afterwards. Materially speaking it is the same body either way. (And if one objects that the significant change that has occurred is that it has gone from having mental states to not having them, then one is assuming that moral value is grounded in mental states rather than the object that is having them - a view already discounted).

Thus, it seems that it is not the physical object - be it the brain or whatever - that has moral value, but something else. 'I' then, am not a physical object with sensible features, but an immaterial thing that lacks any and all of them.

Each body is valuable and unique — Gregory

Oh, okay. If you say so. I mean, they're not unique (entirely possible for two bodies to be qualitatively identical - presumably you think twins do not have mora value?) and you've sort of entirely ignored my argument that our value has nothing to do with our bodies, as we are morally valuable irrespective of what kind of body we have. But, you know, excellent point. You really are a smart one.

Well abortion is immoral but that's a different question. The issue is live humans and what makes them valuable — Gregory

Oh, abortion is immoral is it? Thanks for sorting that one out for us. I thought there was a long and intricate debate over it and a multiplicity of reasonable - or reasonable-ish - positions on the market. But silly me. If Gregory says they're immoral, well that's good enough for me.

Look, you're not arguing anything. There's no question my OP contains an argument. One might disagree with it, but it's there. Now, this is for philosophy grown ups. So take your pronouncements and go play with the traffic like a good boy.

What about functionalism? If a mind is a lump of meat functioning in a particular way, lumps of functioning meat can be valuable without there being any immaterial objects. I'm just going with your assumptions again here. I'm not a functionalist, but you haven't adequately dealt with actual materialist theories of mind here. — bert1

I don't have to, for if I can show that immaterialism is true, then I have shown that all materialist views about the mind are false. And that is going to include functionalism, if that's what functionalism is.

However, it seems to me that functionalism is compatible with immaterialism. For functionalism is the view that two functionally isomorphic mechanisms will both have mental states if one does (regardless of what the mechanism may be made of). But so understood it does not take a stand on what kind of thing is bearing the mental states in question. So, one could be an immaterialist about the mind 'and' be a functionalist. Someone could hold that we have immaterial minds associated with our brains, and agree that were a similarly functioning mechanism to be made out of silicon or copper or whatever, that it too would thereby get to have an immaterial mind associated with it.

So, if functionalism is a form of materialism about the mind, then my argument refutes it. I don't need to specify each materialist theory about the mind, when the argument implies that immaterialism is true. That's like thinking that if I have excellent evidence that John did the crime, I nevertheless still need to discount everyone else on independent grounds - no, the evidence that John did it is , eo ipso, evidence that discounts everyone else.

And if functionalism is not a form of materialism - and I don't think it is - then any credibility it has does nothing to challenge my argument.

What? No, moral value is constitutively determined by God's attitudes. So it is subjective but external.
And it's not 'necessary', because God can change her attitudes. But none of that is essential to my case. Focus!!
Just read the op and try and understand the argument. I mean, you don't even think there is an argument there, so I don't hold out much hope.

Read the OP again. I do not hold the view you think I do

There's no argument to which you wouldn't have said those silly things.

Whether we have moral value or not is not an individually subjective matter. You are convinced it is. That's just confused. If I think I am morally valuable, it doesn't follow that I am. But even if your fallacious and ignorant view was correct, my op would still show that anyone who thinks they are morally valuable irrespective of their physical features or conscious states was, by virtue of that, an immaterial mind. Which is absurd - but just underlines the absurdity of subjectivism about those things that are not subjective. So, your subjectivism is both silly and doesn't challenge my argument.

okaaaaay.

Again, address the argument. Don't just declare things as if you are God and if you say it, it is so. Argue.

Your position is asserted without any argument. It is implausible (if I think I am not morally valuable, that does not entail that I actually lack moral value). And it doesn't engage with the OP.
Imagine a detective lays out carefully some evidence that mark did the crime. And you just ignore it and declare that ghengis Khan did it.

I don't understand your point. I have argued that our minds are the bearers of moral value and that we can learn from this that our minds are immaterial.

If roger thinks he has no moral value, it obviously doesn't follow that he actually lacks moral value.

No, I am morally valuable even if I don't think I am.

You laid out a compelling argument for specific evidence. Banno produced it.
The negation of "necessary" must be at least equal to the force of it's assertion. Now, the LNC alone not necessary; but nothing necessary just means we throw out the LNC because it's not nothing. Poor strategy for such a long reach. — Cheshire

He didn't. He just assumed that there are necessary relations (precisely what I deny) and then appealed to them to try and show how the belief that it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false commits one to affirming its actual falsity.

If you are trying to show that someone is committed to affirming a contradiction, then you have to grant them their premises, not insist on your own. Otherwise all one is doing is showing that they are contradicting 'you', not 'themselves'.

Again then: the law of non-contradiction is true. That, we can surely all agree, is not a contradictory thing to say. And it is what I say. Banno thinks that it is a contradictory thing to say (which is somewhat ironic). It isn't.

One does not need to add anything to it - one does not need to say that it is 'necessarily' true in order for it to be true. It is just true. Plain and simple.

Now when it comes to necessity, I think it names nothing clear. The point, though, is that not appending the words 'and necessarily so' to the claim that "the law of non-contradiction is true' is not needed to avoid violating the law of non-contradiction . Again: the law of non-contradiction is true. And that's all I need to say about it. And saying it does not involve me in a contradiction. If Banno thinks it does, then he needs to show it - and show it not by just assuming it is necessarily true, but by showing how denying this commits one to a contradiction.

Like I say, you're just very conventional.

I deny necessity. One way to express that is to say that one thinks all truths are contingent. But I don't need that word 'contingent'. I don't believe there is a property of contingency that truths have in addition to being true.

And it is you who is confused: you seem to think that there are necessarily necessary truths - how do you make that case without begging the question?!?

I don't believe there are any necessary truths.
— Bartricks

I see. So there can never be any necessary truths, in any circumstances. — Banno

You don't see. How does that follow? How does my claim that there are no necessary truths imply that there can't be?

You seem to have real trouble understanding the difference between saying that something is possible and something is actual.

There are no necessary truths. That's actually true. But it doesn't have to be. It just is.

When it comes to metaphysical possibilities, it seems to me that the issue is whether we think Reason determines what is or isn't possible, or our imaginations. I think it is obvious which it is: Reason. The idea that what we can conceive of or not should determine what's possible seems to me clearly to be a case of human hubris. Reason determines what is and isn't possible and for precisely that Reason anything is possible with Reason.

That's a quite different argument - there you are arguing that the law of non-contradiction is a necessary truth, rather than a contingent one.

But your original accusation was that 'I' am contradicting myself in holding it to be contingent. So to make good on that charge you do not need to defend its necessary status, you need to show how believing it to be contingently true commits me to affirming an actual contradiction.

I don't believe there are any necessary truths. That's 'why' I believe the law of non-contradiction is contingently true. I am happy to argue against there being any necessary truths, but you are question begging if you just assume there are in the course of making your case that my position is contradictory. Again, you need to show my view to be self-contradictory, not banno-contradictory.

Question begging. You have to show me to be committed to a contradiction WITHOUT assuming necessity.

You are a bad and conventional thinker. That's your problem you are impressed with mediocrity and have no originality. Stop helping yourself to necessity. Show me to have committed a contradiction without appealing to any necessary truths. Or concede that you cannot.

Yes, of course he could do that. He can do anything. For instance, he could make it the case that you make good points. That isn't good evidence he's done it. I have excellent evidence your points are appalling. But he could make them good.

You haven't explained it once - not once. This - Bartricks claims the law of non-contradiction is contingently true....#$^^** Kazam!! He's contradicted himself!! - is not an argument.

Possible doesn't mean actual. The law of non-contradiction is actually true. That's all you need to know. And my saying that does not - not - involve me in any actual contradiction.

1.if p, then modus ponens is invalid.
2.p
3. Therefore modus ponens is invalid.

1. If p, then premise 2 is false.
2. P
3. Therefore premise 2 is false.

It's pretty clear that Bart is using a confused notion of the relation between necessity and contingency. — Banno

Really?? Pure wishful thinking on your part. You seem to think that if I think it is possible for the law of non-contradiction to be false, then I think it is false. 'If' is not an assertion.

I think the law of non-contradiction is true. I don't think it has to be. I just think it is.

It's you who doesn't seem to understand that in saying something is possible, one is not asserting its actuality.

So, again: unicorns don't exist. They're not impossible. They just don't exist. Presumably you don't think that's a contradictory thing to say?

Now: the law of non-contradiction is true. It doesn't have to be. It just is. Why - without recourse to silly symbols - do you think that's a contradictory thing to say?

It may be an implausible thing to say - most consider the law of non-contradiction to be a necessary truth - but it is not a contradictory thing to say.

You think it is. You've got no argument, however. Just squiggles that you can't translate into English.

And how on earth is my view of God incoherent? Someone who thinks God exists of necessity has an incoherent view - demonstrably so. They are affirming a contradiction. Someone who thinks God exists of necessity is an idiot, for they think God can do anything and can't do something (namely, not exist).

God exists contingently. God is omnipotent - so, can do anything - and thus God exists contingently. Why? Because he can do anything. Which means he can destroy himself. Thus he exists contingently.

How is that incoherent? Coherent. That's what that is.

And i note you just toss in that I am confused as well about God's ability to make mistakes....oh, am I? Really? Why?

No, you'd be mildly annoying a tiger. But yes, I don't think it'll be profitable. Hasn't been thus far. Just lies and squiggles squoggles.

you are just expressing convictions, not telling me the means by which you know things.
What you say is false, incidentally.
But I want to know how you know these things. Not 'that'you know them,but how you do. How did these beliefs get in you head? (Not that beliefs are in heads, of course)

How do you know your hair is not Aristotle? — Gregory

Look, I don't have a limitless supply of glasses to smash into my face.

Why not? You think it is only if the past is necessary that we can know about it? Why on earth would you think that?

That's as silly as thinking that I can't know there's a cat in my kitchen because there isn't necessarily a cat or necessarily a kitchen. That is, it's tremendously silly. I have a kitchen and there is a cat in it. Deal.

Well, now I'm down one glass.

Ah, the fine and delicate logic of a whisk brain.

God can change the past. That doesn't mean he does or has. 'Can' doesn't mean 'has' or 'is doing'. Bloody hell.

And being 'able' to do something does not mean there's a 50% chance you'll do it. How do you not know this?!

I am able to take the glass in front of me and smash it into my face. That is something I can do. That doesn't mean there's a 50% chance I will. There's a 90% chance I will out of frustration at this discussion!

How do you know that?

You don't know, I suspect. That is, you don't know how you know it.

Doesn't matter. I think it is true too. So, this mysterious way by means of which you know of its truth - just attribute it to me too. I know of its truth just as you do. Happy?

We both agree that it is true.

How do you know it is 'necessarily' true, as opposed to just true?

LIke I say, you don't understand anyone.

So you reject all history because "God" can make the past different from what he was. Descartes just as likely started WWII in your worldview as Hitler, and Buddha was the big bang! — Gregory

No, I do not 'reject history' (whatever that means).

Your position on relativism leads straight to solipsism. — Gregory

No it doesn't.

As I have said before, show your working. How - how - are you getting to these conclusions? I am currently rather fancifully imagining that the inside of your head contains a slowly revolving cake whisk with some post-it notes on it with philosophical expressions and theories written on them, rather than a brain. Now please will you explain how you got from what I said to those bizarre conclusions? Or did the 'solipsism' paddle just hove into view?

Yes, to say that something is 'possibly true' is normally to express tentativeness. And that's fine. That's how I generally use it. Similarly, if someone says "that 'must' be true" they mean to express certainty.

It is philosophers who mistakenly think that these terms do not just function expressively, but can sometimes function descriptively - to describe curious features of the world called 'necessity' and 'contingency'. There are no such features, just the fallacy of reification.

Our reason tells us that some things 'must' be so, and others are merely 'possibly' so. Philosophers (with the occassional exception, such as me) then think that there is, in addition to truth, 'mustness' and 'possibility'. There is not. There's just God being adamant and God being tentative.

So every second that follows in the future has a 50/50 chance of staying consistent? — Gregory

Why would it be 50/50? I have a coffee every morning. I don't have to. I just do. But the chance that I will have one tomorrow is not 50/50, but about 90/10.

And what about the past? If God can do contradictions "she" can make the past such as that you were never born, nursed, or grew up. — Gregory

Yes. Powerful, eh?

Yet your God of Contradictions can do this. — Gregory

She's not 'my' God, she's God. And she's not a god of contradictions, for it is due to her that there are not any.

How can you be sure of your own thoughts if you are contingent? — Gregory

I don't understand the question. You must be confusing 'necessarily' with 'certainly'. I exist with certainty. I don't exist with necessity.

Yet you say you are Cartesian. — Gregory

I agree with a lot of what Descartes said, but I am not a follower. I follow me. If Descartes was alive, I think he'd be a Bartricksian too.