Ah so I didn't hear them or take the input in through any sensory channels but my faculty of reason detected a command to not believe a proposition to be true and false at the same time.... somehow. — khaled

Yes, that's what possessing a faculty of reason involves. Having one gives one some awareness - in your case, scant and very foggy awareness - of reasons to do and believe things, including imperatives to do and believe things. That's why it is called our 'faculty of reason'. Stupid people have a poorly operating one; clever people are well-operating one.

This is all very basic stuff that isn't seriously in dispute. It is also irrelevant, as you need to refute the proof I gave.

Right but I must at least remember getting issued them. — khaled

Er, why? Is that what your reason tells you - does your reason give you the impression that it is an imperative of Reason that if you are aware of an imperative, you must remember someone having issued the imperative to you? Weird. Like I say, your faculty is really ropey.

For example, my argument proves that imperatives of Reason are the imperatives of God. Now, to your mind this means that we have to be aware that they are imperatives of God and must remember encountering God and God telling us them. That's just bonkers. That is, like I say, as stupid as thinking that if someone demonstrates that water is made of tiny molecules, then you can refute them by just saying "no, water is NOT made of tiny molecules, because I am not aware it is. If it was made of tiny molecules I'd have to be aware of it. Indeed, someone would have had to show me each molecule and I'd have to see them gradually becoming a bit of water. I don't remember seeing any molecules coming out the tap last time I turned it on; I don't remember seeing any molecules in the river or the lake." That's you - that's how you reason. It's terrible.

The evidence that imperatives of Reason are imperatives of God is.....the argument. The proof. Not 'the fact you remember meeting God and him issuing imperatives to you'. Jeez. What is the point in arguing with people like you - I'm charitably assuming that you're actively going out of your way to misunderstand everything.

Okaaay, whatever. Buddhist.

Er, yes. A justified true belief is still a true belief. So your 'no' was incorrect.
— Bartricks
JTB's are TB's, but TB's aren't necessarily JTB's, so:
You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all.
— Bartricks
...my no correctly refutes that wrong part. — InPitzotl

No, because in the scenario described all we have reason to think you have acquired is a true belief. Whether it is justified or not is left open. So, all you have shown is something I already pointed out in the OP, namely that you can acquire true beliefs by means of mechanisms that were not intended to furnish you with them - indeed, mechanisms that were not intended to furnish anyone with anything.

Yes, quite. I learn from the sign in the park that someone doesn't want me to walk on the grass. I don't have to know that it is Mr Brown whose attitude it expresses, or know that Mr Brown is the world's best chess player, even though those things are true and can, with dedication, be discovered.

I was guessing, not reporting — praxis

I think it is fair to say that Russell would agree that just as one should not trust a stupid man's report of what a clever man has said, one should not trust a stupid man's guess about the matter either. (I can't remember, but I don't think the next line in the relevant passage was "But as for guessing..."

I think you misunderstand my argument. In order to be able to perceive a world one needs to be subject to mental states with representative contents, yes?

The point of my thought experiments was to show that in order for a mental state to be said (vulgarly) to 'represent' something to be the case, there would need to be an agent who is doing the representing in question. The mental state itself does not do any representing. That's as foolish as thinking that the note I wrote on is telling you about the cat. The note is not telling you anything; I am telling you about the cat via the note.

What you are doing, it seems to me, is focussing on the fact that we can nevertheless acquire accurate and justified beliefs about the world via various mechanisms that are expressing no attitudes of an agent. And I clearly agree with that. That's not the issue. My point is that something - be it some squiggles on a piece of paper or a mental state - does not itself 'represent' anything to be the case (and pointing out that we can acquire accurate information by such means is beside the point - one can acquire accurate information from dreams, that doesn't mean one is perceiving things in them). The representing is done via them, but not by them. They have to be being used - used by an agent - for that purpose or a sufficiently closely related one before they can be said to be 'representing' something to be the case (and again, even then, this is loose talk, for the state itself does not do any representing).

So we can have two states that are introspectively indiscernible, and one can be representing something to be the case, and the other not. In order for us to be perceiving a world, our mental states - some of them - need to be representing there to be a world. It is not sufficient that they be introspectively indiscernible from such states. They need actually to be representing something to be the case. And they will not be doing this unless an agent got them to arise in us for that very purpose. If that is not the case - if our faculties have been forged by unguided natural forces - then although we will still acquire true beliefs about the world we are living in from them, we will not be perceiving the world, even though our situation would be introspectively indiscernible from what would be the case if we were.

Demonstrating that some E can produce x that isn't y cannot reasonably be a demonstration that E cannot produce y. "E can produce x" is a capability. "E cannot produce y" is a limitation. x not being y is nowhere close to demonstrating said capability implies said limitation. — InPitzotl

This I do not understand - that is, I do not understand how what you're saying here relates to anything I have argued.

The alleged argument for this premise is about the capability of unguided evolutionary forces providing things that don't convey information to us. What has that argument to do with that premise? — InPitzotl

That's just a mistaken interpretation on your part. I have not argued that blind natural forces cannot cause us to acquire true beliefs about the world. I said the precise opposite of that. They can. Obviously. The point is that they will do this by causing the beliefs in us, not by representing anything to be the case.

I should add, that if our belief forming mechanisms are also wholly the product of unguided forces, then the same would apply to our beliefs - or 'beliefs'. They would not in fact be beliefs, though we would be unable to distinguish them from the real deal.

The point is that nothing in principle stops an unguided mechanism from creating in us an accurate belief, provided we have a belief-forming mechanism already in place.

I do have some sympathy for your frustrations. — Foghorn

I am not frustrated. I already explained: arguing with numskulls can be very philosophically fruitful. (Any apparent frustration is an act).

The following theory might help?

The more insightful an idea, the smaller the audience. — Foghorn

No, because the theory is false. I prefer this:

You are brilliant and everyone else is stupid. — Foghorn

Maybe I can answer for you. You’re not religious because you have no faith in any religious doctrine or religious authorities that you know of. — praxis

One of my favourite quotes is from Bertrand Russell: never trust a stupid man's report of what a clever man has said.

↪Bartricks
If a proposition is true, do not believe that it is also false.
— Bartricks

And you have memory of God saying this to you? — khaled

I take it you accept that this is indeed an imperative of Reason and thus you accept that premise 1 is true.

You are now changing the topic and wondering how we learn about the existence of these imperatives, yes? And you are thinking, with all the sophistication of a child, that if they are imperatives of God, then you must have met God on a cloud when he told you these things, right?

You have a faculty of reason - in your case an extremely ropey one - and it is via that faculty that you gain an awareness of these imperatives.

You do not have to know that it is God who is issuing them. That is as unbelievably stupid as thinking that water is not made of tiny molecules because you just drank some water and you don't recall drinking any molecules.

I told you umpteen times I am not religious and that I believe in God. This must puzzle you enormously because you keep asking me the same question over and over. I can only imagine that you must have superb instincts as otherwise I find it hard to see how you could navigate yourself around the world with so easily confounded a faculty of reason.

If a proposition is true, do not believe that it is also false.

Er, no. There are imperatives of Reason and those are imperatives that have a single existent mind as their source. Just follow the argument.

You keep asking what an imperative of reason is - why? The argument shows you.

Are you, perhaps, trying to deny that there are any, but just using the wrong words to do it?

Or are you asking me to provide you with the content of one?

Because I am not religious. Why would I be? Presumably you think that if someone reasons to the conclusion God exists, they will then think 'well, I better go join a religion'. Why would I do that? How does one get from 'God exists' to 'the bible is correct about everything' or 'the Koran is correct about everything'?? Maybe they are or one of them is - but it is not implied by the argument on whose basis I believe in God.

The argument tells you: imperatives a single existent mind is issuing.

The mind described in 5 will be God. That is, it will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. No point wasting time explaining why that will be to someone who doesn't understand how arguments work.

That argument proves God. It proves God because the mind in 5 is God. I don't have to show that for it to be true (you think otherwise, but that'sbecause you learnt to reason from russell brand). I can show it. But I don't have to. It proves God regardless of whether I take the trouble to explain to you why that mind will have the omni properties.

Which premise are you trying to challenge?

You get it do you? This is a playground and the level of philosophical sophistication here is somewhat low. So I expect few will get it. But explaining subtle ideas to total numskulls can be surprisingly useful philosophically, as their utterly bizarre 'criticisms' can make one think in novel ways.

Thank you for your condescension. But it is fine as it is. If one is writing a discussion post one should not make it too long and dense. Thus there will be many points that require development - one leaves that to the discussion. Why don't you start your own discussion and show us how it is done.

Because I'm not religious. I believe in God. I am not religious. Not hard to understand (unless you're creativesoul, in which case I just said I am an onion and the number 8).

And faith isn't necessary to be religious. Perhaps this claim confuses you and sounds like it might contradict my claim not to be religious - it would sound like that to the dumb. There are people of faith who are religious and there are people who believe in God on rational grounds who are religious, and some may have started out one kind and become the other. But me? I believe in God on rational ground and I am not religious.

I presented the argument (which I knew would be a waste of time). You don't know how to argue well. You learnt your skills from Russell Brand - that's what you said, yes? You said 4 asserted that God exists, which it doesn't as anyone who can read can know.

Total gibberish.

Chicken pie!!

Yes

Er, yes. A justified true belief is still a true belief. So your 'no' was incorrect. And yes, the belief is justified. Relevance? Do weight machines greet you now?

Yes, the one I provided and that you don't understand.

Waiter: yes, you can't drink chicken pie. The point is that you ordered chicken pie, not a pint of beer

Let's start over.

Ok. What would you like?

A chicken pie.

Er, are you sure? You sure you don't want a pint of beer?

Chicken pie!!

Well, er, I just brought you one - it's in front of you.

But I wanted a pint of beer.

And I just told you my answer.

Shall I help you understand it?

Those moral norms that are imperatives are imperatives of Reason.

Those moral norms that are not imperatives but something else - urgings or recommendations, perhaps - are the urgings or recommendations of Reason.

This isn't hard.

it doesn't represent the weight of your cat, for the reasons just given (stop begging the question). You acquire a true belief about your cat's weight, that's all. And if you are not a philosopher you will also say that it told you your cat's weight. But it didn't, because it doesn't 'tell'you anything. When it says 'good morning' it's not greeting you.

A value isn't an imperative, so no. All moral norms are imperatives of Reason if one means by a norm 'an imperative'
And Reason is God. That's what the argument demonstrated.

One thing at a time, to quote you. 4 does not assert that imperatives of reason are imperatives of God. You can see this by learning English and then reading the content of 4.
You in a cafe:

What would you like, sir?

A chicken pie please.

Here you go.

This is a chicken pie. I ordered a pint of beer.

No sir, you ordered a chicken pie.

I said 'a chicken pie please'

Yes. That's ordering a chicken pie. You say those words.

But I wanted a pint of beer.

Okay, but you said you wanted a chicken pie.

A chicken pie isn't a pint of beer.

Yes. But you ordered a chicken pie.

I can't drink a chicken pie.

Yes, and 4 doesn't assert it. Have you had a stroke??

4 does not assume what's under contention. And I am not wasting any more time with someone who thinks otherwise. I might as well show the argument to a horse.

oh I am begging the question am I - riiiight.

When I write you a note, the note isn't telling you anything. It doesn't have a little mouth or desires that you know things.

I am telling you something via the note. The note is not telling you anything.

Language is in the hands of idiots and so we are permitted to say 'the note told me the cat was on the mat'. But it didn't.

We must talk with the vulgar, but think with refined, as Berkeley would say.

Thoughts don't think. Desires don't desire. And communications don't communicate.

And weighing machines don't talk to you.

4 does NOT assume it. Christ!

The issue under contention is E.

Here's how I've reasoned

All As are Bs.
All As are Cs.
Therefore all As are Bs and Cs.
An A that is a B and a C is an E.
Therefore all As are Es

And what you are doing is saying 'all As are Cs just assumes As are Es' over and over again.

No, matey, it doesn't.

Now, answer this question or stop wasting my time: do you have a positive argument against 4? That is, do you have a valid argument that has the negation of 4 as a conclusion?
I have lots for 4. Lots. Do you have any against it?

No, the matter of contention is whether God exists. That's what you asked me to prove. So I have. Stop changing the goalposts.

I presented you with the argument. You then said that it begs the question because premise 4 asserts what is under contention. That is manifestly false as I have explained several times now.

The machine is designed to tell your weight. How is that a counterexample? I am arguing that your faculties need to have been designed to tell you about the world if you are to be told about the world via them. And you are trying to challenge that with a weighing machine that is designed to give you information about your weight?!? How on earth does that work, Anscombe?

read mine!!!

Yes, I have lots of arguments for 4. But we need to be clear about something: 4 does NOT express the matter under contention.
You may think 4 is false. But it most certainly does not assert that God exists. As I have just said, it is widely affirmed by those who do not believe the source is God.

This is a circular argument:

1.p
2.q
3.therefore p

For the matter under contention is p.

This is not:.
1. P
2.q
3. Therefore p and q.

My argument has a conclusion that is extracted from the premises, but is not asserted in any one of them. We need to be clear about this.

And I take it you have no argument against 4, you just don't see any reason to think it is true, yes? Or do you think there is positive evidence of its falsity?

it is not the matter under contention. It's a non question begging premise. It does not say 'God exists'.

If you think 4 is false just say that and raise a doubt about it.

And yes, I have numerous arguments for it. Why do you think it is false?

No. The argument is not circular. The conclusion is not expressed in any premise.

Note that one could agree with 4 and yet not think the source is a mind. Plato called it 'the Good'; Kant just called it Reason and didn't go further.

So no, 4 clearly does not express what is at issue. It expresses an independently plausible self evident truth recognized throughout the history of reflection.

Note too that by the time we get to 4, all objectivist metanormative theories are out for the count. So we are not in Kansas anymore.

I just set it out above. You will note that it is valid and thus that you need to deny a premise. I believe no reasonable doubt is possible about any one of them.