I am saying that Genesis is not an account of God making this world. The place described does not resemble this one and to insist it is this place generates problems that would not arise otherwise.

Whether this place - which is referred to as 'the world' - is made or not is another matter.

'Odd' is not a rational criticism.

The OP isn't about that, is it? It's about the coherence of Christianity and whether there is any justifying reason why Christians typically believe God created the world.
Justifying reason, not explanatory reason.
It's not a 'have a pop at christianity' thread.

That's question begging. You are just assuming at the outset that God does not exist and that christianity is bollocks, yes? Stop that.

Really. — Bitter Crank

Yes.

You think you already know that God is unknowable. That's both extremely arrogant and obviously confused, for if you don't know anything about God then you don't even know what you're using that word to refer to, do you?

What was the point of that post?

A God-Creator 'works' because we seem to require a beginning to everything, somehow. Big Bang or Fiat Lux. — Bitter Crank

But that kind of argument does not get one to God, but to uncreated things. That is, from the fact that there are created things, one can conclude that there are also uncreated things. Nothing commits one to supposing that there is just one uncreated thing that is responsible for all else, much less that it is God.

The more we talk about the nature of God; what God did or did not do; what God is or is not like, etc. the deeper into the indefensible we get. Our claims about God are indefensible because we can't know God. In my opinion (talk about hubris!) God (the Father) is above and beyond our knowing. God (the Son) is the knowable person of God. — Bitter Crank

It is hubris to think you know that we can't know what God is like. If God wants us to know what he is like, then he can do that. And he has, for we can know that God exists and we can know something of what God's character is like from our reason. From our reason we know that God wants us to be people of a certain character or characters - well, we can reasonably suppose that God's character resembles one of them.

And what's this stuff about God the son? First, is God his own son? How does that make any sense? And you have contradicted yourself. You've said God is unknowable and knowable.

Well, why do you not believe that God created the world? What justification do you have for this belief? — Bitter Crank

I think the burden of proof would be on the person who thought God did create the world.

There seems no positive reason to suppose God created this world. And there seems positive reason to think God did not create it, given how ugly some of it is.

So, the default is that God did not create this world, not that he did.

And as for Christians, it seems to me that there is nothing in the creation story in the bible that commits them to thinking that God created this world. It would be more reasonable for them to believe that Genesis is a story about another place, not here.

Note, I am not interested in a psychological or sociological or historical explanation of why it is that Christians typically believe God created the world.

I am interested in whether there is any good philosophical reason for them to do so.

A berk, I think.
What "issue"? People believe whatever they want. — Vera Mont

No, some people believe what they think they have reason to believe and stop believing what they recognize they do not have reason to believe. Not berks though.

Is the choice really is between the absolute acceptance of that omni-doctrine and a peach? OK then I'm a berk, because both appear silly to me. — Vera Mont

Yes. I think that's what you are.

he commitment of Christians is not in a definition; it's in the acceptance of Jesus as their redeemer. A cornerstone of the doctrine is believing that story in the foundational book that starts "In the beginning...", which also enables the same God to be King of Heaven, which is important to Christianity wih it afterlife myth. But they do a lot of interpreting, ignoring and cherry-picking between that and the Ascension.
They don't need to 'square the book' with the omni-God. They just need faith and short memories. — Vera Mont

Again, relevance to the OP??

Christians believe their god created the world, because the Sumerian creation myth is in a book that was written down by Hebrews long after they picked up the oral tradition. Meanwhile, the Christians' founding figurehead changed the whole concept and identity of the Hebrew god. So they have the Saviour figure at the center of their religion, but His role depends on the God figure that's supposed to have engendered Him, which is a different person from the Jehovah of the OT. But the compilers of the Bible that modern Christians use as their source and final authority lived in Roman Europe 300 years later just lumped all the stories in together, regardless of their origins, ages and contradictions. So the Christians are confused and conflicted and all the time at odds with one another over doctrine. — Vera Mont

Again: you're not focussing on the issue.

Does the concept of God - defined as I defined God - entall that God created the world? No.

Does the bible commit a CHristian to believing that God created the world? So far as I can see, no.

Maybe you're taking somebody else's unreliable word for what God is like. Who told you He's all-good? — Vera Mont

OMG. Did you read the OP? It's true by definition. What did I say someone who quetsions that is? Focus on the issue.

When it came to my dinner invite examples, I wouldn't be surprised if you thought that the thing to focus on is how nice pasta and ragu is.

Shall we go through it again?

No one has to invite James to dinner. No wrong is done if James is not invited to dinner (don't question that. Don't say 'but what if James is really hungry' or something tediously stupid like that. That'd be thicker than a thick thing on thick day. So don't.)

Jane wants to invite James to dinner. But she only has ingredients for meal X. Pssst, it doesn't matter what the meal is. Don't ask about the meal. Don't ask why she only has those ingredients and didn't work harder and acquire more ingredients. That's irrelevant.

Now, given that Jane can only serve James meal x if she invites him for dinner, is it morally ok for her to invite James to dinner?

Depends what x is. A dinner guest is entitled to a meal of a certain quantity and quality.

Let's imagine it is morally ok for her to invite James to dinner.

Well, if it is ok for her to invite James to dinner given she can only serve him x, then it is surely also ok for Marjorie to invite James to dinner and serve him x, even though she is capable of serving him something better.

Now, inviting James to dinner is playing the role of procreation in the above analogy. The meal x is life here in the sensible world as it is.

Jane is us. Marjorie is God. If it is morally ok for us to subject a person to life here in the sensible world as it is, then it is morally ok for God too as well. That is, if it is morally permissible for us to procreate, then there is no problem of evil.


But a proponent of the problem of evil thinks Marjorie did wrong in serving James X. If that was what she was going to serve, she should not have invited him.

So, a proponent of the problem of evil thinks it wrong for Marjorie to invite James over for dinner if all she is going to serve him is meal X.

But that now means that Jane would also be doing wrong if she invites James over for dinner given she can only serve him meal X.

In other words, if God would have been doing wrong if he introduced innocent life into this world as it is, then we too are doing wrong if we introduce innocent llfe into this world as it is.

See?

If it is wrong for Marjorie to serve James X, then it is wrong for Jane to invite James over given she can only serve him x.

If it is ok for Jane to invite James over given she can only serve him x, then it is ok for Marjorie to serve James x (even though she has the ability to serve him something better).

Thus, if it would be wrong for an omnipotent omniscient person to subject innocent persons to life in a world such as this, then it would be wrong for us to as well, given all we can offer is life in a world such as this.

And if it would be morally permissible for a person who can only offer life in world such as this to subject an innocent person to a lifetime in it, then it is morally ok for an omnipotent, omniscient person to do so as well, even though he has the ability to alter how the world operates.

So, if there is a problem of evil for God - and virtually everyone thinks there is (mistakenly, as it happens), then procreation is immoral.

If procreation is not immoral, then there is no problem of evil for God.

No, you don't seem to understand at all.

And you don't seem to understand what a proponent of the problem of evil believes either.

My argument is addressed to those who believe that the evils of the world constitute evidence that God does not exist.

It is not addressed to those fools who think the concept of God does not make sense.

So, step one: try and focus on the relevant parties. I am addressing procreator (or natalist - by which I mean those who believe procreation is typically permissible) proponents of the problem of evil

If you think God can't exist, then you're not someone I am addressing.

I am addressing procreator proponents of the problem of evil.

Now, in order to help those who find it difficulty to follow a line of argument focus on the relevant issue - totally and utterly pointless in a context like this, I know - in my original example I asked you to imagine an omnipotent, omniscient person. Not God. Just an omnipotent omniscient person., Now, I know a little voice is saying 'ooo, but that ain't makking no sense'. Shut that voice up and focus.

And what did I then do? I then asked you to notice that a proponent of the problem of evil thinks a person like that morally ought not to invest a world like this with sentient life unless he was going to alter how it operates.

So, a 'good' omnipotent, omniscient person would either alter how the world operates so as to eliminate the risk of horrendous evils, or they would not invest the world with innocent life.

Forget whether you agree. This is to do with what a proponent of the problem of evil will agree to. And they'll have to agree to what I just said otherwise there is no problem of evil.

And that principle - either ensure the world will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you make live in it, or do not make innocents live in it - has this form 'Either p or q'

And we are not able to ensure that the world will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents we make live in it.

That means 'not p' is true for us.

From which it follows. as a matter of basic logic, that q. That is, that we ought not to invest the world with innocent life.

1. Either p or q
2. Not p
3. Therefore q

is a deductively valid argument

Jesus!

Now, because that argument is deductively valid, anyone who wishes to deny its conclusion must deny a premise.

The second is clearly undeniable.

So it all hangs on the first.

And note, the question here is not whether you agree with 1, but whether a proponent of the problem of evil agrees with it.

if you think they do not have to agree with it, then explain how such a person could argue that the evils of the world imply God's non existence without appeal to that principle.

As my argument here is directed at proponents of the problem of evil, it would depend on whether milder evils are considered by them to be incompatible with God.

It is generally thought that the quality and quantity of the harms that befall people here are such that God, if he existed, would surely prevent.

Antinatalists, such as myself, are persuaded by a variety of arguments.

The argument I am making here is not directed at antinatalists, for we are already persuaded by other arguments. This argument is directed at those who think the problem of evil provides good evidence that God does not exist. That's most philosophers. But most philosophers are not antinatalists. This argument shows them that they should be.

As far as Jane inviting James over? Why does she have to serve the glassy sauce? She could serve the spaghetti plain - maybe with a bit of olive oil, a dash of salt, and some parmigiana cheese. Yum. Oh, her cupboard is empty? She can go out to the store and buy some. Oh, she's broke? She could call James and say "Hey James, I'm so sorry, all I have is plain spaghetti but I'd still like you to come over". Or she could call up James and say "Hey lover boy, would mind picking up a jar of ragu on your way over?" — EricH

You don't seem to understand the example.

I'm forceful, — god must be atheist

No matey, you're just rude:

but this time you are fucking your own self.
— god must be atheist

You show here very clearly that you haven't the slightest clue what morality entails.
— god must be atheist

Yikes!! Your questions make exactly as much sense as your other participatory remarks on this board.
— god must be atheist — Bartricks

Those were opening comments of yours.

This:

How the bloody hell does that even begin to be an argument? — Bartricks

is forceful.

- illogical
- spews nonsense — god must be atheist

I am not illogical. Your OP does not contain an argument. I don't think you know what one is. That's why everything I say sounds weird to you. You can't see, for instance, that this is an argument:

1. If p, then q
2. p
3. Therefore q

Which is understandable given that you think this is an argument:

1. P
2. Elephant
3. Therefore a cake.

Now, I haven't the faintest idea what you're trying to say in the OP. Not a clue. Are you trying to raise the problem of evil?

Before continuing I just wanted to say that I'm glad that we have had an invective free conversation. I believe very strongly (that whenever possible) it is ideas that should be criticized, not people. I hope that we can continue in that vein — EricH

Oh, I very much doubt it, vicar. For you just criticized me there, didn't you? Tut tut.

I think I finally understand what you're getting at - and here is where we disagree. I am not seeing any connection between being a PPE and your Ps & Qs. Being a PPE does not imply that one should have any opinion on how God should act, let alone that it is wrong of God. — EricH

Yes it does. How doesn't it? A proponent of the problem of evil believes that it would be wrong for God to invest a world such as this one with innocent life. They point to the evils of the world and conclude that God would have prevented those. That's the basis upon which they believe God does not exist. They believe that God would either have altered how the sensible world operates so that it doesn't visit any horrendous evils on the innocents he puts in it, or he would not have put innocent persons into it.

So what is Mr. X's opinion of AN? Is there any connection between Mr. Xs atheism and AN? — EricH

Yes, clearly. Mr X believes this principle is true:

1. Either alter how the sensible world operates so that it does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you plan on introducing into it, or do not introduce innocents into it. (Either p or q)

And this premise is clearly true:

2. We cannot alter how the sensible world operates so that it does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents we plan on introducing into it (not P)

3. Therefore, do not introduce innocents into it (antinatalism) (therefore, q)

I take it there is a limit to what we owe to others? If, for example, the only way your life could be saved is if I stop eating all of my favourite foods for the rest of my life, presumably that is beyond the call of duty. I am not obliged to make that kind of sacrifice for a stranger.

If that is correct, then it applies to cows and so on as well.

Veganism is, then, supererogatory. As is vegetarianism. At most we are obliged to make some dietary sacrifices, or to make some for a period and then no longer. But it seems implausible that we should be required to abandon entirely a diet we have come to be very attached to.

First, that post was not addressed to you, was it. It was addressed to god must be atheist. He had, in another thread, just make the following remarks to me (entirely unprovoked):

but this time you are fucking your own self. — god must be atheist

You show here very clearly that you haven't the slightest clue what morality entails. — god must be atheist

Yikes!! Your questions make exactly as much sense as your other participatory remarks on this board. — god must be atheist

In this context, you can see how my robust question was entirely in keeping with the tone that he had already set.

Second, focus on the argument, not the arguer. Note in that post I helpfully explained how God must be an atheist's 'argument' is just a list of random claims and then provided some useful examples of valid argument forms.

Third, how the bloody hell is it an argument?

The absurdity of the procreator proponent of the problem of evil's position is becoming increasingly apparent to me.

Jane wants to invite James over for dinner. She doesn't have to. She just wants to. But all she has in her cupboard is some spaghetti and a smashed jar of ragu. So all she is capable of serving James is spaghetti with sauce that has bits of glass in it. And she has no pudding to offer.

Well, I'd have thought it was obvious that she ought to refrain from inviting James over, given all she can serve him is a meal of glassy ragu and spaghetti. A guest deserves better - much better - than that.

But let's imagine that you think - bizarrely - that no, it is absolutely fine for Jane to invite James over and serve him glassy spaghetti and sauce.

Well, Marjorie wants to invite James over for dinner too. She doesn't have to either. SHe just wants to. But she has lots of things in her cupboard, including a smashed glass of ragu and some spaghetti. And she wants to serve James that. However, she is going to give him a great pudding.

Now, aren't you mega-bizarre if you think that it would be wrong for Marjorie needlessly to subject James to an evening of glassy spaghetti and sauce followed by a nice pudding, but not at all wrong for Jane needlessly to subject James to an evening of glassy spaghetti and sauce?

I think so. Yet that is analogous to the view of the person who thinks it would have been wrong for God needlessly to make innocent persons live in this world with all its evils, yet not wrong for them to do so.

God could have gotten rid of the evils - just as Marjorie could have served James something other than spaghetti and glassy ragu. But he is, it is supposed, going to provide a great pudding (an afterlife in heaven).

You, however, could only have served spaghetti and glassy ragu, for that is all you had. You didn't have to invite James to dinner, of course. And you can offer no pudding. If God did wrong, you did worse! I mean, whose invite would James prefer to receive?

By a proponent of the problem of evil I mean someone who thinks that the evils of the world imply God's non-existence. So, they are those who argue that God does not exist on the basis of the evils of the world.

I am not one of those. I think God exists. I think there is no problem of evil.

But most philosophers think there is a problem of evil. They think the evils of the world provide us with good evidence (most would say decisive) that God does not exist.

Those philosophers ought to be antinatalists. That is what I am arguing.

That's not why I am an antinatalist. I am an antinatalist for a whole host of reasons.

My point, though, is that an argument - the problem of evil - that the vast majority of philosophers think is a very powerful one against God, implies the truth of antinatalism.

So, 'if' the problem of evil provides good evidence that God does not exist, then there is good evidence that it is wrong for us to procreate.

If P, then Q.

However, it does not follow that if Q then P.

So, although I am an antinatalist, this does not commit me to thinking that the problem of evil provides good evidence that God does not exist.

I think the problem of evil fails. But most think it succeeds. They are inconsistent if they are not also antinatalists.

It is entirely consistent to be an antinatalist and to believe the problem of evil fails to show God's non existence. For there is nothing inconsistent in being a theist antinatalist.

It is entirely consistent to think procreation is morally permissible and that there is no problem of evil. False. But consistent.

It is inconsistent, however, to think that there is a problem of evil and that it is morally ok for us to procreate.

Well, it looks like we're stuck here :angry: :grimace: For clarity's sake I am re-posting your OP — EricH

Yes, another fantastically prejudicial judgement by Mickie/Xtrix. This argument:

1. Either ensure that the sensible world does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you plan on making live in it, or do not make any innocents live in it (P or Q)
2.We are not going to ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that we plan on making live in it. (Not P)
3.Therefore, we ought not to make any innocents live in it. (Therefore Q)

Is a 'life sucks' argument, apparently. Which means all discussion of the problem of evil should also be moved to this thread too.

If you are using your omnipotent, omniscient person (OO-P) as an example/template to possibly emulate - as the OP clearly states - then your discussion of the properties & behavior of the OO-P is subject to debate - since that is the foundation on which you construct your Ps & Qs. — EricH

What I was trying to do is show how a proponent of the problem of evil is committed to affirming the truth of a disjunctive moral principle.

1. Either ensure that the sensible world does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents you plan on making live in it, or do not make any innocents live in it (P or Q)

The omnipotent, omniscient person is dispensable insofar as it is the truth of that principle - if true it be - that gets one to the antinatalist conclusion. But as I was trying to show how those who run the problem of evil are, on pain of inconsistency, committed to affirming it - or seem to be, anyway - that was why I mentioned such a creature.

One could argue the other way - that is, one could take the moral permissibility of procreation as one's starting point and argue that it implies that there is no problem of evil.

To go back to my dinner invite examples. Jane wants to invite James over for dinner, but she only has ingredients for spaghetti bolognaise in her cupboard. But that's fine - there's nothing impermissible about inviting someone over for dinner if you're going to serve them spaghetti bolognaise (provided there's enough of it). For James does not dislike it and it's a meal of the kind a guest is entitled to expect.

But then surely it is fine for Marjorie - who is capable of cooking all manner of things for James, but just wants to cook spaghetti bolognaise - to invite James over and serve him spaghetti bolognaise too? SHe will not be doing James an injustice if she does that. She could serve him something better. But he's not entitled to anything better and so he is being done no wrong by Marjorie if she serves him spaghetti bolognaise.

That applies now to God. If it is morally permissible for us to procreate, despite the fact we'll thereby be subjecting an innocent to the risk of suffering horrendous evils - so, if we do no wrong to that person - then it is also morally permissible for God to subject innocents to life in this world despite the risk of them suffering horrendous evils. God is like Marjorie and creating life is like serving spaghetti bolognaise to a guest.

As is now obvious, this is clearly a life-sucks argument through and through and definitely belongs here.

Thanks, appreciated. It won't do anything, of course. Clearly they have decided that any argument for antinatalism is - must be - an argument that assumes life sucks. That is as ignorant and stupid as thinking that anyone who thinks there is a problem of evil for belief in God is also someone who thinks 'life sucks'. The best explanation is that there is a prejudice in operation.

I can distinguish at least 8 distinct arguments that have antinatalist implications. Only one of those is what's known as a 'miserabilist' case that assumes life here subjects its liver to more harms than benefits. One. One out of 8 arguments that I know of. Yet clearly were I to make any of those other 7 arguments, my thread would be merged with this one. Why? So as to close the debate down.

I have never made a life sucks argument for antinatalism. The closest I have made is a death-based argument, but even then I still assume that life here benefits its liver more than it harms them (the harms come after). Every single argument I have made for antinatalism has NOT been a life sucks one. Note a single one.

I believe that is false. There is clearly no rational basis for merging my discussion with this one. My argument had no premise that asserted that life sucks. It didn't even have an antinatalist conclusion, but a disjunctive conclusion: either antinatalism is true, or there is no problem of evil.

So, philosophically it demonstrably makes no sense at all to merge my discussion with a 'life sucks' thread. They have nothing in common. It is as stupid as merging a thread on the problem of evil with 'life sucks'. Would you do that? Do you think someone who thinks there is a problem of evil for theism is someone who thinks 'life sucks'?

If someone on a thread starts making 'life sucks' claims, then it is also absurd to make that a basis for merging it with another thread, especially when the person whose thread it is is continuing to take part in a focussed discussion of the OP - an OP which makes no 'life sucks' claim.

Given the philosophical ineptness of thinking my thread was at home in a 'life sucks' thread it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that the mods - or some of the mods here - have a bias against antinatalist threads, regardless of the particulars of the arguments, and so have a tendency to destroy any focussed discussion of them.

How the blood hell is this anything to do with 'life sucks'? Clearly Mickie (a.k.a Xtrix) - who moved this here - thinks that any argument for antinatalism, or that has antinatalist implications, is therefore a 'life sucks' view. That is so ignorant and stupid it beggars belief.

It's as dumb as thinking that as some utilitarians argue for vegetarianism, any argument for vegetarianism is therefore a defence of utilitarianism (so, merge any argument for vegetarianism with utilitarianism, despite the fact there are all manner of non-utilitarian arguments for it).

It's as dumb as thinking that as some Nazis were vegatarians, any argument for vegetarianism is therefore an argument for Nazism.

Or as thick as thinking that as some moral realists are divine command theorists, any argument for moral realism is an argument for God.

And so on.

Life sucks and antinatalism are not equivalent and only a bloody idiot thinks otherwise (so, you know, virtually everyone here). It's called the fallacy of affirming the consequent. If life sucks, that implies antinatalism. But it doesn't follow that an argument that implies antinatalism implies life sucks. That's called being stupid.

No premise in the argument i made - which wasn't even an argument for antinatalism, but for a disjunctive conclusion: either antinatalism is true or there is no problem of evil - expressed the view that life sucks.

Most arguments for antinatalism - including what is currently the most famou (Benatar's axiological asymmetry) - are NOT life sucks views. Benatar's axiological asymmetry argument is not a life sucks view. It has no 'life sucks' premise. Other asymmetry arguments aren't life sucks views. The consent argument is not a life sucks view. The Rawlsian argument is not a life sucks view. And so on and so on.

There is no philosophical justification for merging my thread with this one. The motivation is clearly just a brute dislike of philosophical discussion of antinatalism or any argument that might have antinatalist implications.

Perhaps someone might object that in order for this principle - Either ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that you plan on making live in it, or do not make innocent persons live in it - to apply to a person, the person in question must have the ability to fulfil either of the disjuncts. That is, it only applies to you if you have the ability to alter the world in the required manner, and the ability to invest it with life.

But that seems false. At most one only needs the ability to fulfil one of the disjuncts. For instance, that is all that 'ought implies can' requires. So long as one can fulfil one of the disjuncts, one is able to comply with the directive.

And imagine a god who is unable to prevent herself from introducing new life into the world, but who does the ability to ensure that the world will not visit any horrendous evils on that new life. Well, clearly she ought to exercise that ability. That is, her inability to fulfil one of the disjuncts does not mean the principle does not apply to her. Likewise then, the fact we can't fulfil one of the disjuncts does not mean the principle does not apply to us.

That's irrelevant. All that is relevant here is whether this principle is true:

1. Either ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that you plan on making live in it, or do not make innocent persons live in it. (P or Q)

Which it is. Or at least, proponents of the problem of evil must accept it is.

To challenge me you would need to argue that a proponent of the problem of evil can reject that principle. It's not about what abilities God has. Nor is it about what I can deny or affirm. It's about what a proponent of the problem of evil can do. Can they deny that principle? No, not and be consistent.

This thread is about this argument:

1. Either ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that you plan on making live in it, or do not make innocent persons live in it. (P or Q)
2. We cannot ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that we plan on making live in it. (Not P)
3. therefore, do not make innocent persons live in it. (Therefore, Q)

Now, you have had long enough to read up on disjunctive syllogisms and research how they can fail such that you can then wearily tell me that the one above fails in one of those ways and then refuse to clarify in the hope that others will charitably assume that you do know, even though you and I know that you don't.

So, come along. Say where the argument goes wrong. You are sure it does go wrong, for no better reason than that I have made it. Yes? If Bartricks makes an argument, that argument is rubbish. So, now try and explain why it is rubbish. Do so without quoting yourself as if your pronouncements constitute pieces of evidence. And do so without any squiggling and squoggling.

So if She is not bound by LNC, then She can satisfy both desires. Since we frail/fallible human beings are bound by LNC we cannot fathom/understand how this is possible - we simply have to accept it. — EricH

Yes, but that's irrelevant to the case I am making. For I am not trying to shed light on what an omnipotent person is capable of doing. Rather, I am trying to shed light on the morality of procreation. I am simply using the example of God and the problem of evil to do that, for there we find much more agreement than we do on the issue of antinatalism.

When it comes to the problem of evil, there is widespread - though not universal - agreement that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person would not invest a world like this one with innocent life.

Those who think that is not true can simply ignore the rest of what I say. The majority - certainly the majority of contemporary philosophers - will agree that it is true.

These folk will agree to the truth of this claim:

Either ensure that the sensible world does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents living in it, or do not introduce innocent life into it.

For if that claim is not true, then there is no problem of evil. And they think there is.

God has the ability to do the former, but we do not. But that's irrelevant. For all it means is that we must accept that we cannot ensure that the sensible world does not visit horrendous evils on any innocents living in it. Thus, what follows is that we ought not to introduce innocent life into it.

Pointing out that God can do all manner of things that we cannot - including, if she so wishes, making the LNC untrue - misses the point. The LNC is actually true and we gain insight into moral matters by employing our reason. It is what is actually moral - not what could be - that I am interested in.

And it would seem that this is a sound argument, or at least that a proponent of the problem of evil seems bound to accept it is.

1. Either ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that you plan on making live in it, or do not make innocent persons live in it. (P or Q)
2. We cannot ensure that the sensible world is such that it will not visit horrendous evils on any innocents that we plan on making live in it. (Not P)
3. therefore, do not make innocent persons live in it. (Therefore, Q)

Show your working. Identify the false premise above and explain its falsity. Christ. You know you would have shown your working if you could.

Which one is false - 1 or 2? Come along.

Cheers, Bart. — Banno

That's not an answer to the question. I understand you're scared. The nasty reasoning man has come to town, so now the squiggle squoggle salesman better pack up his cart and run away.

I'll answer for you.

Banno: yes fartypants.

Right. Now a proponent of the problem of evil must accept this moral principle:

Either adjust the sensible world so that it does not visit horrendous evils on those living in it, or do not introduce innocent life into the world

If they think that principle is false, a problem of evil does not arise. Thus, they must affirm it.

So, this premise is true (or at least a proponent of the problem of evil must accept it anyway):

1. Either adjust the sensible world so that it does not visit horrendous evils on those living in it, or do not introduce innocent life into the world

Now, none of us can adjust the sensible world so that it does not visit horrendous evils on those living in it, can we. So we're not going to. Thus we must accept that this premise is true:

2. We are not going to adjust the sensible world so that it does not visit horrendous evils on those living in it.

And from that it follows that we ought not to introduce innocent life into it. That's antinatalism.

Meh. You set up a false dilemma in the fifth paragraph. But i know from previous discussions that there is little point in explaining this to you. — Banno

Just answer the question.

Perhaps, but the quality of his arguments is quite low. — Banno

No they aren't. You just think they are. That's not the same.

Take the argument in the OP. What's poor about it?

For instance, do you think this is valid?:

1. Either P or Q
2. Not P
3. Therefore Q

There's nothing in the OP worthy of consideration, unlike some of your posts, to which I have occasionally replied. — Banno

Yes there is. I've shown how those who think there's a problem of evil should accept that it is wrong to procreate. That's extraordinarily interesting. An actual philosopher would recognize that.

It's apparent that you have actually read, perhaps studied, some philosophy, unlike Bart. — Banno

Er, okaay.

I simply do not share in your conviction that life is unpleasant. I'm content that I am here. From that foundation your arguments for antinatalism gain no traction, and your arguments that one ought feel that life is not worthwhile are superfluous. — Banno

Like many, you ignorantly assume that the only argument for antinatalism is one that assumes life is unpleasant. Presumably that's because it's the only one you understand. Therefore, it must be the only one that is ever offered! Or perhaps it is becasue it is the only one you can say anything to challenge.
Therefore it is the only one!

There are lots of arguments for antinatalism, as you'd know if you had studied the area. Which you haven't.

The argument that I gave in the OP, for instance, does not assume that life is miserable. As anyone who has taken the time to read and understand it would know.

Trying to get another person to agree with you, that is the problem you face. — Sir2u

Well that wasn't very witty now was it. Up your game.

No, I've been modelling myself on you! — Sir2u

But I'm clever and witty.

Fuck you and the horse you rode in on — Sir2u

Well, that's not nice either. Odd. Did your advice to be nice only apply to me and not you?

Get your big head out of your arse and try to be nice. — Sir2u

But that's not nice, is it? I've been modelling myself on you! You called my OP "claptrap" among other things.

And failed miserable for everyone, no one understands your ideas, that is why your are getting upset and not answering anyone's questions. You don't have any answers. — Sir2u

I am not responsible for the fact that most people here can't follow an argument or can't tell what is or isn't relevant.

No I copy pasted the definition from a reliable source so that you can see how wrong you are. Why do so many people think that they are the only ones that know anything? — Sir2u

No, you did what I said you did. You passed off a line on the internet as a line from you. That's called plagiarism. And you don't know what a disjunctive syllogism is. You hadn't heard of them before today. Yet you still think you know more about how to argue well than I do, don't you?

Now, when you read my extremely helpful example of Jennifer and the curry and James, you probably though that it was about curry (or the beginning of a romantic novel about how Jennifer and James eventually get together after a rocky start). When in fact it was just illustrating a pattern of reasoning. But in order to be able to tell that it was illustrating a pattern of reasoning, you'd need to have the intellectual power to abstract that pattern from the example and notice its presence in my original reasoning about the omnipotent, omniscient person. What dawned on Peter Singer - as it has also dawned on me - is that vast swathes of the population are simply unable to do this. Just as there are sounds some of us can't hear, there are mental operations that some can't perform.

Here's the example again. Try and understand what it's illustrating and try not to get hung up on the picturesque details.

Jennifer wants to invite James over for dinner. She also wants to cook a particular dish -a hot curry that James dislikes.

She should thwart one of those desires. That is, she should either invite James over for dinner and cook him something else (thus thwarting her desire to cook the curry). Or she would indulge her desire to cook the curry, but thwart her desire to invite James over.

Now. if you also want to invite James over for dinner, but you are only capable of cooking that very hot curry, then you ought not to invite James over for dinner.

So, either invite James to dinner or cook a curry, but not both
Cook a curry
Therefore, do not invite James to dinner

In Jennifer's case cooking a curry is simply something she wants to do, but does not have to - for she has the ability to cook other things. Still, if she decides to cook the curry, she ought not invite James to dinner. In your case you lack the ability to do anything other than cook a curry. But it still follows that you ought not invite James to dinner.

Now, when it comes to God, God ought either to alter the world so that it does not subject people living in it to horrendous evils, or she ought not to create new life.
That is something a proponent of the problem of evil agrees with. THey must do, for if they thought God could satisfy both desires, they wouldn't think there was a problem of evil.
If, then, God decides not to alter the world so that it does not subject any living in it to horrendous evils, then God ought not to invest the world with life.
We are unable to alter the world so that it does not subject any living in it to horrendous evils. Therefore we ought not to invest it with life either.

See?

Err, no.
disjunctive syllogism: A logical argument of the form that if there are only two possibilities, and one of them is ruled out, then the other must take place. — Sir2u

You didn't know what a disjunctive syllogism was until I mentioned it, yes? You looked it up and then wrote down a line you found on the internet and passed it off as your own. And now you think that you know more about this style of argument than I do and that I didn't engage in it in the OP. Most peculiar.