One could modify the premise to be: "if we have come into existence and are the products of our environment and the laws of nature, then everything we do is the product of initial character, environment, and the laws of nature, none of which are we morally responsible for." — ToothyMaw

No, there's me with my initial character. If that has been created by factors external to me - which it will have been if I don't exist with aseity - then I am not morally responsible for being the me that I am with the character that I have, yes? You've agreed with that.

Note, no mention of environment or laws of nature.

Then there's what i subsequently do - my actions - and what those actions may transform me into - my subsequent character.

Now it is 'that' which is - must be - the product of a combination of my initial character and my environment. Which is what F expresses.

You make this argument:

A) If we have come into existence, then we have been caused to come into existence by events external to ourselves
B) If we have been caused by external events, then we are not morally responsible for our initial character
C) Therefore, if we have come into existence, we are not morally responsible for our initial character
— Bartricks

I totally agree with this and acknowledge that it is deductively valid. However, later you write: — ToothyMaw

Right, good - so this argument establishes not that we exist with aseity, but that aseity is required for us to be morally responsible for our initial character.

F) If we have come into existence, then everything we do is a product of initial character, environment and laws of nature, none of which we are in any way morally responsible for
— Bartricks

The reasoning here seems faulty to me; the premise C) merely dictates that coming into existence means not being responsible for one's initial character. To say that coming into existence means that we are also products of the environment and laws of nature does not follow. — ToothyMaw

I do not follow you. There's what I do - my actions. Now, what causes them? Presumably a mix of me and my environment. What more could there possibly be? You can't say 'indeterminism' as that's part of my environment. So I do not see on what grounds you deny F. What extra ingredient is missing?

No premise of any argument I have made asserts that we can violate the laws of nature. So I do not know what you're talking about. We don't need to violate them to be morally responsible, we just need to exist with aseity (among other things - aseity is a necessary condition, not sufficient). As my argument shows.

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur?
— Bartricks
Well it's consistent with this:
By all means prove me wrong,
— Bartricks — InPitzotl

No it isn't. Obviously. What did I just say? I just said that 'even if' two objects of different kinds are incapable of causal interaction, that does 'not' show that the mind is material.

'There's a tree outside my window'. Is that evidence that the mind is material? Er, no, obviously. (Typical response of someone on this kind of thread - but what's a window?)

'Two objects of different kinds can't causally interact'. Is that evidence that the mind is material? No.

You're entirely correct... not having an explanation for how the immaterial interacts with the material isn't proof that the mind isn't material. — InPitzotl

That's not what I said. I said not having an explanation of how something is occurring is not evidence it is not occurring.

It's a distinct point. I don't know how this computer is working. Is that evidence it is not working. No.

So, 'if' I don't know how the mind and body interact, that is not evidence that they do not interact.

Here's a completely different point: if immaterial things can't interact with material things, that's not evidence that the mind is material. This argument, in other words, is obviously invalid:

1. Material things can't causally interact with immaterial things
2. Therefore, the mind is material

you should be held to the same standard in your proofs of its immateriality. — InPitzotl

Yes, I provided 10 arguments. Each argument has premises that are far more plausible than their negations. If you think otherwise, show me wrong. If each argument is only 50% likely to be sound, the proposition is shown to be 99.9% likely to be true. That's a proof, yes? If someone constructs a case for the truth of a proposition that establishes its likelihood as 99.9%, then they have proved the proposition according to the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' meaning of proof.

...then the second set looks a bit better than the former set, unless we build some straw version of materialism where the Linux kernel, not having a weight, taste, or color, is immaterial. — InPitzotl

Er, no. The second set are all question begging. Look: do any of my arguments have a premise that asserts the immateriality of the mind? No. They all 'conclude' that it is immaterial.

Now, construct arguments that 'conclude' the mind is material and then let's look at the premises you need to get there.

No, it's the other way around. It is ignorant scientists thinking that they're doing philosophy and then others in the public reading their ignorant works and thinking that science has supplanted philosophy.

You, for instance, seem entirely ignorant of the fact that materialism was refuted by philosophers thousands of years ago.

They should teach philosophy in schools and that might go some way towards remedying things.

Philosophers demonstrated there's no such thing as materiality thousands of years ago.
Scientists aren't investigating the matter at all. Saying 'there's no material world, coz it's all waves' is as confused as saying 'there's no materiality, as everything is made of tiny bananas, not tiny apples'.
And saying the mind is everywhere is to assert a confused materialist view of the mind.

The question here is whether the mind is material or immaterial. This is not a question investigated by science. Philosophy isn't backward science. And science isn't sophisticated science.

I do not know what you mean.

I have explained why the question is misguided in this context. Those who ask it demonstrate by their asking of it that they simply do not understand the dialectic and are therefore below the level of intelligence needed for fruitful debate.

Do you understand, for instance, that even if there is no way to answer it that will satisfy the asker (and there invariably isn't because they mean by an 'explanation' a purely materialist one) that isn't evidence it doesn't occur? And do you understand that even if no such interaction can take place, this doesn't imply the mind is material?

Yes, of course - if the mind is immaterial and the body material, then we have abundant evidence that objects of different kinds can and do causally interact.

But he's not asking for evidence of interaction, he's asking 'how' it can happen, which is quite different.

Now that question is confused in this context for several reasons. First, you do not need to be able to explain 'how' something is happening in order to have evidence that it is happening. Second, it is not clear what's wanted in terms of an answer. Those who ask the question will never be satisfied with anything one says, for what they really want is a purely material explanation of interaction between the material and immaterial. Third, as I explained earlier, even if no such interaction can take place, this doesn't provide evidence that the mind is material

Dunning and Kruger. You have no expertise in philosophy. If you did, you'd know it wasn't drivel.

no, I have no idea what your position is. If you are denying there are minds then there's really nothing I can do for you as you're not responsive to reason and seem profoundly conceptually confused

To be capable of understanding the answer you'd first have to be recognize why that's a confused question to ask.

No, I said I suspect your argument is valid. — bongo fury

But you think they're unsound, though. And yet your only basis for doing so is that they lead to a conclusion that you judge to involve a fantasy of an immaterial soul. But whether it is a fantasy to think we have an immaterial soul is precisely the issue, and my arguments appear to demonstrate that it is not. Of course, if one just decides - as you seem to have - that our minds are not souls, then they will be powerless to move you. But then you're the fantasist, as you're deciding how things are with reality and then closing your mind to evidence to the contrary. I don't understand that attitude at all.

But don't forget I have a mind in a manner of speaking about my physical constitution and behaviour. — bongo fury

What do you mean? Do you mean you do have a mind or that you don't? I mean, you are thinking things, right? And thoughts are mental states. So you have a mind. A mind is just whatever is doing that thinking and desiring and so on.

But you think you don't have any mental states, right? Or rather, you've typed that (you can't think it, for thoughts are mental states. So if you're correct and you don't have any mental states, then you're just a typist without a mind....which is a bot).

Partly because I suspect that arguments like yours would show that this idea leads easily to the fantasies (as they seem to me) of immaterial souls and the like. So I would see your argument, if it works, as a reductio. — bongo fury

Ah, I see. So because you already know how things are with reality and my arguments contradict your understanding, my arguments must be faulty.

It seems you think you're God. But you also think you don't have a mind. Hmm. Methinks you're confused.

I doubt (as also no doubt will you) that I am qualified to offer the kind of stress test of your argument that you seek. I thought I would try instead to see if there was any chance of getting you to appreciate the possibility that animals might evolve without acquiring any non-physical aspect or component, but then also in certain cases be able and inclined to think the opposite. — bongo fury

How do you doubt something without a mind? Do you think doubts can exist all by themselves, just drifting around like clouds?

Why are you mentioning animals? And yes, if there actually are any extended sensible objects then I accept entirely the possibility that a sensible body might evolve without there being any soul inside it. I mean, you're one by your own admission.

The idea that we each have a mind, except in a manner of speaking about our physical constitution and behaviour. — bongo fury

So you're a bot?

Note, that doesn't mean that a sensible object has all the sensible properties
— Bartricks

Thus it is possible that consciousness is a sensible object without smell or taste or texture or color. — khaled

Well, no, because consciousness is not an object at all, but a state. It's typical of your sloppiness that you treat consciousness and minds as equivalent, which is as silly as confusing thoughts with thinkers.

Although I have not assumed that a sensible object must have all the sensible properties, it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?). And our reason represents minds to have none of them. That is prima facie evidence that our minds are not sensible objects. Try again.

There is a sizable population that believes there is no such problem.... heck I would say the majority don’t think it’s a problem — khaled

Okaay. You might want to get in touch with the world's philosophy departments and point this out then.

No, you'd genuinely consider me insane if I wondered what a lump of cheese thinks like
— Bartricks

Correct. Because the lump of cheese happens to be one of the sensible things that it makes no sense to ask what they’re feeling. While minds are one of the sensible things for which the question makes sense. In the same way that it makes sense to ask what a mushroom tastes like but not what light particles taste like, even though both are sensible. You just couldn’t understand the argument. — khaled

Flagrantly question begging. But that's what you do, isn't it? Note too, it is not 'minds' that it makes no sense to ask the 'what is it thinking?' question (jeez!). It is lumps of ham. Psst, whether lumps of ham are minds is what is in dispute....so if you just assume that a lump of ham is a mind, then you've done what those of us with philosophical expertise call 'begging the question'. As for understanding arguments - er, you're just providing us with more evidence, were any needed, of the Dunning and Kruger effect.

This assumes determinism. Which is not necessarily the case. And QM makes it unfavorable — khaled

No it doesn't. The claim that if something comes into being it has a prior cause is not equivalent to causal determinism. My argument is consistent with both determinism and indeterminism and so assumes the truth of neither.

This is the case. Or else you're just question begging. When asking whether or not the mind is physical or immaterial, that means you don’t know (that the host doesn’t know whether or not Megan is a dog). — khaled

Well, I shouldn't have said that 'you' would conclude that Megan was not a dog, for your reasoning skills are so poor that for all I know you might conclude that Megan is the capital of France. But a reasonably intelligent person, upon asking "Is Megan at the party? And are there any dogs at the party?" and receiving the answer "Megan is certainly here, but I am not sure if there are any dogs here" would conclude that Megan was not a dog. Note too that the 'host' is Reason, not 'you'. That you confuse the two is, of course, no surprise as you're no doubt one of these people who thinks that reality is their plaything and all they need to do is assert something and it will be so. Also, maybe learn what 'question begging' means before throwing the term around (presumably you're operating on the principle that if you make the accusation enough, it will eventually be accurate).

An electron for one. Yes. — khaled

Electrons are divisible. Your confusing 'currently unable to divide it' with it being metaphysically impossible to divide it. So, for example, atoms were divisible in Roman times, even though Romans couldn't divide them. (I've often wondered who the 'remove from packaging' advice was for on foodstuffs.....I wonder no more).

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2). — khaled

Yes, you could couldn't you. You could bark at the screen too, or smear your dinner all over it. But none of these things would raise a reasonable doubt about the argument's soundness.

But not every sensible object is divisible. Nor is there reason to think they are from armchair musings. — khaled

Yes they are, and yes there is. But nice try! So, go find an armchair and sit in it (remember: your face should face 'out' and not into the back of the chair and your legs should drape over the front lip and not be folded beneath you). And now muse on this: every extended object has a top and a bottom. There has to be some space between the top and the bottom, else the top will be the bottom and vice versa. And that space can be divided. See? Or you could just read what I originally said and realize that any region of space is infinitely divisible and thus any object that occupies some space will be as well, and as any extended object occupies some space, any extended object is infinitely divisible.

Because my brain is still churning away. Try to stop that. Then come back and report what happened to “you”. — khaled

That's question begging. Note too that I am imagining no sensible object exists - so I am imagining that my brain does not exist. So, I can conceive of myself existing, and my brain not.

You can’t assume idealism, then argue that minds are immaterial. That would not be convincing to anyone who’s not an idealist. — khaled

I didn't 'assume' idealism, I argued for it.

I would give them a 1-3% chance. — khaled

Yes, but you're not an expert and I am and furthermore you clearly haven't understood any of them. I'd give them an average of about 60-70% each. Perhaps that's too high - but like I say, at even half that they'd still put the matter close to beyond a reasonable doubt.

Actually, upon thinking about it, even if you have aseity you are still constrained by the laws of nature - you cannot perform actions that are physically impossible according to the laws of physics. Thus, the conclusion to the aseity argument is not an argument for aseity. — ToothyMaw

That makes no sense to me. Yes, of course one is subject to the laws of nature, and of course they are not laws for which one is morally responsible. The point, though, is that if I am morally responsible for my initial character, then although I am not morally responsible for the nature of my environment (including the nature of the laws that prevail in it), I am still morally responsible for how I behave, because how I behave is a function of two elements - me and my environment - and one of those elements is an element I am morally responsible for.

Nobody in their right mind thinks that to be morally responsible for an action you need to be morally responsible for 'all' of its causes. After all, imagine John says something that makes me decide to punch him. Am I morally responsible for punching John? Of course. Yet I did not cause John to say what he said - that was completely out of my control. Yet obviously that does not get me off the hook for how I reacted to it.

Similarly then, I am not morally responsible for the wider John that is my environment. But that doesn't prevent me from being morally responsible for how I react to it.

Aseity is needed to stop it from being the case that everything I am and do is a product of external causes. It is needed, in other words, to ensure that one of the ingredients in what I do is an ingredient I am morally responsible for.

This argument only applies if you leave out the constraints to free will you acknowledge in this premise:

F) If we have come into existence, then everything we do is a product of initial character, environment and laws of nature, none of which we are in any way morally responsible for
— Bartricks — ToothyMaw

My argument was valid, so you need to dispute a premise. Are you denying that the argument was valid?

The argument was valid and it gives us the conclusion that if I have come into existence, I do not have free will.

As I do have free will, I can conclude that I have not come into existence.

To deny this you would need to deny a premise in the argument.

It seems to me that you are now disputing the truth of D, yes? For you seem to be suggesting that there is another way in which I could be morally responsible without existing with aseity, and that is if I am morally responsible for the environment in which I am caused to exist in, and/or am morally responsible for the laws of nature that prevail in it. But that's simply false unless you think D is false. So you're disputing D, yes? I just want to be clear.

Note, D asserts that I am not morally responsible for my environment or the laws of nature. It is not a conditional: it does not say 'if'. You seem to be reading it as a conditional.

Can you imagine an abstract Game of Life, as in Conway's Game of Life? — InPitzotl

No. I do not know what you're talking about. You're parachuting this word 'abstract' in - what do you mean? I can imagine an olive. Can I imagine an 'abstract' olive? Nope - no idea what that is.

Now a 'game' is not a thing, but an activity. I can imagine activities, though when I do so it is by means of imagining things engaged in the activities. But an 'abstract' activity? I don't know what you mean....

I think we have different conceptions of abstract objects then. — InPitzotl

I'd say.

But this is thread is not about abstract objects. It is about the mind, which no-one thinks is an abstract object. It is about whether the mind is a material object or an immaterial one.

I have presented 10 arguments - 10! - in support of the view that they are immaterial objects. Do you doubt the soundness of any of them?

Does it have effects? If it does, it's not an abstract object.
— Bartricks
I have no idea what you mean by object then. An olive has effects. — InPitzotl

Er, yes. Olives aren't abstract objects. It is part of the definition of an abstract object that it does not have effects.

So, if the Linux thingy has effects, it is not an abstract object. It does, yes? (Not that I actually know what we're talking about here). So it is not an abstract object.

I suggest it is not an object at all, but a system - a network of relationships between things.

But this is all beside the point. The point is that you haven't raised any doubt about the soundness of any of the arguments I have employed (by your own admission!).

You can't show an argument to be unsound by showing that it is sound!

You cannot imagine an abstract computer? — InPitzotl

No, I have literally no idea how to do that.

I can imagine thinking without there being any sensible objects. And my reason tells me that if I am thinking then I, a thinker, exist. So the combination of being able to conceive of myself thinking in the absence of the existence of a sensible world and the fact my reason assures me that if I am thinking then I, a mind, exist, is what tells me that it is possible for my mind to exist absent all sensible existences.

This doesn't begin to apply to an abstract computer, as I have no idea what one of those is.

You could call it a system if you like, but I wouldn't call it one. The kernel is an abstraction; it's kind of an abstract object. — InPitzotl

Does it have effects? If it does, it's not an abstract object. It's not an object at all, but a system. But anyway, I am unclear what your point is. I have used an argument to show that minds are not sensible objects. You have used the same argument to show that something else is not a sensible object. What's your point, exactly? That minds 'are' sensible objects after all? Clearly, that wouldn't follow. That minds are systems?

No, that's a category error. Likewise if you propose that minds are abstract objects (whatever one of those may be). Our minds are concrete objects: they are causally effective. The question is what kind of object they are: material or immaterial. And the arguments I am presenting all imply that minds are immaterial objects. I don't yet see any basis for doubting the soundness of any of the arguments and pointing out that the self-same arguments can be used to establish that other things are not sensible objects - such as systems and so on - is not to cast any doubt on their probative force.

Argument 9:

1. My reason represents it to be possible for the Linux kernel to exist apart from any sensible thing
2. If the Linux kernel were a sensible thing, then it would not be possible for it to exist apart from any sensible thing
3. Therefore, my reason is representing the Linux kernel not to be a sensible object — InPitzotl

Again, this argument is clearly unsound in a way that it would not be if 'mind' were used instead. Premise 1 is obviously false.

I'm not sure why this is even difficult. But, there it is. Given I have made the same argument about the Linux kernel, then by demonstration it can be made. Any real objections to this then? — InPitzotl

Yes. First, the question is not 'is the mind an object or something else?' but 'what kind of an object is the mind - material or immaterial?'

Confusing systems with things is a category error, akin to confusing friendship with a thing. (You could put 'friendship' in the premises of the first argument and get the same result). So you're using the arguments to establish something quite different from what I am using them to establish.

Second, what point are you trying to make? Do you think that the Linux kernal 'is' a sensible object and thus that there must be something fallacious about those arguments? Or do you think that it is not a sensible object and thus you accept the arguments go through? Or do you think that the relevant arguments leave open whether the mind is an object or a system? It is entirely unclear to me what you're trying to show....

Argument 3:

1. If our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object
2. Our reason represents the Linux kernel exists indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably
3. Therefore, our reason implies that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object — InPitzotl

Premise 2 in that argument is clearly false. It is true when you substitute 'our minds' for Linux kernal.

But anyway, it is not clear to me what your point is given that the Linux kernal is indeed not a sensible object. (In this case you have arrived at a correct conclusion by unsound means).

Argument 1:

1. It is self-evident to our reason that it makes no sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture or taste, or sound the Linux kernel has.
2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
3. Therefore, it is self-evident to our reason that the Linux kernel is not a sensible object — InPitzotl

The reason these arguments do not apply, is that the question at issue is what kind of an object the mind is, not whether it is an object or not.

As I understand it, the Linux kernal is a 'system', not an object (it will involve sensible objects, but isn't itself one anymore than, say, a 'friendship' is an object).

But anyway, I take it you accept that the Linux kernal argument is sound? So, it does establish or provides prima facie evidence that it is not a sensible object, yes?

And so presumably you accept that it does the same where the mind is concerned - it establishes or provides prima facie evidence that the mind is not a sensible object too, yes?

As the question is not 'is the mind an object or something else?' but 'what kind of an object is the mind?' then this would establish that the mind is an immaterial object.

It wouldn't do that where the Linux kernal is concerned, but that's because it's a system involving sensible things, rather than a sensible thing itself.

Someone who thinks that the mind is a system is making a category error of the same kind someone who thought the Linux kernal is a sensible object is also making a category error.

Everything I have said above applies to what you've said about argument 2. You presumably accept the argument is sound, as when we put in Linux kernal it delivers the correct verdict. It is just that, once again, the question at issue is not 'is the mind a thing or a system' but 'what kind of a thing is the mind'. But again, you accept, I take it, that the argument is sound in respect of the mind, yes?

No they couldn't.

Another (6):

1. If an object is sensible, it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore, my mind is not a sensible object
— Bartricks

I would change “divisible” for tangible. — javi2541997

But then you would not be addressing my argument.

Strictly speaking, premise 1 is false if sensible objects are understood subjectively. That is, if a sensible object is really a bundle of sensations - as Berkeley argued (convincingly, in my view). For though sensations can be divided into different kinds, sensations themselves can't be 'divided', for they are not 'things' at all, but mental activities. But of course, understood that way sensible objects are only 'objects' in an inverted commas sense and there would be no doubt that our minds are immaterial.

But if sensible objects are conceived of as extended things, then they are always going to be divisible. For any sensible object, so conceived, takes up some space. And any region of space admits of infinite divisions.

So the argument is sound, I think.

You have as a premise that we each have a "mind" (or "mental events"). Can you imagine a rational animal being like a robot in lacking a such a gift? — bongo fury

My arguments have the premises they have. Are you disputing one? Which one and why?

Note too that minds and mental events are not at all the same. A mind is a thing, an object. A mental event is a happening involving a mind. For an analogy: my body walks, but walking and my body are not the same. Likewise, my mind thinks, but my mind and thinking are not the same. Thinking is an activity of mind - so, when a mind thinks those thoughts are mental events - but the mind itself is not the thinking, rather it is 'doing' the thinking.

And your question is also confused. What 'gift' are you talking about? And what do you mean by a 'rational' animal? Do you mean an animal that is aware of reasons to do and believe things? I assume so. But a state of awareness is a kind of mental state. So a 'rational' animal must have a mind, else how can it be in the mental state constitutive of being aware of reasons? So no, I can no more imagine a rational animal lacking a mind than I can imagine a bachelor having a wife.

Mental things causing physical changes is telekinesis. Seems dubious. — khaled

Doesn't address what I said.

2. It makes sense to wonder what colour, smell, texture, taste or smell any sensible object has
— Bartricks

No. What does light taste like? What is its texture? — khaled

Those questions make sense when asked of light particles. Note, that doesn't mean that a sensible object has all the sensible properties (I have not said that if a sensible object has one sensible property, it has all others). But if I tell you that there is a sensible thing that has a certain smell, then it makes sense to wonder what it might look or feel like etc. But it does not make sense to wonder what one's mind smells like etc. But by all means just contradict me, just note that unless I am correct then it is inexplicable why there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview. Try again.

Overgeneralization. It could just be the case that it makes sense to wonder what some sensible objects (such as minds, according to the position you're arguing against) think like, while others (such as olives) not. In which case the conclusion doesn't follow. — khaled

No, you'd genuinely consider me insane if I wondered what a lump of cheese thinks like. Likewise with a lump of ham. Yet that's what a brain is. Try again.

If our reason represents our minds to exist indubitably, but at the same time represents all sensible objects to exist dubitably, then our reason is implying that our minds are not sensible objects
— Bartricks

Where did this come from? — khaled

What do you mean? I assume you're asking why that premise is true, you are just using entirely the wrong words to do it.

Imagine you have been invited to a party. You've heard rumours that 'Megan' is there. You are allergic to dogs. So you phone the host and you ask the following: "Is Megan there? And are there any dogs there?" The host replies that Megan is indeed there, but she's unsure if there are any dogs at the party. Do you have grounds to conclude that Megan is not a dog? Surely. It is, of course, possible that Megan is a dog, for it is possible that though the host knows Megan is at the party, the host does not know whether Megan is a dog. But though that possibility exists, it is more reasonable to assume that as you are speaking to the host and the host is sure Megan is there but not sure any dogs are there, that Megan is not a dog. And that's what you'd actually conclude, right? Well, the host is Reason and Reason has told you that your mind definitely exists, but has also told you that she's not sure whether any sensible objects really exist. Draw the same conclusion. Or don't and be rationally perverse.

If I am a sensible object, then everything I do traces to external causes
— Bartricks

Not necessarily. — khaled

Explain.

If an object is sensible, it is divisible
— Bartricks

Not necessarily. — khaled

Er, you think there can be extended things that are not divisible.....okaaay. Brilliant refutation. Plato and Descartes take note.

2. The destruction of our sensible bodies harms us at the time at which it occurs
— Bartricks

Not necessarily. Depends on the way you die. — khaled

Doesn't need always to be harmful. It is sufficient that it is ever harmful. Now, are you claiming that it is 'never' harmful to have one's sensible body destroyed?

2. if any sensible object exists, it will have infinite parts
— Bartricks

wtf? — khaled

Due to it being divisible. No matter how small an extended object, it will be divisible. Thus it will have infinite parts. As nothing has infinite parts, they do not exist, or at least they do not exist as 'extended' things (which is all that needs to be shown in order to demonstrate that minds are immaterial).

My reason represents it to be possible for my mind to exist apart from any sensible thing
— Bartricks

Really? What would a mind that has no body feel like? Doesn't seem possible to me. — khaled

Stop up your ears, close your eyes, make sure not to be eating or smelling anything, and now render your body numb. Are you still aware of your self? Of course you are and you don't need actually to do any of those things to realize that you would still be aware of your self.

Sensible objects exist as bundles of sensations
— Bartricks

Ontologically no. We only know of them through bundles of sensations. To assume sensible objects ARE nothing more than bundles of sensations is just idealism. — khaled

Question begging. What I am aware of when I am aware of, say, a table is just a bundle of sensations. The table itself, if I am to gain any awareness of it via my sensations, must resemble them in some or other respect. Yet sensations can only resemble sensations; thus what I know through my sensations are sensations. And sensations exist as the experiential activity of minds. Now, don't tell me that this is a well-known argument for Idealism, for I am well aware of that. The point, though, is that the argument has a high degree of plausibility and if it goes through it establishes that our minds are immaterial.

I stress too that only one of the arguments needs to go through. Just one. And you do not undermine my case if - and I do not think you have done this - you raise reasonable doubts about the premises of each and every one. For even if each argument is only 50% likely to be sound, the set of 10 such arguments will render the proposition that the mind is a soul 99.9% likely to be true.

Address the arguments

see op

see op

As it stands, the question you ask is ambiguous. For instance, are you asking for the meaning of the word 'existence'? Presumably not. I take it you are inquiring about what purpose our lives here might be serving? That is 'meaning' here means 'purpose'

For me the answer is clearly no because meaning itself is created by thinking beings like humans (and Animals or a possible god if you want).What do you think about the topic? — SmartIdiot

I do not follow your reasoning here. You are concluding that our lives here have no purpose, because purposes are the sole preserve of minds. But that simply doesn't follow. You're correct, of course, that purposes are the sole preserve of minds. Minds and minds alone can have ends they are doing things to try and serve (which is what a 'purpose' is). But how does that, by itself, imply that our lives lack a purpose?

To get to that conclusion you would have to make the additional assumption that no mind is responsible for having brought us into being here for any purpose.

Yet the proximal cause of us being here is the sexual activity of our parents. Such activity was not necessarily purposeful, and even if it was it needn't have had the production of you as its end.

But it's entirely possible, of course, that your parents did seek to bring you into being here for some purpose or other. Your life would then, in a very real sense, have a purpose: it's purpose was to fulfil the end for which your parents brought you into being here.

That, however, would presumably not satisfy you, as the purpose you're interested in and sceptical about is a grander one that applies to us all and comes from the same unifying source.

So it seems that you are assuming there is no single mind who brought us all into being here for a purpose.

Fair enough: I agree that this is indeed the condition on our lives having a purpose ('purpose' in the sense that those who wonder about the meaning of life are wondering about). That is, it needs to be the case for there to be such a mind who has made us all live here for a purpose in order for it to be true that our lives have a purpose in the relevant sense.

But you would have to accept, then, that if such a mind exists, our lives do have a purpose, yes?

The conclusion does not follow because you must specify that external factors such as environment and laws of nature, as you do in an earlier premise, also contribute to a lack of moral responsibility. — ToothyMaw

But the conclusion does follow from those premises. So I am just wondering which premise you are disputing. Here is the argument:

A) If we have come into existence, then we have been caused to come into existence by events external to ourselves
B) If we have been caused by external events, then we are not morally responsible for our initial character
C) Therefore, if we have come into existence, we are not morally responsible for our initial character

That argument above is deductively valid. And presumably you would accept that it is sound (though in case you do not, I will say something about A and B's plausibility below).

D) we are not morally responsible for our environment or for the laws of nature
E) if everything we do is a product of matters for which we are not morally responsible, then we are not morally responsible for anything we do
F) If we have come into existence, then everything we do is a product of initial character, environment and laws of nature, none of which we are in any way morally responsible for
G)Therefore, if we have come into existence, we are not morally responsible for anything we do

This part of the argument is also deductively valid. And it is presumably one of these premises - more specifically, E or F, that you wish to dispute. But I am not yet entirely clear which one.

Let's just go through each one in turn, starting with A. Can you reasonably deny A? I do not think so, for denying A would mean having to maintain that one can create oneself. But that involves a contradiction: to create yourself you would have to exist prior to your own existence. So, A is not open to reasonable doubt.

What about B? Well, if you deny B then I find it hard to conceive of on what basis you think determinism is incompatible with free will. You could not, for instance, say that determinism is incompatible with free will because it deprives us of alternative possibilities of a sort only indeterminism can provide. For clearly denying B would mean you accept that it is possible for someone to be morally responsible for something for which they exercised no control at all, namely their initial character. The compatibilist could simply reply to you that as you're happy enough with people being morally responsible for their initial character despite lacking all control over its acquisition, then you should be happy enough with people being morally responsible for what that character subsequently determines them to do.

So, I don't think you can deny B without making your incompatibilism ad hoc.

C follows as a matter of logic.

What about D? Well, clearly you accept this, as you keep appealing to it (and it is self-evidently true). And indeed, the basis for thinking D is true is really the same basis for thinking that B is true, namely that one was not involved in any way in these matters.

What about E? E says " if everything we do is a product of matters for which we are not morally responsible, then we are not morally responsible for anything we do".

Well, from your comments it seems to me that this is the premise that you wish to deny. For I suppose one could argue that it begs the question against the incompatibilist, as an incompatibilist thinks that if some of what we do is the indeterministic product of matters for which we are in no way morally responsible, then we can - somehow - be morally responsible for that product.

But this is not really question begging as the burden of proof is squarely on the incompatibilist to support that claim. That is, E is not default false, but default true. It is prima facie plausible. By contrast, the claim that somehow the involvement of indeterministic causation could transform us from devoid of moral responsiblity for our decisions to morally responsible for them is prima facie implausible. I provided an argument in support of that: I am (by hypothesis) in no way morally responsible for my desire for a pie. And I am (by hypothesis) in no way morally responsible for my desire not to eat a pie. It is - thanks to laws of nature for which I am also in no way morally responsible - indeterministic which of these desires will cause my decision. Well, how does that make 'me' morally responsible for the decision? That seems like magic. It's not like the decision is any more 'mine' than it would be if it had been determined by whatever desire caused it. And it's not like any more control was exercised over it.

The point can be made another way. Imagine that it was indeterministic that I had the initial character that I did. Well, how would that make me morally responsible for that initial character? How would the fact - if it is a fact - that I genuinely could have had a different character from the one I actually possessed, transform me from not being morally responsible for it to being morally responsible for it? The mind boggles. It is surely about as self-evident as anything that whether or not my initial character was one that was deterministically conferred or indeterministically conferred makes not a tiny bit of difference to my moral responsibility for it.

Well, how would things be any different when it is indeterministic which decisions my initial character causes me to make? Again, it seems clear that this is pure alchemy.

So E is not question begging in any worrying way. For we cannot reject arguments or premises that lead to the negation of our position on the grounds that they beg the question, for that is to have rendered one's own view as the touchstone of credibility, when the correct way to proceed is not to have a view, but simply to see what follows from plausible premises.

To reject E, then, one would need a good independent evidence that indeterministic causation alone can magically make one morally responsible for what it produces. I am sceptical such an argument exists.

What about F? F says "If we have come into existence, then everything we do is a product of initial character, environment and laws of nature, none of which we are in any way morally responsible for"

Well, the previous leg of the argument has established that we are not morally responsible for our initial character. And it is obvious that we are not morally responsible for our environment or the laws of nature. So how can you deny F? Even if you are an incompatibilist, you can't deny F, for you don't think we're morally responsible for indeterminism being true, do you? Whether indeterminism is true or not would be a function of the laws of nature - for which we're not morally responsible. (If you think we are somehow morally responsible for hte laws of nature, why can't a compatibilist say the same?).

So, F doesn't beg the question against the incompatibilist, for no incompatibilist is going to deny it. The incompatibilist doesn't claim that we 'are' morally responsible for any of those elements. Rather they just think that if indeterminism (for which we're not morally responsible) is involved in what the combination of those elements causes, then the results are results for which we can be morally responsible.

As such, then, it seems to me that E is the only premise that you can realistically challenge, but you haven't really challenged it yet as to do that you'd need to make an argument for E's falsity, not simply note that its truth - or apparent truth - is incompatible with incompatibilism.

Again, silly and ignorant.

Moral responsibility presupposes free will. They're two sides of the same coin such that they're pretty much used interchangeably in the contemporary debate (a debate you're unfamiliar with, yes?).

It's not a question in physics. Christ! And you can't possibly know what implications a physical theory has for the question of free will until or unless you've clarified just what having free will involves. Which is why, you know, it isn't discussed in physics.

And once again, even if it is true that no one acts as if they do not have free will (which is itself highly questionable and would require clarifying just what having free will involves 'first'), that doesn't tell you anything interesting about whether we have it or not. "I can't help believing X.....therefore X is true" is really stupid reasoning.

Maybe you did have power over the facts of the past, but you do not have power over the facts of the past in the present, which is what that means. — ToothyMaw

No, because if I did have power over a past event, then I can be in principle morally responsible for that event. And thus the fact that at present I lack control over it is irrelevant, given that I am nevertheless morally responsible for that past event. I mean, it is no argument against my current moral responsibility to point out that how I am at present is a product of past decisions I made 'for which I am morally responsible'.

Again, if I have always existed, then premise 1 of that argument is false.

Those who run such arguments are simply ignoring the possibility that we exist with aseity, perhaps because so few take the possibility seriously.

Yet it is quite clear to the reason of virtually everyone who reflects on this matter that if we are wholly the product of external causes then we are not morally responsible. I mean, this is precisely why so many quickly conclude that determinism undermines free will. Yet as I have shown above, if one simply follows reason diligently on this point one will arrive at the conclusion that we exist with aseity. That is an unusual conclusion, to be sure. But it is not incoherent and it is what the evidence implies.

But anyway, there is a more general point to be made against scepticism about free will and the moral responsibility it grounds.

Do you agree that it is irrational to reject a stronger premise on the basis of a weaker one?

I assume so.

Which is more self-evident to reason: that we are morally responsible for what we do, or that moral responsibility requires X? (and make X anything you like - that is 'indeterminism' or 'alternative possibilities' or whatever).

Surely it is more self-evident that we are morally responsible? I mean, we have empirical evidence for this in the fact that there is - and has always been - considerable disagreement among philosophers over what X is, yet despite this the bulk of philosophers agree that we are morally responsible (with notable exceptions, of course).

Manifestly then, it is more powerfully self-evident among those who think most clearly about these matters - professional philosophers - that we are morally responsible, than that moral responsibility requires X, whatever X may be.

Given this, it is irrational to conclude that we lack moral responsibility on the grounds that we do not have X, isn't it?

So, someone who argues that we lack moral responsibility because determinism is true, is guilty of this mistake: for whether moral responsibility really does require determinism or not is clearly less self-evident than the fact we are morally responsible.

I think, then, that it really is irrational - demonstrably so - to conclude that we lack moral responsibility. It is always going to be more rational, if we discover that determinism is true, to conclude that compatibilism is true, than to conclude that we aren't free and responsible.

I apply this to my own view too, of course. If we found out that we do not exist with aseity - and, like I say, to my knowledge there is no such evidence, only evidence that our sensible bodies do not exist with aseity - it would be more reasonable for me to accept that aseity is not, after all, required for moral responsibility than to conclude that we are not morally responsible.

It then follows from what I have written above that having free will does not mean one must exist with aseity. Thus, premise (1) is unsupported. — ToothyMaw

I do not follow you. The argument I gave in support of premise 1 was logically valid, so you must deny a premise. Which one do you deny?

I have an issue with this; one could not be self-originated yet have free will. They just aren't responsible for their coming into existence. They can still be the ultimate source of their own actions without aseity: — ToothyMaw

Say you did - per impossible - create yourself. Well, now you are responsible for your own existence (as even you would surely admit). Why, though? Well, surely the only answer we can give to this question is that if you created yourself then nothing external to you would be responsible for your existence. Yet this is also true if you exist with aseity.

So, ultimate sourcehood condition on moral responsibility is a negative one: you need 'not' to have been created by external events or objects. It is not a positive requirement that you have created yourself.

And you must accept this too, if you are an incompatibilist. For at best indeterministic alternative possibilities will only secure a negative condition, not a positive one. For it is patently absurd to maintain that if indeterminism is true we create ourselves, as self-creation is manifestly impossible regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism is true.

Initial character might constrain one's choices insofar as it limits what choices are available to one, but one could still be free to choose between all of the alternatives available to them in an unconditional sense. And a lack of aseity only means that one is not responsible for their initial character, nothing else. — ToothyMaw

I don't see how. So, let's assume that you have been brought into being. Well, you're not morally responsible for your initial character then. Everything you subsequently do is going to be a causal product of that character - for which you are in no way morally responsible - interacting with an environment for which you are in no way morally responsible. How on earth can you be morally responsible for anything you do under those circumstances? Indeterminism is no help at all, for how does indeterminism magically make you morally responsible for what you decide to do? The decision is still caused, yes? Indeterministic causation is still causation. And what caused it? Well, your background character - for which you're not morally responsble - and your environment - for which you are not morally responsible.

Let's say I desire a pie. And I also desire not to eat a pie. So, I am subject to competing desires. And let's now stipulate that it is indeterministic which desire will produce my decision: that is, it is indeterministic whether I decide to eat a pie or not. Well, how does that make me morally responsible for the decision? The desire to eat a pie was not a desire for which I was morally responsible - for it was caused by external factors. Nor was the desire not to eat a pie, for the same reason. How does the fact it was indeterministic which one would win magically mean I am now morally responsible for it? It's not like the indeterministic nature of the whole process was something for which I was morally responsible. So, unless you introduce a new element - a morally responsible me, standing in the wings as it were, who reaches in and makes teh decision (and then I want to know how that new me got to be morally responsible, of course), it looks like we have pure moral responsiblity alchemy here.

Your point is a silly one. All you're doing is pointing out that those who deny free will are hypocrites if they ever blame or in some other way adopt reactive attitudes towards the behaviour of others.

So what? You can't establish that a proposition is true by showing that its denier is a hypocrite.

no one could have acted differently in any way, and a number of compatibilists do indeed assume that moral responsibility requires different possibilities. — ToothyMaw

That's question begging again: even if determinism is true, there's a perfectly intelligible sense in which we could have done otherwise than we did. For, as I say, there are conditional and unconditional interpretations of 'could have done otherwise'. It is the unconditional interpretations that require the kind of alternate possibilities that indeterminism provides.

Of course, perhaps when it comes to moral responsibility/free will it is the unconditional reading of 'could have done otherwise' that is the more plausible one, but nevertheless one would have to argue for this and not simply assume it.

I am myself agnostic on the matter as it seems to me that the more fundamental requirement for free will is some kind of ultimate sourcehood: the causal chains that produce our actions need to terminate with us, or at least have a terminus that includes us (they do not need to be wholly free from external causes, it is just that 'we' need to be in the causal mix from the get-go). And it seems to me that if this condition is not met, then indeterministic alternative possibilities are not going magically to make us morally responsible for what we do. If my initial self is the product of external causes, then I am surely not morally responsible for my initial self. And it doesn't matter from there on in whether the initial self develops thanks to deterministic influences or indeterministic influences, the resulting self will not become a self for which I am morally responsible either way.

Needless to say, much contemporary debate over free will is beside the point. It doesn't really matter whether determinism or indeterminism is true; what matters is whether we exist with aseity or not.