What I am saying is it does no harm to him after he ceases to exist. — jgill

If the harms of death are post mortem - and you have yet to explain how the hermit's death could be harmful ante-mortem - and you need to exist in order to be harmed.....then he will exist after his death.

'Death' does not mean 'ceases to exist'. As I said in the OP, if you define death that way then you've just built a conviction about what death does to us into the definition.

What I mean by death - and I made this very clear in the OP - is the point at which we are no longer 'here'. Here in this realm. Not 'here in existence'. But 'here, in this universe'.

That definition leaves open - as it should - whether death ends our existence or merely alters it in some way.

You seem to be saying that a person is alive to these sensations after they die. — jgill

So, you know already what death does to us, do you?

I refer you to what I said in the OP:

I shall also define death in a neutral way as the point at which a person is no longer here, in this realm. The question of whether death ends our existence or whether it takes us elsewhere is a matter for reasoned debate to settle, not a definition. — Bartricks

Stop assuming you already know things you don't know.

You don't know what death does to a person, yes?

Nobody does.

So stop thinking you do.

Nobody does.

Now that you have taken your slice of humble pie and realized that you don't know what death does to person, stop discounting the possibility that you survive it and suffer terribly.

And now follow my reasoning and draw my awful conclusion. jeez.

The harmfulness of death is post mortem.

To be harmed you need to exist.

So guess what - death doesn't cease your existence, it makes your existence a whole load worse. See?

So the hermit's death is a great harm to the hermit. It won't harm anyone else. It will harm him.

And it will harm him, will it not, even if he has no plans that killing him with thwart.

And it will harm him even if he isn't particularly enjoying his life.

So, it will harm him even if it deprives him of nothing.

Thus, the harm of death cannot reside primarily in what it deprives a person of. For it harms those it deprives of nothing worth having.

Any attempt to account for the harmfulness of death by appealing to ante-mortem harms will run into this problem. We can easily imagine someone whose death will not create the ante-mortem harms in question, yet it seems obvious that that person's death will nevertheless harm them greatly.

Thus, the harmfulness of death is post-mortem, not ante-mortem.

Explain to me how the hermit themselves is harmed by being killed on your view - explain it without contradicting yourself.

And then explain how you could possibly think you're addressing the OP when I said in the OP that I am assuming that death is a harm to the one who dies.

In the sense that death deprives the person of their future. It's a harm one can predict with some measure of certainty at any point of one's life. — baker

So killing a 90 year old barely harms them?

And a person whose future here promises to be one of mild discomfort is not harmed if they're killed?

It is obvious that these people are harmed and harmed severely. So deprivation accounts simply won't work.

Actual things. Crikey. Look, the idea of there being a terrible place is really not hard to grasp.
If death takes you to it, then that would make sense of what our reason tells us about death's harmfulness to us. If, by contrast, you suppose death ceases our existence then you have to account for its harmfulness by citing ante-mortem harms.

No. Nothing isn't harmful.

It would take us to a terrible place.
If it did that, then we would have reason to stay here for as long as possible, unless our continued existence here would be even more terrible for us.
And that's exactly what our reason tells us, no? It tells us to stay where we are unless staying would be a torment. Thus, our reason is telling us that death takes one to a terrible place. That's also why it can operate as a penalty. Note, those who oppose the death penalty typically do so because they seem it too severe a penalty to risk visiting on those who might be innocent. That makes no sense at all unless death is among the most serious of harms.

So, just to be clear, your view is that killing an unknown hermit does not harm whatsoever to the hermit?

Isn't that view, you know, obviously false? Certainly virtually every philosopher writing on the subject thinks that death harms the one who dies and would accept the hermit example as a reductio of the view that death is harmless.

And again, isn't it obvious that the hermit themselves has instrumental reason not to kill themselves, other things being equal? Surely.

Finally, note that in the OP I said very clearly that I am assuming that death harms the one who dies. The question is in what way, not 'whether' it does.

If death harms a person in virtue of what it deprives a person of, then death would not harm a person whose life is not going particularly well.

So, Ralph's life is not going particularly well. It's just boring. Well, is it not obvious that he nevertheless has instrumental reason not to kill himself? None of us - surely - would recommend suicide to him. On the contrary, we'd encourage him not to take the exit. So, in reality we all recognize that even those whose lives are not going particularly well have instrumental reason to stay.

Now, a deprivation account of the harmfulness of death can't make sense of that. Ralph's death would not deprive Ralph of anything positively worth having.

So, join the dots. If Ralph's death will be very harmful to him - and it will be, else why does he have instrumental reason to avoid it? - yet will not deprive him of anything worth having, then the harmfulness of death must lie elsewhere.

Added to which, it is hard to see how one can be deprived of something if one does not exist. So, in order for death to harm a person by depriving them of something, they would need to exist.

So deprivation accounts of the harmfulness of death are in double trouble. They're of questionable coherence, given that it is arguable incoherent to suppose that someone who no longer exists can be deprived of something. But even if they are coherent, they are clearly inadequate, as they deliver the verdict that Ralph above is not harmed by dying, yet manifestly he is.

I'm sorry, I can't explain it any better than I already have. — Agent Smith

Explained what? I am at a total loss to understand what you're talking about.

Okay then.

Nobody's perfect — Agent Smith

How do you know that?

Their position does have merit though as death seems to have that finality to it which is the reason why we dread it. — Agent Smith

Er, what? You think reality gives an F about these matters?

In line with your own view, religion comes along and raises the specter of naraka (hell). :scream: Just a few days ago I was on my bed doing nothing in particular when I heard a a threatening voice on my daughter's phone (she was on TikTok) say "I'm not done with you![/i] Death may not be the end suiciders hope that it is. Et in Arcadia ego — Agent Smith

Again: what?

Punching a wall is a scaled down version of suicide and indeed it isn't clear whether suicide is moral/immoral acceptable. Interesting. Go on. — Agent Smith

Suicide is incredibly stupid under most circumstances. If someone's life is going moderately badly, we - virtually all of us - would not recommend suicide, would we?

So, even if your life is going moderately badly, you don't have reason to kill yourself.

What does that imply?

Here's an analogy. Imagine there's a company that is losing money every year and shows every prospective of continuing to do so. Yet the accountants tell you not to wind up the company but to keep funding the losses.

Why? What does the accountant's advice imply? They have your best interests at heart - so what does it imply? Here: it implies that winding up the company wiil incur costs far greater than you'd incur by suffering the losses.

Our reason tells us to keep our lives going even if they are recording moderate losses. Join the dots.

what's your response to some posters saying that post death there's literally no one to injure/damage? — Agent Smith

They arrogantly suppose that they already know what death does to us.

Do try and focus on the OP.

No, if you harm a person that is not necessarily immoral. Sheesh. For instance, right now I just punched the wall. I hurt myself. Was that immoral? No.

When Tom tries to kill Jane and Jane kills Tom by defending herself with a gun, she harms Tom but does nothing wrong.

And when we catch a serial killer and put them in prison and/or kill them we have not necessarily done anything immoral, even though we harmed them.

And so on and so on and so on and so on.

Now, don't start questioning the above - that's derailing.

This thread is about the harmfulness of death and whether it is best understood to be mainly ante-mortem or post mortem. It's not about whether punching a wall is immoral. It is not about veganism. And it is not about metaethics.

How come this latin phrase primum non nocere appears in bioethics? — Agent Smith

Whatium? Relevanti? No sensium you makium.

Er, why on earth are you talking about veganism?

This isn't about the morality of killing, but about the harmfulness of it. These terms 'harmful' and 'immoral' are not synonyms.

I am arguing that the harmfulness of death is plausibly mainly post-mortem as opposed to ante-mortem. That is not to deny that death also harms us in ante-mortem ways. It is just to point out that ante-mortem harms cannot capture the full harmfulness of death, for death harms those whom it deprives of nothing worth having.

Again: Tom's life is moderately uncomfortable and shows no prospect of being anything but moderately uncomfortable. Would killing him harm him? Answer: of course it bloody would. Yet it would not deprive him of anything worth having. Is it rational for him to kill himself? If he came to you expressing suicidal thoughts, would you say 'go for it!' or 'don't go for it' - the latter, yes? So, in realty we would virtually all judge him to have reason not to kill himself - instrumental reason - even though his life is moderately uncomfortable for him. Again, same moral: his death will harm him despite the fact it will deprive him of nothing worth having.

If X will harm you despite the fact it deprives you of nothing worth having, then one obviously can't explain the harmfulness of x in terms of what it deprives you of.

I did not backtrack on the intrinsic value view. I think it is true. What I argued is that it does not provide a plausible way of accounting for death's harmfulness.

If - if - death ceases our existence, then it destroys something of intrinsic value. That's bad and could be construed as a harm I suppose - that we have been deprived of something of intrinsic value, namely our lives.

But it won't explain death's harmfulness. Consider: a life of moderate misery is not worth starting. Even most natalists will agree. The intrinsic value of life is therefore not sufficient benefit to eclipse the disvalue of the mild discomfort living such a life will impose on its liver. Yet if such a life is being lived by someone, we would not recommend suicide. It seems clear that it would be irrational to take the exit under those conditions, unfortunate though they are. Now we can't explain that by appealing to the intrinsic value of continued living, because we have already implicitly acknowledged that it doesn't make the life net valuable. So the harm that death will visit on this person must come from elsewhere.

And note too, if the harm is mainly post morten, then that implies we survive our death, which in turn means that death does not destroy the intrinsic value of continued existence.

We do not know for sure what death does to us. Any reasonable person will surely agree. So a view that implies we survive it cannot be rejected on those grounds. To put it another way if you reject my case on the grounds that it implies we survive our deaths, then you must think you already know that we do not survive our deaths. But you don't.
To reject my case on a reasonable basis you need to argue that death is no more harmful to us than the antemortem harms make it.
So, if the harms are antemortem, then the death of an elderly person barely harms them at all, as it deprives them of so little. And imagine a person whose life is mildly unhappy. That is the harms slightly exceed the benefits, but there's no agony or anything like that. Well, on the ante morten view death will benefit such a person, as it will deprive them of nothing worth having. Yet we would all, surely, counsel against them killing themselves? In real life we would. So we seem to recognize that it would not benefit them at all, but harm them. That implies the truth of the post morten view.

Read the OP

So, to be clear, you think death benefits a person, yes? It's good to die - is that your view?

If so, read the OP and look at what I said about the assumptions I am making. I am assuming death is harmful to the one who dies. I really coudn't have been clearer. Note, sometimes it may be the lesser of two evils, but the lesser of two evils is still an evil. Death is a harm. That's in the bank. That's not in serious dispute. And I am not disputing it. What I am arguing is 'where' the harm occurs.

Oh, and note too that what you mentioned are possible ante-mortem benefits that would accrue to those whose lives here have become terrible.

I don't understand your question or its relevance to the OP. Please clarify.

No, I still do not know what you mean.

Look, why don't I just solve the problem of what truth is?

Truth is a property of propositions. And there is debate over what exactly that property is. This can't reasonably be denied.

And we - we philosophers, that is - all know what would settle the matter: the matter will be settled when it is clear to us all that a particular view - theory x - is the one Reason asserts to be the true one. That can't reasonably be denied either. For what more can one do in the way of showing a theory to be true than to show that Reason asserts it to be?

So, the true theory of truth is the theory that Reason asserts to be true.

Well, then our working hypothesis should be that 'that' is what the property of truth amounts to. That is, for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting it.

I am an antinatalist and I am not a hedonist. Hedonistic antinatalists are likely to be miserabilists.
The important point is that miserabilism and antinatalism are distinct views and one can be one without the other.
It's like thinking that as some ethical theorists are utilitarians then all talk of ethics is talk of utilitarianism and can be dismissed on the grounds that utilitarianism is false.

Do people here realize that antinatalism and the 'life sucks' view (known as miserabilism) are not equivalent?
Some seem to have difficulty understanding this. Antinatalism is the view that it is wrong to procreate. It is not the view that life sucks.

you do realize I don't read quotes. Own words. Use your own words
Frey Bentos. Have you ever had a frey bentos pie? They have a very poor quality filling.

I'll take that to mean 'I'm playing'. I recommend buddhism.

The space of reasons. How much space do they need? 10ft sq? What about their colour? I like beige ones.

I'm serious. But again: that's me. Don't you worry about me. And stop trying to give yourself an excuse not to focus on the argument. Worry about the argument. Can you refute it? Are you a philosopher or are you just playing games?

Resist the temptation to focus on me. Focus on the argument I gave you.

Normative reasons are directives. You know that now. Wikipedia confirmed it for you.

Directives need a director.

And in the case of normative reasons, its not us, but Reason. That's why they're called 'reasons'. They're directives from Reason.

And so Reason is a director. And only a person can be one of those. So Reason is a person.

Where is the misstep? Or have I been altogether too clear?

But physics!

How am I lost?

Brandom and you are the lost ones.

I have taken you by the hand and shown you what a reason is. It is a directive. And directives have a director. And that director is Reason. And Reason is a person, because directors are persons. And now you know what Reason is.

That's not lost. Show me where I have taken a wrong turning.

A bunch of mouths is not a mouth.

So now I am the director? How so, given I have reason to reject theories that contain contradictions even if I do not tell myself to?

If the tribe can be mistaken, then their directives do not constitutively determine what they have reason to do.

How can a tribe issue a directive? Tribes are not persons.
And what if my tribe dies save me. Are you saying that now that no tribe exists I no longer have any reason to do anything or believe anything?
And can't an entire tribe of us, no matter its size, be mistaken about what it thinks it has reason to do?
It is Reason who issues the directives. That's why we call them directives of reason.
And Reason is not the name of a tribe, but a person.

The clay example was designed to show you that it is a mistake to confuse changing something's properties with taking something away from the thing.

The argument I provided demonstrated that substance causation exists. That is, substances can cause events without doing so by means of a change You have said nothing to address that argument.

So, to believe that one has a reason to do something - anything - is to believe that one is directed to do it. And so for any such beliefs to be true, there would need to be an actual directive being issued to one to do so, else the belief is false.
But whose directives could be the truth conditions of such beliefs? Not my own, surely?

So if I believe - as I do - that I ought to reject a theory that contains a contradiction, then i believe i am directed to reject it.
But who is the director? Not me, yes?

But what is a norm? Is it not a directive?

You have used the word ought. But there are normative oughts and bon normative oughts. (The rain ought to arrive soon, for example, is not a normative use of the word ought)

So what makes a normative ought a normative ought?

By an impression I just mean some kind of a mental state with representative contents. That is, a mental state that we tell ourselves is telling us something.