But the quest for the truth suggests that we are not content with things, — Brett

I don't see the relevance. The question I am trying to answer is "what is truth?" Why truth is important is a distinct question. If you don't even know what truth is, how can you possibly hope to answer your question? My question is the more fundamental and so it must be answered first.

Is it possible the quest for truth, the definition of it a hopeless quest? — Brett

No. There is an answer to the question, and I see no reason to think we cannot acquire it - indeed, I have provided you with it above.

How would you ever know that someone has given you the answer until or unless you consider the evidence they have provided in support of it?

You mustn't make yourself deaf.

And of course, as I have proposed an answer - namely, that truth is whatever Reason asserts to be the case - then we can sketch an answer to your questions. For instance, when you ask those questions, presumably you don't just want me to give you an answer, but rather to provide reasons - reasons - why my answers are the true ones, yes?

Well, to give someone a reason to believe something is to set about showing that Reason wants you to believe it.

Thus, why do we have reason to search out the truth - including the true answer to the question "what is truth?"? Well, because Reason wants us to.

To have a hope of answering those questions, we have to answer my one first.

Yes, I have read some of Benatar's work. And the philosopher Hugh Lafollette has written an article making essentially the same case I have made.

The only legal/moral issue would be bodily autonomy, the right to do with ones body as one wants; but then again, we wouldn't be licensing sex per say, but rather, the procreation of children...and people are all-for stripping women of their bodily autonomy... — Grre

Yes, although our right to bodily integrity is not absolute and does not normally extend to doing things with our body that pose a serious danger to others. For example, it seems justifiable to quarantine those who are carrying highly infectious diseases (not always and everywhere, but under a lot of circumstances). And I am not entitled to use my body to drive a car or plane until or unless I can show that I have certain skills.

It's hard to deny that child-rearing, when done badly, causes significant harm (harm that lingers for a lifetime). The case for licensing reproduction then, for thinking that no-one has a right to use their body to have a child if they lack the skills etc to bring it up badly, both because this is unfair to the child itself (who does have a right to a good upbringing etc), and unfair to the rest of us as we'll have to live with the results.

As for stripping women of their bodily autonomy - it seems to me that, if anything, such a policy would enhance their autonomy overall, given that mother nature seems to be something of a misogynist and so - historically anyway - leaving things to nature to regulate has led to women being burdened with the lion's share of the disadvantages that accrue to those who procreate irresponsibly.

Adoption certain presents tests for parents. But they are asking to get kids that the government has custody of. The government is in loco parentis (sic, likely). So as an already existing parent, it wants to make sure it is handing over the child, who is also already alive and here, to someone who has the potential to do well. Biological parents create their own child. There is no one giving them that child and passing on responsibility. — Coben

I do not think this makes a big difference where justifying licencing is concerned.

We licence pilots because of the terrible harm a totally incompetent pilot can wreak on others. Imagine, however, that if a pilot flies an empty plane above a certain altitude this brings into existence people who then occupy the empty chairs. A bizarre idea, I grant you, but conceivable. Well, wouldn't we still think it right and proper to licence the pilots of these planes? They have brought into existence the passengers on their aircraft - people who would not have existed if we did not allow them to fly - but still, this doesn't seem to affect the need to licence these pilots.

So it doesn't seem to matter whether the people who'll be endangered by a lack of licencing exist independently of the activity in question, be it flying or procreating.

The reason for licensure is first and foremost to restrict competition in the field and increase profits for the cartel that controls it. — alcontali

No, that's sometimes the reason, but it is not the reason being mooted in this case.

The problem I have with this idea is what is the best way to raise a child. Once you were a poor parent if you didn’t instil Christian values in them. What sort of values should they have? And how would you prove someone has the prerequisites you mention? A licence suggests that the state knows what’s best for you. — Brett

The policy does not have to make substantial assumptions about what the best kind of parenting involves, only what the worst kind involves. Just as driving licences are not designed to ensure that only the best drivers drive, but to stop the worst kind from doing so.

Take adoption - the adoption process in most civilized countries is heavily regulated precisely in order to weed out the worst. And, as I understand it, it is quite successful at this. I read somewhere that adopted children are five times less likely to be abused by their parents, for instance.

I think the details would be for psychologists to sort out, not philosophers - but whatever criteria need to be met for adoption could just be applied to prospective breeders as well.

any idea, that government can make close intrusion below the belt is unpalatable, — tim wood

I don't think it is - we already make such intrusions, for we do not allow anyone to have sex with anyone, for instance. Plus I have always found that the idea of licensing reproduction is one that many people find perfectly ethical.

Like any licensing scheme, it could be abused. And some criteria would be more ethically debatable than others. There would also be room to debate to what extent its goal should be merely to prevent the worst kind of parents from breeding, or to promote the best kind of parenting (the former being much easier than the latter, of course).

It is, I think, also worth reflecting on just how terrible the current system is - nothing prevents a sociopath with poor impulse control, a history of violent abuse and no money from breeding. We could reasonably predict that such a person would make an appalling parent, with results that the rest of society will have to live with for a lifetime. Yet the state in no western country does anything at all to prevent them from becoming a parent.

Preventing those kinds of people from procreating is a long way from any kind of problematic eugenics, I suggest.

Plus, to get the focus back on procreation (rather than on the issue of the justifiability of any and all licencing) - is there any reason why we should not licence procreation, given that we licence adoption?

I am against all licensing. — Pfhorrest

That's quite an extreme position - and if you're opposed to licensing reproduction on grounds that would include being opposed to licensing pilots and surgeons, then I'd say the case for licensing reproduction remains a good one.

but I think that they should be punished in proportion to the harm they cause -- — Pfhorrest

That seems irrational - surely it should be punished in proportion to the wrong they have done? After all, it is for wrongdoing that one deserves punishment, not causing harm.

Obviously sometimes someone is punished for causing harm, but in such cases the harm for which you are being punished is one that has been judged unjust - that is, it is a harm you were not justified in doing to me.

For example, imagine you harm me in self-defence. Well, clearly you do not deserve punishment for the harm you have done to me. Why? Because the harm you did to me was just, not unjust.

You cite practical problems with a procreation licence, but they are not big problems and anyway they do not get at the heart of the philosophical issue. There are practical problems with any licencing scheme - with any justice system.

Are you going to punish people for having unprotected sex? — Pfhorrest

Yes.

That's going to require an enormous invasion of privacy to be effectual at all. — Pfhorrest

How so? We currently charge people for attempts - attempted murder, attempted fraud and so forth. And for behaving recklessly, even when no harm to anyone else results. These do not require any enormous invasions of privacy.

Let's say an unlicensed couple conceive a child and there is no evidence they took any precautions against this. Well, then a good case exists for thinking they had unprotected sex - that is, we have quite compelling prima facie evidence that they behaved recklessly and deserve punishment. Just as, by analogy, if you discover me at the wheel of a car parked on the motorway hard shoulder - me, someone who lacks a licence to drive - then you have good prima facie evidence that I have been driving without a licence.

In any case, do you force an abortion on them? — Pfhorrest

That would depend on whether abortions are morally permissible in general (and I believe they are). But that's a different issue. The point is that if abortions are not unjust killings, then yes. If they are unjust killings, then no.

Even if you don't, then what? Do you take the children away from them? — Pfhorrest

Yes.

Children raised in institutional environments generally fare worse than even the averagely-badly-parented child, so that seems contrary to the intended purpose of protecting the children. — Pfhorrest

Yes, but if we introduced licencing then most children would be much better parented, so overall the welfare of children would improve.

Do you let the parents keep the children, and just jail one or both of them? Both seems obviously problematic — Pfhorrest

No more problematic than cases in which, say, a parent has committed some other crime. Let's say Jane and Tom are excellent parents, but they both commit art fraud for a hobby and we catch them. Now, do we send them to jail and their kids into care? Yes, obviously.

You keep saying the policy would defeat the purpose.

No, I see no reason to think it would. You're focussing on the children of offenders, not children generally. Children generally would fare much better as they'd not be brought up by feckless losers.

Plus the purpose is not just to improve the welfare of children, but to make others behave more responsibly.

You're against all licensing?

There is really no substantial difference between licensing something and saying that 'doing this without satisfying certain criteria will result in us punishing you'.

Someone who drink drives but gets home without running anyone over should be punished, not quietly admired for their gall.

Yes, it is the antithesis of freedom in that we are saying "you are not free to do this" - but not all freedoms are equal. As the saying goes, your freedom to swing your fists ends where my face begins.

If - if - you are opposed to all licensing, then do you at least agree that 'if' it is justifiable to licence piloting and medicine, then it is justifiable to licence reproduction?

Yes, I am aware of that - I am an idealist of Berkeley's sort. But he never made the above argument against physical reality (his argument was different). So the argument I have made against the existence of extended objects supplements his.

You seem to be trying to parcel stoicism off as part of psychology rather than as part of ethics? — I like sushi

I am saying that much of what Stoics say is not philosophical, but psychological. However, I am not saying that 'all' of what they say is. Far from it. I am saying that they often make philosophical claims.

But what one needs to be on guard for, is the tendency - when under argumentative pressure - to subtly change the topic from philosophy to psychology. That is, to stop doing philosophy and start doing therapy.

More quotes. Can't you put things in your own words?

although I’m nonplussed as to how I would cause physical things to exist. — Wayfarer

I used your mind as an example of something simple - something unextended. But I am not thereby saying that you caused all else to exist, only that something, or things, like you has.

Also, of course, the argument establishes that physical things do not exist. So, nothing created them - they have no reality.

As for the sensations of colour, texture, smell, and so forth - well, we know from our own case that we, minds, mint such things. For we do so when imagine things.

There is the sensible world - the world of sensation - and it exists. But the physical world does not. There is no illusion, however, just a mistaken belief that the sensible world exists extra-mentally.

So, you just changed your initial claim into something else? You first stated that "a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance", which then became "No one does wrong willingly, yes? That's a core Stoic view". Hmmm, suspicious. Like, moving the goalposts, suspicious — Ying

No, Stoics also make the first - Socrates famously maintained that all wrongdoing was a product of ignorance and Zeno followed him in that belief.

Plus, depending on what assumptions one makes about the connection between reasons and motivation, they're not even obviously distinct claims - there's a long tradition of believing that what one takes oneself to have reason to do, one is necessarily motivated to do (seems to have been Socartes' view, for instance, and it continues to be held in some form or other up to the present day).

If that's true then any desires that prevent one from doing as one ought are themselves symptomatic of ignorance.

Seems like you claim that stoicism advocates that one shouldn't feel grief at all ("Someone who felt no grief for a loved one who has just died is not healthy. "). The quote I provided says otherwise. — Ying

No, read the quote again. Read what it actually says, not what you think it says.

Well, are there any instances of 'simple things' other than as a rhetorical device? — Wayfarer

You haven't followed the argument (or you have dismissed it as a 'rhetorical device').

The argument establishes the existence of simple things. If anything exists, some simple things (or thing) exist - that's what it establishes.

And yes, you have an example in yourself. You are a simple thing. Can you be divided? No. So you have no parts. You - a mind - are an instance of a simple thing.

"Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Then there's Ying - he does neither", earlier? Not exactly the epitome of politeness either. — Ying

It matters not just what someone says, but when they say it. You had already started to be rude at that point - started to talk about me, not the argument and had said I hadn't done my homework and then had the temerity to try and take me to school (though not by actually addressing anything I'd said, but by quoting others on irrelevant topics).

As for my understanding of stoicism, well, lets just say that I'm not wholly uninformed, — Ying

but I'm more informed than your average run of the mill guy off the streets I guess. — Ying

Why do you just assume that's not true of me too? Again, the rudeness. You just assume I'm ignorant. Yet I have made substantial claims - in my own words - about Stoicism and rather than provide evidence that they are false, you have asserted my ignorance.

Now, I actually have evidence that you're not very well informed, because I said some things about Stoicism that are true and you said that I needed to do my homework - which implies you think they're not true.

Was I wrong - half-witted - to say that a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance?

Yes. As in, you're wrong about that being a core belief of stoicism (they also pointed to other causes like greed and being ruled over by emotions; stating that the stoics boiled the entire issue down to just ignorance would be a gross oversimplification). Not making any claim on you being a halfwit or not. That's not for me to decide. — Ying

Potato, potarto. No one does wrong willingly, yes? That's a core Stoic view.

And it is false, yes? I mean, obviously false.

You quote Seneca:

but I would not have you sorrow more than is fitting. That you should not mourn at all I shall hardly dare to insist; and yet I know that it is the better way. — Ying

But you don't interpret the quote correctly (or at all, in fact). He does not dare to insist that you not mourn at all, but that's entirely consistent with believing that it is nevertheless irrational to do so. And indeed, in saying hat it is the better way he means that it is more rational - so ideally rational response to death is no grief at all, yes?

Seneca is confirming what I said, not refuting it.

This is a version of the cosmological argument, is it not? I — Wayfarer

It has some premises in common, certainly. But the cosmological argument has 'Therefore, God exists" as its conclusion, whereas I am arguing that no physical - that is, extended - objects exist.

my argument is much stronger than a cosmological argument because it seeks to do less.

My argument does not seek to establish the existence of a very specific, single person - God - but only the existence of a certain kind of thing or things, namely unextended things, and consequently the non-existence of extended things (physical things).

In my lexicon, the way I put it is that 'existing things' are necessarily compound and impermanent, that being the 'mark' of 'anything existent'. So this distinguishes what is 'compound and contingent' from what is 'simple and self-existent', which is the mark of 'real being'. — Wayfarer

That's not how I would use those terms. An existing thing is just anything that exists. Simple things are things that lack parts.

I think any object that has parts requires explanation. Confronted with something that appears to have parts, our reason tells us that it is legitimate to wonder how those parts came to be united in that way.

By contrast, simple things - that is, things lacking parts - do not require explanation as anyone who grasps the concept of such things can recognise. For a simple thing, lacking parts, is not made of anything more basic than itself. To ask how it came to together, then, is to have failed to grasp that one is dealing with a simple thing. Simple things cannot be made, for there is nothing from which one can make one.

Likewise, simple things cannot be destroyed, for there is nothing into which one can deconstruct one.

Thus, by simply applying our reason to the idea of a simple thing, we can see that any simple thing that exists, exists by its very nature and thus does not require explanation (or, perhaps better, its existence is explained by its nature).

This is not so with complex things.

The problem with extended things - with physical things - is that they are by their nature complex, for they are infinitely divisible and thus have infinite parts.

This is by itself sufficient to establish their non-existence. But additionally, it means that they always require explanation, and that explanation is going to have to reside in something non-physical (which combined with the fact that nothing non-physical can cause something physical, establishes once more their non-existence).

I should add, some would go further and say that simple things - or at least one simple thing - exists of necessity.

I don't. I think that existing by one's nature and existing of necessity are not quite the same concept. After all, the idea of a simple thing that does not exist seems entirely conceivable, which is not what one would expect of a necessarily existing thing.

So, I think that all things that exist, exist contingently.

But some things that exist, exist by their very nature.

I’m not sure Stoicism is against grief. I think the issue is more about grieving the death of someone who is still alive. Once they are dead then grief is faced. — I like sushi

Yes, possibly, but then the Stoic makes their stand on grief banal. So, for instance, in reality it would appear that grief is sometimes rational, sometimes not - sometimes healthy, sometimes unhealthy. Grieving the death of people one has no close relationship to, for instance, seems unhealthy, especially if it is accompanied by a tendency to feel less, or no greater grief for the deaths of those with whom one does have a close relationship.

But if 'that' is what the Stoic is saying - that sometimes grief is rational, sometimes not - then their view is banal. And although individual Stoics may put more meat on the bone by supplying more detail about when and where grief is rational, at this point there would seem to be nothing distinctive about Stoicism.

If, on the other hand, Stoicism is to be a distinctive philosophical view, then it needs to say something substantial about these matters, and what they say would need to be supported.

For instance, let's say that a Stoic argues that grief is irrational because death is not a harm to the one who dies. Well, that's a substantial - non-banal - view. The problem, however, is that it appears to be false.

Stoics claim to be informed by Reaosn - indeed, to see reality as underpinned by Reason in some sense (and I agree with that). But our reason represents death to be a harm and grief to be appropriate - so in this respect anyway, the Stoics seem to say things that fly in the face of what Reason says.

That's the point at which the Stoics will typically appeal to well-being rather than truth.

Stoicism surely can't be merely therapy. The stoic ideas were formulated with a metaphysical doctrine in mind. It is the relation between the therapy and the metaphysics that effectively makes stoicism a philosophy. — Pelle

My claim is not that Stoics are therapists, or that Stoicism is therapy, but that it is either therapy, or a collection of true, but banal ethical injunctions (such as 'be good'), or controversial but false claims, such as that guilt is irrational and that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance.

In reality, Stoics flit between these - that is, they may defend a controversial ethical claim - such as that all wrongdoing is a product of ignorance - by appeal not to evidence (as a true philosopher would), but by appeal to the supposed therapeutic benefits that may come from believing it.

So, let's just be clear - because I'm getting a bit sick of the ugly combination of ignorance and self-righteous indignation that so many of you lot instantiate - you just called me a halfwit, right?

I dealt with that one by actually quoting stoics since that's what we are talking about, not some halfwitted understanding someone cooked up during lunchbreak. — Ying

Yes? So, as far as I'm concerned, that now makes you - you - a really rude person who can, with justice, be spoken to in a fashion that would be rude were it applied to anyone else. That's what I do. I talk to rude people - like you - in the manner you deserve.

Now, again, stop attacking me - stop suggesting I'm a halfwit - and actually address the OP.

Stop quoting and put things in your own words, otherwise a) it is not clear that you understand at all what is in the quote and b) it is not clear whether you endorse what is in the quote.

Was I wrong - half-witted - to say that a core Stoic belief is that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance? Was I wrong to say that a core Stoic belief is that grief is irrational?

er, no. They are all true. But thanks for your input.

What do you make of the is/ought problem? Various 'great' philosophers have taken the position that reason just tells us what is, not what ought to be. — Eee

I do not see a problem, just a dogma that - to those who cleave to it - generates a problem. Our reason gives us insight into the norms of Reason - that is, into what Reason prescribes.

It is by our reason that we learn about a prescription to seek out and beleve what is true. That is a norm. And I take it that the word 'ought', though ambiguous, in this context denotes some kind of prescription or bidding.

So, the judgement that we 'ought' to be generous is a judgement about what Reason prescribes - she prescribes generosity.

She tells us to seek out and believe what is true. She also tells us to be generous and kind and honest.

There is no is/ought problem, as such, for these are all oughts. It is just that they can sometimes conflict. Sometimes, for instance, it would not be moral to seek out and believe what is true.

Where Hume was right is that our reason - and so, by extension, Reason herself - seems ignorant about the extended world, the world of sense. Reason seems to know that the world of sensible things has a basic character, but nothing very specific. Hence why we cannot, by reason alone, figure out whether water will suffocate us, to use one of his examples. We have to observe the world to find that out - although again, not without assistance from our reason, for it is by reason (not sense) that we are told to do this (that is, to observe and to make inferences about future events on their basis).

But Hume was wrong and quite unjustified in taking this further and declaring Reason dumb about matters of substance and reality. indeed, I think his position is quite incoherent. Reason's prescriptions - about which true and false claims can be made - include both the prescription to seek out and believe what is true, and moral prescriptions, and the prescription to pursue our own desires, and no doubt some more besides. My point is that they are all kinds of prescription, and we cannot even begin to learn which descriptions are true until we start to attend to the prescriptions of Reason. So, prescriptions are, in a very real sense, prior to descriptions.

I will respond to the rest later.

Hmm, I am not sure I follow.

Perhaps I should say that I do not think anything exists with necessity, including God - I am a sceptic about necessity. But I take it that others would say that if a thing exists by its very nature, then that's what it is for something to exist with metaphysical necessity (I would not say this, but I accept that some things exist by their very nature).

But if a thing does not exist by its very nature, then the kind of explanation its existence requires is a causal one. That is, something external to it needs to be causally responsible for its having come into being.

If that's right, then the fact that extended things do not exist by their very nature, combined with the fact there are no infinite regresses of causes and fact that extended things cannot causally interact with unextended things, would suffice to establish their non-existence.

And this, combined with the fact my mind exists with certainty, would then entail that my mind is not an extended thing (something that, I think, is implied in multiple other ways).

Re your God example - I did not quite follow it. I accept that no thought can exist absent a mind to have it. But I would say that God substance-causes his own thoughts. God's first thought would not have been caused by any prior thinking on God's part, but it would still be caused by the thing that is God. Perhaps I am missing something here though.

The point is not to say your conclusion is wrong, mind you, but that you need to defend a version of premise 9 that argues that if there is no "causal interaction" between two things that that must also entail that there is no metaphysical and logical dependency between those things. — Walter B

Hmm, I would say that the credibility of the claim that no extended thing can causally interact with an unextended thing is about the same as the claim that no extended thing can causally depend on an unextended thing.

Take a ball on a cushion and let's assume that they have both existed in that arrangement for eternity. It seems true to say that the ball is causing the indentation in the cushion, even though there is no event of the ball having caused the deny. So this, I think, would be an example of one thing - the dent in the cushion - causally depending on another thing - the ball, without there being any interaction between the two.

However, could something about an extended thing depend, in that kind of way, on the presence of an unextended thing? No, or at least it seems as hard to conceive of this as it is to conceive of interaction between an unextended thing and an extended thing.

So I think premise 9 is as plausible when it is about causal dependency as it is when it is about causal interaction (which is to say, very plausible though - I accept - not true beyond all reasonable doubt).

One problem is how you go from arguing that immaterial reality has no causal relation with physical reality to therefore no physical things exist. Perhaps immaterial reality does not interact with material reality in one specific causal manner, as in the way that a potter crafts a pot to exist, but that does not seem to preclude the possibility that material reality is metaphysically contingent upon immaterial reality- which may be metaphysically necessary- the point here is that is possible to say that the existence of x causes the existence of y to exist (if x's existence is logically prior to y's existence) and still have no "causal interaction" with y. — Walter B

I agree that the weakest premise in the argument is the one that asserts that extended things can only causally interact with other extended things.

But without necessarily endorsing it, it does have a great deal of prima facie credibility. I think it is fair to say that the reason of many people - including, it would seem, the bulk of contemporary philosophers - endorses it, for it is the principle basis upon which (ironically) belief in the soul is rejected as false. For it is at the heart of the so-called 'problem of interaction'. The (supposed) problem being that if our minds are immaterial things - souls - then they would be incapable of causally interacting with our extended bodies; yet as our minds clearly do causally interact with our extended bodies, our minds must themselves be extended things (and thus not souls).

So, because that problem is currently considered a very big one, and because it depends crucially upon the premise that extended things and unextended things cannot possibly causally interact, I think we can safely conclude that the reason of many represents causal interaction to be impossible between objects of different kinds.

If that's right, then it is reasonable to think that the relevant premise is true. But I agree that its truth is not beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let's imagine it is false, then. Well, we still need to stop the regress. The only way to do this, so far as I can see, is to attribute a power of so-called 'substance causation' to extended things. That is, although extended things can cause events by undergoing changes themselves, they can also cause events directly - that is, without themselves undergoing any change.

But here Plato's point, I think, is that we simply do not see this kind of causation among extended things. What we observe, where extended things are concerned, is event causation, not substance causation. That is, we notice that every movement in a thing, is caused by some other movement elsewhere. There may be no necessity to this, but it is what observation suggests. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that the movements of extended things are ultimately caused not by substance causation by extended things, but substance causation by immaterial things.

I will respond to the rest shortly

OK, but pragmatically I see no reason why a philosopher can't in principle answer a question purportedly exclusive to a therapist. And, I mean no disrespect to either or both professions. — Wallows

And there's also no reason why a philosopher can't bake a cake or lay a wall. Not sure what your point is.

Have you ever been to therapy, may I ask? — Wallows

No, why on earth would I go to therapy?

Why are they distinct disciplines?

Psychologists often make philosophical assumptions (often unnecessarily), and philosophers sometimes make psychological assumptions.
But they're distinct disciplines.

Can't you see the difference between these two questions:

"What will make me happy?"

"what is happiness?"

Says who? — Wallows

Me. Just then.

It is not a non-sequitur. It is just a fact.

Why do you think psychology and philosophy are distinct disciplines?

I am not lost and I know exactly what I am talking about.

You asked me some questions - such as the difference between therapy and philosophy - and I answered them.

I do not know why you are lost or think that I am.

A therapist tries to change your psychological state.

That's not what a philosopher is trying to do.

A philosopher is seeking to answer questions that only careful reasoned reflection can illuminate. Such as 'what 'is' a psychological state? (are they physical states, or states of an immaterial thing?)', and 'what psychological state is it good for a person to be in?"

It is precisely because the philosopher's questions can only be answered by careful reasoned reflection, whereas the therapist's questions require detailed empirical investigation, that we have separate disciplines dedicated to answering them.

yes, because it is a good example. I have never encountered a Buddhist who stuck to providing evidence rather than reverting to appeal to therapeutic benefits when pressed.

I think some Stoics are therapists, some are philosophers, and some (most, I suspect) are a bit of both.

A therapist is just trying to treat a person - that is, they are trying to make you into a certain sort of a person, be it a happier person, or a more controlled person, or whatever.

But a philosopher would be interested in what kind of a person one ought to be, and in what oughtness itself is, and in what a person is, and in what reality would need to be like in order for it to contain properties such as oughtness, and goodness.

So take Buddhism. If you engage a Buddhist in argument - that is, if you ask them to provide some kind of evidence that their worldview is true - they will typically change the subject and tell you how to be content.

Not saying all Buddhists do that - but in my limited experience, most do.

At that point they are not doing philosophy. They are not giving me epistemic reason to believe in their worldview. Rather, they are seeking to show me that I have instrumental reason to believe in their worldview.

Or take a Christian. A Christian might point out how much happier you'd be if you believed in God and an afterlife in which all wrongs are righted and so on. Well, they may be right - but that is not evidence that their worldview is true.

The philosopher - the true philosopher - is interested in whether gods and afterlives and souls and so on, actually exist. They are not interested in how beneficial or otherwise it may be to believe in such things.

So, if a Stoic starts saying "here's how to be happy..." and "believing this or reflecting on this will make you more able to deal with reversals of fortune etc." then they are offering instrumental - perhaps even moral - reasons to believe in their worldview, but they are not offering epistemic reasons (evidence) for their worldview. And it is evidence that true philosophers are interested in.

I would have thought that the last person someone who needs counselling should see is a philosopher!

Second, do you only think in a pejorative (stereotypical) manner? — Wallows

I am not sure what you mean. I think extremely aggressively. That is, if someone tells me their worldview, then I try my hardest to show that it is false.

Well, I think to be deserving of the title 'Stoic' one surely has to have a body of views that bear a strong resemblance to those of the historical Stoics, otherwise it would be a misleading thing to call oneself. So I think attacking the views traditionally associated with that title is fair enough, as anyone who is currently calling themselves a Stoic should either be able to explain why they do not believe such things yet can still be fairly called one, or should be able to defend those views.

It isn't a straw man. If you're unhappy and want to be happy, you see a therapist, not a philosopher.

Why? Because a therapist is someone who's an expert on how to manage one's psychological states.

A philosopher, by contrast, is not an expert on those matters. For though a philosopher is interested in using reason to find out what's true, they focus on those questions that do not seem to be capable of being settled by empirical means.

So, if you want to know if you ought to be happy, then you would seek out a philosopher.

A psychologist can - or may be able to - tell you how to be happy.
A philosopher can - or may be able to - tell you whether you ought to be, and can tell you about whether happiness is purely subjective or has an objective aspect to it.

I have not said that Stoicism is definitely a psychological thesis. But many Stoics seem to make it into one - typically when their more philosophical claims are placed under scrutiny.

I accept - and mentioned this earlier - that psychology is a branch of philosophy in that it uses reason to find out what's true.
But whereas a psychologist will want to know the causes and mechanisms of our psychological states, the philosopher will want to know things such as what psychological states it is good to be in, what psychological states one ought to be in, and what a psychological state is, in and of itself.
those are not questions psychologists ask or set about answering.

Now, if you want, you can say that Stoicism is about what emotions we feel and how to get rid or them (or control them). And you can say that, as such, it is a psychological thesis, but as psychology is really a branch of philosophy, it is therefore a philosophical thesis.

And that's fine - I agree. But let's just be clear: it is a thesis not about what is good or bad, or what is right or wrong, or what the universe is fundamentally composed of. Rather, it is just a psychological thesis.

I did learn about stoicism — Mark Dennis

I see no evidence of that. If you knew about Stoicism you'd know that the views I mentioned - such as that grief is irrational and that wrongdoing is a product of ignorance - are typical Stoic views.

such a jealous reaction to anyone with a degree — Mark Dennis

and have probably read far more on both those subjects than yourself, else I wouldn't have gotten my degree — Mark Dennis

Your inability to focus squarely on the arguments and your tendency to take robust arguments personally strongly implies you lack any proper academic training. And you clearly do not know much about either Stoicism or antinatalism or argumentation. You seem incapable of making valid inferences or in fairly characterising an opponent's position. Antinatalism, for instance, is not synonymous with the view that we ought to kill ourselves (as anyone who's read the literature on the subject - or, you know, just thought about it intelligently - would know).

Whatever reason you have for being jealous of children you should drop it. — Mark Dennis

Er, what? Are you literally insane?

This thread is about Stoicism and is not an appropriate venue for you to vent your irrational and unfocussed anger. I've argued here that Stoicism often ceases to be philosophy and becomes therapy. It is in that capacity that it may be both helpful and needed by you.

Same difference. Business ethics is ethics applied to business.

Anyway, how is this about Stoicism? It's just you venting your frustration at me after ignorantly asserting that the belief that grief is irrational and something to be conquered is not a belief associated with Stoicism.