Functionalism about the mind
I don't think life and mind have anything in common.
I don't believe that most life has mind or is conscious, most notably plants and also amoeba,bacteria or individual cells. Or that life entails mind in any way.
Life and physics are concepts of the mind so it seems unlikely mind emerges from concepts. (as opposed to isolating specific causal relations and mechanisms) (Where do mechanisms come from)
I don't think complexity implies mind either, although it may allow for the impression of life. By the "impression of life" I mean activity we interpret as life. I don't think you can isolate one process and call it life. Is life just complex processes?
I don't see how "cost free interactions" entail no need for a rigorous explanation of a property or emergent property.
The definition of information is controversial or multifaceted. I think there is a difference between conscious & symbolical information and physical non-symbolic interactions. You could say that the physical interactions involved in making a cake were information transfers but not the kind involving awareness just alterations in properties. Non-conscious information leads to the zombie hypothesis. Or panpsychism with any info becoming conscious.
I also don't think that the problem is solved concerning which process are adequate to give rise to minds
If the processes are vague or broad like computation or energy transfers it does not offer a restriction on what can be conscious or a true rigorous causal account. For example if I said I am a mixed race male that would describe me loosely and not be false but it is not a causal description or something you could identify me with. You would need more precise, specific or detailed info.