Can you turn this into an argument? What is it that you want to conclude here?

The table here is made up of molecules of cellulose with a few impurities.

Some folk conclude that what is real is the atoms and molecules of the cellulose, that the table is an illusion.

Some folk note that those atoms are mostly space. and again sups the table to be an illusion.

Neither of these is a sound conclusion. It remains that there is a table, consisting of cellulose and space.

The argument for time being an illusion is similarly unsound. It remains that the OP was written three days ago.

The problem here is not with time and space, but with the misuse of the words "illusion" and "real".

This:

Hence, Phosphorus could be the sun? What would Hesperus be? Under this clarification is "Phosphorus is Hesperus." still a tautology? Or is it downright false? — Corvus

The fiction of dragons includes "breathing fire". But fictions still can't engage in the real world activity. — Relativist

Sure.

Do you understand my objection to the original statement:
Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire. — Relativist

You can't say of something that does not exist, that it breaths fire. Just showing you one way to make sense of that.

Breathing is a real world activity by real world creatures. A fiction can't do this. — Relativist

And yet it is true that dragons breath fire.

Ergo, fictional creatures can breath.

IMO there's one ontology. Dragons are either real-world creatures, or they are concepts residing in minds. — Relativist

Take a closer look at what is going on. We can set "exists' as a quantifier, ∃(x)f(x), which just says that something has the property f. Then we can happily talk about dragons breathing and still say that they are fictional.

Fictional creatures are found in fiction, in the real world. Sure, you will not meet one in the street.

On this account dragons can breath fire. On your account, it is false that dragons breath fire.

Then the sentence "dragons breathe fire" is false, because fictional creatures don't actually breathe at all. — Relativist

Why would you think fictional creatures do not breath? Or are you now saying that there are two levels of ontology, stuff that exists and stuff that is actual?

∃(x)(x is a dragon & x is fictional & x breaths fire)

Looks fine to me.

, ok, so going back to the OP, lived time exists?

At best you might say that some dragons breath fire.

-If dragons don't exist, then "dragon" refers to a fictional creature. — Relativist

Then dragons exist and are fictional creatures.

∃(x)(x is a dragon and x is fictional)
or
∃(x)(x is a dragon ⊃ x is fictional)

Well, use "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" instead.

While I'm here, the equation of independent existence and necessity is also fraught. These are two quite independent ideas, conflated.

That something exists independently does not imply that it exists in every possible world. And that something is found in every possible world does not imply that it's existence is not dependent.

Again, possible world semantics shows us were we have been led astray.

(added: @tim wood, was that your point?)

It's a subtle point, I supose.

Consider "It is raining". It is possible that it is raining, but it is not necessary that it is raining - there are possible worlds in which it is not raining. So we don't move from it being possible that it is raining to it being necessary that it is raining.

But then consider "god exists". If we start by considering that it is possible that god exists, as is done in the second of Anselm's arguments, and move to the conclusion that it is necessary that god exists, we have a formulation that goes from ◇P to ◇☐P. That is what brings about modal collapse - we can apply the axiom ◊□P→□P to get from ◇P to ☐P.

So if we say that it is possible and that god is a necessary being, modal logic collapses.

In effect, in saying that it is possible for god to be necessary, one is saying it is both possible and necessary that god exists. A contradiction. So anything follows, including that everything is necessary.

Plantiga's proof smuggles in necessity by saying god is possibly necessary.

So we can say that god is possible, or that god is necessary, but not both. That is, the move in the ontological argument from god being possible to his being necessary is void.

Added:

...one is saying it is both possible and necessary that god exists... — Banno

But if god is necessary, then it must be possible for god to exist? Sure, ☐p→◇p in S5. But not ◇p ^ ☐p.

The OP raises whether or not it's possible to 'change the past' of the actual world ( — 180 Proof

If that is how you read it, well, no. The past is kinda fixed.

Unless the universe (of determinant forces and constraints on one) changes too, I don't think so. — 180 Proof

If the universe is of determinant forces and constraints, then it is determinant.

So not seeing any disagreement here.

, and yet god is supposedly unchanging.

So much the worse for god.

As for Leon's insults - that I troll, I lack any real skills of reading comprehension, my posts are full of weird shit; oddly, I "bury (my) head in the sand and moves on as if nothing has occurred" - not sure how one can move on with one's head in the sand - my posts are driven by emotion, I haven't read the paper, I've hijacked the thread, I shit on everything, I do not engage in authentic dialogue, But most confusingly, I'm both a logical positivist and yet a solipsist.

I'm not sure it's me who is having an emotional response here.

Klima is supposedly "trying to build a bridge to mutual understanding" based on the claim that those who do not agree with his argument have not understood the nature of god; yet the basis for the claim that they have not understood the nature of god is that they do not agree with the argument. Hmm.

Now I think I have provided a reasonable response to the very few actual replies to what I have said. Kripke does emphasis descriptions, in order to reject the descriptivist theory of reference. Both Klima and Aquinas accept the criticism I offered, after Gaunilo, on the definition of "greatest". If there is something that you, gentle reader, think needs addressing, let me know, I'm still here.

I'm not happy that Leon is so upset. It's a topic that is for some very close to their identity. Putting up a thread is putting one's balls on the anvil, so to speak, and occasionally things do not go as expected. Being gainsaid is part of being on these forums. Thanks again, Leon, for starting this thread. But I am not responsible for your reaction to my posts.

...determined... — Truth Seeker

Sure. If your genes were different, you might have acted differently. If your environment were different, you might not have had access to this web site. If you had skipped breakfast, you might have been too tiered to bother posting. That's not to say that even if your genes had been different, you may have acted in the very same way. If your environment had been different, you may have changed it so as to gain access to this site. Had you skipped breakfast, you might nevertheless have still made the OP.

"...they are determined" just means that identical choices would result in the same outcome. So yes, if they are determined, then identical choices would result from identical variables.

See how much how you ask the question sets up the answer you get?

No, you didn't do otherwise. But you can give consideration to how things woudl be had you done otherwise.

Was that inevitable? Well, what does 'inevitable" do? It's origin is "not avoidable", and now that you have read that paragraph it is unavoidable that you read it. But you still might not have read it, and this thread might then be shorter.

So the answer to "Could anyone have made a different choice in the past than the ones they made?" is that yes, it makes sense to consider how things might have been.

I just did an x & v from another web site to get the "iota" character, changed the cap letters and didn't bother removing the already present parenthesise.

The sentence could be read either way. — Relativist

Well, no. There is a difference between Venus and the concept of Venus. Venus is a planet. The concept of Venus, whatever it is, is not a planet. So "Venus" does not refer to the concept of Venus.

Whether they exist or not, dragons breathe fire. — Relativist

A change of topic. From "Dragons breath fire", you can conclude that something breaths fire. You cannot conclude that there are dragons.

Why are the parentheses necessary in this case? — Arcane Sandwich

I guess they are not.

Cool. Then this:

If I'd had a different history, I'd be a different person, maybe closely kin to me, like a cousin. Therefore I can't have a different history. — frank

is a tautology, because you are now identifying yourself as your history, not as frank. All you are saying is that the person who did not become a criminal did not become a criminal.

The referent could be a concept in your mind — Relativist

Well, no. The referent is Venus.

I am trying to understand how choices are made and if our choices are inevitable or not. — Truth Seeker

Yep. And the answer (at least in part) is to consider in a bit more detail what you are asking. You can consider how things would have been had you not posted the OP - you would not be reading this post, for one, and might be doing something much more gratifying. In that sense, of course you might have done otherwise than you actually did.

And then there is consideration of what you might do next. Will you finish reading this paragraph, or go do something else? You might do either, but you will have to wait to find out which you actually do. And only one or the other will actually occur; you can't both read this paragraph to the end and not read it to the end. Is it inevitable that you read this far? Well, my prose has kept you enthralled, I suppose, since here you are.

But you might have done otherwise.

I'll go over the physics again, becasue I think it a point worth making.

The universe is not deterministic in the way Newtonian physics suggested. It's not that we could measure the position of everything in the universe to any arbitrary level of precession. If we measure the momentum of an object to a greater degree of precession, we loose precession in the measurement of it's position. We can't have both.

Supose we take the universe back to before did the OP, and ask, if we did it again, would everything happen in the exact same way? And here we might be asking one of two different things. If you are asking us to take the universe back to the exact same state as it was before the OP, and set it rolling again, then physics says that the notion of "the exact same state" does not make sense, because there can be no such measurement of the state of the universe. But if you are imagining not a physical state but a modal state, the universe just as it was, then of course the exact same thing would happen again... becasue that is what you are supposing in your modal ruminations.

How do you know this? — Truth Seeker

Know it?

It's about making sense form your question, working out wha tit is you asked.

Could anyone have made a different choice in the past than the ones they made? — Truth Seeker

We can consider how things would have been different if you had chose not to post your OP. You know this, and can readily bring to mind how things would be if you had gone for a walk rather than posting on the forums.

And that is all you are asking.

Unless you wanted to know if the universe were deterministic, in the way 180 seems to suppose. But then, what would that mean? That if we rolled the universe back to how it was before your post, and set it in motion again, would things always turn out exactly the same? But we know that the sort of infinite precision that is suggested here is not physically possible, from Heisenberg. Things would proceed differently.

That's not what the physics says, if that is what you are asking.

if I had become a criminal, the resulting person wouldn't be me — frank

Then who became the criminal? "I" is a rigid designation, picking you out in every possible world, including those in which your nefarious self comes to the fore.

That's were Pratchet enters the equation.

‘Do you remember—’
‘I have a … very good memory, thank you.’
‘Do you ever wonder what life would have been like if you’d said yes?’ said Ridcully.
‘No.’
‘I suppose we’d have settled down, had children, grandchildren, that sort of thing …’
Granny shrugged. It was the sort of thing romantic idiots said. But there was something in the air tonight …
‘What about the fire?’ she said.
‘What fire?’
‘Swept through our house just after we were married. Killed us both.’
‘What fire? I don’t know anything about any fire?’
Granny turned around.
‘Of course not! It didn’t happen. But the point is, it might have happened. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened. You might think something’d be good, but for all you know it could have turned out horrible. You can’t say “If only I’d …” because you could be wishing for anything. The point is, you’ll never know. You’ve gone past. So there’s no use thinking about it. So I don’t.’ — Terry Pratchet

Counterfactuals are recondite. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened.

Pratchett, Terry. Lords And Ladies: (Discworld Novel 14) (Discworld series) (pp. 162-163). Transworld. Kindle Edition.

Pretty much. So presumes the universe is determinate, then concludes that we cannot make choices:

Unless the universe (of determinant forces and constraints on one) changes too, I don't think so. — 180 Proof

I don't think modal logic has any metaphysical import though. It's just about the way we think. — frank

Well, yes. Same with modality.

We can think about how things might have been different. That's what "could" does in "Could anyone have made a different choice in the past than the ones they made?"

There's a possible world in which you did not make that OP.

Simple application of modality. Time perceptions and quantum multiple universes are irrelevant.

Damn, they're on to us....

Nuh.

Been watching Juice Media for years.

Emergent properties exist. If time were an emergent property, then it would follow that time exists.

For my own purposes, I'll summarise my response to the article.

The first section advocates an account of meaning in terms of the intent of the speaker or user of the language, so that a reference refers to what the speaker intends it to refer to. Relying on intent fails to account for many aspects of language use. Relying on intent also renders the context opaque, since someone's intent can only be inferred from what they say and do. This is particularly clear in the mooted "object of thought", which seems to be very much the sort of thing rejected by the Private Language argument.

This opacity carries in to the argument proper in section two, were god is defied as a thought-object. This is perhaps most apparent at line five, were the thought-object is substituted into a thought in order to construct a contradiction, despite it not being obvious that this substitution can be done salva veritate. The argument also defines god as the maximum element in a sequence that may have no limits. There is a move from ens rationis to ens reale, that can be brought out by using Free Logic. Finally, that the first assumption, "God is only in the intellect", is the one that must be rejected is not satisfactorily argued.

Section three addresses Anselm's second ontological argument, and has similar problems to the first argument. But in addition there is the problem of how to deal with a necessary being without the consequence of modal collapse. Here are also offered three defences of the argument, which seem inadequate.

And here we begin to see the thesis of the article: that those who disagree with the argument have not understood the idea of god.

Section four returns to the theory of reference, The problem with the article's argument here is clear enough: how could we know that "the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer"? And further, how can the "thought-object" in the mind of the saint be said to be the same as the "thought-object" in the head of the fool - and indeed, how could they be said to be different?

The final section sets out an account of Aquinas' rejection of Anselm's argument, on the grounds that the non-believer may well not accept that the sequence of greatness has a limit. Klima's thesis is here explicated somewhat. Those who have not agreed with the argument do so becasue they do not have an adequate understanding of god; and that their understanding is inadequate is shown by their not accepting that the sequence of greatness has a limit. The circularity of this approach is obvious.

The ontological argument may well be a way for the theist to grasp what it is they believe. But there are sufficient problems with the argument for it to be discounted as a demonstration of theism. Of course it does not follow that there is no god. Similarly the thesis of this article, that those who disagree with the argument have not understood the idea of god, may give solace to believers but is dependent on an approach to reference that ignores the communal dynamics of language.

I've enjoyed reading this article in detail, so thanks for this thread. In the end I doubt that anything is changed by such rumination, but they can be entertaining. Ontological shock, the surprise we feel at there being something rather than nothing, is not answered by such discussions. To my eye it is more honest to simply admit that there are things we do not, and perhaps cannot, understand.

I'm inclined to agree with this. many a thread gets lost in arguments about animal beliefs and prelinguistic actions, which it seems to me to somehow miss the point. We attribute beliefs to actors in order to explain their acts, but it does not follow that there is a thing in the brain, or even the mind, of the actor that is the belief.

But here we are heading towards anomalous monism, perhaps too far from the topic.

I think its more the fact that we cannot talk about truth without using sentences and words. — Apustimelogist

That's bang on.

Yes, there is something of the deflationary account in 's reply. Although ""truth is the adequacy of thought to being" is pretty obtuse, and might look a bit like correspondence.

We can't tell what is actually happening in another person's head, or our own head, when we are believing or are knowing. Why would we think invoking dog-beliefs would help clarify anything? — Fire Ologist

If an agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.

We attribute belief in order to explain behaviour. We attribute belief tot he dog based on its behaviour.

Whether the dog really has a belief in mind is moot.

...a theory of truth cannot tell us what is true, except perhaps for what is true about truth. — Moliere

Yep. One of the advantages of Davidson's approach is that it takes truth as fundamental. That's a pretty cool move, since any theorising or ratiocination is a seeking for truth, and so presupposes that we might recognise it if we saw it.

That's pretty close to how I think of language — Moliere

Cool. And yes, the next step is the iterative and constructive aspect of language, allowing the construction of our social world.

Let's have no more use of "sky daddy," — Count Timothy von Icarus

The appropriate path would be for you to mark the offending posts for consideration by the mods.

But I doubt that they will much care.

"we can assert or deny any part/whole relation as true of false... based on what is useful," is an approach, but it's hardly a serious one. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's pretty much the approach adopted by Quine and the later Wittgenstein, although somewhat bowdlerised by your pejorative take.

You don't have to take it seriously, of cores, but that is more about you than about doing philosophy. It might provide others with a reason not to take you seriously.