Tim apparently thinks that there is at most one correct way in which the world can be divvied up. God's way, presumably.

Others, perhaps you and I and maybe @Dawnstorm, think that there may be multiple ways to divvy up stuff, each of them capable of being coherent if not complete.

Does that help?

In any case is God compelled to fix our mistakes? This comes back to the obvious fact that he has no created a perfect world, not if a world, to be perfect involves no suffering for any creature. — Janus

For consistency god must have created the world of necessity. In modal logic (S5) if there is a necessary being then everything in every possible world is necessary. That is, god does not make choices.Whatever god does he is compelled to do out of necessity. The alternative, of course , is that there are no necessary beings.

The Best Possible World, But Not For Us is a curiosity rather than a serious proposal.

I almost agree with your critique of the causal chain theory of reference. It does not quite satisfy me, either. However I will say that it's advocates might not disagree with you that there is most likely a description involved at some point in the chain. But the success of the reference here and now is not dependent on that description. So at some stage Socrates was names "Socrates", perhaps using some description of the form "I name this baby before me'Socrates'". But now, given the ubiquity of the use of the name, there is a widespread agreement as to the referent of "Socrates" such that it is not dependent on that particular act.

Hence this from SEP:

2. On the causal model, words refer in virtue of being associated with chains of use leading back to an initiating use or ‘baptism’ of the referent. Extending this model beyond names has proven difficult, but one option is to insist that it is really the perceptual connection that underlies most baptismal events that runs the show. In that case, perceptually-grounded uses of demonstratives, deictic pronouns, and definite descriptions can be folded into the picture relatively easily, with anaphoric uses treated as something akin to links in a chain of reference-borrowing — Reference (SEP)

Notice "...leading back to an initiating use or ‘baptism’ of the referent".

Their target was the idea, from Russell and others, that a name refers in virtue of a description, and so that description must be at hand for a reference to be successful. This theory of reference is difficult to make work in a modal semantics.


Added:

Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions. — Banno

Actually, looking at that again, it's much too strong. The casual chain argument is not at all central to N&N. It is offered as an example of the sort of thing that might serve as an alternative. The main line of argument is against the necessity of a reference being associated with a description, and how possible world semantics shows this to be fraught with contradiction.

Compare and contrast

believes satisfies his description

against

believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.

See how one is about a description, and the other is about the referent?

Now Kripke rather famously showed that names do not refer in virtue of some associated description.

So it is an error to claim that Kripke thinks a description is needed in order to fix speaker's reference.

The example given shows that speaker's reference is not as clear-cut as might otherwise be supposed. It provides a direct counterexample. The key issue here is not just what Kripke’s general definition says, but whether it applies universally. The case of Sarah misidentifying Kaplan demonstrates that speaker’s reference can diverge from belief, precisely because reference is not determined solely by belief but also by contextual factors like pointing.

Klima assumes that 'conditions for being the semantic referent' must involve a descriptive element, but Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions. So Klima’s reading is not just mistaken—it contradicts Kripke’s core argument. Merely citing Kripke’s general definition does not refute the point. The question is whether all cases of speaker’s reference conform to this model, and the Kaplan/Kripke case shows they do not.

Is this important? Perhaps not, perhaps it was just a slip on Klima's part. Or perhaps it indicates some reservations he might have towards Kripke's semantics.

For me a far more telling argument would be that God should be able to create a perfect world but hasn't. That throws in doubt either omnibenevolence, omniscience or omnipotence. On that point it seems that the latter two must go together, or at least if Gord were omnipotent he must be omniscient, but neither require omnibenevolence. — Janus

Did you see the argument, from a recent Philosophy Now paper, proposing that this was the perfect world, but not for us?

The Best Possible World, But Not For Us

@Gnomon started a thread on it.

Sure. What do we make of this? If god sees what we have done, and so cannot change it, then there is something god cannot do. Or god does not know what we will choose, in which case there is stuff he doesn't know.

Not long ago we had a chap who insisted that god's omnipotence included his ability to perform paradoxical acts - make round squares and so on. I suppose one might go down that path.

Or one might choose Kierkegaard's approach, accepting the paradox as an act of faith.

There isn't an answer here. The dialogue is interminable.

I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se. — Janus

Well, there is an argument from Broad to that conclusion. If God is omnipotent, he should be able to create a being with free will, but if he is omniscient, he should know what the being will do, which would take away the being's free will.

And we can take this a step further, pointing out that a being with any two of these characteristics might be consistent, but that a being with all three is inconsistent. And yet, a being with all three would be greater than a being with any two. Hence, the notion of a greatest being in inconsistent.

To be sure, these are not arguments to which one might attach much practicality, but they can be amusing.

no one seems to want to give an argument for their claims — Leontiskos

There's a difference between arguments unpresented and argument unacknowledged.

You really will do anything to avoid addressing the elephant sitting opposite you at the table.

Ok, I'll keep playing. Yes, the intentional theorist and the causal theorist may well agree that folk can talk about something despite not having a description that fixes the topic.

So what.

What is mistaken is the view that in the "Kripkean framework" the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

For anyone who wishes to check, here is a better link to Kripke's article: https://www.uvm.edu/~lderosse/courses/lang/Kripke%281977%29.pdf

(added: The crux is that Kripke argues that the semantic meaning of an act of reference can be maintained over the speaker's meaning. He uses this to defend Russell against Donnellen's view. Kripke's argument is that semantic reference is independent of speaker intent.)

Here's the footnote quoting Kripke:

“So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.”

This is in defence of:

In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

Notice that the quote does not mention descriptions at all. And notice also the use of the word "tentatively".

Speaker’s meaning depends on context and intent. But Kripke showed that proper names are rigid designators—they refer to the same entity in all possible worlds. Speaker’s meaning is intensional, or if you prefer, subjective. It varies between individuals, and so cannot account for multiple folk talking about the same thing, nor provide modal rigidity.

You and Klima both appear to have read "the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" as implying the presence of a description. But the phrase is chosen so as to be neutral. The "conditions" can of course as well be those causal conditions that are the basis of Kripke's theory of reference.

Look, I can do bolding too!

~~

Language is not the only case of signification in the world. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep.

Notice Quine is concerned with language?

I'm not seeing how this addresses my post. I do not see where your diagrams take into consideration the fact of language as social phenomena, as the interaction of multiple people, doing things with words.

I think the actual real life interpretation can't complete until we add the third level of analysis: pragmatics. — Dawnstorm

I quite agree.

The diagram shows a relation between symbol and referent, linked by thought. Quine, Austin, Searle Grice and others showed this to be a somewhat keyhole version of what is going on. There is more to language than just reference, so a diagram that explains only reference will explain only a small part of language.

You have still not said what you think parasitic reference is.

And then this:
"But throughout this process, the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer, without knowing under what description or name the answerer identifies this thought object."
The issue here is clear enough: how could we know that "the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer"? And further, how can the "thought-object" in the mind of the saint be said to be the same as the "thought-object" in the head of the fool - and indeed, how could they be said to be different? — Banno

I don't see how this is at odds with what Klima has said. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Who is the sentence "He did not write "Naming and Necessity" about? It is true of Kaplan, not of Kripke. Which is Sarah referring to? Her intent is to speak of that man she points to - Kaplan; and her description is true, he did not write Naming and Necessity. . Her semantic reference is to Kripke. Hence it is not true the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies her description. Kaplan satisfies her description, but is not the semantic reference of the statement. This brings out the issue of the opacity of the speaker's reference. It would be disingenuous to claim reference fails here, but the interplay between speaker's reference, the description and the demonstrative are not as direct as Klima supposes.

More generally, Kripke and Donnellan show that there need be no description in virtue of which a reference is made. The speaker's reference may succeed when description is not satisfied by the referent, or if the belief of the speaker is in error.

And this in turn brings out the fraught nature of what it is for a reference to succeed. In extensional situations, this is fairly simple - the reference succeeds if those in the discussion are talking about the very same thing. But in the non-extensional context of the beliefs of the participants, how are we to check that this is the case, that what each believes they are talking about is the same?

And so back to Quine, who asks if there can even be a fact of the matter here, while pointing out that the pragmatics can overrule the semantics and intent of the speakers in such a way that the issue of whether the reference is successful or not becomes moot.

If nothing else, this shows the poverty of any deep metaphysical theory that hopes to explain reference in every case. At the least, intent, semantics and pragmatics all play a part.

1. Is parasitic reference coherent? — Leontiskos

You might first explain what you think parasitic reference is. Do you agree that it is something like referring to the thought-object in someone else's mind?

The following appears mistaken:

For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.

Kripke showed that speaker's reference may differ from semantic reference. However, he also showed that a name may refer to it's referent regardless of any description, and indeed in the absence of any description.

Consider Sarah, a philosophy student who sees Kaplan at a conference and mistakes him for Kripke. She says, pointing to Kaplan, "Kripke is a great philosopher, but he did not write Naming and Necessity". The speaker's reference here is to the man pointed to - Kaplan. The semantic reference is to Kripke, in virtue of the name used. Sarah believes that she is referring to Kripke, but she is instead referring to Kaplan. Kaplan did not write Naming and Necessity, so her description is true.

The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent. Which is to make the obvious point that what someone is talking about does not always align with what they think they are talking about.

This is a generic problem with accounts of reference in terms of speaker's intent. Reference is a communal activity, and so not reliant simply on the intent of the speaker.

Collingwood viewed metaphysics as unearthing the foundational assumptions behind our scientific theories - behind our understanding of how things are. He viewed the Ontological argument as one such supposition, hence "A man who has a bent for metaphysics can hardly help seeing, even if he does not wholly understand it, that Anselm’s proof is the work of a man who is on the right lines" - that is, someone who agrees with Collingwood's view of metaphysics will see the argument as an expression of that seeking for foundational explanations.

They will not be put off by the fact that the argument fails.

Pretty much.

What happened in Canberra was the public servants who were dropped took on contract work to do the same job for more pay.

In the interests of efficiency, of course.

The result was that the folk doing the work have less incentive to gainsay their bosses. They will not get the next contract.

But the public service has changed, the occupants of the higher offices are on shaky ground and will acquiesce to poor policy.

Hence robodebt and so on.

Again, in the interests of efficiency, of course.

Something along these lines is perhaps the inevitable result of the sustained critique of the Argument - that it has an historical, "metaphysical" place or a place in devotion.

:wink:

Enjoy the melodrama.

Meh. You've squandered much of what good will I may have had towards you with your insults, but now that you have actually expressed your needs, I will do you the kindness of holding off on posting my thoughts on section five, and any concluding remarks, despite your plain rudeness.

I flagged your post for you, so no need for you to draw their attention.

You need not respond to my post if you do not wish to, and can proceed at whatever pace suits you. For my part, I've addressed the thread at length in detail and in sequence, and am preparing my comments on part five. That is were I am up to.

( I suspect it's only you and I who are paying this thread much attention, so the point is probably moot.)

So on to Part Four.

There's a description of the intentional theory of reference, allowing for successful references even when descriptions are inaccurate or fictional and so enables speakers to refer to objects based on shared intentions, even when the referent is not directly known or believed to be true. And then this:

But throughout this process, the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer, without knowing under what description or name the answerer identifies this thought object.

The issue here is clear enough: how could we know that "the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer"? And further, how can the "thought-object" in the mind of the saint be said to be the same as the "thought-object" in the head of the fool - and indeed, how could they be said to be different?

And here again we bump in to the lack of extensionality. Two sets are said to be extensionaly equivalent when they contain the very same members. But infamously, there is simple no way to verify that the thing in the mind of the saint is the same as the thing in the mind of the fool - and indeed, every reason to doubt it.

Now this is apparently recognised by Klima in the next paragraph. But rather than drop the very idea of thought-objects as a useful notion, as the fool might, he suggests:

Accordingly, if one mind entertains a thought object under some particular description, another mind may make what I would call parasitic reference to the same thought object, by merely intending to refer to the same thought object that the first conceives of, but not conceiving it under the same description, indeed, sometimes even denying that the description in question in fact applies to this thought object.

Intending to refer to the same thought-object but under a different description. "I'll have what she's having", involving some sort of telepathy, perhaps.

This is the sort of thing attributed to the fool. But of course there is a much simpler response that can be made, that the idea of reference to some imagined thought-objects is misguided. A better approach would be to reject the picture of reference as being about latching onto pre-existing "objects" in thought at all. Instead, reference is a practice embedded in linguistic and social interaction, where success isn't a matter of mental duplication but of communicative coherence. In that case, the fool's response is not just simpler but arguably the only coherent one.

And it avoids the lack of transparency that plagues talk of intensional references.

Notice that this is very much the approach taken by Quine and Davidson, amongst others.

So at the end of Part Four, the fool may on this account discuss the concept of god had by the saint, and see how this leads to the saint's belief that god exists, while consistently maintaining there own account of god in which god need not exist.

Does it? It seems neutral to me. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I supose it would.

One problem with the pictures is that there is only one signification/meaning/interpretant/dicible. Perhaps they are addressing a different issue to Davidson and Quine?

:wink:

The emphasis on "sign" is problematic, in that it supposes that the main purpose, or fundamental element, in language is the noun.

It isn't. Language is about getting things done as a group. Reference is incidental to that purpose.

Added: that, in a nutshell, is the difference between the Tractatus and the Investigations.

By who? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No one would admit to such a thing openly, of course.

Well, almost no one.

There is a lot of information exchanged in speech... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Language is more about constructing, rather than exchanging, information. This choice of words may mark a pretty fundamental difference between those who agree with Quine and those who do not.

Seems to me you are on the right track.

In response to this question the atheist now may claim that the way Anselm wishes to force him to think of God will not make him admit that God is even in the intellect, at least, in his intellect, despite the fact that he understands very well what Anselm means by his description, which may not be contradictory after all. For understanding this description does not require him to believe that it applies to anything, so understanding this description will not make him think of anything that he thinks to be such that nothing greater than it can be thought of. So, since he denies that the description applies to any thought object he can think of, he just does not have such a thought object in his mind, while he perfectly understands what is meant by this description.

Taking the example from the text, one can clearly conceive of a greatest prime, and then look to see if such a thing makes sense. One can proceed, as has been done, to show that it involves a contradiction, thereby showing that a greatest prime does not exist.

Let's use this analogy to look at one misunderstanding of what the fool is suggesting.

Supose the theist were claiming that they have a proof of the existence of a highest prime. The proof in part claims that since we can conceive of a highest prime, one must exist. The fool does not need to demonstrate that there is no highest prime in order to show that the theist is mistaken. They only need to show that it does not follow from our being able to conceive of a highest prime, that such a thing exists.

The fool does not need to show that god does not exist in order to show that the argument that he does exist is flawed. "...understanding this description does not require him to believe that it applies to anything".

But here the theist swoops down: of course, the atheist is just a fool! Indeed, a wicked fool, who, only because of his insistent denial, admits to be simply unable to think of the same thought object that I think of, that is, God. With this last move the atheist just revealed himself for the miserable fool he is, for in order to maintain his untenable position he simply gives up his otherwise natural human ability to think of God, that than which nothing greater can be thought of. As Saint Bonaventure put it: “the intellect has in itself [...] sufficient light to repel this doubt and to extricate itself from its folly. Whence the foolish mind voluntarily rather than by constraint considers the matter in a deficient manner, so that the defect is on the part of the intellect itself and not because of any deficiency on the part of the thing known.”18

And here, the fool is "simply unable to think of the same thought object" as the theist. The thought in the theists head is different to the thought in the fools's head, and never the twain; together with as much disparaging of the fool as can be mustered.

Part of what is going on here is a bit of theatre, an attempt to avoid considering the fool's account by simply denigrating it. Hence "But even without these moral implications..."; the fool is evil for not thinking in the same way as the theist.

This is not an argument, but a call to the faithful to pull together and reject anything Other. And the rejection of this painting of the fool as "other" occupies much of the remainder of the paper.

(I'm essentially setting out my own notes on the article for my own purposes, which is enough for me. If there is anyone apart form Leon reading on, which I doubt, I apologise for plodding.)

He is summarizing the Anselm-Gaunilo exchange, and this is transparent in the paper. — Leontiskos

Yep.

Sure. Let's see.

At this point, however, the atheist may shift the burden of proof by saying that even if this description does not seem to contain any prima facie contradiction, it may well be contradictory. By way of analogy, he may bring up the description: “the greatest prime number”, which, on the face of it, does not appear to be contradictory, so it seems to refer to the greatest prime number. But, as we know from Euclid, the assumption that there is a greatest prime number leads to contradiction, so the description cannot refer to anything.

In response, the theist first of all can point to the whole tradition of rational (as opposed to mystical) theology showing how apparent contradictions concerning God’s nature are resolved.17 Second, he can say that a contradiction, if derivable at all, could be derived from this description only with the help of other assumptions, just as in the case of the greatest prime. But, unlike the case of the greatest prime, these auxiliary assumptions probably need not be accepted as true. Finally, concerning Anselm’s argument one can also say that the premise attacked by the atheist does not even require that Anselm’s description should be free from such implied contradictions. For the premise requires only that one can think that God (under Anselm’s description) exists, which one can do even with the greatest prime, until one actually realizes the implied contradiction. So the burden of proof falls back upon the atheist, if he wishes to challenge this premise. Therefore, he has to turn to the other premise anyway, asking whether he has to admit God as at least a possible object of thought.

Here he offers three replies to the fool. The first is that theology has shown that the concept of god can be made consistent; of course, the fool will disagree. The second, that any contradiction must be derived from auxiliary assumptions; but the problem is not one of contradiction, it is of circularity and ambiguous definition. The third, the familiar insistence that all that is assumed is that one can conceive of god; ignoring premise 3.

Klima offers the fool a rhetorical exit - perhaps he has misunderstood the language involved in the argument, in the way of someone not understanding that "triangle" means "shape with three sides". What's salient here is the use of "I mean" in explaining the discrepancy between fool and saint.

There are those who think that what a word means is what the speaker intends it to mean, and nothing more. So if the fool intends "four sided shape" by "triangle", then that's an end to it, and communication simply fails.

This speaks to the poverty of this view of meaning. If the meaning of "square" is only what we each intend, then there can be no justification for supposing that you and I mean the same thing when we talk of squares. But of course there is such a justification, which can be seen in the ongoing conversations and interactions amongst us; when I order a square table, that's what you provide, not a triangular one; when someone talks of the three sides of a triangle, we question them; and so on.

Language is inherently social. The meaning of a word is not given by speakers intent alone.

Does Klima hold such a view? Read on.

I'll not reply to this directly. From past experience, including on this very thread, I do not regard Leon as an honest respondent. If any one else thinks there is anything of merit in Leon's post, let me know and I may reply.

Or PM me, as some have already.

...the argument looks ok at first glance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well... not so much. The definition (1) supposes that there is a greatest thing, which, even if we assume that "greatest" works in this way, is what is in question when we ask if there is a god. In combination with the other premises the argument is circular. That's not OK. But of course the argument has to be circular in order to be valid.

If the point is to convince the fool of the error of their thinking, then it will not do to only be "at least prima facie plausible that God can be conceived of in this manner". And frankly the attempts to keep the various traditional properties of God consistent have the look of post-hoc bandaging.

Can one ever totally eliminate the possibility of error? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Perhaps not, but here the error is set before you.

There is more to be said here yet about the theory of reference being used, which seems to me to be quite problematic. Leon asked us to go slowly, so let's do as he suggests, and plod on. We should be reasonably clear as to what Klima is claiming about reference before we go on to critique it.

Added: We might agree that one of the issues with the argument is that it treats god's being as on a par with the being of the more familiar stuff around us. I made this point previously, in pointing out that he does not carry his notion of ampliation into the argument proper.

So I am happy to play the recalcitrant fool. Anselm’s second conclusion denies the obvious, namely that God can be thought not to exist.

Contrary to the suggestion in the article, what is juxtaposed here is not theist and atheist. A reasonable theist might accept the issues give so fat and yet not be moved to reject their theism. The argument supposedly shows that all rational folk must agree that god exists; showing it to be wrong does not lead to the conclusion that god does not exist. This is not a debate "between the theist and the atheist."

If the argument is to hold, the it must not be possible for it to be in error. Accordingly it is not incumbent on the fool to show that one of the premisses must be false; but only that it might be false. So indeed, there is a clear way in which one can supose “something which cannot be thought not to exist", and understand that such a thing entails a contradiction. “something which cannot be thought not to exist" may well occupy much the same space as "a number greater than any other" or "A triangle with four sides" or even "The present king of France"; there may be no such thing.

If the argument is to hold, the theist must show that “something which cannot be thought not to exist" is not of this sort.

But notice that even if the argument turns out to be unproven, it can still serve as the sort of "intellectual prayer" mentions.

Next we might begin to look at the place of reference and language generally.

Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction. So, it shows that we should affirm the existence of God, on pain of being fools or misologes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The argument professes to prove that; but it doesn't succeed, for the reasons given.

Are you able to back up your claim?

Sure, but the rejection of particularly Christian revelation doesn't affect the ontological argument at all. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What's your point here? Neither does the price of tea in Patagonia.

That there is stuff may be a mystery, but there is no need to prefer the answer supposedly given by the ontological argument, especially since that argument is fraught with problems. — Banno

Crikey pointes out that Dutton now has two ministers responsible for reducing government waste...

Think about that. Perhaps twice as many bureaucrats reducing bureaucracy will reduce the bureaucracy twice as fast...?


Added: And whele you are there, check out Dutton has the worldview of a Queensland cop, someone once wrote. We should take that seriously

And so to section Three.

It seems, therefore, that all that Anselm’s proof requires is that modicum of rationality which is needed to understand a simple descriptive phrase, to reflect on what the description implies, and to conclude to these implications concerning the thought object one has in mind as a result of understanding the description.

So this section takes the previous argument as valid and sound. Perhaps seeing that it is not sound requires more than a modicum of rationality?

So to the second of Anselm's proofs.

If you understand the phrase “something which cannot be thought not to exist”, you have to think of something which cannot be thought not to exist. But what cannot be thought not to exist is certainly greater than anything that can be thought not to exist. So, if that than which nothing greater can be thought of were something that can be thought not to exist, then something greater than that than which nothing greater can be thought of could be thought of, which is impossible. Therefore, that than which something greater cannot be thought of cannot be thought not to exist.

The change here is in emphasis rather than form. Much the same problems can bee seen as in the first argument. There might simply not be a “something which cannot be thought not to exist”, despite our being able to think about it, just as there is no greatest number, despite our being able to think about a greatest number.

The argument also depended on the ill-conceived notion of "necessary existence". How one is to make sense of a something that supposedly exists in every possible world is contentious. In particular, in S5, if something exists necessarily, then everything exists necessarily, and the distinction between the possible and the necessary collapses. See Modal Collapse.

Yep. It's pretty hard to work with an empty domain, so we do tend to suppose that something exists. That something exists rather than nothing can be seen as somewhat puzzling, a bemusement the ontological proof plays on - what has been called "ontological shock". It tries to show the necessity of something beyond the stuff of the world. But it fails in the detail.

One can take it as given that something exists, ontological shock and all, and admit that this is a puzzle without demanding an answer.

Which gives me another chance to quote a favourite from Dave Allen:

The Pope and an atheist are having a discussion...

and it slowly gets more and more heated until eventually the Pope can't take it anymore and he says to the atheist - "You are like a man who is blindfolded, in a dark room who is looking for a black cat that isn't there."

The atheist laughs and says - "With all due respect, we sound awfully similar. You are like a man who is blindfolded, in a dark room who is looking for a black cat that isn't there but the difference is you think you've found it.

Edit: This is also a reply to . The non-theist need not maintain that the various notions of "unlimited being" are unintelligible, but can agree that it may be intelligible to some degree while maintain that it has not been demonstrated that this "unlimited being" is the same as say the Christian god, or indeed any god. That there is stuff may be a mystery, but there is no need to prefer the answer supposedly given by the ontological argument, especially since that argument is fraught with problems.

One can simply admit "I don't know". This at the least has the appeal of honesty.