Yes, I'll agree with that.

Sellars might well caution that access to or articulation of this division is mediated by our frameworks, this doesn’t necessarily entail rejecting the claim of independence itself.

Stop motion of lunar eclipse.

You and I are speaking the same language right now. It's the English language. — Arcane Sandwich

How do you know? Take the question literally - what information do you have tat hand that shows that you and I are speaking the same language?

The suggestion is that what this amounts to is our ongoing agreement as to the overall topic - that we are not here talking in German or about V8 engines is shown by our overwhelming agreement - that we are discussing philosophical issues concerning reference in a forum for that sort of thing. That is, we can be confident we are speaking the same language becasue of the holistic context.

What's the alternative?

That's not good enough. Quarks are not made of anything. — Arcane Sandwich

Quantification is not about what something is made of. That table exists because it is made of wood; and therefore something is made of wood. And that something is now the value of the variable bound by "something is...". The table is the value of a bound variable. And Pegasus is a greek myth, therefore something is a greek myth, and so Pegasus is the value of a bound variable.

Putting this in your common sense terms, when we say Pegasus does not exist, but the table does, we meant that Pegasus is not the sort of thing that is made of wood, but it is the sort of thing found in a greek myth.

Philosophers have the moral obligation to vindictive ordinary speakers when they say that tables exist and that Pegasus doesn't. — Arcane Sandwich

Sure. And they can do this by pointing to the difference between being made of wood and being a myth. That is, by quantifying over wood and mythology.

By speaking the same language. — Arcane Sandwich

And how will you be able to tell that you and your companion are indeed "speaking the same language"? Indeed, what is "speaking the same language" apart from the sort of agreement Quine is using?

Why is this such a big deal in the first place? — Arcane Sandwich

Quine's point is that we don't.. All we need to do is get on.

You have to options here: to trace a distinction between conceptual existence and real existence, or to only recognize one type of existence (real existence). — Arcane Sandwich

Or drop "existence" altogether in favour of quantification. To be is to be the value of a bound variable. Which is Quine's approach.

(DK1) There is no explanatory connection between how we believe the world to be divided up into objects the how the world actually is divided up into objects. — Daniel Z. Korman

Do you think Quine somehow posited this?

In simple terms, there is an "explanatory connection between how we believe the world to be divided up into objects the how the world actually is divided up into objects", given by holism. We use names so as to achieve the best fit to all our beliefs. We can't just divide the world up willy nilly - it has to be self- consistent.

But moreover, the presumption that there is a "way the world is divided up" that is distinct from our conventions concerning rabbits and legs looks very much like "the myth of the given".
So Quine would perhaps join you in rejecting DK1.

There's also perhaps a presumption here that either the way the world divides up is entirely independent of our language, or it is entirely and arbitrarily dependent on it. Why not a middle ground, where we divide the world up using language in accord with how things are?

I’m still stuck on how one can speak to another about anything, and uses more than one word to form a sentence, without reference to, without invocation of, without admitting, without assuming, essence. — Fire Ologist

How familiar are you with the notion of a family resemblance?

Is there an "essence", common to all and only the members of a family, that makes it what it is?

What is assumed, in "assuming essence"?

What do all games have in common, in virtue of which they are properly the referent of "game"?

What is a things essence?


(Edit: But this is not Quine's criticism of essence. That's described elsewhere. )

A proper noun such as "Neil Armstrong" successfully refers to Neil Armstrong. A Russellian definite description such as "The first person to walk on the Moon" successfully refers to Neil Armstrong. When Buzz Aldrin says to Neil Armstrong "Hey Neil, how's it going?" he is successfully referring to Neil Armstrong. — Arcane Sandwich

Again, there's a presumption that if there is a name then there has to be a something named. After all, it has a noun; and nouns name things, so there must be a thing that any name names.

It strikes me as an error to suppose that becasue there is a name there must be a thing named.

So "Neil Armstrong" succeeds in referring to Neil Armstrong, but what of "Pegasus"?

When I say "that rabbit", and I point to a rabbit, I am successfully referring to that rabbit that I am pointing at. — Arcane Sandwich

What's your criterion for "success" here? That you understand what it is you are referring to? That seems inadequate. That someone else understands what you are referring to? That how will you be confident that they understood you completely? Perhaps they think "rabbit" is the name of the creature you saw, or the word for an attached rabbit foot. How will you find out?

By continuing the conversation and checking for understanding.

And on Quine's account, you can never be quite certain that they have understood you.

The territory is not the map. — Arcane Sandwich

Harking back to General Semantics, again? It's "The map is not the territory", and reminds us that any map is incomplete. Sound advice.

The map may be an excellent example of how Quine's web of belief works. That dot - it is the Church? In order to work that out, you will need to orient the map and interpret the other dots and lines in terms of the territory. You cannot decide that the dot is the church without giving due consideration to the whole; or perhaps to the context, as put it.

So yes, that dot on the map is indeed inscrutable, until the surrounds are taken into account. Much like "gavagai".

I don't read @frank as suggesting that mass is not real. Quite the opposite.

Cheers.

It's clear that someone can show us a lead weight, but not a kilogram. Mass is not directly observable. But this is not to say that there is no such thing as mass. @frank's point seems clear enough.

I have no idea how you came to this take. — Count Timothy von Icarus

By trying to make sense of your post. For instance,

Things have essences. Our senses grasp the quiddity of things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't say that you said that essences is "what it is to understand something", rather that understanding what something is, involves understanding its essence. So ok, you think that "essences would be what is understood" but when asked what an essence is there is a gap; not properties, not definitions, but quiddity; and I have nothing left with which to understand quiddity except as "the inherent nature or essence of something". The circularity remains. As I said, not vicious, but not helpful in terms of explaining stuff.

No clue where you're getting that either. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, your posts are erudite and expansive, but perhaps not so pertinent as they might be. Passive aggressive writing as an art form? Almost making an argument, but not quite, so as to maintain plausible deniability...

I dunno. It seems we each misapprehend the other. But it pleases me that you have seen fit to bud two threads off from this one, at the least it has had you doing some reconsidering.

Cheers.

There are few atheist flat earthers.

The Earth doesn't orbit around the sun, nor the sun around the earth, but both orbit around a common centre of mass, under the influence of the other bodies in the solar system; and this will be so regardless of the frame of reference chosen.

I quite agree, indeed it seems we all agree, that relativism is inconsistent. It remains unclear who, if anyone, is being outed as a relativist.

I suppose Quine's approach to dealing with Bob would be to draw upon his web of belief to show him a few inconsistencies, and ask him which of his beliefs he would modify in order to remove those inconsistencies. The recent thread does this sort of thing.

I also agree that a belief is not well represented as a mental state. However I do think there is some use in treating beliefs as an attitude towards a proposition. Perhaps my last post above to J will explain some of this.

The comparison to "concept" is good. Neither one can be reduced to physical items. But don't we agree that there's more to existing than being physical? — J

Oh, very much so. Nothing here should be construed as suggesting that there are no such thing as beliefs. And I'd even go along with reifying them, when we use them as explanations for actions, for example, so long as we are aware that this is what we are doing.

Beliefs are curiously foundational in regard to actions. That I went to the tap to get a glass of water is explained by my belief that the tap was a suitable place to obtain water together with my desire for water. That I believe the tap a source of water is sufficient, regardless of of whether the tap works or not. While it makes sense to ask why I believe the tap a source of water, it is somehow incoherent to ask if I believe the tap to be such a source, given my actions and assertions.

I think what this shows is the directionality of beliefs of this sort. So in coming to believe that the tap is a good source of water I am changing my belief to match the way things are. But in going to the tap to fetch water I am changing the way things are (my location) to match my belief (that there is water in the tap). This I take to be bringing out the intentionality involved in beliefs as well as explaining why they are foundational in explaining actions.

I'd also ask folk to note the part played by the propositional content of the belief in explaining behaviour. Without "taps are a source of water", the belief would have no explanatory value. Those who would deny propositional content will at some stage need to contend with this problem.

The comparison with darkness is helpful, although as you say belief is not an absence.

How did we get to this from Quine? We were talking about essences, and moved to beliefs. We were discussing beliefs in part becasue of the place they have for Quine in the Web of Belief.

We moved to essences when made the suggestion that to "grasp the intelligibility of things" - gavagai, perhaps - we needed first intelligible essences... or something like that. There was an odd circularity here, in that we need essences to understand what something is, but when pressed it seems Tim thinks an essence is exactly what it is to understand what something is... we understand what something is by understanding what it is. Now circularity is not strictly invalid, but it is far from convincing. And there's the rejection of logical atoms, together with the analysis around family resemblance, amongst other things, for advocates of essence to deal with.

seems now to be ascribing some form of cognitive relativism to someone - not sure if it's Quine, or @frank, or me, or all of us. I don't see anything like that in Quine, who was strongly enamoured of science and empirical evidence, rejecting radical pluralism. Quine sought coherence and utility within a single scientific worldview. For my part I've long advocated the rejection of cognitive relativism found in Davidson's On the very idea...".

Anyway, we are each not responsible for the way others misunderstand us - and there has been plenty of that in this thread. The way to overcome this is by continuing the conversation. But even then there may be a point at which we might not be able to progress, and all we can do is laugh and walk away. Perhaps charity has limits.

The upshot of this is that it would be a mistake to expect an express some "essence of belief", and that expecting such a thing might be a philosophical foible. It doesn't matter.

Well, what exactly is a concept? You won't find one by dissecting a brain. It's the way we use the associated language, the things we do in the world, and the things we think... and so on. When we talk about a "concept" we reify and individuate all these, bringing them together and treating them as if they were bits of mental furniture. We say someone has the concept "five" when they can add to five, count five, divide by five and so on. On reflection, is the concept "five" a thing?

So is a belief a thing, or a series of interconnected activities and ways of thinking?

And now we might be approaching something interesting on this topic. But it must be past your bed time.

Good, but then what is it? — J

There's a presumption that it has to be a something. After all, it has a noun; and nouns name things, so there must be a thing that "belief" names.

What do you think of that argument? It strikes me as an error to suppose that becasue there is a name there must be a thing named.

...propensity... — J

I agree this doesn't help. And here Anscombe's response comes more in to play, in that beliefs are more than just inclinations. We might also include the neural net pattern recognition mentioned in my reply to , but also the state of the world in "Pat believes the tree is an oak"...

Lovely. But not quite right. It's rather that tools are for using than that used things are all tools. And I do Consider Quine a rather fine philosopher.

a thread in which you posted 69 times — Leontiskos

It pleases me that you have taken such a keen interest in my writing. Tell us more about me.

The answer that comes to me initially is that we recognize a unique example of a kind of pattern that we have come to associate with the concept 'tiger'. Not sure if that is an adequate answer. — Janus

Presumably the process of recognising a tiger takes place in the neural web in one's head, and recognising patterns is what neural webs do. Attaching the word "tiger" presumably involves an extra layer of that web. I understand that recognition occurs in the Medial temporal lobe while the words are found in Wernicke’s area.

"We're just going to declare that issue out of bounds, and talk about 'believing true' instead." — J

My approach to answering this is quite different to , but that should not be taken as implying that he is mistaken.

Would that I had the text, so I could see the context.

Quine appears to be invoking what he elsewhere called semantic ascent, moving from talk about objects to talk about the language used to talk about those objects. But here he is reversing the process. To put this in an example, the move described is from "Pat believes the tree is an oak" to "Pat believes-true that the tree is an oak'". "We can retreat to this without claiming that believed things are sentences" becasue now what is believed true is the state of affairs that the tree is an oak. What is believed is not the sentence, so much as the way things supposedly are. So in "Pat believes the tree is an oak" is abut the belief. But in "Pat believes that 'the tree is an oak' is true" the subject is what is true. What's believed by pat is not the sentence "the tree is an oak" but the truth that the tree is an oak.

"Therefore, one tends to conclude that the things believed are not the sentences themselves. What, then, are they?" — J

They are, speaking more roughly than one should, states of affairs or ways things are in the world.

Again, I don't think Tim's more discursive reply is mistaken, belief is indeed complex and nuanced, and the whole of a belief might not be captured by a single proposition. Yet treating beliefs as beliefs in the way things are is at least a start, and at least not wrong. As Anscombe might argue, it's an oversimplification, but Davidson might reply that it works.

But the problem is that we're now invoking an unstated something that is supposed to be identical to a statement. — J

"A believes that P" is not a restriction on what one might do, think or feel. It is a stipulations as to which of those things might be best called a belief. "A believes that P" says that a belief is had by someone, which I hope is not controversial, and also that the content of a belief can be true or false. It's by way of setting out what it is we are discussing.

I'll ask again for an example of a belief that cannot be put in this form - not because I'n certain there are none, but because an example might show us more about he nature of belief. "I believe in Trump" might be considered a counterexample, with a proper name rather than a proposition as its content. Here a dictionary is useful, setting out differing senses of "belief", The first being to accept something as true, the second being more akin to "having faith".

There's gold in those hills even if no one says so. That gold isn't identical to the statement about it. The belief need not be identical to the statement about it.

Thanks for the read. Keeping to PI§48 for the sake of continuity, Sider is making the point that we might consider a monochrome square as consisting of two rectangles, as Wittgenstein suggests, but we cannot arbitrarily consider it to consist of two circles - these would not be congruent with the picture. And this is quite right; not just any proposition will do, there is a further restriction that the proposition be true. Two rectangles would make a square, but two circles would not.

Let me know if I have miscomprehended Sider.

And I think this fundamentally correct. Not just any proposition will do; it's the true ones that are to be preferred if our task is to set out how things are. And here Davidson is again of use. If we have two communities, one of which talks of squares, and the other of rectangles which are sometimes paired, then we might construct a translation from one language into the other, such that statements about squares in the first can be translated as statements about paired rectangles in the other. Using such a translation we might reach some agreement as to what is the case with the item at §48. Here the Principle of Charity comes in to play, since the translation is based on treating the beliefs of both communities as essentially the same, just expressed somewhat differently.

What's salient here is that charity does not rely on a notion of objectivity, apart from shared belief.

So in answer to Sider's question "what else beyond my use of words must the interpreter consult?" the answer provided by Davidson is, the interpreter's beliefs together with the assumption that those he is translating have the same beliefs.

This avoids Lewis's use of the "the facts of naturalness". But I don't think it disagrees with Sider's view that the world is structured.

I'll have to come back to this paper when I have some time. I would like to get a handle on the more formal aspects of Sider's account.

This discussion is in many ways very similar to an ongoing discussion between @Joshs and I, but with Joshs in my lace and myself in yours. It sometimes seems to me that Joshs allows the mooted divisions in the world to be too arbitrary, as you seem to think I am proposing.

Thanks again for taking this discussion seriously and engaging with it fully.

So if McDowell has a good argument, set it out for us. What is it that you understand from the lecture?

Anscombe's discussion of intentionality is excellent, both agreeing and disagreeing with Davidson in details. Now while Anscombe did think the reasons for our actions could not always be reduced to a causal relation between beliefs or desires and intentions, and would likely say the "x believes that P" oversimplifies the issue, would she reject it outright? Well, I'd have to be convinced.

Anscombe differed from Davidson, and here I am agreeing more with Davidson. But it is not a simple issue, and without the details (the transcript is shite)...?

You are welcome to set out what you think McDowell is saying that Anscombe says.

Does the pro-Israel vote outweigh the pro-palestine vote? More Australians are in favour than in opposition of recognising Palestine as an independent state, apparently.

B ut both are overwhelmed by those who are "not sure" - or perhaps couldn't give a fuck.

I don't think it will be a big issue, do you?

Can they surface non-linguistically? — J

Of course they can. That's one of the things they do - explaining our actions. An example from my Bio

If an agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water. — Banno

But if some posited "belief" cannot be put into the form "x believes that P", then I think that is good grounds for discounting it as a belief. That goes for background and unconscious beliefs, too. Unstated is not unstatable.

Small 'd' will do.

I pointed exactly to the limb - the issue of indexicals. I had in mind Kaplan's Demonstratives.

Cheers, Leon.

It was a proposal for addressing reference, rather than universals. Nor was it offered as a complete solution. Though it could also work for universals, for what they are worth. "That counts as a tree for the purposes of horticulture" at least moves the issue on to indexicals.

Connecting propositions to the world is one of the things we do with words, when we use them to talk about stuff. I don't see that as especially problematic.

Telling, it seems to me, that the problem of universals does not have an entry in the SEP - except for the historical article. Blame Austin, especially Are There A Priori Concepts?

I liked that equated statements and beliefs. We'll make a Davidsonian out of them yet.

Righto.

Now you're getting it. One pertinent thing about a tool is that it is used to do something. We do things with words. Watching what philosophers do with words can be quite enlightening. That's all.

Linguini on tap. Yep.

It isn't? Ok, then that's about your use of the word "tool", such that you do not use it to talk about words... :wink: there's that semantic ascent again.

You use tools, and you use words. It's a metaphor, maybe, pointing out that philosophers perhaps should take a bit of care with their language. Or will any words do? Dog up the pillow and oligarchic trench, then.

...whether there are grounds for a given stipulation that are justified by the world itself, as opposed to what we want to do with the terms we stipulate. — J

And then...

we don't have a use for it. — J

But...

the person who believes this... is making a mistake. — J

Well, yes, interesting. So what is the mistake here? Not grasping the essence, if grasping the essence is just using the word; not intending, since one can as much intend tiger-and-thumb as tiger.

Maybe have another look at the rejection of atomism in PI, around §48. How far can the argument there be taken?

The premiss of this thread - that for Quine, scepticism is "the first principle of philosophy", is both unsupported and incorrect.

A better instance might be Descartes.

...trying to cram the idea into the frame of philosophy of language as first philosophy... leads to continually conflating and collapsing the sign vehicle by which something is known, the interpretant (i.e. the knowing), and the referent (what is known). — Count Timothy von Icarus

:blush: You say that like it was a bad thing...

But this is a mischaracterisation. There is a problem with utterances such as <Paris is a city in France> and <"Paris" is a city in France> - a "conflating and collapsing the sign vehicle by which something is known, the interpretant, and the referent" (few!). That's not a general characteristic of linguistic approaches to philosophy - indeed, quite the opposite.

Since philosophy is done almost exclusively by making use of language, words are the tools of philosophers. Shouldn't the philosopher, like all honest tradesmen, have a care for his tools?

At some point the web has got to include statements -- beliefs -- about how propositions connect with that world. — J

I quite agree! But what will these be like?

One solution is that they will involve some sort of stipulation; that this counts as an "a".

That's the point of ' example, chess. Yes, a meaning may be stipulated, perhaps explicitly, sometimes more by acceptance or convention.

And yes, language games - things we do with words - do involve the stuff that makes up the world around us. That much of what we do is linguistic just does not imply that it is not embedded in the world - although @Count Timothy von Icarus seems to think otherwise.

There's no denying that the two learnings -- of tigers, and of "tiger" -- can go hand in hand. I'm just holding out for there being a difference. — J

Sure. Not in contention, for me.

Last example of equivocation: "to exist is just existential quantification." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Another ambiguously attributed post - did I say that? I do make use of Quine's joke, "To be is to be the value of a bound variable". It's another useful example of semantic ascent, were ontological issues can be understood in an informative way by treating them as issues of semantics. Do you need an explanation as to how it works?

This strikes me as an odd framing of "naturalism," as if naturalism is defined by a commitment to the linguistic turn. — Count Timothy von Icarus

An odd interpretation of what I said:

(Quine) rejected Aristotelian metaphysics. In general, he rejected the idea that objects have an intrinsic nature, independent of our web of belief. This follows pretty readily from naturalism, with our understanding of the world embedded in science and language. What we might think of as intrinsic to the stuff around us is dependent on the other beliefs we bring with us, and not to some presumed but cryptic intrinsic nature. — Banno

Quine accepted naturalism, but is not much considered not part of the "linguistic turn" - although Semantic Ascent is included in Rorty's book. Semantic ascent is the move from talk about things to talk about the language of those things. The aim is to attempt to reframe metaphysical issues as linguistic issues, at least to achieve some confidence in the language we are using, and potentially to dissipate some metaphysical issues entirely. The Gavagai fable is an example, where the ontology of rabbits and rabbit parts is considered by examining the referent of "gavagai".

Nothing in that implies what you suggest.

It's a simple courtesy to use the quote and mention functions in order to let someone know you have been discussing their ideas. You've missed doing so a few times. I'm sure you would not want people to think you were avoiding my replying to your comments on my suggestions.

Do you think I hold that view, Tim?

Edit: Or that such a view is implied by linguistic philosophy generally?