Ok.

I've very much appreciated the discussion. — wonderer1

Yeah, it's attracted some fine, intelligent comment, and gone in a few unexpected directions. Most pleasing.

Meh. Keeping to one book or article has proved to be a good way to manage a thread. I've done a few of them. The topic has induced more interest than I thought it would, so maybe it would be worth looking at a few of the Philosophical Papers later.

And if you find the topic repetitive, go do something else. You don't have to be here.

But equally, I'm not obligated to reply to your posts.

That's pretty general. I don't see anything specific enough there to warrant a detailed reply, and in any case, my purpose and interest here is specific, the one book by Austin.

Look, if you need to have a go at Austin, there is already plenty of material out there you can use.
If you want to understand where things went after Austin, read up on Peter Strawson and Paul Grice. Strawson and Austin clashed over the analysis of truth, while Grice inserted a very fine blade between use and meaning, forcing the two apart again. The result was a turn away from natural language in favour of formal languages, especially the work of Kripke and Davidson.

This would be very interesting material for follow up on, perhaps in another thread, or after the material that is at hand here.

It would not occur to anyone to conclude that a man is asleep from his saying "I am asleep' any more than to conclude that he is unconscious from his saying 'I am unconscious', or to conclude that he is dead from his saying 'I am dead'." — Richard B

:grin: Good stuff. Very droll! Hope others are enjoying these jokes.

"If a philosopher uses the phrase 'mental phenomenon', say, in such a way that dreams are mental phenomena by definition, then obviously no argument is going to prove to him that they are not. — Richard B

See 's comments regarding representation and mental imagery. There's a lot of variety int he way these ideas are used in philosophical discussion. I'm not at all surprised to find some disparity even amongst those that share basic philosophical methods.

Add that to recent studies showing that folk have very different styles of cognition - not just aphantasia, but a much larger variation, to the extent that it has been suggested that no two minds need quite be the same in how much of their cognition is visual, how much linguistic, and exactly what these both mean.

After all, why should we think that what goes on in everyone's minds is much the same? Why shouldn;t folk give vastly different accounts of their own cogitations?

And hence why should we expect any agreement on "mental Phenomena"?

But what linguistic philosophers, or adept psychologists, might be able to do here is to outline some sort of common ground or some general features, perhaps a "grammar" on which there is more agreement than disagreement.

I'm dubious that any such grammar might include stuff that could clearly be called "qualitative".

This is all very speculative, mere hand waving. The point is to indicate that we might not have good reason to expect much agreement here. Why should we expect there to be one universal account of consciousness, dreaming, cogitation and such?

See The last great mystery of the mind: meet the people who have unusual – or non-existent – inner voices

and Most of us have an inner voice, but if you're part of the minority who doesn't, this could be why

and mostly Cognition: do we all think in the same way?

I'm sorry, , but what are you referring to with "contemporary criticisms and analyses on the points laid out in his works"? There's lots of critique out there. What do you have in mind?

My reason for not accepting it is that perception (seeing, hearing, etc.) is always perception of something - hence the tendency to think about subject and object. That's how we get led astray. In the case of imagining something, there is no object - I mean that unicorns don't exist and that it is misleading to suppose that when we imagine unicorns we necessarily see something unicorn-like. — Ludwig V

I think that's about right.

Your infinite regress suggests that I cannot acquire any capacity, and I don't believe that. — Ludwig V

Yep. Another case of making the box then trying to squeeze stuff in.

Lecture VII is not a theory about what the word “real” means. — Antony Nickles

Oh, yes. Those who suggest these are just linguistic quibbles haven't understood that how we talk about the world is how we understand the world.

His arguments have been largely ignored — Richard B

Check out these Ngrams, just out of interest.

https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=J.+L.+Austin%2C+Norman+Malcolm&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3

I find the ideas intriguing, although as I said I am only familiar with them by proxy. However it seems to me that there is a difficulty in Malcolm's notion of consciousness, or rather unconsciousness. As I understand, he envisions consciousness as either on or off. That's not my experience, nor what I understand from others.

also, i think Austin's point stands, in the face of what Malcolm has to say. That is, that we do differentiate between the various forms of dreaming and waking indicates that we have a fairly clear understanding that there is a difference. That's not the whole of an argument against Descartes, but it is a good start.

Thanks for your posts.

I like the way you put that. I’m sold. — NOS4A2

Why, thanks. It is odd that the point needs to be made, really. How many threads start by defining the terms to be used instead of examining them?

But it's so much easier to start with a definition. You don't have to think, or read.

:rofl:

Ok.

It's again a methodological point. One of the departures for Ordinary Language Philosophy from other forms of analytic philosophy is that it does not start with an attempt to achieve certainty. Ayer shares an analytic background with Austin, coming from a (mis)reading of works such as Wittgenstein's Tractatus. He thinks he can fill out a theory of perceptions in such a way as to provide a firm basis for scientific knowledge, while at the same time showing the poverty of other supposed ways of knowing. In the process of firming up such a theory he leads himself, and a great many others, astray. As Austin points out, pp 59-61, there is historical precedent. Perception will not bear the epistemological weight philosophers put on its shoulders. it needs help.

An observation, not an argument.

Get in line.

One says "Why should we believe?"; the other "Why should we doubt?". Both are useful. Dropping either one altogether leads to irrationality.

My favourite graffiti:

Sad, that folk are taken in by that line of thought. Sick, really, that they accept such twaddle because it fits in with the need to assuage fear and resentment by arming themselves. It's an insidious predicament, deriving from the American Dream. Elsewhere, folk have learned the advantage of looking after each other.

Would it not be just the same question in different wording? — Corvus

No.

How many contexts would be necessary to appease someone like Austin? — NOS4A2

Well, pretty much all of them. It's not too hard, with the aid of a tool such as the OED, to pick out the main instances. Even easier now, with online tools. Austin occasionally envisioned a team of scholars doing such research for each philosophically dubious term. But the main methodological point is the order of proceedings: look at how the word is used before deciding what it means.

It's in line with Wittgenstein, of course:

To repeat: don’t think, but look! — PI, §66

How can one be sure (one) is not fooled? or deluded? — Corvus

Why is that the question?

Why not "What grounds do you have for doubt?"

If you like. It was your interlocutor rather than you whom I had in mind. Sure, dismiss this as a mere bookish quibble.

It doesn't matter. — Ciceronianus

I interpret the QM claim that nothing is real as meaning something like 'nothing is really as it seems'. Not saying I agree with this as such. but it might be said that in the context, and from the point of view of what QM tells us about the microphysical constitution of ordinary objects, what they are is not what they appear to be. — Janus

Ok, so what do you think Austin might have to say here?

Well, for a start, the word "real" in "nothing is really as it seems" should bring on some hesitancy. What's it doing there? We might take it out, and see what happens. Consider "nothing is as it seems". Well, that doesn't seem right. It seems I am writing this, and you are now reading it, to the extent that one could not make sense of "It seems I am not writing this, and you are not reading it".

Also, there isn't anything special about QM in this regard. Pop physics has long told us that the ground beneath your feet is mostly space - "Not really solid, as it seems". But of course the ground is both solid and mostly space, and a good deal of decent physics and chemistry has gone in to showing how these can both be true.

It seems to me (Banno, not Austin) that "QM claims nothing is really as it seems" is a rhetorical attempt to give preeminence to one sort of view over others. But while QM is fine for physics class and designing computers, it's not much use in arranging flowers or deciding what to have for dinner.

So it seems to be an example of the sort of thing Austin was addressing, where the intricacies of the world are overly simplified.

I'm pretty confident that in places where there are no firearms, there are no deaths by firearm.

The point is whether seeing an object in your mind, not in the external world should be included in perception. — Corvus

Why should it?

There is a very clear distinction to be made between imagining a cup and pouring tea into it. And a long historical agreement that perception concerns the sense, and the objects in the world around us, and so is best contrasted, rather than confused, with imagination.

But even if you are inclined to hesitate at that distinction, it would be best to keep clear as to the difference between what is imagined and what isn't, lest one spill the tea.

VIII
Austin returns to Ayer's text armed with the contents of the previous lecture. Ayer has attempted to explain perception, making a distinction between those that are "qualitatively delusional" and "existentially delusional". Austin's objection is that this gives the impression of their being only two cases to consider. He gives examples that break this proposed dichotomy. Ayer missed those cases where something is taken to be something that it isn't, entirely missing what is perhaps the most common delusion.

Austin goes on to criticise the notion that there are preferred conditions for observations in which we can see the "real" qualities of some object. Again, by way of a series of examples he shows that it is not possible to make this approach coherent.

The key problem according to Austin is trying to give one account where there are multiple, quite different cases. The result is a gross oversimplification that cannot capture or explain what is going on without gross misrepresentation.

Amusingly, on reading the posts in this very thread concerning actors and actions, one can see the very same problem being repeated.

I should like to emphasize, however, how fatal it always is to embark on explaining the use of a word without seriously considering more than a tiny fraction of the contexts in which it is actually used. — p.83

The philosopher's pride here allows him to supose that he can first make the box and then squeeze the examples in. It's surprising how often it is those who advocate some form of empiricism who, for whatever reason, drop their love of observation so readily when they turn to their use of words, instead joining with Humpty Dumpty. It's a worthy quip.

VII
In addition to what has said, I'd like to emphasises the method that Austin explicates on p. 63.

Words already have uses. Elsewhere Austin says

First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method.) — (Austin, J. L. “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1957: 181–182

There's an evolutionary point here, that the natural language we use is the result of adaptation over a very long period of time, with the result that it is particularly well suited to doing the sorts of things we do with words.

Notice also that Austin is explicitly not saying that we ought only use words as they are used in everyday contexts (a common criticism from those who have not read Austin). By all means, adapt and invent for new contexts, but do this with care, and with an eye to the existing distinctions and nuance.

Austin also makes the point that changes in the way words are used in one area may have unexpected repercussions in another. Hence it is best to consider widely the context in which they are embedded.

Oh, and for subsequent use, it is worth noting the last point in the lecture, that it is worth making a distinction only if there is a way of telling the difference between what has been distinguished.

The wish for that is a fear of any chance of error, instead of seeing that our practices are rational and any errors have means of resolution, even when that is only rational disagreement (in the moral or political realm). Our fears and desires are isolating us as the only way to maintain something certain (by pulling back from the world); but we don’t need everything to meet the criteria of certainty. — Antony Nickles

So in outline, Ayer was looking for certainty, and in the process misused and muddled the terms and concepts he was working with. Austin's approach, along with others involved in the "linguistic turn", is to look for clarity over certainty.

The arguments in Lecture VII contrast these difference in approaches.

Comprehensive. Well done.

This is an argument I have made use of many times. I have several times used this quote from Austin's Other minds:

The wile of the metaphysician consists in asking 'Is it a real table?' (a kind of object which has no obvious way of being phoney) and not specifying or limiting what may be wrong with it, so that one feels at a loss as to 'how to prove' it is a real table. It is the use of the word 'real' in this manner that leads us on to the supposition that 'real' has a single meaning ('the real world' 'material objects'), and that, a highly profound and puzzling one. Instead, we should insist always on specifying with what 'real' is being contrasted - not what I shall have to show it is, in order to show it is 'real': and then usually we shall find some specific, less fatal, word, appropriate to the particular case, to substitute for 'real' — Austin

An example of it's use, in a conversation with @T Clark

Let's look at "Does quantum physics say nothing is real?". Austin's strategy is to ask about the use of the word "real" here, looking for an alternative phrasing that sets out what is being said - as explained previously.

To understand what "real" is doing here we ask what it is to be contrasted with, and what other term might replace "not real". Use pattern is "it's not a real X, its a Y"...
— Banno

So we parse "Quantum physics say nothing is real" as something like "According to quantum physics, it's not a real thing, it's a..."; and ask what we are to put here - fake, forgery, illusion...

We know what to put in the cases cited previously, but it is far from clear what we might put here. What this might show is that the words "real" and "unreal" have here become unmoored. They are here outside of a usable context.

What is offered by Austin is not a definition, but a method to test proposed uses. What we have is an antidote to the philosopher's tendency to push words beyond their applicability.

Perhaps seeing this requires a particular conception of philosophical problems as knots in our understanding, to be untied, explained, or showing how to leave the flytrap. but the fly has to want to leave....

There may perhaps be a sense not covered by this, a sense that is "absolute" in some way; but Austins method sets the challenge of setting out clearly what such a sense would be. — Banno

And here again, from three years ago:

It's a bit of a classic misuse by philosophers, a textbook case for Austin.

Is it a real painting, or a reproduction? Is it a real coin, or a counterfeit? Is it a real lake, or a mirage? Is it real magic, or prestidigitation?

What is real is set by the item being discussed.

But philosophers will wander up the garden path by asking if it is real per se. — Banno

Sure. Some might suppose that the conceptual work of the philosopher must give way to the empirical evidence of the scientist but that would be to forget the theoretical background on which such evidence rests.

But still, something is going on in sleeping bodies. Why not say they are dreaming?

VI

This is a bridging lecture. Up until now Austin has been addressing the argument from illusion. After this lecture Austin moves on to discussing "real" and realism. This is the bit in between, consisting of a bit of summation and a bit of anticipation.

It's I think no more scathing than the previous chapters, in which Ayer's argument is subject to a close vivisection. Austin invokes, again, Ayer's framing of the issue, the presumption that we must either perceive material objects or we perceive sense data, puzzling over Ayer's motivation, and concluding that Ayer began with the view that we only ever see "sense data", the "sensible manifold". On this account the argument from illusion is secondary, a post-hoc justification.

That's all.

I tire of beating my head against the wall and talking to myself. — Antony Nickles

That's the natural state of those with our inclinations.

I've comments to make about VI, but have been doing other things. Apropos of that, what you say here about prejudicial engagement is one of Austin's critiques of Ayer in VI.

Anyway, happy for others to move on, if you want to do VII. Small steps, and my notes are mainly for me.

The core of the argument is that to be asleep is to be unconscious, but to experience something is to be conscious, so the common sense of dreaming is self-contradictory. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree that this is his account - forgive my previous poor phrasing.

The only facts of the matter... — Ludwig V

There is, as you point out, also REM and other evidence that show a great deal of activity during sleep. It looks as if something is happening. That seems to be why Malcolm's ideas are discounted.

Consciousness is ubiquitously taken as granted, much too little attention being paid to what we mean in using the term. Malcolm's contribution here is to be applauded.

That is, the idea of direct, immediate experience doesn't do what (Ayer) thinks it does. — Ludwig V

Yes, Ayer wants to use it as a basis for certainty on questions empirical, and it simply will not bear that weight.

Thanks for bringing in some more background on Ayer. I've misplaced my copy of Metaphysical Animals, but recall a discussion in there about how Ayer was popular amongst the young men of the mid thirties, who were fond of saying to the dons that they "didn't understand" them - a product of Language, Truth, and Logic. The pendulum, set in motion by Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, had swung too far with the Vienna Circle and its consequences. The forties brought a deep re-thinking of the way philosophy was being done, that superficially looked like an overemphasis on language.

That's very good - bringing in a deeper discussion of the nature of dreaming.

I have not read Malcolm's book, but have heard of it. From what I understand his emphasis was on the observation that our discussions of dreaming are post-hoc; they take place after the fact, while we are awake; and that this led him to supose that dreams are not experiences at all. If that is the case he can hardly be cited as arguing that there is no qualitative difference between dreaming and lucidity. If anything it seems he doubles down on Austin's approach.

we know how to use the words 'I am awake' but not the words 'I am dreaming'. — Richard B

But "I am dreaming" has a use for those who have lucid dreams. The central critique aimed at Malcolm's account is, as I understand it, that he insists that dreams occur (at least in their quintessential form) when one is soundly asleep, a definition not accepted by others, especially dream researchers.

What is most interesting here might be the potential for a distinction between Malcolm, a student of Wittgenstein, and Austin, that might shed light on their relative differences. Good topic.

It now seems to me that you have not understood what Austin is doing. I suggest a re-read.

I wonder how much the incapacity to deal with an extended and detailed sequence of arguments is a result of learning philosophy from YouTube.

It is a fantasy-world question — Antony Nickles

Yep.

The point concerning direct and indirect has been made by others, myself included. Some ground is infertile. Ideas will not grow there.

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” — Antony Nickles

Yes, there may have been too much presumption on our part that folk had an idea of what Logical Positivism entailed. Ideas of sense data and maybe also of emotivism are perhaps engrained in the thinking of our engineers, without their realising whence they came. But in addition there seems to be a dislike of critique generally. I don't find Austin's style sarcastic so much as droll.

Anyway, nice to see a bit of discussion being kicked up by the thread. It's already much longer than I expected it to be.

The objects of logic to be compared are presumed to maintain their identity (endure) throughout the comparisons. — Joshs

Ok.

That's a mess. Doubt that it would be worth trying to sort it out.

Thanks.

Formal logic also depends on it. — Joshs

Formal logic depends on duration?

How?

Not a bump, swear. — Antony Nickles

So pushy. :wink:

I'll get to it, soon.

There's too much going on in all that for a brief treatment. But perhaps we ought be suspicious of distinctions that are seen only by philosophers.

I was understanding that Austin dismisses the distinction between direct and indirect perception as not meaningful,because he thinks perceptions are direct, although some perceptions are indirect such as when using binoculars or telescopes in visual perception.  I might have misunderstood the point. If so, please correct me, and confirm what is the case. — Corvus

I don't think the bit I bolded is right. Indeed, Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case. And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.

Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data.