As someone that has a very analytical mind and who is usually able to clearly think through things on my own without prayer this is a question that I struggle with. Most of the time it comes down to the success rate of prayer in my own life for helping me work through my problems and the beliefs about God that I have come to hold through my own reasoning. I also don’t doubt the spiritual and psychological positives of meditation. I think that can be great too. I just have seen the best results in my own personal growth through contemplative prayer. It’s something that at times can be hard to describe to others who haven’t experienced it the same way.

@DingoJones I mean I guess that is one way to think about it; I think it's a little more of an action though. I think the value in it is very similar to something you could get in counseling. Oftentimes we push down the things that are troubling us deep down and even when we think about them we don't really have to address them, but similar to how talking through those thoughts with a counselor can provide some clarity, I think that active prayer to God can provide an even greater and more powerful form of clarity in the form of spiritual wisdom.

@DingoJones My conception of prayer does not necessitate that God "respond" in the way that you describe. I definitely feel that in my life personally prayer has been a way that I have been able to find clarity about certain decisions but as I don't know your religious background I can't assume that that kind of thinking would hold much value for you. I think the assumption that God responds to all prayers in some tangible way is another misconception about prayer and another way that prayer is misconstrued in a selfish way. As I stated before, prayer is not for the person but should be a way to worship God, in this sense that you are acknowledging his power and that he has control over the situations you are in. I think that is highlighted by the examples from the life of Jesus that I mentioned earlier.

@Terrapin Station Please correct me if I misinterpret or misunderstand the solution you pose to the third man argument but I take what you said to be a response very similar to Constance Meinwald's response to the TMA in that there are two predications of what it means for something to be Good.

A thing can be good because it partakes in the characteristics of the good and something can be good because it is the nature of goodness. An thing that might be used to support your claim would be the two these two statements: man is a Man and Socrates is a Man. Man with a capitol M in this example is essentially the Form of a Man. In this example, man would be part of the nature of Man and Socrates would be something that partakes in the characteristics of what it means to be part of Man. Therefore asserting that man and Socrates could be in the same group would be ludicrous because the element of Man that pertain to each of them is so different. This would appear to solve the TMA.

The problem I find with this response is that the the self predication that Plato asserts the forms have isn't a limited kind of predication like the one listed above. According to Plato F is F and the reasoning you seem to have asserted says that F is F's nature. This is far different than F is F. If we are to truly say that F is F then that must mean that we are saying that the Form of the Good is the same as itself in every way possible, therefore it must share the characteristics of the things that partake in the Form of the Good. This would allow for the lumping together that the third man argument shows would be a problem for the Forms.

@Pfhorrest Plantinga's response involves no maybe's. He very directly states what the solution to the problem would be. He asserts that there are things that an omnipotent God cannot do, such as force people to freely do something. That would mean that people have the option to choose evil. The probability of every single person ever picking the right thing to do in every circumstance is so low that it makes sense that in our free will, we as humans would have chosen to do things that are evil. He also addresses the objections that you raised about why free will would require evils and why a world without free will would be worse so instead of sarcastically posing the questions, I recommend you actually read what he has to say instead of assuming he hadn't answered those questions. He is a far better philosopher than either you or I, so calling him dumb (which is essentially what you've tried to do here) not only does nothing productive for people reading this forum but also makes you look rather silly. Instead of asking why he asserts what he does about evil and free will (which, as I stated, he has already answered), why don't you assert some substantial objections to his claims instead of just saying "no, it's really not" as that is about as unphilosophical a comment I've read on this forum. Also your summary of his points ii and iii is incorrect it's not that "possibly, it is not possible for there to be a world where evil is not possible" but rather he asserts that it is not possible for there to be a world where evil is not possible and humans have free will which is a distinctly different claim. He also doesn't assert that the world would have more evil in it if we didn't have free will but rather that the ability to choose to do right is of greater value than being forced to do it. I think we can agree that if someone did what was good or virtuous because they were forced to, it would be less good then someone who did it on there own accord. For instance taxes are money that the government forcibly takes from us in order to pay for things that the citizens need, for instance paying for some healthcare. Paying those taxes is noticeably less good then giving to a charity that does the same thing.

I would agree with the original argument however I would not add on the 8th line as @DingoJones did. I don't know if you are a Christian or not dingo but regardless, I think it's important to look at the way that Jesus prayed if we are to understand the value of prayer or the answer to this question. In the two most famous instances of recorded prayer from Jesus we have the Lord's Prayer and his prayers on the Mount of Olives before his crucifixion. In both cases we see one similarity. In the first he says, "Your kingdom come, your will be done on earth as it is in heaven," clearly saying that what we should truly want is only what God wills. In the second case, he ends his pleading to God for his life to be spared by saying, "but not as I will, but as you will," clearly pointing to the knowledge that what he wants is not important in changing God's plans, and that God’s plan is what is truly good. Prayer was not intended for God to give us what we want but as a way to converse with God. This is something that is often misconstrued by the church I believe. But this is also why I agree with how this argument is constructed. Premise 6 clearly states that the only time we are guaranteed to receive anything from God is when we ask for something that directly aligns with his will. In all other cases we should not expect to have our prayers answered with a yes. Stating the 8th premise is essentially asserting that the only reason to pray is if we are going to get the things we want out of it, otherwise it isn't worth our time. That is the most one sided and selfish version of prayer I've heard of. The point of prayer has nothing to do with human wants but is rather supposed to be a form of worship and a way to realign people with what God wants for them (through his perfect will). It's a way to ask God what he wants and try to carry that out instead of asking him to do a bunch of favors for us.

@Terrapin Station Ah I understand. The third man argument is not particularly relevant for this premise. The problem that the third man argument brings forth (as I'm sure you are aware) is that something else would be needed to define what was good about the form of the good and then another thing would be needed to define what was good about what was good about the form of the good and so on into eternity. The only way to escape this problem is to find a way to end the infinite series and my point in this argument is that the form of the good being the essence of God would solve this, since God is the GCB and therefore nothing can even be conceived to define the goodness of God. Something would need to be greater than God in order to define why he is good but since he is the GCB that is not possible.

I also want to acknowledge that my wordage for this premise was kind of trash. The point I was trying to get across is that in order for something to be the form of the good it must be able to define what the perfect version of each thing would be and what characteristics are ascribed to that thing being good. So if we grant that something is able to do this and define what best version of everything is, then that thing must have a complete understanding of all the elements that make that thing what it is. So the form of the good would need to understand every part of human psyche, behavior, physique, etc. (as those are some of the characteristics that are of importance when discussing the goodness of humans), while also having that same sort understanding for all things in existence. Otherwise how could this thing possibly be able to define the goodness of everything, or anything for that matter.

My claim is that God's form would be the form of the good that Plato describes, yes.

@Terrapin Station Are you confused why I'm talking about the third man argument or how I explained it? Could you clarify what you are stumped on.

@tim wood So are you trying to say that you think talk of the forms is not important or necessary at this point because of the progression of time and the fact that we live in a different time where we don’t need universals to keep track of the ideas anymore? My point is not about whether the forms exist or if we even need them. My claim is about whether or not it’s even possible for Plato’s theory of the forms to be true without a God. So if you don’t believe in the forms that’s totally fine. That’s independent of my point. I don’t even know if I side with Plato on this issue I just wanted to explore the connection it could have with God. Thanks for the dialogue.

@Zelebg even if being tied is just as good as being solo first, my other objections still stand.

@Zelebg The idea of the greatest conceivable being does make it mandatory that there only be one such being. I think if you can picture many greatest things being equal then those things are not in fact the greatest but rather tied for the best and it would therefore be better if only one of those things achieved that level of greatness. Being tied for first is not as good as being first on your own. You could also conceive of one of those beings breaking the tie which would then make that one being better. And your answer of these tiny greatest conceivable beings (TGCB) forming a meta-being would support my claim because that meta being would be greater than the TGCB since it would be a being composed of greatest conceivable beings. And despite what the world tries to tell us, the internet is not greater than a mind as it was created by minds and therefore it can't be greater than the ones that conceived it. This gives further support for my claim that the only thing that will be able to understand the inner workings of all things will be a mind. If what I'm saying as a mind doesn't make sense to you, maybe you can check your meta-internet for a better answer.

@tim wood Thank you for your response. I appreciate the feedback. If you want to say that the good neither has to be perfect or part of the GCB, I think I agree with you 100%, but I believe the philosophy that you are ascribing to there is far more Aristotelian than Platonic. Plato seems to assert that the Form of the Good is very much so defined and set whereas Aristotle seems to be saying that the form of the good is in the same grouping as anything else on earth. Rather than being above all things and defining what it means for those things to be good, the good is something that is in the process of being defined just like all other things. I don't know if I articulated that very well, but the point I'm trying to make is that I believe I would add a secondary argument to make the first more clear: That if a God doesn't exist then we should ascribe to the Aristotelian alternative to the forms. Would this satisfy your objection?

I am acting under a moral theory that, more than believing it should be universal, I believe it is universal for the example that I gave. And as I mentioned throughout both my first two posts, I don’t believe all morality is universal but specifically for the example that I worked with in the post that is what I will subscribe to. Again i acknowledge the value of these definitions but I believe context would’ve given you the answer that I just provided and I would love to hear your thoughts on my argument itself (if you have any objections, if you tends to agree, etc.)

I don’t think anyone here is in the process of writing their dissertation on this topic and if they were they wouldn’t be coming here to banter. I think the point of this page is to informally bounce ideas off of each other and while I 100% agree that in formal philosophy (if I was writing an article or finishing a paper for a masters program etc) I would definitely make sure that every word was carefully defined and understood but since we are not doing any of those things here and because these are the between lunch and dinner kind of comments that you expressed disdain for earlier, I feel like it is reasonable to just give each other the benefit of the doubt and deduce meaning through context unless there is clearly equivocation going on. If that’s not your style no problem but this just may not be the place for you.

Sorry for not making myself more clear.

For objectively, I used the definition given by Bartricks in his original argument.

For immoral, I mean the opposite of moral and I feel like it would be insulting your intelligence to define what that is. If you do actually want me to define it check the first entry in Webster’s.

For inherent, I mean something that is characteristic of a thing from the moment it comes into existence or a characteristic that is part of its core being, so just as one might say that God (if you were to believe in one, I don’t know your religious beliefs) is inherently omnipotent, I am thus saying that human life is inherently good.

Good, as I briefly mentioned in the post you quoted and more directly in the following one, I define as something that is an attribute of the Form of the Good. You seem to have a deeper knowledge of Plato then I do and I don’t claim to have a ton of experience with platonic writings so I feel as though you can understand what I mean by that probably better than I can put it into words but I feel like I was pretty explicit about what I meant on that topic in my second post.

And as for value, I would define it just as Webster does I believe, as the worth or importance of a particular thing.

I don’t think any of those definitions end up changing the validity of my argument but I would be happy to address any objections you have to the argument itself.

I totally hear what you are saying and I think we do agree to some extent. I think where we differ is in this; if I understand you correctly you are asserting that in order to be a moral value it has to be valued by someone (a subject) or conversely that if something isn't valued by someone then it can't be a moral value (at the very least in that specific instance). My argument is that even in spite of someone not valuing something, that thing can still have moral value because of the effect that it has on an intrinsic good (such as human life).

For instance, Peter Singer believes that killing infants and individuals with mental disabilities is morally acceptable because they don't possess a certain level of intelligence. I am saying that regardless of his subjective views on the matter, morally speaking, life still has value and the killing of an mentally disabled adult or infant would be objectively morally wrong, since in this instance it is outside of the subjective moral view of Singer. The preservation of life has intrinsic moral value outside of what any subject thinks about it ever.

Even if you don't care for that particular example, it seems to me that if you are to claim that things can only be of value if they are valued by a subject, then you are denying the value of things like the virtues or a platonic sense of the Good like I mentioned earlier. This concept revolves around the idea that there is a perfect good and that as humans we should be striving towards it and if we were ever to find it in its fullness, that we would be compelled to act in alignment with it. It is made up of many elements and I am of the opinion that we will never be able to fully grasp the entirety of the Good but just the fact that it exists presupposes that there are things that are morally good without a subject necessarily valuing them at that moment.

I fear my statements may have become a little incoherent but the point is that I do as a subject believe that murder is immoral but I also assert that there is such a thing as the Good and since we agree that life has intrinsic value, it seems to me that preserving it would be part of the Good. This would be an example of something objective creating moral value, since the Good is not a subject.

As a side note my Platonic philosophy is a little sloppy sometimes so if you object to something in that particular section of this response, I would love to hear your thoughts.

@Bartricks
My objection to your initial statement would be to premise two. In that premise you state that only a subject can value something. I believe someone attempted to make a similar objection earlier in this thread but just tried to say you were wrong, without actually addressing a premise, so hopefully this will be more direct. I would say that, things can have inherent value without a subject valuing them. This highlights the argument between the objectivity and subjectivity of morality. I believe that people have values that are subject to them. I don’t believe that all things only obtain their value from a subject. Finding one instance where this is the case would disprove the basic form of your argument.

I would say that murder is objectively morally wrong. I think that any person in their right mind will admit that human life is inherently good. If something is inherently good then it must have some inherent value. A person could attribute no extra value to it themselves as a subject and yet life still has value. Therefore, if they were to take life away from someone they would be going against something of inherent value. And that would be immoral.

Put in to a simple argument form, this would read:

1. Human life is inherently good
2. If something is inherently good, then that thing has inherent value
3. If something has inherent value, then destroying that thing, while in your right mind, is objectively immoral.
4. Therefore, ending a human life (aka murder), while in your right mind, is objectively immoral.


I believe this serves as a solid counterargument for what you are saying. The only way I could really see you raising an objection to this would be by objecting to premise 3, but it seems to me that if anyone disagreed with that statement, they themselves would be deemed immoral. I want to make clear that when I say good, I don’t mean good in the subjective sense like "Man that was some good pizza," but instead similar to a platonic view of something being part of THE Good.

Thoughts?