Thanks for sharing this! Unfortunately, though, it seems your argument is invalid in its form.

You claim that premise 3 of the argument follows from premises 1 and 2 by means of modus ponens, but this is not the case. In premise 1 you offer a conditional, and instead of affirming the antecedent, as a modus ponens argument would, you instead affirm the consequent, rendering the inference from premises 1 and 2 to premise 3 invalid. This is because the premises of an argument that include a conditional and then affirms the consequent could be true, but the conclusion of the argument could still be false (e.g. 1. if you live New York, then you live in the U.S. 2. You live in the U.S. 3. So, you live in New York).

Maybe you just accidentally switched up the antecedent and the consequent, which could be fixed and could give the argument its validity in form. Instead, premise one could be put like this:

1. If we are held responsible for our decisions, then our decisions are not influenced through intervention by God.

This would allow the rest of the argument to follow validly and not undermine how you ultimately reach your conclusion instead.

As far as the soundness of the argument, separate from the validity of its form, I think premise 4 to be a false premise. First, by "influenced," I take it that you mean "overridden" based on what you wrote above before laying out the argument, so that is what I will mean when I use "influenced."
It seems, to me, that petitionary prayer could be useful without our decisions having to be influenced by God's intervention. It certainly seems plausible that our ability to make free decisions could remain intact while God intervenes in response to a petitionary prayer. I do not see how an answered petitionary prayer, such as someone who is sick and asks for healing is this healed by God (this is also an instance of where petitionary prayer is useful), would entail that this person's free will, i.e. the decisions they make, is being overridden. Because of this, I think premise 4 to be false.

In summary, this argument is invalid because of its form. However, if the form was fixed, I still think it to be false in light of the objection I rose to premise 4 of the argument.

Thanks for sharing this! Before I respond, I am going to assume (based off the way you used it) that when you use the term "moral" you mean "morally acceptable" or, at least, something that is the opposite of "immoral." So, I will subsequently use "morally acceptable" here in the same sense that I believe you were meaning. Additionally, I do not address your parallel between God and a parent, because I thought the overall argument could still be charitably summed up without including it.

To begin, I think that you are giving an argument in your post similar to the one that follows:
1. If God exists, then God has all the authority over our lives and does not allow us to have authority over our lives.
2. If God has all the authority over our lives and does not allow us to have authority over our lives, then his existence is immoral.
3. If God exists, then his existence is immoral.

While this argument is valid in form, since it is just a simple hypothetical syllogism, I do not think it is successful. In other words, I think premise one to be false. Why must me assume that God has sole authority over our lives, leaving us with none? I agree with you that if God had sole authority over our lives and did not allow us to have any, then this would not be morally acceptable. But it seems one could argue that God does not have sole authority over our lives, and that we could at least have some free will to control our own lives. Many have argued this, such as prominent philosopher Alvin Plantinga who does argues this quite well, so I do not think that it must be the case if God exists then he must have sole authority over our lives and we have none. Even just the possibility of us having free will would be a counterexample to premise one, rendering it to be false and ultimately corrupting the overall argument. Because of this, I think it is important to engage the topic of whether we have free will or whether God ultimately controls everything in our lives (including our decisions). Without doing this, I think the argument is false because of the problem that arises to premise one.

Again thanks for sharing this! I encourage you keep posting and I hope you feel welcome here.

It seems like you are giving an argument similar to the one that follows:

1. If there is something that can be used in a discussion to allow it to not fall apart, then that something should be used in every discussion
2. Definitions, when used as starting points, allow a discussion to not fall apart.
3. Therefore, any discussion should require definitions to be used as starting points.

This argument runs a modus ponens to argue that "definitions" are what are needed for a discussion to not fall apart, which seems to be what you are (generally) arguing for. While I agree that definitions, in the way describe them as "Religion is" or "Theology is," can help add some structure to discussions and help discussions from falling apart, I do not think that means that every discussion should use them as starting points or that there could not be discussions that use them and do not still fall apart in the end.
I think an objection arises against premise two of my above argument. Certainly, it is easier to have a discussion that begins with a claim or foundational principle, but does that mean that it will not fall apart? I do not think so, for many people could not understand the definition to begin with, or if they do, then they could eventually stray off topic from what was initially being discussed. I think both of these things, if not addressed and corrected, could cause a discussion to ultimately collapse, though a definition is acting as an established starting point for the discussion.
Because of this objection, I think the argument fails. Maybe a reply to this could be that the argument is not charitable enough, and that this is not in fact what the argument is. I would disagree with this reply, especially in light of the section that we should start all of our discussions with definitions of what "God is," what "Religion is," or what "Theology is." So, ultimately, I think the argument fails.

It seems like you are giving an argument similar to the one as follows:
1. If there are many ways to see God and practice worshipping him, then it must be that God manifests himself in these many different ways for whatever form is being used and practiced.
2. There are many ways to see God and practice worshipping him, given the numerous amount of different religions in the world.
3. Thus, God manifests himself in these many different ways for whatever form is being used and practiced.

I think this is something similar to what you were trying to say in regards to the "Elsewhere, elsewhere" objection in your last paragraph. In regards to this argument, I think one of these premises to be false, namely premise 1. It does not seem like the most plausible answer to me to conclude that in light of there being so much religious diversity and many ways to worship and practice religion it then must be the same God manifesting himself in different ways for each different manner that he is seen or worshipped. Instead of solving the problem of everyone seeing God differently by saying that everyone is in fact correct in their ow n way, why can't it be that everyone is simply wrong? Or that there is only 1 (or a few select) religion(s) that is correct and that the rest have skewed view of God? It seems like assuming first that there is indeed a God and that second he is the same God being worshipped by everyone is a stretch of a solution to explain religious diversity and different ways people worship in the world. There are other options to be considered that I think are initially more plausible to go towards in light of this issue, so I think that premise 1 is false in that it immediately rules these other options out without addressing them.

It seems like you are giving an argument similar to the one as follows in your post:
1. It is wrong to worship idols other than Yahweh as a Christian.
2. If Jesus is an idol, then it is wrong to worship Jesus.
3. Jesus is an idol.
4. Thus, it is wrong to worship Jesus.

As apparent in this argument, I am putting aside the issue of graven or carved images that mentioned as well as what is right or wrong in the Muslim tradition which all can be addressed another time. In regards to Jesus being an idol though, I have some pushback. An idol, in biblical times, was something worshipped in place of God (Yahweh) as if it were actually God. In the case of Jesus, however, I do not think that it is the case that people who worship Jesus are worshipping an idol in this same sense, i.e. worshipping something in the place of God as if it were God instead. This is because Jesus IS God. Jesus is the manifestation of God in human flesh so that God could die for those he loved, as in us, and so that we may not take or deserved punishment for our sins. If this is denied by saying that Jesus was not the incarnation of God and was simply just a human then Jesus would be an idol, but if he is the incarnation of God then he is not a replacement of God like an idol would but is actually God himself. So, I would have to say that premise 3 of this argument is false; Jesus is not an idol but is the incarnate of God himself, so it would not be wrong to worship him as a Christian.
Hope this can be of some help!

Hi!

Thanks for your argument, this is very interesting. I worry though that the conclusion does not follow from premise 3, like you mentioned, and that there is more that is required to be demonstrated in order to arrive at your conclusion.
It seems that we cannot infer that we should prefer your conclusion, using both masculine and feminine pronouns to refer to God, simply because we have arrived at a conclusion that we should not exclusively use one over the other. All premises 1 through 3 show is that we should not exclusively use masculine or feminine pronouns, but it does not give us which option we should prefer. We could use both, true, but we could also use neither, or we could even use a different set of pronouns or introduce new genders other than masculine or feminine. I have also heard it argued, and quite well at that, that God himself is genderless but using both masculine and feminine pronouns are the best way we can communicate and relate to God, a similar but still different conclusion to yours.
This is all just to say that there seems to be several options not accounted for in your argument and that it takes an invalid inference from 3 to 4.
While I have given a few different of these options specifically, the specifics are besides the point. It is clear that there are indeed more options than just using both masculine and feminine pronouns and because of this the argument should show why we should prefer that option over the others. Overall, I like where the argument is headed, but I do think that it requires more than it currently gives and would be interested to see a more encompassing and compelling argument for why we should refer to God with both masculine and feminine pronouns as are primary way of communicating to and about God.

It seems like you are giving an argument similar to the one below:

1. If Christianity is a monotheistic religion, then it should only have one god.
2. Christianity does not have one god but rather three, namely Jesus, Jehovah, and the Holy Ghost.
3. Therefore, Christianity is not a monotheistic religion.

I would disagree with premise two of this argument which claims that the Trinity, i.e. Jesus, Jehovah, and the Holy Ghost, do not constitute as one god in Christianity but rather as more than one.

It seems to me that that the doctrine of the Trinity is not something given just to circumvent incoherencies in Scripture, but rather a way to describe the main parts of who God is. This means that it is not that case that Jesus, Jehovah, and the Holy Ghost are all different entities, but rather that they are just parts of one being manifested in different ways so as to perform different essential functions.

To give an example, think about it in terms of a normal human body. It would seem absurd to claim that because we have two arms, two legs, a torso, and a head that we are not one person but many. Each respective body part plays a different role and performs a different function, but is still ultimately a part of only one human body. In the same way, it seems that the one God of Christianity manifests Himself in different ways so as to perform different functions, which are seen in the three parts of the Trinity.

In conclusion, it seems that under this view, in contradiction to the one given by you and expressed in my argument above, the doctrine of the Trinity can be coherent with Christianity being a monotheistic.

(Additionally, if you are looking for material for where the Holy Ghost is mentioned in the Bible, the book of Acts in chapter 2 is a great place to start.)

It seems that you are giving an argument similar to the one as follows:

1. If God is truly omnipotent, then God must be able to successfully perform both the logically possible and the logically impossible.
2. God is omnipotent.
3. Therefore, God must be able to successfully perform both the logically possible and the logically impossible.

While this argument is valid in form, I do not think this argument is sound because of premise 1. I think we both agree with premise 2 that God is omnipotent, but I think our definition of what "omnipotence" means and looks like for God are different.

I think this difference comes from your abuse of the term "logically impossible." It is clear that you argue that a being who can do both the logically possible as well as the logically impossible is more powerful and omnipotent than a being who cannot. However, I think that to say that God cannot perform the logically impossible is not infringing on His omnipotence.

The definition of "logically impossible" is something that is contradictory or contrary to the laws of logic, such as a round square or a tall man not being tall. Your misuse of the term is seen when you claim that an omnipotent being can create a stone so heavy that it cannot lift it and then proceed to lift it, because if it can lift the stone then the stone was not too heavy for the being to lift it after all, and thus would fall into the realm of "logically possible" rather than "logically impossible," because logical impossibilities simply cannot exist. Logical impossibility infers that one cannot perform both action "x" and action "not x." Thus, God could not create a stone so heavy that He could not lift it and then lift it because it would be logically impossible, e.g. performing both "x" and "not x."

On another point that I will not dive too deeply into but think is worthy of bringing to light, do we even want to say that God can perform logical impossibilities? I think not, as this would have absurd implications, such as God being able to be both maximally just and unjust, loving and not loving, omnipotent and not omnipotent, etc.

In conclusion, I think what you are arguing to be unsound due to the misuse of the term "logically impossible," for it is not infringing upon the omnipotence of God to say that what is logically impossible, i.e. what is contradictory and therefore cannot occur, exist, or be done, cannot be done by God; if it could be done by God, then it would not be impossible but rather possible, because logical impossibilities cannot exist.

I think this is a well-formed argument, as your conclusion clearly follows from the premises you gave. However, I think you misinterpret the Genesis 1:27 verse for which you base your argument. This misinterpretation is specifically apparent in premise 1.

It seems that the antecedent "if God is made in the image of man" in premise 1 is conveying something very different than the verse that states "So God created mankind in his own image," and I think this difference is coming from the equivocation of the terms "man" and "mankind." By using "man," it is clear that you are using this term to refer to male gender, which is distinctly different from female gender.

However, it seems more likely that when the term "mankind" is used in Genesis 1:27 it is rather referring to all humans in a general sense, instead of a specific gender of humans like the male gender. This is where I think premise 1 is an incorrect representation, since it is obviously interpreting the verse to mean that supposedly God is made in the image of the male gender, which is something different from what the verse is conveying. There may be other ways to craft a similar argument like this one based off different evidence given by the Bible, but I think this one to be an unsound misinterpretation of the verse given, especially since the latter part of the verse says "male and female he created them."

Apart from this objection, I definitely agree that God should be viewed as a genderless being, because there are numerous problematic implications that arise from exclusively referring God as one gender or another. I appreciate your addressing of the issue, as I think it is one not many think about but also one that all Christians can benefit from!