Okay. I think this is deeply, deeply confused. But we can leave it there.

Look, I really don't want to continue this. I refer you to my previous comments on illusion. Illusion is not some kind of 'second substance' or something like that.

Compassion can be conventional, though. I do believe in compassion, but I doubt it's the watery-eyed universal force that a kind of Christian sentimentalism would have us believe.

However, this still doesn't make sense, because then you have that pesky ever present first organism. — schopenhauer1

Okay, I really don't want to continue this conversation anymore. I'm sorry, I just don't think it will be profitable, given that you're still on this and nothing that I say seems to help clarify what you want or mean.

No, I'm saying your objection doesn't make sense, because you're presenting two thing alongside one another as if they're contradictory when there's no clear sense in which they are.

Imagine if I said, 'there can't be trees -- all is plants.'

This makes no sense, friend.

But that's simple. The misconception comes from thinking of time as if it were transcendentally real, rather than ideal, and so making category errors.

Ah, see I told you, you were going to "school" me on illusion :)! This all just seems like getting something from nothing. Your use of the word "arising" as if at point A is will at point B is the world of representation seems a category error as it makes no sense that there is arising in an atemporal unity. Your use of the word illusion as a way to be the final word, when the idea of illusion itself makes no sense when there is just unity. If all is one, there cannot be room for One and Illusion, it is just a meta-version of subject/object, the exact thing you say does not exist. One/Illusion is just a replacement for subject/object and you simply have the same problem with different terms. — schopenhauer1

I got into this a little with csalisbury before, but I think this is a fundamental misunderstanding of what an illusion is. It's not as if there is a new thing that arises, a second sort of thing, an illusion, that introduces a duality that now has to be explained. An illusion is just the mistaken conception that there is some new thing.

THIS is where we disagree. Representation "arising" just does not make sense. Whether it is Schopenhauer or your interpretation of it, makes little difference to my argument in this case. Schopenhauer cannot have it both ways where Representation "arises", or "emerges" and have an atemporal Will or a non-temporal Will (or whatever way is best to describe this unity). The "arising" must be accounted for itself. — schopenhauer1

Okay, sure. What can happen, though, is that the will in objectifying itself presents representation itself as arising in time, via presenting biological organisms arising in time who have representational capacities (and a past where there were none). If you like, from the atemporal perspective of the will itself this is a kind of illusion.

I have my own disagreements with Schopenhauer as far as the text goes, but have not been articulating them here. I have only been reproducing, to the best of my ability, a reading of the text itself. Much of what you have previously said and implied, about the equation of the subject with will, the subject with the organism, denying that Schop. says we experience the will in any way other than in a subject/object framework and so on, has been at odds with the text on any plausible reading, given that the author outright denies all of these claims, and while you seem to think I am being condescending by telling you to read Book II, I think your comments portray basic misunderstandings of the material, which is why I said it.

As for how I would characterize objectification, it would be: the will without presentation has a kind of unity to it, which isn't the singularity we find in presentation (of being 'numbered' one). This unity is pretty abstract and hard to understand, not well fleshed out in the text. But this unity is one of striving and competition with itself. In other words, the will is internally strife-indicing, fights with itself, injures itself, on its own terms (which we experience as pain). Representation then arises as a way of doing this, by more effectively managing its own struggles, and creating codes, signs, and pathways for trying to satisfy the will by committing these injuries and winning these internal competitions. If you can see where the food is, you can eat and satiate your hunger. This results in a kind of seeing, rather than just a dull experience of hunger, of an object as if distinct from oneself, which acts as a kind of objectified 'unit' that is a kind of guidepost to fulfilling those desires. But, since this 'unit,' the object, is just a kind of bundle of indications as to how to manipulate the will, it is an objectification of the will itself, a kind of crutch that lets the will see how to attack and hurt itself for its own satisfaction. So if I see someone eating, I am seeing the will satisfying itself -- this is how the will reacts to its own processes, with a kind of dull awareness of what is going on with itself, but only through this refracted lens.

No, I just want you to get at something you are missing. Will "objectifying" itself, I'd like YOUR interpretation of that notion, not explain to me as if I did not know anything about Schopenhauer. — schopenhauer1

I didn't know we were talking about 'my' interpretations?

I really do not understand what your question/complaint is. You just quoted things we've already been over back a me, so I'm not sure what you want.

What are you talking about? Explain "already" and "objectification of the will". — schopenhauer1

This is explained in Book II of WWR.

The organism must be present for time to be there. We agree on this. — schopenhauer1

No, the subject must be. The subject is not the organism, or any worldly object.

Why not just will and no subject/object relationship? — schopenhauer1

There is no reason. You're thinking of the principle of sufficient reason as if it applied to thing in itself. From within the world, we can give reasons as to why certain biological organisms with representational capacities developed. But this entire explanation, and the world itself, is already just an objectification of will. At bottom, will has no reason for what it does. To think otherwise is to make a category error.

The subject is atemporal, but so is the subject/object relationship. I hope that sums it up differently. I agree, if beginnings exist only in time, then there was no beginning to the organism that has subject/object relationship. You have to make an account for the representation side of the account. — schopenhauer1

I am still trying to figure out where, and whether, we actually disagree on this, because I am having trouble understanding what you're saying.

If by 'organism' you mean the human animal, empirical object in the world, flesh and bones and all, then of course it has a beginning in empirical time, so your position isn't tenable as a reading of Schopenhauer, but would have to be a disagreement with him. The subject has no beginning in time, but (i) that's not because it has been around forever, but rather because the category of time doesn't apply to it, and (ii) the subject is not an animal, but the source of the representational forms.

I disagree. He we know ourselves as both subject AND object. — schopenhauer1

I don't know what you mean, you disagree. This is explicit in the text. The subject/object distinction is all part of the world as representation, but we also know ourselves as will, via the movements of our body and the experience of pleasure and pain. There is no subject/object distinction there, and we know the will by being it rather than by observing it. This is in Book II of WWR. To focus on only our view of the world through representation, and the subject/object distinction, is to cut off half of Schop's philosophy and relegate yourself to a Kantian one-sided view that he warns against. The view you present here would be what you would get if you didn't heed that warning and stopped reading after Book I. This latter part of Schop's philosophy is the unique potion that separates him from Kant and other transcendental idealists like Husserl.

But it does. If consciousness is not there all along, how could it "come along" when Will has no "time" prior to the "time-in-consciousness" for there to be such a "first" or "prior to"? — schopenhauer1

If you're serious about this question there must be something you fundamentally misunderstand about the account. It might help if you laid it out piece by piece. Representation does not 'come along' in time, because time is a form of representation.

Given that, it makes no sense to say that representation was there 'all along' in time, as if time were prior to it. There is an atemporal present in which the subject exists, but since it is atemporal, there's no sense in which this can have been there 'since the beginning,' since beginnings exist only in time.

I really don't know what else to say about this unless you elaborate further on what your issue is. Repeating it isn't helping.

This seems like a TGW interpretation. — schopenhauer1

Schopenhauer is quite clear that representation is a function only of animals.

You may only be able to talk about it as to what it is not, but not otherwise positive things other than what we can gleam from what we see from the perspective of a subject to object which is that everything is Will and it strives. — schopenhauer1

This is simply wrong. The way Schop. introduces the notion of will is through our own primitive knowledge of it through our own identity with it, via movements of our body and pleasure and pain. There is no subject/object distinction in these areas, though Schop. does say the form of time remains in some rudimentary form there (this latter point I would dispute, and admit it is my own interpretation, not his).

it is important to rememeber that Schop. thinks we are the thing in itself. For this reason we do not only glean what we can from observation, we also inhabit it.

So this I think we interpret the same- consciousness needs to be there in the picture for time to be there. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but that doesn't mean that the consciousness had to be there 'all along' since the beginning of time. In fact if the subject is the transcendental condition for time, that makes no sense. It would once again be treating time as either transcendentally real, instead of ideal, or as some kind of empirical object for the subject to be 'in.'

What we do not agree on is that representation is the flip side of Will. My argument is that representation is part of Schop's reality. All might be Will, but Will cannot create representation because create implies cause. How to solve the dilemma? The representation is right along with Will, being its flip side aspect. This means the organism which it is that representation "adheres" with also needs to be part of the flip side aspect. Will is not alone, but has the partner, representation. — schopenhauer1

Representation is only the flip side of some very small parts of will. Most will does not objectify itself, and does not partake in representation at all. Even in representing animals, pleasure and pain, which are at the core of our lives, are not representations at all but direct affections of the will.

If you guys want to do a reading group, I am up for it. I just finished some things and have some extra reading time. And I haven't read any philosophy for quite a while now.

Sorry, I think I lost the plot a bit. Yes, I agree that your closeness to someone is what makes it painful for them if you die, which in turn is a deincentive to killing yourself so as not to hurt them. But no, I don't think closeness generally is the cause of suffering, since you will suffer no matter what, only in different ways, if that closeness is abandoned.

I don't know what to say. You already agreed with me that the empirical reality of there being time before an organism is guaranteed by the structure of time, once established. So by there always having been an organism present, you can't mean in empirical time or in any ordinary sense, like a being waiting around at the beginning of the universe watching it. This would be a really, really bad misunderstanding of transcendental idealism, and from what I can tell you understand this and have explained why it makes sense for the being to retroject time backward while it still being an empirical reality that there was a time before the organism.

But if you agree to all of this, I can't make sense of what you mean by there always having to be an organism from the beginning of time, or why you think this is necessary. Clearly it isn't necessary in the above sense. But if you don't mean this, what do you mean? There is the atemporal standing present, but there are no 'beginnings' of that, precisely because it is atemporal.

As for representation being necessary for the will, there is just no plausible reading of the text that supports that position.

I don't think divine punishment and hell is about vengeance, it's something more disturbing than that.

I don't think I'd try to have someone who brutalized a family member of mine tortured, bc I agree with yr Cyrenaic quote but, like, an animal part of me reallly would want that. — csalisbury

But then, like the brutalizer, you're to be forgiven because it's just your animal passions :)

But like I said, I can understand the desire for vengeance and to kill the person who did it, but not torture. I think there's a sense in which people deeply feel that those who violate certain norms that they themselves expect to be held with regard to themselves, they have forfeited their right to exist, which is contingent on those very norms. And so retribution gives people an intuitive right to end that person, and even to get a righteous satisfaction out of it. But torture is just sick and purposeless.

Put another way, when someone dips beneath humanity by committing some atrocity, we feel that since they've let go of being human, they are no longer entitled to life as a human. But torture doesn't destroy their humanity -- animals hate physical torture in the same way that people do. It teaches no lesson, solve no problem, resolves no dispute, gives no closure.

No, the person the murderer-who-deserves-torture kills is a woman. Not even a child, mind you, but a woman.

But what if everyone looks pretty much the same? — csalisbury

Well sure, I doubt people are literally sensitive to other people's genes. They'd probably be sensitive to outward epiphenomena causally linked to those genes.

But that's the point. The closeness is what causes the suffering. — csalisbury

You will always suffer, no matter what. Distance and closeness both cause suffering; everything causes suffering.

Say, for some reason, someone out there in Chicago, on campus, who you didn't personally feel close to, felt v close to you indeed. Who knows why, bizzare. And say you were in deep pain, but you knew your absence would make his or her life very hard. Would you suffer so that he or she didn't? — csalisbury

Maybe, but I'd doubt the sincerity of anyone who made that claim.

A fun jab for csalisbury here, too --- note the gender of Agustino's perfect / most heinous victim. And note your lack of surprise at noticing this.

I guess it's hard for me imagine how that bias would feel - just a sense you like the other person but you can't say why? — csalisbury

It would feel like a rationalization, probably, like with countless other things.

The language that explains what is going on in a phenomenon is never the language in which the phenomenon tries to explain itself. If you want to know what's going on in the world, you don't ask politicians, and if you want to know why someone does something, you don't ask them.

But, in any case, I think we agree that the desire not to hurt your family, even if condemns you to suffering, seems largely related to their having been close to you, yeah? — csalisbury

Most people in the world obviously wouldn't even know if I died, of the few that did, most wouldn't care. The closeness of the family is simply what makes my death cause them suffering int he first place.

For one, I think many of us would feel good to see such a person subjected to the worst kinds of suffering until he begs for mercy. Would you disagree? Would you not feel good to see such a bastard suffer? — Agustino

No, and I think something is wrong with you if you do.

I can understand the natural desire for vengeance, the repaying of insult to maintain honor, and even having no sympathy for people who are destroyed after committing a heinous act. But classical avenging results in death, not torture.

"They asserted also that errors ought to meet with pardon; for that a man did not err intentionally, but because he was influenced by some external circumstance; and that one ought not to hate a person who has erred, but only to teach him better."

Moral anti-realism is the mainstream position in modern philosophy and Western society at large.

I'm not sure, actually. The 'right' answer is supposed to be it's indifferent, but I wouldn't be surprised if people had unconscious biases toward people genetically closer to them even if they didn't know this.

Your friends. BUT if you equalized it so that you knew all of them equally in your life and had equal experience with them, your biological kin.

Maybe. There's ways other than age to get things going, though, like trauma.

Biology is just old habit and convention.

There are probably biological reasons people care for their families, and there probably aren't any having to do with putting elbows on the table.

When we look at animals we don't explain their actions by appealing to choice or personality, because their actions look to us transparently as the result of their (genetic and physical) environment. People are the same way, it's just harder to tell from here.

No, the latter is deeper ingrained. Some people overcome it obviously, but it's not that hard to put your elbows on the table.

Yeah, and when a rationalization is needed something like 'I'm a good person' is a good go-to.

No, as in the human body, not a biology class. Humans are animals, we do whatever we're conditioned to do.

Biology, I guess.

No, less trivial things that you probably aren't aware of.

Whatever you got told when you were young is a good place to start.

It's being singled out because its the relevant reasonless thing here. I don't think it makes sense for you to say most things don't have reasons bc here is a list of reasons: conquest, sex, security, admiration, victory, comfort, money. — csalisbury

I don't know if those are reasons. Maybe pleasure is a reason in some sense.

You've mentioned, elsewhere, the big deterrent for suicide for you, is the impact it would have on your family. If life is so awful, it's strange you'd be deterred by something you recogize as mere habit and convention. — csalisbury

I don't think it's a matter of looking at what's right and then deciding not to do it because of a habit, but rather the habit itself stops you.

I don't see why compassion is singled out for not having a reason. Most things don't have reasons. Some have rationalizations, which is not quite the same.

But I think all these things are a matter of habituation without any deeper significance. There might be a sort of higher compassion that stems from the thing itself rather than a convention, through the recognition that pain is inherently bad on its own terms, but I doubt it has a serious presence for people.