Agreed, and being a 'good person' is usually tied, especially for kids, to social signifiers. Pretty gross, but that seems to be the truth of it.

So we're in agreement that not wanting to put your elbows on the table is no less trivial than not wanting to hurt your family through suicide?

No, the latter is deeper ingrained. Some people overcome it obviously, but it's not that hard to put your elbows on the table.

No, it's not. Though it feels funny at first.

What makes the latter more deeply ingrained? You mentioned conditioning earlier, but I was certainly conditioned not to put my elbows on the table. So it's not conditioning in-and-of-itself.

There are probably biological reasons people care for their families, and there probably aren't any having to do with putting elbows on the table.

When we look at animals we don't explain their actions by appealing to choice or personality, because their actions look to us transparently as the result of their (genetic and physical) environment. People are the same way, it's just harder to tell from here.

Ok, are you rescinding your earlier claim that not wanting to hurt family stems from habit and convention?

(There are studies showing that most organisms of a certain complexity act altruistically in direct proportion to the genetic material shared with the object of their altruism. Siblings>Cousins etc. So it might make sense to ditch convention and habit and go straight to biology)

Biology is just old habit and convention.

So the thing was the elbows was just that it wasn't of sufficient vintage, basically?

Maybe. There's ways other than age to get things going, though, like trauma.

Yeah, I almost posed a thought experiment of my dad shocking me or some such when my elbows were put on the table.

Is it ancientness or trauma that makes hurting family so difficult? Let me put it this way. Say you were abandoned, Quasimodo-style, on the steps of a cathedral. Years later, due to whatever circumstances, you found yourself on the TITANIC (!) with a group of people, and, due to previous displays of whatever, found yourself in charge of lifeboat triage. Some of the people had grown up with you, been dear friends, you drank and smoked together and talked about how much you'd like to get a ticket for the TITANIC (!). And there was the priest who took care of you. And the nursemaid. etc etc. And some of the people you had no relation to. And two of the people, unbeknownst to you, were your biological mother and sister. Or they could be your biological father or brother. In any case. Who would you be more inclined to save?

Your friends. BUT if you equalized it so that you knew all of them equally in your life and had equal experience with them, your biological kin.

But what if you knew all of them equally well, but had no idea who you were related to?

My intuition is: who knows. What would the phenomenological account of that experience be like? I feel like it'd have nothing to do with genetic kinship.

I'm not sure, actually. The 'right' answer is supposed to be it's indifferent, but I wouldn't be surprised if people had unconscious biases toward people genetically closer to them even if they didn't know this.

Yeah, I suppose I don't know either. It'd be interesting to see the results of a study, if such a study were in any way feasible. I guess it's hard for me imagine how that bias would feel - just a sense you like the other person but you can't say why?

But, in any case, I think we agree that the desire not to hurt your family, even if condemns you to suffering, seems largely related to their having been close to you, yeah?

I guess it's hard for me imagine how that bias would feel - just a sense you like the other person but you can't say why? — csalisbury

It would feel like a rationalization, probably, like with countless other things.

The language that explains what is going on in a phenomenon is never the language in which the phenomenon tries to explain itself. If you want to know what's going on in the world, you don't ask politicians, and if you want to know why someone does something, you don't ask them.

But, in any case, I think we agree that the desire not to hurt your family, even if condemns you to suffering, seems largely related to their having been close to you, yeah? — csalisbury

Most people in the world obviously wouldn't even know if I died, of the few that did, most wouldn't care. The closeness of the family is simply what makes my death cause them suffering int he first place.

What does a rationalization feel like? I'm saying that there'd be have to be some felt affinity that could only subsequently be rationalized. The genetic affinity makes sense, to a point, if we focus on physical markers. But what if everyone looks pretty much the same?

Most people in the world obviously wouldn't even know if I died, of the few that did, most wouldn't care. The closeness of the family is simply what makes my death cause them suffering int he first place.

But that's the point. The closeness is what causes the suffering. And our closeness to those close enough to suffer is what leads us to prevent that suffering

Say, for some reason, someone out there in Chicago, on campus, who you didn't personally feel close to, felt v close to you indeed. Who knows why, bizzare. And say you were in deep pain, but you knew your absence would make his or her life very hard. Would you suffer so that he or she didn't?

But what if everyone looks pretty much the same? — csalisbury

Well sure, I doubt people are literally sensitive to other people's genes. They'd probably be sensitive to outward epiphenomena causally linked to those genes.

But that's the point. The closeness is what causes the suffering. — csalisbury

You will always suffer, no matter what. Distance and closeness both cause suffering; everything causes suffering.

Say, for some reason, someone out there in Chicago, on campus, who you didn't personally feel close to, felt v close to you indeed. Who knows why, bizzare. And say you were in deep pain, but you knew your absence would make his or her life very hard. Would you suffer so that he or she didn't? — csalisbury

Maybe, but I'd doubt the sincerity of anyone who made that claim.

@The Great Whatever @csalisbury

This may be a moot point at this point, but I'd like to go back to Schopenhauer's idea of time, and my interpretation of this that in order for us to see time as stretching all the way back to the big bang, we have to have an ever present organism keeping the world of representation present.

Reminds me of the creationists who think the world really is only 6000 years old but God/the Devil just made it look like it was 7 billion years old to test our faith/trick us.

Reminds me of the creationists who think the world really is only 6000 years old but God/the Devil just made it look like it was 7 billion years old to test our faith/trick us. — darthbarracuda

Yes that came to my mind as well. It seems a bit too basic for Schopenhauer, but that is the only interpretation I can see. I don't see how time comes after Will, because that is presupposing that causes happen "prior" to a certain point, and that would be self-defeating if Will is timeless. My guess is that this might come down to different interpretations of the concept of illusion.

My interpretation is that you must account for the "illusion" as well. Let us say as babies, we have no experience of time, we are closer to pure Will (this is VERY hypothetical), and over time, through the environment's interaction, the illusion of time and representation takes place in our head, along with space, time, qualia (this seems very Dennett like), then you still must account for this phenomena occurring in the first place. There is a phenomena that is taking place which is an illusion of interactions with the environment. Well this phenomenal existence/representations must be accounted for.

I mean we could argue a kind of idealism, similar in some respects to Neo-Platonism, in that the entire world is the Idea of the Demiurge, and we are just incarnations of the Demiurge's thought. It's a bit metaphorical as a lot of Continental philosophy seems to be but basically the Demiuge/God/Will/[insert thing here] is what grounds existence. For Aquinas, God was like a man in a lighthouse who saw the entirety of the world, past-present-future and focused the beam of light on a certain area, called the present.

You will always suffer, no matter what. Distance and closeness both cause suffering; everything causes suffering. — tgw

?

I was responding to this:

The closeness of the family is simply what makes my death cause them suffering int he first place. — tgw

This may be a moot point at this point, but I'd like to go back to Schopenhauer's idea of time, and my interpretation of this that in order for us to see time as stretching all the way back to the big bang, we have to have an ever present organism keeping the world of representation present.

Sorry to keep talking over you, it's just I don't know what else to say at this point. I sympathize with your frustrations, but you seem to want to find a resolution in Schopenhauer, and there just isn't one there.

This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared, this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all. — Schop

I don't know what to say. You already agreed with me that the empirical reality of there being time before an organism is guaranteed by the structure of time, once established. So by there always having been an organism present, you can't mean in empirical time or in any ordinary sense, like a being waiting around at the beginning of the universe watching it. This would be a really, really bad misunderstanding of transcendental idealism, and from what I can tell you understand this and have explained why it makes sense for the being to retroject time backward while it still being an empirical reality that there was a time before the organism.

But if you agree to all of this, I can't make sense of what you mean by there always having to be an organism from the beginning of time, or why you think this is necessary. Clearly it isn't necessary in the above sense. But if you don't mean this, what do you mean? There is the atemporal standing present, but there are no 'beginnings' of that, precisely because it is atemporal.

As for representation being necessary for the will, there is just no plausible reading of the text that supports that position.

Sorry, I think I lost the plot a bit. Yes, I agree that your closeness to someone is what makes it painful for them if you die, which in turn is a deincentive to killing yourself so as not to hurt them. But no, I don't think closeness generally is the cause of suffering, since you will suffer no matter what, only in different ways, if that closeness is abandoned.

But if you agree to all of this, I can't make sense of what you mean by there always having to be an organism from the beginning of time, or why you think this is necessary. Clearly it isn't necessary in the above sense. But if you don't mean this, what do you mean? There is the atemporal standing present, but there are no 'beginnings' of that, precisely because it is atemporal.

As for representation being necessary for the will, there is just no plausible reading of the text that supports that position. — The Great Whatever

Let's look at the quote that csalisbury picked so we are both referencing the same part of Schopenhauer:

This long course of time itself, filled with innumerable changes, through which matter rose from form to form till at last the first percipient creature appeared, this whole time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all. — Schop

So time itself is only thinkable in the identity of a consciousness whose succession of ideas, whose form of knowing it is, and apart from which, it loses all meaning and is nothing at all..

So this I think we interpret the same- consciousness needs to be there in the picture for time to be there.

What we do not agree on is that representation is the flip side of Will. My argument is that representation is part of Schop's reality. All might be Will, but Will cannot create representation because create implies cause. How to solve the dilemma? The representation is right along with Will, being its flip side aspect. This means the organism which it is that representation "adheres" with also needs to be part of the flip side aspect. Will is not alone, but has the partner, representation.

Like I said earlier, my prediction of your way around this is to try to "school" me on what an illusion is, and that representation is an illusion. I tried to say that illusion qua illusion still must be accounted for, as any attempt to justify it coming after Will will only beg the question. Thus, in a way (I am don't remember if he was using it in this context), csalisbury's use of the picture of one hand drawing the other drawing the other.. applies here as Will needs representation needs Will needs representation.

So this I think we interpret the same- consciousness needs to be there in the picture for time to be there. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but that doesn't mean that the consciousness had to be there 'all along' since the beginning of time. In fact if the subject is the transcendental condition for time, that makes no sense. It would once again be treating time as either transcendentally real, instead of ideal, or as some kind of empirical object for the subject to be 'in.'

What we do not agree on is that representation is the flip side of Will. My argument is that representation is part of Schop's reality. All might be Will, but Will cannot create representation because create implies cause. How to solve the dilemma? The representation is right along with Will, being its flip side aspect. This means the organism which it is that representation "adheres" with also needs to be part of the flip side aspect. Will is not alone, but has the partner, representation. — schopenhauer1

Representation is only the flip side of some very small parts of will. Most will does not objectify itself, and does not partake in representation at all. Even in representing animals, pleasure and pain, which are at the core of our lives, are not representations at all but direct affections of the will.

Yes, but that doesn't mean that the consciousness had to be there 'all along' since the beginning of time. — The Great Whatever

But it does. If consciousness is not there all along, how could it "come along" when Will has no "time" prior to the "time-in-consciousness" for there to be such a "first" or "prior to"?

In fact if the subject is the transcendental condition for time, that makes no sense. It would once again be treating time as either transcendentally real, instead of ideal, or as some kind of empirical object for the subject to be 'in.' — The Great Whatever

Just see above, same response.

Representation is only the flip side of some very small parts of will. Most will does not objectify itself, and does not partake in representation at all. Even in representing animals, pleasure and pain, which are at the core of our lives, are not representations at all but direct affections of the will. — The Great Whatever

This seems like a TGW interpretation. Using descriptions like "small" is not even applicable to such a transcendental monistic unity such as Will. The only way to describe it would be simply by analogy from analogy from the world of subject/object which is to say the world of representation. You cannot discuss Will as Will. You may only be able to talk about it as to what it is not, but not otherwise positive things other than what we can gleam from what we see from the perspective of a subject to object which is that everything is Will and it strives.

But it does. If consciousness is not there all along, how could it "come along" when Will has no "time" prior to the "time-in-consciousness" for there to be such a "first" or "prior to"? — schopenhauer1

If you're serious about this question there must be something you fundamentally misunderstand about the account. It might help if you laid it out piece by piece. Representation does not 'come along' in time, because time is a form of representation.

Given that, it makes no sense to say that representation was there 'all along' in time, as if time were prior to it. There is an atemporal present in which the subject exists, but since it is atemporal, there's no sense in which this can have been there 'since the beginning,' since beginnings exist only in time.

I really don't know what else to say about this unless you elaborate further on what your issue is. Repeating it isn't helping.

This seems like a TGW interpretation. — schopenhauer1

Schopenhauer is quite clear that representation is a function only of animals.

You may only be able to talk about it as to what it is not, but not otherwise positive things other than what we can gleam from what we see from the perspective of a subject to object which is that everything is Will and it strives. — schopenhauer1

This is simply wrong. The way Schop. introduces the notion of will is through our own primitive knowledge of it through our own identity with it, via movements of our body and pleasure and pain. There is no subject/object distinction in these areas, though Schop. does say the form of time remains in some rudimentary form there (this latter point I would dispute, and admit it is my own interpretation, not his).

it is important to rememeber that Schop. thinks we are the thing in itself. For this reason we do not only glean what we can from observation, we also inhabit it.

There is an atemporal present in which the subject exists, but since it is atemporal, there's no sense in which this can have been there 'since the beginning,' since beginnings exist only in time.

I really don't know what else to say about this unless you elaborate further on what your issue is. Repeating it isn't helping. — The Great Whatever

The subject is atemporal, but so is the subject/object relationship. I hope that sums it up differently. I agree, if beginnings exist only in time, then there was no beginning to the organism that has subject/object relationship. You have to make an account for the representation side of the account.

Schopenhauer is quite clear that representation is a function only of animals. — The Great Whatever

No, that I agree with, I just don't think you can say more about what Will is outside what we can analyze from the subject/object perspective, as we cannot get outside our own perspective. So you cannot say what Will is, in and of itself other than a few things like "striving" which was gleamed at only through our human subject/object perspective.

This is simply wrong. The way Schop. introduces the notion of will is through our own primitive knowledge of it through our own identity with it, via movements of our body and pleasure and pain. There is no subject/object distinction in these areas, though Schop. does say the form of time remains in some rudimentary form there (this latter point I would dispute, and admit it is my own interpretation, not his).

it is important to rememeber that Schop. thinks we are the thing in itself. For this reason we do not only glean what we can from observation, we also inhabit it. — The Great Whatever

I disagree. He we know ourselves as both subject AND object.