The way in which this symmetry breaks is kind of the goal of my investigations into this subject. — punos
So Hillary climbed a set of subjective experiences — Banno
Is there any similar survey of mathematicians? The comparison might be amusing.. — Banno
A new survey of 1785 English-speaking philosophers — Banno
If we do not infer a person is conscious of him or herself, then we assume that person is sleeping. — Manuel
One person reference the pyramids as to why our future gives us the technology to create the pyramids? — TiredThinker
What you describe is not experimental philosophy, it is science - psychology or maybe sociology. I think when science broke off from philosophy, it took all the empirical stuff with it — T Clark
↪jgill
My dad was in diapers when he was 20? — Hanover
The visitor may not have the same skill as the gymnast in performing a gymnastic routine, but they can share in the experience. — RussellA
A long line of Hanovers went to UGA. One's now in Colorado. Son, is that you? — Hanover
I need to go vote in a few days. It's between Warnock and Walker. It's a difficult choice. I sort of like the idea of a pro-life candidate who has paid for a few of his girlfriends' abortions. Something just rings true about that. — Hanover
Daniel Dennett identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia.[2] According to these, qualia are:
1. ineffable – they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience.
2. intrinsic – they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
3. private – all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
4. directly or immediately apprehensible by consciousness – to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.
Human form B does not need to express their private subjective experiences in words for me to have an almost absolute belief that their private subjective experiences are the same as mine. — RussellA
it could also be said that "actions are words", in which case putting our private subjective experiences into actions is a form of language, and therefore not ineffable — RussellA
What paradigms have been broken, altered, or introduced by philosophers in that time period? No fair citing physicists or other scientists who have speculated about their subjects, just philosophers known for their contributions, those ideas familiar to the general public. — jgill
A century ago, the Newtonian/Euclidean conception of the universe was shattered. And set theory finally enabled us to be certain that 1 + 1 = 2. Doesn't get much more fundamental. — alan1000
Yes, but even uber-logical mathematicians work on the basis of a metaphysical worldview, implicitly assuming the existence (being qua being) of non-physical mathematical objects, that they mentally manipulate as-if real things — Gnomon
not specific inert lumps of Objective Matter. :smile: — Gnomon
. . . parasites! All of them are bloodsuckers. No more! — 0 thru 9
that motivated frustrated Feynman to argue that physicists should not play the role of feckless philosophers ; instead, just "shut up and calculate" — Gnomon
But scientists are human beings, whose reasoning may sometimes be used in service to emotions, including comfortable prior beliefs & paradigms. So they can't help having feelings about their facts. And it's those ineffable Feelings that . . . — Gnomon
Escaping the cave is no longer a metaphor, the cave is urbanism, suburbanism, institutional. — introbert
Ineffable concepts are usually expressed indirectly by metaphors & analogies. — Gnomon
So, it's left to Philosophy to dabble in the ineffable & mental (metaphysical) features of reality. — Gnomon
you are not entitled to anything by virtue of being in this world — introbert
Logical positivism was put into question by the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy — Joshs
But, place a whole bunch of philosophers knowledgeable of science and scientists knowledgeable of philosophy in the same room, and one might stand a chance — javra
Because it is due to physicists that we hold our modern notions of causality and identity on which modern physics is contingent? — javra
As an empirical science, physics will always make use of foundational metaphysical concepts - and so will always be grounded in metaphysics in general. — javra
Interesting. I noted the mention of a "computational metaphysics"... apparently an attempt at a "formal ontology" — Banno
Can they be productive in the way that debates among competing approaches within the economic, political or psychological sciences are productive without producing a clear ‘winner’, expect perhaps in the eye of the beholder? — Joshs
When they're [scientists] explaining their theories, sure. But they're also comparing their just-so stories with each other and providing experiments which support the stories in a way which is very appealing to the critical mind. Do metaphysicians have anything comparable? — coolazice
(Stanford Metaphysics Lab)The theory of abstract objects is a metaphysical theory. Whereas physics attempts a systematic description of fundamental and complex concrete objects, metaphysics attempts a systematic description of fundamental and complex abstract objects.
(Canales)Most important, then began the period when the relevance of philosophy declined in the face of the rising influence of science.
(Bergson)Instead, let us imagine an infinitely small piece of elastic, contracted, if that were possible, to a mathematical point. Let us draw it out gradually in such a way as to bring out of the point a line which will grow progressively longer. Let us fix our attention not on the line as line, but on the action which traces it. Let us consider that this action, in spite of its duration, is indivisible if one supposes that it goes on without stopping; that, if we intercalate a stop in it, we make two actions of it instead of one and that each of these actions will then be the indivisible of which we speak; that it is not the moving act itself which is never indivisible, but the motionless line it lays down beneath it like a track in space. Let us take our mind off the space subtending the movement and concentrate solely on the movement itself, on the act of tension or extension, in short, on pure mobility. This time we shall have a more exact image of our development in duration.
Your thought experiment read simply, but the instructions were not that clear to me — Watchmaker