Any chance this thread gets half the attention that the Trump thread has gotten?

But zombies like soggy meat.

The point of the argument is that the appearance doesn't have the qualities which would cause a hard problem. It only seems like qualia, p-zombies, inverted spectrum and Mary the Color scientist are a thing.

I still don't know about the damned bat, though. But I think Ned Block's harder problem can be addressed if illusionism is the case. That's libertarianism for you.

What is an illusion? What is not an illusion? — A Seagull

An appearance of something which isn't there. And it's not limited to the visual. It could be any sensation or object.

it is odd, but what the illusionist is saying is there are no ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehended sensations. There is no redness of red. Instead, there is an appearance of something which seems to have those qualities.

I'm not sure illusionism entirely avoids the problem, but I thought it worth summarizing my understanding of their argument, because most people just dismiss it of hand.

In addition, it seems to me that all Illusionism does is shift the problem. Isn't the problem of creating illusins of qualia just as hard? — Echarmion

Nope, because an illusion of qualia does not present a fundamental conceptual problem That's what the illusionists think.

But we don't need a justification to ignore the hard problem. We can just concentrate on the easier problems regardless. It's not like the hard problems presents any barrier to physical research. — Echarmion

You don't need a justification to ignore any philosophical problem. You can just do it. Same with math, history, unsolved crimes, etc. But some people will continue to be interested in those puzzles and want to solve them. Even some scientists. Why does it matter at all? Because the hard problem potentially alters what we think about the world and ourselves. But again, you can ignore that if you want.

I would take the self to be part of the experience we miscategorize as phenomenal, and not something separate from that. But I'm not saying illusionism is necessarily right. Only that it's more sophisticated than has been given credit.

I have no idea what consciousness is. I only know it presents a confounding puzzle.

Our perceptual sensations are out there in the world if there are other minds. — Harry Hindu

"Out there in the world" is understood to be mind-independent. Naive realism assumes that objects have all the properties we perceive them to have, the way we perceive them. That has been shown to be wrong. The mind-independent world is not simply a reflection of our perceptions. Not unless you're a subjective idealist.

How can you even claim that science has provides answers if we don't get at the real states-of-affairs of the universe in some way. — Harry Hindu

Of course I'm assuming science is providing answers based on some correlation with the real world. But there is a long standing problem of perception. Which is why skepticism never completely goes away, and people come to different metaphysical conclusions about the nature of reality.

We've had 100+ page debates on this in the old forum before.

If the world isn't colored in, or sound or feel like we experience it, then how can you say that there are brains that produce qualia? It seems to me that minds produce brains - which is a 3-dimensional colored shape as we experience it. What is it really "out there" - brains or minds? How does a mind "fictionalize" other minds - as brains? — Harry Hindu

Inference to the best explanation, given the overwhelming data from studies, experiments and various medical cases we have now.

Science is not compatible with the world being colored in, full of sound, feels, etc. But this was known to an extent in ancient philosophy. Full-blown naive realism just cannot be the case. Now maybe a sophisticated version of direct realism can work, but not one that places our perceptual sensations out there in the world.

The self is is itself a useful fiction. Don't Buddhists consider it to be an illusion?

and a mirage would be an illusion within the "illusion" of consciousness, — Harry Hindu

I'm not sure whether this is a pro or con. Maybe the fact that we're subject to illusions and hallucinations suggests that the entire thing is illusiory. Why would genuine qualia be subject to illusion?

Maybe chill out while reading this:

https://nbviewer.jupyter.org/github/k0711/kf_articles/blob/master/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/illusionism.pdf

True, but it's also being used as a metaphor. Illusionists aren't saying there's literally a computer-like graphical display in the brain. Also because vision is just one of the senses, and we should be mindful not to base too much philosophical argument based on vision alone, as that can be misleading.

However, to your point, I do wonder about dreams and day dreams, which very much seem like a theater or movie playing in the head. It's weird to me how the hard problem is super-focused on perception, when I think the hardest part is the non-perceptual experiences, because those aren't originating from outside. A dream is almost entirely a product of the brain (setting aside occasional external stimulus making their way into the dream). And that presents a problem.

And what are the implications, other than that the hard problem doesn't exist? — Echarmion

That's the point of the debate. If there's no hard problem, then it's just a matter of the easier problems amenable to neuroscience and psychology. Easier as in they don't cause a metaphysical or epistemological issue.

But sensory modalities are a thing, and bat's utilize sonar which we don't, so they may have a kind of experience, or at least an illusion that we don't.

"What it's like" is just a way of saying that.

That's the problem... — creativesoul

The what it's like is the illusion that we have qualia. So we are having an experience that seems to be what it's like in the sense of the hard problem. It's a powerful illusion.

I admit this isn't entirely convincing. The crux of the argument is whether one can present this in a way where the illusion isn't itself phenomenal.

But what it is doing is attacking the notion that we can just take our introspective judgement of consciousness at face value. What if we're wrong?

That strikes me as a we bit circular. The hard problem is the reason we are even considering the approach. — Echarmion

Yes, but this is a rejection of the hard problem, while explaining why we mistakenly think there is one.

But since, in that scenario, we are the computer desktop, it seems entirely irrelevant (much like the simulation hypothesis, incidentally). — Echarmion

Yes, the brain is presenting an "interface" to itself. Some people have suggested this is for an greater ability to reflect instead of just automatic responses.

How does the brain introspect, and when a brain introspects, why doesn't it experience an arrangement of excited neurons rather than the qualia of colors, shapes, sounds, etc.,? — Harry Hindu

Why would the brain produce a qualia of colors, shapes, sounds, etc.? Qualia aren't compatible with neuroscience. That's why it's called the hard problem.

For something to be useful, it has to have some sort of connection with real states of affairs in the environment. — Harry Hindu

Yes, but I take it this position is assuming indirect realism. It's certainly assuming that science has shown that the world is not colored in, doesn't sound or taste or feel like we experience it.

I don't understand how a "fiction" is useful for anything but entertainment, — Harry Hindu

A fiction would be useful for hiding the overwhelming complexity an organism is dealing with. But you raise some good question I don't know enough to answer.

What's the difference between experiencing the illusion of qualia and experiencing qualia themselves? — Echarmion

One leads to a hard problem and one doesn't.

What difference does it make in any practical capacity? — Echarmion

An analogy used is that the illusion is like a computer desktop, which is a useful abstraction for users, while the underlying computer system is quite different from the visual interface.

It can be said, not without adequate justification, that we've outgrown the colonial mindset and no nation is currently engaged in conquering other lands in an expansionist attitude. — TheMadFool

The existence of nuclear and economic superpowers and their role in organizations like the UN and Nato have a lot to do with that. It's not so easy to conquer another nation these days and get away with it.

The mediocrity principle implies that we should regard our habitable situation as "average". The rare earth hypothesis violates that. It claims our habitable conditions are/were exceptionally NOT average. Is there a good justification for this? — RogueAI

The justification is in multiplying the probabilities which lead to a technological civilization. You start off with some percentage for habitable planets, factor in some probability of life emerging, then the likelihood of that world being stable enough for life to stick around, then the advent of multicellular life, and finally some form of life that can create sophisticated tech.

On Earth, there's only been one species in 3.5 billion years which matches that. We also have a rather large moon that keeps the Earth from wobbling too much and generates larger tides, which may have played a role. And we have a Jupiter size planet farther out in the solar system which attracts or deflects a lot of large comets and meteors. Also, we don't live too close to the galactic core or a star about to go supernova.

There's a lot of factors that go into us or any complex, idiosyncratic species evolving. And consider one other thing. The principle of mediocrity doesn't change the fact that your birth was a very low probability event. If any one of a trillion things went differently, you probably wouldn't be here. But here you are instead of the countless other humans who could have existed.

Tardigrades, immortal jellyfish, flatforms, possibly lobsters and turtles... — Pfhorrest

All those organisms die. They just don't do so from aging. There's no such thing as immortality. Something always kills you.

Someone dropping a big rock on the earth is far more survivable than living on another planet, and there doesn't seem to be a lot of doubt that the latter will eventually (if not soon) be possible. — Pfhorrest

But if it's dropped with the purpose of knocking out the "immortality" technology, then there goes living "forever", or whatever takes out the backup body facility. A space rock is just an extreme example of blowing it up, or releasing some flesh eating nanobots.

And the Earth can be moved, and the sun can be changed. You're looking at things through the primitive lens of a Type 0 civilization. — Pfhorrest

That's all science fiction, but even if doable someday, none of it grants individuals immortality. If nothing else, we can kill each other just fine with all that fancy future tech.

Heat death of the universe is not guaranteed if it is not a closed system, which dark energy suggests it is not. — Pfhorrest

Pretty sure it is. At the very least, everything will expand until there's nothing left to harness. If you want to believe in immortality, just have faith in whatever deity grants it rather than hoping some extreme scifi scenario will get you there.

At any rate, research into telomeres isn't going to make you invincible or give you everlasting access to energy.

That's also the reason we better continue to cure "regular" diseases because otherwise longevity research will just be a waste as nobody can enjoy its full potential otherwise. — Benkei

Also because cancer will kill everyone eventually if lifespans are extended enough (assuming something else doesn't first).

Altered Carbon is on Netflix, though I did not really like the plot. — Echarmion

And people can be killed for good on that show. You just have to destroy the technology that stores people's minds, which happens. Even that super rich dude with a dedicated backup satellite and bunch of clones isn't immune to someone taking him out.

And of course Earth isn't immune to the sun expanding to a red giant, or someone dropping a big rock on it.

You think the wright brothers listened to people when they told them they couldn't fly? — Witchhaven87

Flying was possible, and birds already showed that to be the case, while living forever is not, and there is nothing immortal.

It's highly and most likely we will yes but you're not god so don't act like you know for certain that it is predetermined I'm gonna die as well as you. — Witchhaven87

It's 100% absolutely certain you will die at some point. No technological breakthrough will change that, ever. At the every extreme end of what's possible, entropy and the heat death of the universe will make sure of it. But before then, all sorts of things will kill you first.

What you're asking for is the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine. It's not thermodynamically possible. But we don't have to go that far, since statistics would make it 99.999999999999999999999% likely you die of one of a billion other things even if aging is cured during our lifetimes. You're more likely to walk through a solid wall.

I'm not gonna die because people can get it together. — Witchhaven87

You're going to die for one reason or another, no matter what medical and technological breakthroughs happen during your life. Only question is how long and how healthy will your life be.

whether chairs really exist. — Pfhorrest

It depends on whether God said, "Let there be chairs", or God said, "Let there be particles arranged chair-wise".

Or alternatively, the chair-forms emanated from the ground of being, and the particles partake in the divine form.

..because if there is an all-knowing, all-seeing and all-powerful being, then the answer to every philosophical question becomes "Because God Says". — Banno

Is it an answer to every question because God says so, or is God says so an answer to every question because of God's nature? If the first, then logic is divine fiat, if the second, then God is logic.

If God is logic, then checkmate, atheist.

Life isn't meaningful either. It's a misapplication of the term. Life just is. You might find any given action or goal meaningful (purposeful is a better word), but the fact that you're alive has no inherent meaning.

Are there true sentences involving colors as objects of them? If so, then colors exist. — Pfhorrest

"The sky is blue."

Obviously true, right? Well hold on there

We know there's a lot more eletromagnetic radiation in the atmosphere than what we can see. If we could see it, what color would the sky look like? Most likely not the clear blue we see.

So it can't be simply true in the objective sense. It can only be true for animals with vision similar to ours.

It's just ridiculous. If 'science' can't square with simple everyday facts... then 'science' is using the wrong linguistic framework. — creativesoul

Or common sense is just plain wrong, as it has often been shown to be the case. After all, if science disagrees with the obvious fact that the sun moves across the sky, the Earth is stationary, and the table is completely solid, then obviously it's using the wrong language when it says the earth is a sphere in motion and tables are mostly empty space, right?

Or the sky is water held up by the firmaments. Why else would it look blue?

So take this to the final step... is your conclusion that colours do not exist? — Banno

They don't exist as objective properties. But they do exist in the same way anything subjective or mind-dependent exists. I take the question to be an ontological one, and therefore colors don't have a mind-independent, real existence, anymore than hallucinations, thoughts or dreams do.

It's like asking whether pain exists. Yes, as a sensation it certainly does. But no, it doesn't exist independent of organisms that experience pain.

The table is made of wood; therefore there is no table, only wood.

Would you agree with this?

The table is made of atoms which are mostly space. Therefore there is not table, only space. — Banno

I would tend to say the table is a collection of molecules arranged table-wise. Ordinary objects don't exist quite as we think they do (yes, I'm hedging a little bit here).

The sky is the selective absorption of certain wavelengths of light. Therefore there is no sky. — Banno

There's an atmosphere, or collection of gas molecules several miles thick around the Earth.

Colours are differing electromagnetic frequencies. Therefore there are no colours.

Colours are just the result of differential firing of the rods and cones in your eye. Therefore there are not really any colours. — Banno

Colors, in terms of our experience of color, are correlated with visual brain states, somehow. The rest is a causal story of how visual perception works.

Perhaps. But do you see how naive realism is foundational? — Banno

Yes. And Philosophy began (at least in part) by challenging that foundation.

It doesn't hide the assumption of naive realism - it displays it and shows that it underpins language use. — Banno

But it doesn't show that naive realism is true.

And there is no rationality that can show how any statement can have a direct correspondence to the 'world of actuality'. — A Seagull

It's pretty easy to show how "Donald Trump is POTUS" is true, though. If I said instead, "Alien life exists out there.", then your criticism would apply, as we don't have any way of justifying that statement, so we don't know the truth of the matter.

Now if I knew you were guessing that about the president of the US, but didn't really know, then it would be a matter of belief.

The second asks about the domain of a predicate, are there things that are coloured? ∃(x)f(x)?

This difference in structure shows why it is so much easier to see the second as asking 'bout word use. — Banno

It's asking whether the world is colored in as we perceive it to be.

Let's take an example. "Is the sky blue on a clear, sunny day?"

On an ordinary language usage, it is obviously is. That's because the ordinary language usage assumes normally sighted human vision. Or at least for languages that make usage of blue hues.

But what if the question is asking whether the sky is actually blue on a clear, sunny day? Then it's no longer about normally sighted human vision for language speakers that utilize blue hues.

It turns into a question about the nature of the world. And since we know that visible light is but a small part of the EM spectrum, and that other animals can see in wavelengths and primary colors that we cannot, then it's not so obvious what the answer is.

It lends itself to questioning whether the world is colored in at all. Maybe color isn't a property of the environment and things themselves, but rather animal perceptual systems. If that's true, then the sky isn't actually blue at all. It's not any color.

That's the difference between a philosophical question concerning what we perceive, and one making use of ordinary language. The first can also be a scientific one.

The problem with ordinary language in this case is that it hides an assumption of naive realism when it comes to color. And a lot of other things, for that matter.

Why? — 180 Proof

Because it takes time to go from pond scum to up-right standing monoliths. There should be aliens running the gamut between us and the advanced ones. Unless there's a reason they get wiped out or subsumed.

Suppose, as I point out in wall-of-text # (iv), we can't recognize "any evidence for them" - we can't surmise validly from our own intellectual / technological deficits that we're alone even locally in this constellation or galaxy. — 180 Proof

For the god-like ones, sure. But for ones closer to pond scum?

Some people are bothered by consciousness not having a location in the atlas of the brain. It doesn't bother me. I'm just glad it's there. — Bitter Crank

The only thing that bothers me about consciousness is that I just can't turn it off when I want to. If I could go p-zombie mode for undesirable situations, that would be nice.