Mind is myth. Non-actual. — bongo fury

Are information processors, generators and experiencers also myths?

So why are you still involved in the odd word game? You enjoy sophistry and 100 page threads arguing over the status of red cups and apples?

t's a tragedy that no such rescue-mission ever reached our planet; it could have prevented 540 million years of unimaginable suffering. — David Pearce

But then we wouldn't be here. Some alien reengineered biosphere would have been the result. No dinosaurs either :(

Maybe that's a resolution to the Fermi Paradox. Benevolent aliens go around reengineering life. They just haven't gotten around to us yet. Do you think sentient life should be allowed a choice in the matter?

For the first time in history, it's technically possible to engineer a biosphere where all sentient beings can flourish. I know of no good moral reason for perpetuating the horror-show of Darwinian life. — David Pearce

If you're talking about the existing biosphere, that would mean reengineering almost everything including microbes. I'd be really worried about that going badly wrong. Seems way more challenging than creating a new one on Mars or Venus (not that terraforming is easy, but your timescale seems to be over centuries or millennia).

But as for the morality of it, do you think we should do the same if we come across an alien biome? Would we want advanced aliens to come tame our world?

David, do you view transhumanism as a more likely outcome than the dystopian possibilities given the kinds of technologies involved? Potential dangers would include a nascent superintelligence not aligned with human values, CRISPR being used to make bioweapons, gray goo nanotech scenarios, and of course, the super rich receiving the lion share of the benefits, since they'll be to afford riding the early wave of accelerating improvements.

In today's world, although we've reaped a great deal of benefit from the ongoing computing revolution, it seems the general public has become more cynical recently of how technology is being used to push ads, surveil citizens, radicalize people on social media and increase the wealth gap. I'm using that as an example of a technology that has transformed society with a lot of early utopian ideals.

so reality can't be fundamentally mathematical. — Harry Hindu

I don't know what reality fundamentally is, but the question is whether reality includes some sort of abstraction, which would mean nominalism is wrong. If it does, math is the best candidate. At least the maths that are applicable to the world.

Aliens could use a different scribble to refer to the quantity, or use a totally different number-system for all we know. — Harry Hindu

It's hard to see how aliens would come up with a different arithmetic for discrete entities and it have the same usefulness.

Can numbers exist on their own without being attributed to things? — Harry Hindu

I don't know, but they seem to have an objectivity which goes beyond our arbitrary choice of words and symbols.

Can things exist without being counted, or having numbers attributed to them? — Harry Hindu

Sure, but can they be understood to exist without any mathematical properties?

When comparing an apple to an orange, are all the words that we use to compare them numerical? Is color numerical, what about taste or smell? — Harry Hindu

No, I don't think math is all there is to existing.

When talking about ten chickens, are you talking about a number or chickens? — Harry Hindu

Both. Were there not 10 chickens before humans were around to count them? The example I always heard was 2 dinosaurs were in a pond, and then a third joined. Did 1 + 2 = 3 not exist in the Jurassic?

t's not the numbers that are equal, but the weight, right? When we talk about weight, are we talking about measurements, or something else? Aren't measurements OF something? Isn't a measurement simply a comparison of objects and their features? — Harry Hindu

Sure, but the measurement always gives us a numerical value of some kind, and we decide on the units.

Does an object weigh 19 pounds or 8.6 kg? — Harry Hindu

Those are just different units for the same value.

Would it be possible to do meamingful math without the numbers referring to things that are not mathematical? — Harry Hindu

Yes, math is done in abstraction all the time. It's not like there are prime chickens.

Thanks for the book reference. Without having read it, what does the author replace numbers with? If it's something else that's abstract (some kind of operators that can quantify over particulars), then nothing is gained, because then you have to account for that abstraction.

My question would be that if you ditched numbers, how can talk about the properties of electrons, such as their mass and charge, since the value is the same for all electrons? Another way to ask the question is what are physical properties if they're not mathematical (que Tegmark)?

But numbers are just symbols. Where in reality is there a number that the symbol points to? Quantities are always OF something, not something that can exist on its own. Math is merely a comparison of measurements. — Harry Hindu

If that's true, then it should be possible to do physics without numbers.

Where is the number/quantity 19 in relation to the symbol 19? — Harry Hindu

In the world somehow? I don't know, but the symbol 19 is arbitrary. There are other symbols that also denote 19, such as its binary representation or the word nineteen. A mathematical object is not its symbol, since the symbol can be anything we want it to be.

Anyway, the mass of an electron is the same value before our evolutionary ancestors could count. We understand that value numerically.

It being Easter, there was a famous underdog, born into lowly circumstances, died a horrible death, betrayed by one of his supposed friends. (Forgive me, I’m hazy on the detail.....) — Wayfarer

Granted, but the historical figure probably expected God to send angels to fight off Rome and restore the kingdom of Israel. He most likely didn't expect he'd get crucified and then worshipped as a savior for a new religion.

Are you asking if the actual scribble, 19, came to exist when mathematical language was created or what it represents came to exist when mathematical language came to exist? What is the scribble, 19? What does it represent? Is not, "prime number" a word in a language? — Harry Hindu

Obviously I'm not talking about the symbol. It's the number it references, not whatever we use to denote it. 19 is just a symbol. It represents a quantity which is also prime.

Right. So is math the numbers and symbols, or the thing the the numbers and symbols are about, or the relationship between the numbers and symbols and what they are about? — Harry Hindu

Math is about the mathematical objects the symbols represent. Numbers, sets, proofs, functions, graphs, whatever. Realism is asking whether any of those objects are real, not the symbols. The symbols we came up with to represent the objects.

To describe something is to use symbols to represent that thing. Does it really matter if we use math, English or Spanish? — Harry Hindu

It matters for this debate. If we can't use a non-abstract language to describe the world, then the realists about abstract arguments have a good argument for something abstract being part of the world.

Sure, because the mathematical concepts refer to states of affairs that isn't just more math. What is a mathematical concept, if not words in a language? Are you saying that it's mathematical concepts all the way down? Are you an idealist? — Harry Hindu

The realist argument is that those numbers and symbols are about something which exists independent of us.

So you agree that language is necessary for math? — Harry Hindu

For us to do the math. Does that mean prime numbers only came to exist when mathematical language was created? I'm not so sure about that.

The universe isn't made of numbers and function symbols. It is composed of objects and their processes. The scribbles on paper refer to those objects and their processes. Are electrons numbers or objects or processes? Are tables and chairs composed of numbers or electrons? — Harry Hindu

I don't know what a fundamental particle is. I do know that its properties are described mathematically. Tegmark's point is that all physical properties are mathematical. I don't know whether that just means we have to understand them that way, or that there is real mathematical structure.

The challenge to the anti-realist here is to come up with a way of describing electrons that doesn't use math but is still faithful to the experimental results and predictions.

ut the sceptic has misunderstood "here is a hand" in order to doubt it. — Banno

The skeptic is responding to Moore’s metaphysical realism. Waving a hand around doesn’t prove anything beyond the experience of having a hand. Moore thinks he can turn that into a metaphysical statement.

Never read a layman's book on QM? — Harry Hindu

They typically describe the history of some important experiments and physicists leading to the development of QM along with the various interpretations and the authors opinion. But they also include a few equations, with a note that QM is describing a world of the microphysical we don't experience.

I'll revise my question. Can you replace the equations in QM with English making no reference to mathematical concepts?

Math would have never been discovered without language. — Harry Hindu

And prime numbers would have never been discovered without math.

What you can say with mathematics you can say in English. — Harry Hindu

So then give us the English account of QM without any math.

The problem I see with Platonic realism is that if it is not taken to be claiming that there is a separate realm where the Ideas, universals and numbers live, then I can't see what it is claiming other than that (at least some) ideas and generalities have a conceptual or logical existence which is independent of human opinion. — Janus

The strongest case for realism is that we can't do science without some kind of abstract entities, whether they're mathematical or other kind of operators quantifying over particulars. I recently listened to a Sean Carol podcast with a philosopher arguing for a kind of mathematical realism who makes that point. An even stronger case which he defended is that arithmetic is strongly related to consistency, and you can't do away with it unless you're willing to ditch giving consistent accounts of the world.

Now maybe that must means our cognition requires us to have some sort of consistent abstraction to make sense of the world. But that raises the question of why the world would be that creatures would find it advantageous to evolve such a cognition, if there are no real abstract entities whatsoever.

Of course Carol himself thinks that the world does have a mathematical structure to it described by the wavefunction, but that's a separate matter.

The point is that doubting in some circumstances is unreasonable, i.e., our doubting needs good reasons, just as our knowledge claims do. — Sam26

Sure, so we can dismiss Descartes as being unreasonable when he set out to doubt everything. But the ancient skeptics did provide reasons for their doubts. You have the ten modes of Pyrrhonism which provide arguments based on the relativity of sensory organs, locations, situations and what not. Also that every dogmatic position can have an equally compelling counter argument.

Then you have Humean skepticism based on the problem of induction. A popular modern version of skepticism is Bostrom's simulation hypothesis. Then there are arguments based on the findings of science that the world we perceive is a kind of illusion. The Problem of the Many attacks our standard notion of regular objects as having well defined boundaries. And this forum has had many debates which involved QM and what that means for the kind of world we live in. I'm currently reading this book:

We're not forced to, we're just very strongly encouraged to be part of communities. But if someone really wants to self-isolate, they can do so.



That book is about the guy who drove to Maine, abandoned his car and lived in the wilderness for three decades. Granted, he did have to resort to stealing from cottages to survive, but he lived alone without interaction until he was finally arrested.

I haven't read the book, but I've heard about the story on the radio, and the guy (Christopher) claims he was never lonely or bored. His sense of being a self also dissolved during that time. I would guess that means his inner dialog was silenced because he no longer needed to think about himself in relation to others. Except that he did feel guilty about the stealing.

Of course there was the Into the Wild book and movie where another Christopher ends up living in the wilderness of Alaska in an abandoned bus. But he dies from starvation when he eats the wrong plant. The thing with trying to be a hermit is it's hard to survive totally independent of community. People who build cabins in the middle of Alaska tend to have planes fly supplies in from time to time. And some of them do tv shows to help foot the bill.

Everyone agrees that we have experiences of seeing color, hearing sound, feeling pain and what not. But people are going to hotly disagree on the semantics of those terms as they fit into one's preferred solution or defense of the hard problem when it comes to qualia. For some that means dissolving the dispute.

Objections to qualia include its incompatibility with physicalism, the problem it poses for a scientific understanding, and how it makes our conscious world private from others. Those who don't like the subjective/objective split tend to favor dissolving the distinction in favor of everything including mental activity being part of the world. For people who don't like how it's incompatible with the material world, they will point out that it's hard to see how the brain and qualia could interact. Thus the old objections to dualism.

And then there are those who just don't like there being a substantial philosophical problem that doesn't go away, particularly of the metaphysical variety. They tend to view such problems as highly suspect and in need of linquistic therapy.

Personally, I don't see any solution to the hard problem as workable (at least so far). We're conscious, consciousness is at least somewhat subjective, private and non-reducible to brain functioning. That it poses a significant problem is interesting. But I tend to think metaphysical problems are substantial and maybe we're just not smart enough or scientifically advanced enough to solve them yet.

Or alternatively, we're not epistemically situated to answer some questions. Some people hate that, but why should humans be able to answer any conceivable question?

Why not? What's evolution got to do with the judgement of sensations? Evolution requires that appropriate behaviours are produced in response to environmental circumstances. It has no preference at all for how. — Isaac

How do you suppose behaviors are produced in response to environmental circumstances? The brain must be doing something with the manifold of raw sensation. Something like cognition.

That is to have already lumped them. — Isaac

So there aren't unpleasant sensations until we create words for them? That makes no evolutionary sense.

No, sensations are biological, 'Pain' is a concept created by a socially communicating group collecting some of those sensations and naming them. — Isaac

Semantics. What difference does it make if we lump all the sensations which hurt into one general category? The matter at hand is the subjective nature of the sensations.

So what is missing, what form must an answer take in order to constitute one here? — Isaac

Pain doesn't come from language, it's biological. We wouldn't have language for sensations or feelings if we didn't already have them. That's why there's no words for sonar sensation, or colors outside the three primary color mixes we see. We only create words for sensations/feelings we have as human beings. But homo sapiens don't exhaust the range of possible conscious experiences, given that animal biology can differ in all sorts of ways from our own.

The form an answer needs to take is to show how a scientific explanation of the relevant biology results in conscious experiences. Certain pattens of neurons fire and we experience color. How do neurons firing result in color sensations? There's no answer to this as of yet.

Instead, there's a bunch of philosophical arguments ranging over all the various positions on consciousness. I have no idea what an answer will look like. That's why we endlessly argue over it.

If we were discussing universals and you said "It seems to me that there are universals and so therefore there are universals" that would be the end of that discussion too. — Isaac

It would be more like if one person was arguing for universals and the other against by citing physics in support of everything being particular. Which would miss the point of the argument for universals, which already acknowledges that the empirical world is particular. The question would still remain, where do the universals we categorize everything by come from?

Same sort of thing with consciousness. You can cite all the neuroscience you want, but we already know the brain is behind consciousness. We still want to know where the red, pain, dreams, etc. come from, since neural activity isn't itself colored, painful, etc.

Are the reasons for replying to a question with "no comment" identical to the reasons for keeping mum? — TheMadFool

That would always depend on the particular question and poster. Are you looking for some sort of universal ethic here? There is none.

I'm not a computer scientists, so if there's some technical issue I'm unaware of then maybe this would be difficult, but I can't see the intrinsic barrier. Ctrl+esc gives me a rundown of the cpu's occupation, this, despite the fact that the cpu must be in use running the program which works out how 'in use' the cpu is. — Isaac

Sure, but it's not telling you what the CPU hardware is actually doing. And binary is an abstraction of electricity being moved around through logic gates with high and low voltages.

Inner dialogue is talking, no? — Isaac

Private conversation.

We can use our models and shared language to report the state of our models and shared language. Saying "Ah, but your conclusion is just a model too" isn't sufficient on its own to undermine anything. — Isaac

Our models and shared language include private and subjective. The mental talk is part of ordinary language. What's ironic here is that ordinary language philosophy in the form of a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein is being used to discount the ordinary talk of mental states.

No you don't. You think and wonder using neurons. You talk using language. — Isaac

Inner dialog doesn't exist? I hear my thoughts in words.

Because you're claiming it is something private, yet identifiable. I'm refuting that claim, so the next step is for you to present your alternative. I don't know if you're familiar with how discussion works... — Isaac

You haven't refuted it ...

I'm neutral on no commenting, because people can have different reasons for not commenting.

One might be that they just don't know the topic well enough. Another might be that they don't have the time to make a proper response. Or maybe they just don't feel strongly enough one way or another.

Or, they're Pyrrhonian skeptics and are intentionally not taking a position.

You do realize this is just a social construct right? — frank

A pubic carving up of the world.

I've seen no support for the assertion that you know your own conscious experiences, nor have you even suggested a mechanism by which you could (without public linguistic conventions). — Isaac

Luckily for me, it doesn't matter what you've seen. This is like arguing with a solipsist.

Which of all that (and the several hundred more) is 'happiness'? — Isaac

If you don't already know what it is to feel happy, why should I bother trying to tell you?

When people say "I'm happy", what are they doing with the word? Pointing to a chunk of this stream of experience that has a label on it saying 'happiness'? — Isaac

They're talking about an emotional state.

There's a recent television show called Counterpart where an experiment ends up duplicating our world exactly. The other world is linked to ours through the lab, where the scientist meets his duplicate, and things begin to diverge from there. An organization on both worlds is setup to perform various experiments where one world is the control to gain new knowledge. But things start to take a dark turn as people start messing with their other lives, and the organization turns into a spy agency.

We can still compare someone being happy with someone being sad even if their happiness and sadness are never exactly our happiness and sadness. To the extent we can tell when other people are happy or sad, which is not always.

I grant the comparison is inexact, but there is still a comparison of sorts, in that we discriminate feelings for ourselves and others, and often know what it means for someone else to be sad.

What is your alternative by which we could carve up the sensed world by private means and yet still tell each other what we'd done? — Isaac

Intersubjectivity which includes attribution of mental content to others. I know my own conscious experiences and assume other people have similar ones. Mirror neurons play a role in this, allowing us to simulate what others probably feel.

That's not possible is it? Public concepts require boundary indicators or sets of props which are publicly available, otherwise they're undefined. — Isaac

Only if you adopt a certain philosophical position that makes it impossible.