not following 'you' — Isaac

Well, you said that all knowledge is inferential. I asked what inferences you make to know that you are having pain sensations. You claimed that you made inferences from your brain signals. Personally, I'm not consciously aware of signals being sent from my thalamus, and I just have pain sensations without making any inferences. I guess I'm weird like that.

I'm not consciously aware of signals being sent from my thalamus, and I just feel my pain sensations. I guess I'm weird like that. — Luke

You are aware of them. Awareness of a thing and knowing what it's technical name is are not the same thing.

How am I aware of the signals being sent from my thalamus? If I were conscious of it, I think I would know.

Why do people in ordinary language occasionally say things like, "the pain must be in your head"?

Here's the thing i would guard against: those who have, either explicitly or implicitly, a theory of the meaning of "red" or "pain" such that these words refer to something in one's mind. — Banno

Where did the meaning of something being in someone's mind come from?

No. The neuroscientist is not correlating with experiences he has. He's correlating with the spoken words the subject is reporting, on the assumption that these refer to something shared - the public concept of pain. — Isaac

So why are they called, "the neural correlates of consciousness"?

Here's the thing i would guard against: — Banno

No need, really. Having gained their victory, such theoreticians find precious little profit in venturing into that which for them, would be naught but a wasteland.

Still, probably best beware the odd quixotic nonetheless, for whom the proper theoretician is not responsible.

How am I aware of the signals being sent from my thalamus? If I were conscious of it, I think I would know. — Luke

You're aware of your arm movements aren't you? Well, they're signals from your proprioception system through your cerebellum. All I've done there is given it a technical name and added some detail to the route, I've not changed what you're aware of.

Let's say you had some lesion within your cerebellum, you think your arm is doing one thing, but it's actually doing another. What is it you're 'aware of' there? You can't say "my arm", you're obviously not aware of your arm. You're aware of the (faulty) signals from your cerebellum. You assume they're telling you about your arm.

Why do people in ordinary language occasionally say things like, "the pain must be in your head"? — Marchesk

The last part of the system I described to Luke

... These are then modulated, filtered and suppressed in turn by models in the frontal cortex which is where cultural mediation, semantics, other somatosensory feedback and environmental cues come in to play. — Isaac

So why are they called, "the neural correlates of consciousness"? — Marchesk

...on the assumption that these refer to something shared - the public concept... — Isaac

You're aware of your arm movements aren't you? Well, they're signals from your proprioception system through your cerebellum. — Isaac

My arm movements are not my brain function. Am I aware of my arm movements or am I aware of my brain function? The awareness of my arm movements might be the result of my brain function, but that doesn't mean I have awareness of my brain function.

I've not changed what you're aware of. — Isaac

Clearly you have.

Am I aware of my arm movements or am I aware of my brain function? — Luke

I've just shown that. If you have a lesion in part of your cerebellum the thing you think of as awareness of your arm clearly isn't. You're obviously not aware of your arm (your arm is in one place, your awareness is telling you it's in another). So it simply can't be that you're aware of the location of your arm. You're conclusively not.

The last part of the system I described to Luke

... These are then modulated, filtered and suppressed in turn by models in the frontal cortex which is where cultural mediation, semantics, other somatosensory feedback and environmental cues come in to play.
— Isaac — Isaac

So the public referent to "pain in your head" comes from a bunch of technical jargon?

...on the assumption that these refer to something shared - the public concept... — Isaac

The public concept is of a first person experience. That's why it's called a correlation.

Let's say you had some lesion within your cerebellum, you think your arm is doing one thing, but it's actually doing another. What is it you're 'aware of' there? You can't say "my arm", you're obviously not aware of your arm. — Isaac

What I'm conscious of is what I think my arm is doing, even if it's doing something else. What I am not conscious of are the brain signals that help to produce or inform my conscious thought about what my arm is doing.

You're aware of the (faulty) signals from your cerebellum. You assume they're telling you about your arm. — Isaac

I'd imagine that I wouldn't need to make assumptions about my arm if I was already aware of the signals from my cerebellum. But why stop there? I don't see why I shouldn't also be aware of the lesion, if I were to actually have these superpowers of awareness about my unconscious bodily functions.

The last part of the system I described to Luke

... These are then modulated, filtered and suppressed in turn by models in the frontal cortex which is where cultural mediation, semantics, other somatosensory feedback and environmental cues come in to play.
— Isaac — Isaac


So the public referent to "pain in your head" comes from a bunch of technical jargon? — Marchesk

You didn't ask where the public referent fro the expression came from. You asked why people said it. Not all words directly refer.

...on the assumption that these refer to something shared - the public concept... — Isaac


The public concept is of a first person experience. — Marchesk

That's not possible is it? Public concepts require boundary indicators or sets of props which are publicly available, otherwise they're undefined.

What I'm conscious of is what I think my arm is doing, even if it's doing something else. What I am not conscious of are the brain signals that help to produce or inform my conscious thought about what my arm is doing. — Luke

The second part is just a technical definition of the first.

I'd imagine that I wouldn't need to make assumptions about my arm if I was already aware of the signals from my cerebellum. — Luke

Why not?

But why stop there? I don't see why I shouldn't also be aware of the lesion, if I were to actually have these superpowers of awareness about my unconscious bodily functions. — Luke

Why does being aware on one aspect mean that you automatically should be aware of all aspects? I'm aware of sound at mid-level pitch, does that mean I 'should' be aware of all pitches?

What I'm conscious of is what I think my arm is doing, even if it's doing something else. What I am not conscious of are the brain signals that help to produce or inform my conscious thought about what my arm is doing.
— Luke

The second part is just a technical definition of the first. — Isaac

What do you mean by a "technical definition"?

I'm not aware of what goes on in my brain/body to produce my consciousness, and I don't need to be. I've hardly ever thought about how my brain functions, let alone been aware of it.

You cannot collapse the first- and third-person perspectives into one perspective. There's the bodily functions that produce your awareness, and then there's the stuff about which you are aware. You definitely do not need to be aware of the bodily functions that produce your awareness. In fact, I believe it's very difficult to simultaneously be aware of the bodily functions that are producing your awareness without some very expensive technology.

These two perspectives are not the same.

What do you mean by a "technical definition"? — Luke

Technical talk (pace David Lewis) - words used to describe something which do not form part of ordinary language and apply only to the subject or field under discussion.

There's the bodily functions that produce your awareness, and then there's the stuff about which you are aware. — Luke

Well then the stuff about which you are aware cannot have material form, otherwise you're claiming to be able to perform some magic trick, when really it's just grammar.

If we talk about being aware of 'the location of my arm' in the non-technical sense (the object of my mental awareness phenomenologically), then any conclusions drawn from that awareness are about that object - the phenomenological 'location of my arm'. At no point can any analysis done on the non-technical object of your awareness reveal anything at all about the technical 'location of my arm arm'.

If you want to maintain a non-technical sense of the objects of your awareness then that's entirely your lookout. But all the conclusions you draw from it remain in that realm. It cannot be said to be the case that these objects are private, or unique, or any other such universal. It can only be said that the seem to you to be private, or unique, or any other such, because the objects we're talking about are the mental representations as they sem to you.

I don't see how it's of any public interest how things happen to seem to you.

There's the bodily functions that produce your awareness, and then there's the stuff about which you are aware.
— Luke

Well then the stuff about which you are aware cannot have material form — Isaac

Why not?

If we talk about being aware of 'the location of my arm' in the non-technical sense (the object of my mental awareness phenomenologically), then any conclusions drawn from that awareness are about that object - the phenomenological 'location of my arm'. At no point can any analysis done on the non-technical object of your awareness reveal anything at all about the technical 'location of my arm arm'. — Isaac

I'm not trying to eliminate the third-person perspective in favour of first-person perspectives, like you are trying to eliminate first-person perspectives in favour of the third-person perspective. I'm just trying to get you to acknowledge that we have first-person perspectives at all. Do you have pain sensations?

If you want to maintain a non-technical sense of the objects of your awareness then that's entirely your lookout. But all the conclusions you draw from it remain in that realm. It cannot be said to be the case that these objects are private, or unique, or any other such universal. It can only be said that the seem to you to be private, or unique, or any other such, because the objects we're talking about are the mental representations as they sem to you.

I don't see how it's of any public interest how things happen to seem to you. — Isaac

There are no subjects or subjectivity? That's one solution, I suppose. I guess the discussion on the topic can be closed now.

There's the bodily functions that produce your awareness, and then there's the stuff about which you are aware.
— Luke

Well then the stuff about which you are aware cannot have material form — Isaac


Why not? — Luke

Because material forms are shared-world objects. It's been unquestionably established that what you're aware of cannot be the material object (your awareness presents matters not as they they actually are in a shred material sense).

If you mistake the creaking of a tree for dog growling, then we cannot be forever searching for the dog. It isn't there.

I'm just trying to get you to acknowledge that we have first-person perspectives at all. Do you have pain sensations? — Luke

You've just defined, quite clearly, that my first person perspectives are not about anything we can between us refer to as 'pain sensations' The only object that we could both agree constituted a referent for 'pain sensations' is a public object. If you only want to talk about subjective experience as being about objects as they appear to you, never relating them to public object, then the one cannot ever reveal anything about the other, they're two different objects.

There are no subjects or subjectivity? That's one solution, I suppose. I guess the discussion on the topic can be closed now. — Luke

It's not about there being no subjects or subjectivity. It's about translating the objects of subjective experience into public objects so that they can be talked about.

If you maintain that what you're aware of is 'the location of my arm', then you've immediately rendered all conversation about it meaningless. I can't comment at all about 'the location of your arm' in that sense. I can't use the term, it has no referent I can identify. So what's it's purpose linguistically?

You've just defined, quite clearly, that my first person perspectives are not about anything we can between us refer to as 'pain sensations' The only object that we could both agree constituted a referent for 'pain sensations' is a public object. If you only want to talk about subjective experience as being about objects as they appear to you, never relating them to public object, then the one cannot ever reveal anything about the other, they're two different objects. — Isaac

A reminder that the reason for our latest talk about pain sensations was due to your claim that all knowledge is inferential and my questioning what inferences you need to make in order to have pain sensations. Obviously you don't need to make any inferences to have pain sensations, but you changed the subject to talk about brain signals and the third-person perspective - a perspective from which pain sensations disappear - instead.

If you maintain that what you're aware of is 'the location of my arm', then you've immediately rendered all conversation about it meaningless. — Isaac

It was your example. Your example was about my awareness. As you said: "You're aware of your arm movements aren't you?"

I can't comment at all about 'the location of your arm' in that sense. I can't use the term, it has no referent I can identify. So what's it's purpose linguistically? — Isaac

Aren't we talking about what I'm aware of? You keep conflating my awareness of the location of my arm with the location of my arm. All I can say is it's your own example: "you think your arm is doing one thing, but it's actually doing another."

Obviously you don't need to make any inferences to have pain sensations, but you changed the subject to talk about brain signals and the third-person perspective - a perspective from which pain sensations disappear - instead. — Luke

I don't follow. You keep slipping in words like 'you' as if they referred to something other than the brain that I'm talking about. If 'you' is just, by definition, the bearer of conscious awareness, then obviously 'you' might infer pain sensations or 'you' might not. There's no fact of the matter for us to discuss because you've defined it as being the bearer of whatever your conscious awareness happens to be. One might feel one is inferring everything, or not. Or feel like one is the King of Arabia, or in contact with God...

It was your example. Your example was about my awareness. As you said: "You're aware of your arm movements aren't you?" — Luke

Yes, that was not particularly helpful. I was trying to show how your language can be translated to technical language, but I see now that it cannot and the problem runs deeper.

You keep conflating my awareness of the location of my arm with the location of my arm. All I can say is it's your own example: "you think your arm is doing one thing, but it's actually doing another." — Luke

No. This seems to be a running theme here. You cannot declare something to be an awareness of... as a subjective truth. The awareness bit is the subjective truth, you are having an experience of being aware. What you claim to be aware of is an object in the shared world. It's a mutual matter, amenable to empirical evidence, whether you are in fact aware of what you claim to be aware of. That you are aware is without question. The fact of the matter regarding what it is you are aware of is not without question. It is an objective, shared, fact about our mutual reality.

That's not possible is it? Public concepts require boundary indicators or sets of props which are publicly available, otherwise they're undefined. — Isaac

Only if you adopt a certain philosophical position that makes it impossible.

Only if you adopt a certain philosophical position that makes it impossible. — Marchesk

Well yes, but it's not as if such a position is adopted on a whim. It is (has been) exhaustively argued for. What is your alternative by which we could carve up the sensed world by private means and yet still tell each other what we'd done?

What is your alternative by which we could carve up the sensed world by private means and yet still tell each other what we'd done? — Isaac

Intersubjectivity which includes attribution of mental content to others. I know my own conscious experiences and assume other people have similar ones. Mirror neurons play a role in this, allowing us to simulate what others probably feel.

Asking if someone else has the very same feeling as I do is treating feelings as if they were noses or mobile phones. It's taking that language and misapplying it; feelings are not a something, and not a nothing, either. — Banno

We can still compare someone being happy with someone being sad even if their happiness and sadness are never exactly our happiness and sadness. To the extent we can tell when other people are happy or sad, which is not always.

I grant the comparison is inexact, but there is still a comparison of sorts, in that we discriminate feelings for ourselves and others, and often know what it means for someone else to be sad.

I don't follow. You keep slipping in words like 'you' as if they referred to something other than the brain that I'm talking about. If 'you' is just, by definition, the bearer of conscious awareness, then obviously 'you' might infer pain sensations or 'you' might not. — Isaac

Infer them from what? I don't figure out that I'm in pain by carrying around an MRI machine to see what my brain is doing and then infer from the scans that I must be in pain. I have pains without any MRI machine and without any inference.

There's no fact of the matter for us to discuss because you've defined it as being the bearer of whatever your conscious awareness happens to be. One might feel one is inferring everything, or not. Or feel like one is the King of Arabia, or in contact with God.. — Isaac

Again, I'm not claiming that there is only the first-person perspective. I've said that there are both shareable and unshareable aspects of subjectivity. On the other hand, you seem to want to eliminate the first-person perspective in favour of the third-person perspective. As @Marchesk pointed out, how can you speak of "neural correlates" if you only allow talk about the 'neural' but not the 'correlates'.

No. This seems to be a running theme here. You cannot declare something to be an awareness of... as a subjective truth. The awareness bit is the subjective truth, you are having an experience of being aware. What you claim to be aware of is an object in the shared world. It's a mutual matter, amenable to empirical evidence, whether you are in fact aware of what you claim to be aware of. That you are aware is without question. The fact of the matter regarding what it is you are aware of is not without question. — Isaac

You're saying this:

That you are aware is without question. The fact of the matter regarding x is not without question.

I'm saying this:

That you are aware of x is without question. The fact of the matter regarding x is not without question.

There's little difference between what you and I are saying here, except that your two statements have nothing (no 'x') in common. 'X' could be something you hallucinated or just something you thought you saw. That you were aware of 'x' is without question, even if there was no fact of the matter regarding 'x'. So your assertion that "You cannot declare something to be an awareness of... as a subjective truth" is false.

Similary, my awareness of my arm being at location A is without question, but the fact of my arm being at location A is not without question.

When it comes to someone's awareness of their own pain sensations or of how things seem to them, that they are aware of these things is the fact of the matter, without question.

Infer them from what? — Luke

Signals from your nociception system. I've already been through this.

Similary, my awareness of my arm being at location A is without question, but the fact of my arm being at location A is not without question. — Luke

This is not how 'awareness' is ordinarily used and I see no reason given for the special case.

"Are you aware of the works of Shakespeare?" - "Yes, 'Paradise Lost' is my favourite" - "No I'm talking about Romeo and Juliet, The Tempest..." - "Never heard of them" - "Oh, then it turns out you are not aware of the works of Shakespeare"

"Are you aware of what speed you're doing Sir?" - "Yes, my speedometer say 30mph" - "Well, you were clocked at 45" - "I wasn't aware of that, my speedometer must be broken" - Defence Lawyer: "My client was not aware of what speed he was doing, owing to a broken speedometer"

Doctor: "How's the recovery from that brain damage coming along?" - Patient: "Still not recovered, I'm not even aware of the location of my own hand yet"

And so on...

In all cases we treat the X in "I'm aware of X" as a public object amenable to empirical investigation. It can, in all cases, turn out that despite thinking you're aware of X, you are , in fact, not aware of X at all.

That you were aware of something is not in question (the works of Milton, the reading on the broken speedometer, the false signals from the cerebellum...) What is in question in each case is the matter that you are aware of.

Intersubjectivity which includes attribution of mental content to others. I know my own conscious experiences and assume other people have similar ones. Mirror neurons play a role in this, allowing us to simulate what others probably feel. — Marchesk

I've seen no support for the assertion that you know your own conscious experiences, nor have you even suggested a mechanism by which you could (without public linguistic conventions).

I am right now having a whole stream of dynamic, multi-threaded conscious experiences. My thoughts flit from the computer here, to the frosted lawn, the Robin at the window makes me smile, my (still unfinished) report nags to be done though, I'm rehearsing the words I type as I type them, as if I were speaking, there's an annoying hum coming from the screen and I wonder if it might be broken...

Which of all that (and the several hundred more) is 'happiness'?

When people say "I'm happy", what are they doing with the word? Pointing to a chunk of this stream of experience that has a label on it saying 'happiness'?