You may be right about the general, and I don't know about marathon swimming. Perhaps women have an advantage there.

The context was McEnroe's statement, and Serena is elite.

We can compare the top 700 male marathon runner times to female.

Want to make a bet on it?

Did you just vaguely look up "marathon records" or something? Those numbers don't say much, and are not detailed research. — Wosret

They're not, but the context is elite male/female athletes, not an average across all marathon participants, and I have run and watched enough track & field to know the gap between males and females.

Do you think it completely irrelevant that the gap between men's mile record and female's is close to the same for the marathon per mile? Do you think that elite male milers don't get within a few seconds of that mile record? Because they do. It's not a total statistical outlier.

It isn't in fact true. In marathon conditions, the gap closes. Women tend to weigh less, so that things that require less explosive force, and more continuous effort, the more body weight becomes more and more disadvantageous. — Wosret

The men's marathon record is 2:02:57. The women's records is 2:17:01.

I used to run track and cross country. I was decent for a male, but would have been world class for a female. Maybe the gap closes over long distance for your average runner, but probably not as much for the elites (a 14 minute gap or around 30 seconds per mile) seems about right, and the context of this conversation is elite tennis players.

If you compare the mile record in men (3:43) to women (4:12), which is about 30 seconds, then you have the same gap, at least for world record holders.

but rather concepts is something the we shape and create, and they cannot be forced on us from 'outside' (whether by experience or innate nature), because otherwise they would cease to be concepts in the logical sense and will be nothing more then behavioral instincts. — Fafner

So it's a sociological explanation of meaning.

Is it conceivable that someone could be born (as a result of a mutation or whatever) with the WRONG sorts of concepts? Do we have a method to check this? — Fafner

Evolution would weed out concepts too out of sync with the environment. But it's probably more of an ability to form and build upon fundamental concepts, such as space, time, other minds, etc, which allows for a great deal of flexibility.

Of course the concept of 'length' is something the we have created. It really doesn't make sense to 'perceive' a length in an object as an empirical discovery, and for a simple reason: you must already have the concept of length in order to perceive something as having a length, otherwise how could you know that what you are perceiving is 'length' and not some other property? — Fafner

I would argues this is innate, not something language communities create. Some ability for making sense of perception must exist for language to employ concepts. And meaning would in part be built out of that.

That's why I reference Kant earlier, and how he showed that certain categories of thought were necessary to make sense out of the noise of sense impressions. Empiricism can't get going without that.

For comparison, I think the war over the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis and color words is still raging. See this wikipedia article. The nutshell would be something like this: many languages do not have separate words for what we call "blue" and "green" (just as an example); can native speakers of those languages distinguish blue from green? Common sense says so, and I tend to agree, but the research goes on. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, to make things more complicated, the use of language probably shapes the brain of those language speakers.

So if Whorf-Sapir is correct, then telling blue from green would be an ability developed by having words that pick out the difference. There was a Radio Lab episode on color making that very argument, and then one on Shakespear coining new terms as an example of one Researcher's claims that language connects different parts of the brain.

I guess that's a point in favor of language is use, but with a neural underpinning.

Of course it has a physical length, but this claim has to be distinguished from saying what exactly its length is in some unites of measurement. — Fafner

Right. So tying it back into what I've been trying to argue, the concept of length is not something created as part of a language game. It's something we cognate (perceive?) about objects. How we make use of length to measure things is part of language games.

Put it this way. The stick has a property of being extended in space by so much, such that when we settle on a standard of measurement, it will be so many units in that measurement system.

The spatial extension of the stick (along a certain dimension) determines its length. How we measure it is a separate matter.

↪Marchesk You have to keep in mind we're taking about a time when 1 meter was defined as the length of this stick. — Srap Tasmaner

I get that 1 meter is assigned to the length of a particular stick to create a standard. I disagree that the standard stick has no length. It has a physical length. It's extended in space.

he can't say, it's 1 meter by definition, which he can't because he says it has no length. — Srap Tasmaner

But it's simply not true that the 1 meter stick has no length. It most certainly has a physical length, and can be measured by all sorts of means, including non-arbitrary ones found in nature.

That we decided it was a unit of 1 meter is arbitrary. That it is a definite length (so many hydrogen atoms or Plank lengths) is not arbitrary at all.

I have not read Carnap. Summary of his view on this topic?

My understanding is that Witt noticed that rule-following can't account for the entirety of communication because there has to be some source of normativity outside the system of rules. He looked to human interaction to find that source. You're saying we should look inward to find it. — Mongrel

Both, of course. Human interaction accounts for how we assign meaning. Cognition accounts for how we have concepts at all, and why human language differs from animal signalling.

Well, it's more complicated than that, because human interaction can result in combining concepts and coming up with new metaphors and relations and what not. So yeah, he's right about that.

But the reason humans can do that is cognitive, not behavioral or social. And for humans to do that, there has to be a conceptual apparatus. So along the lines of what Chomsky argued.

We make the stick a standard by comparing stuff to it. See? He's talking about meaning and existence simultaneously. — Mongrel

Good point. But the meaning of length itself does not come from using an arbitrary standard, like a stick, or someone's foot. Length is innate to us, like time and space. We don't create the meaning for those things.

My argument is that meaning and language games are built up from fundamental categories of thought that have to exist, or there is no language. Sure, a stick acquires the meaning of standard length by it's use, but length itself does not.

Therefore, meaning can't ONLY be use.

Can't you measure the standard meter by other means? Say the time it takes light to traverse that distance, and then compare that to the time it takes light to go other distances? The speed of light isn't something we made up, so it could serve as an absolute standard, like atomic clocks can be an absolute standard of measuring time.

Here, though, you're surely at a crux where Fafner is right: you are conjuring up an imaginary Wittgenstein in order to make a point of your own. 'Philosophical Investigations' is a complex book and nowhere in it do I remember these 'arguments' that you mention. One thing I'm confident he's saying is that it's difficult to have a clear overview of language, since we only have language to do it with. What you are calling 'meaning' will involve comparing one word with another, or with a group of other words, and asserting that some greater clarity results. — mcdoodle

This is very strange, because you have other posters in this thread, and other threads, like unenlightened, Michael and Banno arguing along the lines that Witty did in fact mean that. Now possibly I have misunderstood their arguments. But it comes up regularly.

The conveyance of thought is its primary use and its communicative use is secondary — Cavacava

Agreed. Good point about talking to ourselves. Language is use is something defended by the Wittgenstein followers, although the interpretation may depend on the poster in question. I take it to mean behavior, given the talk of beatles in boxes and the impossibility of private language.

Not once in our exchange have you even used the word behaviour, — StreetlightX

So you weren't ready the rest of the thread? I mentioned behavior many times. Did you miss all the posts on Witty by me and others?

OK, and what does that have to do with meaning-as-use? — StreetlightX

Meaning as use has it's root in behavior, not cognitive science. I thought I made that clear?

Now if all Witty was arguing is that we assign meaning by how we use words in certain contexts, then no problem. But if he's saying that meaning IS behavior, then that's a problem.

hat is it about (1) meaning-as-use on the one hand, and (2) abstract language features on the other, that makes the two incompatible? This is what I'm trying to get you to articulate. — StreetlightX

I'm thinking of meaning along the lines of how Gerge Lakhoff and Mark Johnson describe metaphors as understanding one conceptual domain in terms of another (cross domain mapping), where the domains are based on neural mapping in the brain, wired up to how our perception and motor functions work.

So for example we talk about how we "grasp" new ideas, using our ability to grab objects as a helper for understanding learning a new idea.

What does it mean to understand each of these? What do we expect if something is to be called "understanding"? — Srap Tasmaner

That another dog walked across Lassie's grave, and if I don't go left, I'll be possessed by the spirit of the Zodiac Killer.

Unfortunately, since neither Lassie nor my cloned Neanderthal friend (DNA found mixed in with a frozen mammoth carcass a few months back, angering the ancestral spirits) can communicate that to me, I go right and then the rest is ScyFy B grade movie.

The above, although worthy of a crappy movie plot, illustrates how our language can be filled with all sorts of ideas probably missing from animal communication.

hat interested Wittgenstein were the logical features of language that make it function as a language, not the psychological conditions which allow some creature but not another to learn language - that has nothing to do with philosophy according to W'. — Fafner

Wittgenstein said that if a lion could talk, we would not understand it, because we don't participate in the lion language games. As such, there's no meaning that we could translate from our human games to the lion games in order to arrive at a common understanding.

I think that's mistaken. The real meaning is based on how a lion understands the world by virtue of being a lion. To the extent that's similar to being a human, we should be able to arrive at some common meaning, and therefore be able to translate between human and lion language.

I'm only using animal communication as a means to critique the notion that meaning is only exclusively it's use. I don't see the difference between a bird using song to woo a mate, and human using words to seduce a mate, if use is all there is to meaning.

And yet, we do acknowledge some pretty important differences between bird song (far as we understand birds), and human language. Some of those involve the use of abstract concepts, which are pretty important. A human male seducing a female might employ the concept of earning potential to interest her. Earning potential is not something animals communicate, because money isn't a concept they form.

gain, the point here is not that we have to look into the realm of psychology (as opposed to behavior) to understand language, rather I think that both Kant and Wittgenstein argued that you have to look at logic or norms, that is how we use the logical/normative system of language in our dealing with the world (or experience in Kant's case). — Fafner

But how does this explain the difference between animal communication and human?

Better syllogism:

1. Meaning-as-use is language game behavior in the world.

2. The empirical world is particular.

3. But, language employs universals.

4. Therefore, language can't just be use.

it works for metaphor, math, and other forms of language that aren't merely particular. Arguably, animal language games are solely particular (with maybe a few exceptions).

And so when Wittgenstein talks about 'use', what he means by that (among other things) is that you have to look at the use of symbols within a system or a praxis to understand their meaning, and this means that you have to consider how the symbols (to put it in a Tractarian way) are compared with reality: e.g., under what circumstances do we say that such and such is the case, what kinds of other propositions can we logically infer from it, and what sorts of language techniques ('language games') we need in order to make the talk about this or that subject matter intelligible (and there is a host of many pother questions). — Fafner

Sort of, but I think at this point one would invoke Kant, because this seems rather Humean and empirical. And Kant argued persuasively that you need categories of thought to get the empirical endeavor off the ground, otherwise you just have a meaningless jumble of sensory impressions.

Similarly, you need cognition to make language work, otherwise, you just have a bunch of meaningless behavior.

I was trying to find a quote from some behaviorist in the past (Watson maybe) that I saw a long time ago. It may have been taken out of context, but it went something like this:

"I could teach an earthworm English with the right stimui."

Which is impossible because the earthworm has no such cognitive capacity to learn English, let alone lacking any sort of body that could communicate words.

I mention that because it ties back to how animals generally lack certain linguistic features that human languages possess, and this is biologically based. Behavior can't bootstrap an ant colony to English, unfortunately, because that would be fascinating. (Did read a scifi story were wasp colonies were intelligent and figured out how to go online and tell us about it. They may have been genetically enhanced, though).

And to understand the meaning of the word "you" is to understand the use that the word "you" plays in the language. — Michael

Yes and no. If you're just talking about he English word "you", then yes. If you're talking about the meaning assigned to it, then no.

You entails understanding that other people exist with their own thoughts, feelings, desires, rights, etc. It is fundamental to human interaction.

That doesn't contradict what I said. It would just then mean that the meaning of "I greet you" is its use as a greeting, much like a handshake or a hug. — Michael

"I greet you" includes you as a meaning. If you didn't understand "you", then there would be no such greeting. The other needs to be part of one's cognitive capacity.

When describing your visit to Rome, you create images and sounds and smells and tastes in the listener's mind which is your intent no? — Harry Hindu

It would seem that Wittgenstein's argument tends to be understood in purely behavioral terms. Notice what unlightened said about how Witty wanted to get away from the Cartesian Theater, thinking that it would be impossible to communicate your beetle in the box.

So I'm guessing the language-is-use crowd might try to deny that. But that's where the argument becomes absurd.

Notice that a severely autistic person does not greet others, because others don't exist as selves to that person. They can't use "hello", because they're mind blind, or something like that.

That should demonstrate that even with a greeting there needs to be a cognitive ability underpinning it.

So it seems to me that you (and Harry) can't reasonable reject the principle behind the claim that the meaning of a word is its use. You just reject the claim that this is the case for all (or most) words. — Michael

Notice that I never said meaning can't be use, just that meaning isn't exclusively use (and cannot possibly be as I see it), which is what Witty seemed to be arguing, or at least the people who have tended to agree with him.

Also, I would argue that there is something more to "hello" than just noticing that it's a greeting. There is some additional meaning. Arguably, when I greet someone, I do so acknowledging them as an individual deserving of some respect, unless it's done sarcastically.

I don't greet a rock or a tree (usually unless I'm being silly or just using it to talk to myself). But people (and pets) are greeted, because there is the meaning of a self that can respond or understand the greeting.

But this is just the conclusion you're trying to establish. You can't use it as a premise without begging the question. This is the very thing im looking for an argument to underwrite. — StreetlightX

Right. I would have to think about how to do that. It's always been my reaction that "meaning is use" can't be right.

But back to the OP, I could reformulate the argument as such.

2. Animals have their own language games were the meaning of signals is determined by use.

3. Animal language games lack abstract language features.

4. Therefore, there must be something about human language beyond use.

That was what I was originally arguing for.

So what are we doing when we translate the word "hello"? What does it refer to? The meaning of the word "hello" is its use as a greeting, and we translate it with this in mind; we look to see what word(s) are used in the same way in other languages. — Michael

Yeah, but not all words are greetings. All that shows is that the meaning of a greeting is it's use.

When translating words from another language, we aren't translating its use, we are translating its meaning, or what it is referring to. — Harry Hindu

Exactly. Also, if Witty is right about it being impossible for us to understand talking lions, because we're not part of their language games, then SETI is wasting their time.

What's the difference between saying "the meaning of a word is its use" and "the meaning behind a word is its use"? — Michael

The claim is that meaning is use, and that is determined by the role it plays in a language game.

I don't dispute that words have meaning in a context. I dispute that meaning is the usage. Rather, the usage assigns the meaning.

Wittgenstein was aiming for a radical redefinition of meaning, not merely pointing out that words acquire meaning by how they're used. Everyone knows that already. Wittgenstein's approach is behavioral, not cognitive, and I take issue with that.

You must have the cognitive (thought) prior to behavior, or there are no language games. Language games can't get off the ground without cognition.

The correct formulation (if we're going by Wittgenstein) is "the meaning of a word is its use in the language". — Michael

That formulation is trivial. Of course "Chair" means the universal of chairs in English, because we arbitrarily (or rather through evolution of English) decided to denote that word as being such.

That's very different from saying that the meaning behind the word is merely the use of it.

Perhaps try a syllogism? (1)Meaning-as-use says... (2)But... (3)Therefore...? Fill in the ellipses? — StreetlightX

I'll try.

1 Meaning-is-use says meaning is the way words are used in the context of a language game.

2. But, word use alone cannot explain the existence of universals, metaphors, math and logic in human language games.

3. Therefore, there is something more to meaning than use.

Admittedly, that's incomplete. There needs to be a couple more steps fleshing out how abstraction is different than other aspects of language, such as a greeting or singling out a particular.

But why not? What is it about concept use that puts the use-theory into question? — StreetlightX

I don't see how it gets off the ground. Say we want to use "Chair" to denote the category (or universal) for all chairs. Well how do we arrive at such a thing unless our brains are first capable of thinking in terms of categories, or universals?

How does number get off the ground, unless our brains have a capacity to quantify? There's a reason human language is full of these sorts of concepts that we've yet to detect in other animal communication (or not a lot, there may be some).

As an analogy, consider the argument that tools are use. We certainly use tools, but tools are more than use. Tools are objects constructed with certain form and function to help with doing certain tasks.

So even though I can use a screwdriver like a hammer, that doesn't mean that my use of the screwdriver that way makes it a hammer. It's still a screwdriver (and it makes a rather lousy hammer, for a reason).

Is conveying concepts not a use? — unenlightened

Yes, but that doesn't make concepts use. We use language to convey concepts. I don't see at all how that makes concepts the same as use.

see the Wittgenstein project here as part of his attempt to undo the Cartesian error of identification as 'thinking thing' rather than 'doing thing'. — unenlightened

I don't think human language gets off the ground without the conceptual machinery in place. Human language is different from animal communication (in part), because our brains evolved the ability to think that way. Otherwise, how do you account for animal communication being different?

We are thinking and doing things. Witty went too far with this. If you want to think about the mind computationally (not terribly fond of it, but it's better than what Witty was trying to do), then we have algorithms other animals are lacking that give us richer forms of communication.

Our computers will be able to communicate like us when they're sophisticated enough to form concepts like we do. Maybe the machine learning will get there someday. We'll see. But notice how Siri, Alexa, etc can use words, but lack understanding, and are not able to pass the Turing Test. I'm not for a second fooled by my interactions with Siri.