What's the difference between the material chairs and the mathematical chairs? — Agustino

Material chairs are made up of physical stuff such as atoms and their bonds. Mathematical chairs only have mathematical properties. There is no physical stuff. Surely you've heard of Max Tegmark and his claim that the universe is mathematical. Instead of particles or fields or space being the ontological structure, it's numbers and their relations.

What does it mean chairs exist because we perceive them? Nobody ever said that. Berkeley said chairs exist because they CAN be perceived. — Agustino

Berkeley said "to be is to be perceived". Plenty of people on these forums have argued along those lines. They call themselves idealists or anti-realists, or have you been absent the various idealist/realist debates?

The idea that reality would somehow exist in itself adds nothing. It is a term invented by thinkers who seemed to have reasons to distinguish an invisible yet existing reality from its visible parts. — jkop

Maybe so, but there have always been parts of the world invisible to us. A lot more of it has been made visible to us thanks to technology, but there is still dark matter, electrons, black holes, etc.

Metaphysics doesn't deal with matters of fact. When I say idealism is true, I don't mean the same thing as when I say chairs are true. — Agustino

By chairs being true, you mean chairs exist? So when you say that idealism is true, you don't mean that chairs exist because we perceive them, you mean that it's simpler to say that chairs exist when perceived as opposed to materialy, or mathematically, or what not.

They are not things out there which can be the case or can fail to be the case. They are frameworks or lens through which you can look at the world. — Agustino

That would be an anti-realist lens to look at the other frameworks with.

You can't be curious about something by considering alternatives which would change nothing if they were true. Even asking "which is the case?" doesn't make any sense. — Agustino

I can be curious about scientific or historical findings that have no impact on my daily life, so that's simply not true. Humans can be interested in all sorts of things having nothing to do with everyday life.

Neither is plausible, and regardless of what Kant's particular take might be I see no good reason for a realist to speak of things in themselves. — jkop

How can you be a realist and not suppose there are things in themselves? What exactly are you a realist about? This is very confusing.

If I'm a metaphysical realist, I suppose the world exists independent of us, regardless of what we say, perceive or know about such a world. The world is as it is, and will continue to be long after we're gone.

If I'm a platonist, then I suppose that numbers exist as they are regardless of what sort of mathematical discoveries we fail to make. They existed before our species could count, and they will persist after the universe is without life. And so on.

And this matters because? — Agustino

It matters the same reason for asking any sort of questions about existence. How do we get here, how big is the world, did it have a beginning, and so forth. Humans have this curiosity about such questions. And some of the proposed answers bother us, and are preferably avoided.

It may not affect our daily routines, but it can affect how we think or feel about the bigger picture. Anyway, metaphysics isn't ethics, and some people don't see a use for philosophy beyond ethics. That's their prerogative.

Haven't the people who wrote stories about it imagined it? — John

Yeah, seems like imagined, visualized, pictured, and conceived are all getting jumbled together. So, I don't think any human can actually visualize a trip to a nearby star, but they can imagine a story in which a trip is made, or perform the calculations for the propulsion system based on estimated weight of ship, crew, food, etc.

This tangent got started by the claim that you don't need to be able to picture cutting down 70 trees to conceive it. One can simply perform the math of cutting down 70 trees for the average human with an axe or chainsaw. It's not a problem for the reality of cutting down that number of trees.

Being able to visualize and being able to conceive are separate abilities.

I can conceive of building a starship and traveling to a nearby star, but I can't actually imagine it. Hasn't stopped people from writing stories about it.

The whole fun is making yourself into a creative genius, or into a rich man, and so forth. — Agustino

In the optimal, tailored life of your own choosing, you can to do exactly that. In the real world, plenty of people would like to become a genius, rich or famous, but for one reason or another, can't or don't.

What do you mean by "appear" here? Obviously you can't mean it in the sense that we see something happening that isn't being seen? — Michael

I mean we experience the world as if stuff happens when nobody's around. I used the word appear to avoid realist sounding language. The subjective idealist can deny that anything actually happens. We only perceive it as if it did.

And how is that any different to the idealist's explanation that there just is a world of mental phenomena that performs steps A, B, and then C? — Michael

The objective idealist can do that. I don't see how the subjective idealist can perform those steps. It's just a brute fact of experience that a lot of stuff appears to have happened in between minds perceiving things.

Then why is there a forest and not some other thing? The realist has the same questions to answer as the idealist, just pushed further back along a proposed causal chain. — Michael

Cause of the Big Bang. There are entire fields of science to explain how the forest got there.

If so, I'm guessing you prescribe to naive realism? — Michael

No possible way TGW prescribes to naive realism. I would be beyond shocked. That would be like Landru coming on here and explaining why he voted for Trump.

But why the forest and not some other experience, to reiterate Tom's question. Realism has a really simple explanation. What's the (subjective) idealist explanation, just because?

The fact that I know why I shot you (I just sort of felt like it) should not be the determining factor in whether I should be held responsible for it. — Hanover

But why did you feel like it? Reminds me of the Radio Lab show where it mentioned one of the detectives who gave the Green River Killer a series of interviews to try and find out why he killed. They never received a satisfying answer. Probably the killer himself didn't really know why. He just felt like it (rationalized as the women deserved it). Maybe the explanation is neurological or developmental.

Nothing wrong with that, right? — Aaron R

If it's just an intellectual challenge, akin to playing chess or doing crossword puzzles, then nothing wrong. But I suspect for a lot of people interested in metaphysics, there is the nagging question of whether one's preferred metaphysics is true. That eventually leads to questioning its assumptions, and taking other metaphysical systems at least a little bit more seriously.

So, is it OK if POTUS is a liar? Trump claiming that Clinton was beneficiary of 'millions of illegal votes', with not one shred of evidence or on any grounds. Is it OK if the 'world's most powerful man' engages in twitter wars about such matters? Seems ridiculous to me. — Wayfarer

Well, he's not POTUS yet. But yeah, he needs to take a four year break from those kind of shenanigans.

I always wondered if you ate a meal on the Holodeck at a fine restaurant in 1970s Paris, upon leaving the holodeck, would the food and drink dematerialize, or would it continue to nourish you?

To be crass, what does holographic stool look like outside the Holodeck?

You can image Holographic bars where people got roaring drunk, exited the program and then immediately sobered up as all that holographic alcohol dissipated. You can return straight to duty after a grand night out on the town.

So imagining an empty forest, with no observer to hear the tree fall, still amounts to a perspective. What would any scene or object be like, from no perspective? — Wayfarer

Back to this. Perhaps the realist can say the idealist is making a mistake here in insisting that the realist be able to imagine what something is like independent of perspective. We can't do that because we're human beings who always perceive from a certain perspective. The best we can do is abstract away. But that doesn't mean the tree or the forest or anything else doesn't exist independent of perspective, just because we can't conceive it that way.

IOW, realism doesn't need to be committed to being able to conceive of something (exactly as it is) for that something to exist. All the realist needs is reasonable grounds for thinking so. And the reasonable grounds are an experience of a world that is much larger and older than us. A world that gave birth to us individually and as a species.

In a way, the idealist is criticizing the realist on idealist grounds, in that the idealist expects the world to be entirely conceivable for it to be. But the realist need not be committed to this at all, since by definition, real things are mind independent, and thus independent of conceptualization.

Further, the realist can just say this is a limitation of human minds, not the world, since human imagination is parasitic on human perception. But the world is not limited by human abilities, or lack thereof. Man is not the measure of the world.

If you say that what humans believe to be true, is simply a consequence of adaptive necessity, — Wayfarer

We die or fail to reproduce if we get it wrong. Dennett's response is that for bacteria, truth isn't relevant. But for a fox, it needs to know what is a mate, what is prey, and what is predator. It needs to know the truth about such things.

http://discovermagazine.com/2002/jun/featuniverse — Wayfarer

So Wheeler proposes a delayed choice double slit experiment using photons from a distant quasar with gravitational lensing involved by galaxies in between. Very interesting.

Question though, what if alien minds existed in that distant quasar. Does that change the outcome?

At least Wheeler allows for inanimate detectors to decide quantum outcomes. Lindren goes all the way to conscious observers only determining the history of the universe. What distinquishes us from the cat in the box? If ancient aliens have put Earth inside a box, perhaps with a quantum object that has a 50/50 chance of turning into a black hole that consumes Earth, are we in a state of destroyed/not destoryed before they look?

Good reply.

1. Entirely ignores the problem posted in the OP. It's head in the sand philosophy.
3. Deflates to a position indistinguishable from anti-realism (or at the very least, a positon that is not realist, since being realist entails mind-independence).

2. Is a bit more promising.

No realist discussion is complete without mention of QM, eh?

I'll read it here in a minute. Wheeler is also the physicist who proposed it from bit, I believe.

So nobody has any thoughts on object oriented realism? It is a form of speculative realism that seeks to answer the sort of post Kantian objections to realism, correct? I thought it was an interesting approach, that sort of gets around the problem of differentiation but acknowledging the limits of understanding, but not because the mind differentiates, but rather because of the nature of objects in relation to one another (including us in relation to the things we perceive). Or something like that.

Oh don't worry, it's just that it then gets hard to remember which thread is which! But, photons are cheap. — Wayfarer

Is the photon from a distant star one minute away not yet perceived real, or only conceptual until we perceive it?

I think the best answer is just to be honest and admit there isn't any evidence for the claims realism makes. — The Great Whatever

David Chalmers in a conference on consciousness briefly discussed why he rejected idealism. It was because it left the structure of experience unexplained. I agree with that. There is something beyond our experiences which is the reason for our experiences. What we experience is a world much bigger and older than us mere humans. Even the fact that I have parents which gave birth to me is enough to doubt idealism (I wasn't experiencing anything as a zygote).

Basic epistemological and metaphysical questions like these don't have good answers, and not because they're meaningless but just because they're hard. — The Great Whatever

This is what interests me, because no answers proposed seem entirely satisfactory, and knowledgeable people can debate them endlessly. I think realism must be the case, but the objection idealism puts forth has not been fully answered by realists. I sometimes wonder if both aren't right in a way, and some sort of synthesis is the answer.

This thread has now been duplicated, courtesy of Marchesk. — Wayfarer

Sorry, I wanted to explore the implications of what you posted in it's own thread. It always struck me as the strongest objection to realism. Didn't mean it to be explicitly about the tree.

Would you rather that God could create rock bigger than even he can lift? — wuliheron

It's kind of like asking if Jesus can microwave a burrito hotter than he can eat. What would it mean for God to lift a rock? Is the rock supposed to be immovable?

To wit: if the evil demon exists, in what sense is he deceiving me? Deception only makes sense if there actually is a possibility that I come to know that I am deceived. That's what I call a deception. I thought something, and then new evidence came up, and it turns out I was wrong. But if the evil demon scenario is correct, then I will never know it is the case - and hence practically there is no possibility that I will know of the deception. But if there is no possibility that I will know of the deception, then it isn't really a deception in the first place, because it's not what we understand by "deception" - a meaning we have arrived at within our world. — Agustino

Unless the evil demon has something to gain beyond just keeping you deceived. The Matrix scenario had humans envatted to server as batteries for the machines. Granted, we would actually make a lousy power source and not be worth the effort, but maybe the evil demon is empowered by our being deceived?

Problems:

1. Numerous, ranging from the ancient Skeptics, to Berkeley, to modern science.

2. Science is incomplete. We don't know how far from a complete scientific understanding of the world we are. Also, the Kuhnian challenge of paradigm shifts.

3. What breathes life into the equations? Also, the challenge of mathematical realism in and of itself.

4. Not sure what the critique is here.

5. This is admitting to global skepticism. Why even suppose there is a real world if you can't know anything about it?

6. Demonstrating how this is different from anti-realism. But it has been used by various realists in these forums and elsewhere as an attempt to avoid traditional objections, and out of a suspicion for metaphysical questions in general. But can metaphysics be avoided altogether without assuming realism is the case?

No answer my question. Is Solomon saying that it is better to humiliate yourself in order to live longer? Is he doing that or not? — Agustino

I don't know, but he seems to be saying that being alive is better than being dead, in general, because the dead aren't aware of anything.

I think Solomon is just making some pessimistic observations about life. You're turning it into a Nietzschean overcoming the world thing with a Christian afterlife.

What's the sceptical problem? — Michael

I perceive a rock. I perceive you talking about having perceived a rock when I wasn't around. I create a mental model of you perceiving stuff in my absence.

The skeptical problem is how I can know you actually exist outside my mental model when I'm not perceiving you. The idealist solution is just to assert that of course other minds are around perceiving when I'm not perceiving them. Solipsism avoided. But it's just an assertion. There is no sound epistemological basis for that assertion.

It's talking about the afterlife, not about this life. "Whoever shall lose his life for my sake - shall gain it". That's the promise Jesus made. Whoever throws this earthly life as if it were nothing, and gambles with it for eternity - they are those truly worthy for the Kingdom and Heaven, and they shall overcome, despite the appearances. They shall be eternal, and live amongst the stars. While those who cling to life, scared, they will perish and will be forgotten - that's the GREAT irony. Those who cling to life will lose it, but those who gamble with it as if it were nothing shall take it all back, just as Jesus Himself did. — Agustino

Christians are amazing at reinterpreting the Jewish scriptures to fit Christian theology. Solomon says nothing like that in the full verse you quoted.

But the idea of life being a struggle to be embraced for a better life later on is an interesting idea. If only there were evidence.

That doesn't follow. "To be is to be perceived" is not the same as "to be is to be perceived by me". The rock doesn't require that I perceive it. — Michael

But my knowledge of other minds comes from perception, just like my knowledge of rocks. So there is a skeptical problem for the idealist that the solipsist recognizes, and the idealist pretends isn't an issue.

Furthermore, the idealist doesn't even perceive the other minds, just their bodies. The other mind is a mental inference. It's an ontological commitment the solipsist would never feel warranted in making.

How is it making an exception? The idealist presumably uses the same inference that the materialist uses to confirm the existence of other minds. They just don't think that this inference can be used to confirm the existence of some non-mental substance from which minds sometimes (but not always) emerge. — Michael

To be is to be perceived. I perceive a rock, so it exists. But it doesn't exist outside being perceive. I perceive you so you exist, at least while I'm perceiving you.

Now I can imagine that you continue to perceive the world as a good idealist once I'm no longer perceiving you, but then I'm just pulling a realist stunt by making an exception for other minds. You can say it's different, because it's other minds. Fine, but I only know about them via perception, so it's an epistemological problem for the idealist.

That's why they screwed the pooch, you answered it yourself. Because they only want paradise aftera life of great struggle. it's the struggle that teaches them about themselves (spirit) and about God. — Agustino

I don't think one life of a few short decades is enough for an eternity of no struggles. Seems to me that the Hindus have a better idea. Reincarnate over many lifetimes until you reach envatment. 70 years just isn't worthy.

Yes, banning them only makes sense if I am opposed. Romeo's and Juliet's love only made sense because of the great opposition against it. Because they had to throw their lives to keep their love, that's what made them great, that's why they are eternal - they will be remembered. It is those who overcome the greatest obstacles based on their love for Truth and Justice that have overcome the world. It's not even about achieving - it's about fighting, it's about never giving up, it's about not yielding. That's what matters - not success. Romeo and Juliet failed in the flesh. And yet, in the spirit they have overcome - they have left this world with their heads up high - unlike other petty fools who cling to a few more days of life, these two threw it all on the line, gambled with it as if it was nothing. — Agustino

As a story, anyway. How many couples in love do you suppose want to die young so that their love can be immortalized?

A saying comes to mind: "A live dog is better than a dead lion". Might have even come from Solomon. I suppose your view changes if the struggle leads to perfect envatment in the afterlife.