The take-home is that half of eligible voters wanted to put their trust in a liar. — Banno
What two types do you think Dennett is equivocating between? And can you provide a link to some of his work that demonstrates the equivocation? — fdrake
Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. — Quining Qulaia
In other words, you can’t be a satisfied, successful illusionist until you have provided the details of how the brain manages to create the illusion of phenomenality, and that is a daunting task largely in the future. — Illusionism as the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness
. In short, he equivocates. He does the same thing with free will. — frank
I was looking through the points made by Berkeley and I fail to see how he arrives at my not having an idea of an object existing unconceived. — Darkneos
I'm stuck in Mary's room. What frequency is it? — frank
Nice dress, isn't it? — Olivier5
It's more likely to be the case that visual imagery in dreams occurs without the usual perceptual stimuli for vision, but that visual imagery in dreams is part of the functionality of the person's sensorimotor and discriminatory systems regardless — fdrake
You can have coloured features in dreams without the same flavour and intensity of sensorimotor feedbacks we have when conscious, that's not quite the same thing as perceptual feedbacks between agent and environment. — fdrake
The thing with colour etc being relational properties means they don't collapse down to either being subjective or objective. A subjective state of colour is "in" your mind. An objective state of colour is "in" the perceived object. Characterising colour as a relational property makes it neither wholly in the head nor wholly in the object, it's a property of the relationship between the two of them. — fdrake
Yes, adequate, with respect to empirical knowledge. Would you agree with me, that human reason is often not satisfied with the merely adequate? — Mww
We never stand still long enough for any sort of input to become present to us in this revealed sort of way; we're already involved with whatever it is, expecting it, seeking it, avoiding it, using it, regretting it, whatever. We're really nothing at all like cameras, you know? — Srap Tasmaner
I think maybe we don't really either, not in the way typically imagined. I want to say what has to be avoided to start with is an image of experience that is at all static. Empiricists have this model of experience as chopped into a long string of instants -- your visual field is like this, then this, then this, and you have to make these inductive leaps to tie it all together into any kind of coherence. But there's nothing like this really going on, is there? We are, while awake, in constant multifaceted contact with our environment and processing an unending stream of data which we constantly project into the future and take action on. All of these point-like experiences we seem to construct retrospectively, I'm not at all sure anything quite like that is ever actually happening. Feeling the sun and the wind is bound up with all the rest of the process of living, testing, responding, projecting. — Srap Tasmaner
I'm not entirely in agreement with Dennett, because I'm not a physicalist, and for good reason. However, he has successfully rendered the conventional notion of Qualia false at best, and devoid of content at worst. He showed that it is an accounting malpractice. — creativesoul
I'm not asking if you agree with that answer (I'm not even sure I do) I'm asking why it isn't even addressing the question, as schopenhauer1 claims. — Isaac
It's no good re-telling us that we do indeed have intuitions that objects have sensory properties, that's where the whole inquiry begins, we move on from there to explore some of the problems with that intuition. — Isaac
There really does only seem to be a taste of tea, Dennet takes us through step by step how what we'd like to think is the taste of tea is not what it seems. I've added a bit of gloss from modern cognitive psychology, but, as I said right at the beginning, Dennet's argument is that our intuitions are mistaken, so it's pointless responding to that with reference to those same intuitions. — Isaac
Consciousness is made up of matter and energy. Consciousness is not another form of existence separate from matter and energy. If someone claims this to be, they must provide evidence to counter the evidence that shows consciousness comes from the brain, which is made out of matter and energy. — Philosophim
But maybe that just is consciousness, not immediately, not straight from the senses, but the continual updating of your model of a world of objects. That sounds pretty close to what we'd expect a conscious organism to be doing, responding to change in a way that enables planning. Is there an alternative that doesn't require a Cartesian theater? — Srap Tasmaner
We don't. That's the easy solution. — Isaac
No, my point was that if I claim we do already have a science of consciousness, and as such we already do know what's conscious, you'll still claim we don't. — Isaac
That is 'how'. As I showed with my examples of other 'how' questions, that's exactly the sort of thing which counts as an answer to 'how' — Isaac
Even so, you're still just repeating the dismissal without specifying a reason. If "explain[ing] how my brain performs certain functions related to discriminating color" isn't an answer for you to "how there is a color sensation", then it seems entirely reasonable to ask you for an account of what's missing. — Isaac
To quite the contrary, I would call it a failed philosophical attempt at taking proper account of what conscious experience consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon. A failed attempt at setting out the pre-theoretical, basic, and/or fundamental elements of conscious experience. — creativesoul
The signals which chemosensory neurons send to cotices higher in the hierarchy. Nothing more. Beyond that you start to see the influence of a whole slew of non-chemosensory systems getting involved, feeding back to the chemosensory neurons, suppressing certain signals, re-iterating others. One if the many paths taken ends up (together with input from a hundred other unrelated paths) in the stimulation of the motor neurons responsible for forming the words "this tea tastes bitter". Where in all that is the 'taste' of the tea? — Isaac
But this is circular. Maybe we have created consciousness in robots "no, they're just p-zombies", how do we know what they've got isn't consciousness? — Isaac
How could an understanding of the world have sensations? If this is your target then its not the 'hard' problem its the downright ridiculous problem. — Isaac
I don't think so. If one is going to dismiss Dennet's hard work as missing the target, I think it's fair to ask for an account of what the target is. — Isaac
This just repeats the question. If, say, I explain the neuroscience of colour recognition, I'm trying to get at the sense in which that's not answering 'how?' for you. It's exactly answering 'how' for me. — Isaac
What would an explanation of this be like? — Isaac
Again, if you assume a distinction between objective and subjective statements, you shouldn't be surprised to find that you can't bridge the gap you created. — Banno
We end up with two different ways of talking about the same thing. The coin is an alloy of tin and copper; and it can be exchanged for a bag of lollies. That's not a mismatch. — Banno
Red is used in explanations. I handed you that cup because it is red. — Banno
Introduce the problematic division of objective and subjective statements and of course you end up with an inability to bridge the great divide that is the hard problem. It's sitting in your assumptions. — Banno