As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? — Xtrix

For example:

Despite Heidegger’s own protestations against identifying Being with ‘the Supreme Being’ of metaphysical theology and against seeing it as in any way ‘personal’ like the theistic God, Löwith argued that it was virtually impossible not to compare Heidegger’s Being with the Judaeo-Christian God, periodically revealing Himself to mortals for purposes that are both inscrutable and, as yet, unfulfilled. Whereas in Being and Time, Being ‘is’ only as long as Dasein is, Dasein itself now exists only by the grace and favour of Being. — Pattison: The Late Heidegger, p. 195

And:

The human being is rather "thrown" by being itself into the truth of being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of being, in order that beings might appear in the light of being as the beings they are. Human being do not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the clearing of being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of being. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism, Op. Cit. p. 252

"Being must be explained beyond intuition." Again, this really goes against everything Heidegger writes. — Xtrix

Again, you don't know Heidegger well :

Thirdly, it is held that 'Being' is of all concepts the one that is self­ evident. Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands "The sky is blue', 'I am merry', and the like. But here we have an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible. It makes manifest that in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities-even in any Being towards entities as entities-there lies a priori an enigma.The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the mean­ing of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again. — Heidegger: B&T, p. 4/27

As I've been very honest about: I know Heidegger better than you. It's not because I'm smarter, it's because I've spent more time reading him. — Xtrix

What a pity! What a waste of time!

And I've quoted MULTIPLE texts that demonstrate exactly the opposite of what you're saying. — Xtrix

I had the patience to seek out your contributions to the debate. You have quoted Heidegger 11 times (including a Youtube). I have quoted Heidegger 32 times. Your quotes are generally short (two lines) and do not relate to the question. My quotes are usually larger (several lines) and ever centred. You say I made a list of words out of context. You see that's not true. I made the list as a summary. My quotes are presented in full, not like yours. And at least they refer to the subject, which is not the case with yours, as I will explain below.

Again, the above quotation is Heidegger, not me. — Xtrix

[

I even linked you a video from Heidegger's own mouth about how he "does not mean by that anything negative." — Xtrix

In this quote your lack of understanding and inexperience about Heidegger are simply obvious. You quote a Youtube, a short interview with Heidegger. Someone who knows Heidegger would have presented other texts by Heidegger where he deals with the subject more deeply. Here he limits himself to a few unclear words.
Nowhere in the interview does Heidegger talk about the topic we are discussing. You are not aware of this. Therefore, his quote refers to the fall of Being. But we are talking about the failure of Western metaphysics. Not of Being.

Let me try this way. If Western metaphysics is "wrong" -- then what's "right"? Parmenides and Heraclitus? What were their interpretations of being? — Xtrix

You've taken other words, like "falsified from the bottom up" (pertaining to translations, — Xtrix

I don't think Heidegger said anywhere that the "interpretations" of Parmenides and Heraclitus were correct. I believe that what he says is that the correct approach to Being was made by Parmenides and Heraclitus. One can say that they were in the right direction or that they unraveled the root of the problem. "Interpretation" is not the right word, I think.What was wrong was the interpretation of its key expressions by the later tradition. You put the question of translation on the back burner. No, not at all. Language is the "house of being" for Heidegger (Letter on Humanism p. 253,.) Any concealing or downgraded translation of Heraclitus and Parmenides in terms of substantia meant the loss of the right way of understanding Being. And this is what Plato and Aristotle did first, and the Western metaphysical tradition after them. That's why they falsified the whole (bottom up) question of Being. And this is the context.

As for "attributing to being a number of powers that go beyond the natural," what are you referring to? There's no way Heidegger "attributes" anything to Being, because being HAS NO attributes. It has no properties. It has no traits. It is not even an "it." — Xtrix

That is why Heidegger says that it is destiny, the key to being saved, that it is revealed or hidden, that it dwells in the languge, that is the truth, etc., etc. Of course, that's not having properties. I suppose Heidegger calls it something else, proclaims it to be the "true" meaning and is so calm. Privileges of quackery jargon.

I, however, think that when someone attributes a property to something, he is talking about property. Of course I speak everybody's language and Heidegger is far above humanity.

So there you go -- I've highlighted a bunch of "negative" words for you. — Xtrix

Leaving aside the fact that here another subject is raised that is not Western metaphysics. the text you quote would work against your argument! Or is being dangerous not negative?

Heidegger offers no interpretation of being — Xtrix

If you mean he doesn't offer any coherent interpretation, fine. But that doesn't stop him from attributing to Being a number of powers that go beyond the natural. That has nothing to do with the pre-conscious understanding of being that he says we have. If that comprehension were enough to understand what being is, Heidegger would not have written the amazing amount of pages he did. As he says in Being and Time, Being must be explained beyond the intuition, because the existing explanations have hidden the truth of Being. It seems that he devoted his whole life to that. With very little success, as he himself admits. In that I give him the reason. His interpretation is just talk. Or bad poetry, at best.

"In the main they are wrong." You simply don't know what you're talking about. — Xtrix

I think this is exactly your case:

You're a good disciple of Heidegger: you've decided that words don't mean what they usually mean but what you want them to mean. That's why you don't care what the dictionaries and everyone who has studied Heidegger say. Of course, the criterion of authority is not an argument in itself, but there are times when it is useful. It's useful in the face of a question we don't know. When talking about nuclear physics, most human beings have no choice but to trust what the scientists say. When all the experts on Heidegger say one thing contrary to what you say you would do well to meditate a little on your position. Especially when you are not able to present a single text that supports your position and you say it because you want to.



And your whole excuse is that "free from something" is a "technical" term whose meaning only you know. Don't make me laugh. Where did you get your knowledge? If you don't back up your interpretation with commentators' texts or Heidegger's, where does your interpretation come from? Is it a metaphysical intuition?

I got tired of providing you with Heidegger's negative terms regarding the western metaphysical tradition, his interpretation of Haraclitus' and Parmenides' philosophy - which had correctly raised the question of Being ("the way the question of Being is formulated"). I think I must have put here a dozen examples taken from Heidegger's own books. I repeat some of them to refresh your memory, which seems to be somewhat weak.

Deteriorating, collapsing, falling down, inadequately formulated, forgotten, distortions, taken over dogmatically, concealments, baleful prejudice, failed to determine, falsified, misses its sense entirely, falsified from the bottom up, degeneration, blocked, forgotten, erroneous

Wow, there were more than a dozen of them. These are all terms Heidegger uses in his usual sense. They are not his own concepts that require an explanation (if they have one), as it would be the Dasein, to be thrown, clear of being and others. All of them constitute a "radical" criticism, that is to say, in its root, to the western metaphysics, which, according to Heidegger has undertaken a wrong way of which it is necessary to get rid of. Of course, according to your metaphysical intuition they do not mean "wrong". They're just for show.

But you just respond like a litany (mantra, if you like) that they don't mean what they obviously say. But you cannot present a single text in your favour. So this debate is not a real debate. It is pure stubbornness on your part.Probably because you presented yourself as someone who knew Heidegger's work well and this is not true. If you have read one or two texts that you did not understand or did not want to understand. There's not much to present you as an authority on the subject.


That Heidegger did not have a concrete answer to the question of Being, he recognizes that himself. He takes refuge in vague and metaphorical terms like "shepherd of Being", "clear of Being", "truth of Being". But in spite of not knowing what he is talking about, he dedicates himself to disqualifying all the previous metaphysics with the qualifiers that I have collected above. All of them imply that this metaphysical tradition was mistaken in the "question of Being". That this is inconsistent with being unable, after twenty years, as he says in Letter on Humanism, to say anything really concrete about Being is one of the problems of Heidegger's reading, which sometimes has really comical effects.


You started this thread by saying:

I want to be clear that I consider Heidegger to be a great thinker and teacher, and that I've learned a great deal from his writings and interviews — Xtrix

You don't look like you've demonstrated that much knowledge of Heidegger to me. Actually, almost nothing. I think the two months I've been reviewing Heidegger has been more productive than your whole life as a Heideggerian. I've presented at least ten times more Heidegger's texts here than you have. A clear indication.

The day that everyone agrees on ‘the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos’ is the day philosophy is obsolete. — Possibility

Does this mean that the essence of today's philosophy is free and rational debate? That's a good point... to start a philosophical debate.

The first point would be: What is rational?

(The day the history of philosophy ends, we can leave it for the moment. These things are usually simple provocations to debate and do not have much scope. You know what happened with Fukuyama and the end of history. What was left of him was taken away by the pandemic).

In general, I agree.
I would change "Ethics" for "Morality".
The philosophy of morality is valid for me and is generally called "ethics".
It's true that there is some ambiguity in these names. That's why it's good to clear it up.

I disagree, philosophy is not about reason and this fixation on reason causes people to misunderstand themselves. — Judaka

Philosophy is not only about reason, but it uses reason. What other tool can you use to investigate philosophical problems? Faith, desire, experiment, irrationality...?


The concept of philosophy is very vague but philosophy is not what you want. A rough method to understand what philosophy can be:

-Differentiate philosophy from other branches of thought. -Why is philosophy not science? Why is philosophy not religion? Why is philosophy not myth?
Some conclusions: Philosophy does not do experiments. Philosophy does not cling to dogmas or faith. Philosophy is not narrative.
- Come and see what philosophers do at the university. They debate on the basis of rational arguments. Whether you think they're good or bad, that's another issue.

First conclusion: Philosophy is based on reason and its main tool is the contrast of arguments. What kind of reason?


This is an important question, although it is not easy. It is important to get rid of a plethora of mystics and gurus who try to legitimize their irrationality by claiming to be philosophers. No, they are not.

paraphrasing Churchill's ironic remark — 180 Proof

I see.

Methological, not metaphysical, materialism no doubt is the worst, least true, intellectual commitment made in human cultural history, — 180 Proof

Do you can explain this, please?
What "methological" is and why is the worst?

From what I've read Heidegger wasn't a Buddhist. However, my knowledge of Buddhism is not superior to that of other religions that I have not personally endured. I mean, I'm not really interested.

Anyway, best wishes.

Kind of a weak appeal to authority. — Xtrix

If you don't mind being alone in the face of danger, go ahead. But Gary Cooper only wins in the movies.

He does not believe the latter is "wrong" -- but rather that an essential thing has been overlooked — Xtrix

Of course, you don't read what I write.

Or maybe Heidegger thinks Plato and Aristotle and Descartes and Kant are all completely "wrong. — Xtrix

Of course, you don't read what I write. Or you're manipulating what I say. That "completely" is an addition from you.

He doesn't say "get rid of," he says we must "free ourselves" from — Xtrix

From Cambridge dictionary of English:
Synonym of free from/of sth. : removing and getting rid of things.

This is my dictionary, what is your dictionary? I'm afraid it's not an English dictionary.

I don't think you're saying that necessarily...but think about it: if they're all "wrong" in their interpretation of being and beings and of time, then what value do they have? — Xtrix

I think I've explained this, but here we go.

If they have any, it will not be as paths to the truth of Being, guides of the thinker. They will be partial and secondary successes. In the main they are wrong. That's not I who say this. Heidegger repeatedly says it, as anyone who's read only one of his books can be aware.

Intriguing perspective. . . I wouldn't have thought to dive right into the semantic end but here we are. I've been more interested as of late into process philosophy which deals with this substance disagreement by dissolving it rather robustly. You on the other hand consider semantic considerations first which is a fairly wonderful take on this. — substantivalism

I'm not at all original about this. Gilbert Ryle already did it with mind. The Concept of Mind, a fascinating book.

I believe that materialism is not a theory that describes a substance, but a mental attitude and a methodological assumption that works differently in different branches of knowledge.
Therefore, there is no such thing as res extensa and res cogitans. Nor is there any such thing as ghosts. This is (my) materialism.

Notice your presuppositions here. They are exactly those of 'Enlightenment rationalism'. — Wayfarer

What assumptions? I am simply describing the position of enlightened philosophers.
It's another thing if you want us to discuss them.

We can negatively judge all philosophy afterwards if we choose, but that's our business. No need to project it on to Heidegger -- he doesn't do this. He's simply pointing out that it's happened. — Xtrix

You're dancing on a tightrope.

Your objections to my interpretation of Heidegger (by the way, this is the standard interpretation) are only based on words.
If you want to say that the concealment of the question of Being begins with Plato and Aristotle is not the same that they deteriorate the basic ontological questioning about Being; if you want to say that the failing of providing an ontology for the Dasein is not a fall of the very meaning of Being, you are concealing words with other words. And concealing is the opposite or truth, because unconcealing is aletheia, it is to say truth, in Heidegger's words.

If you want to say that Heidegger's words against metaphysical Western tradition (degenerated, deteriorate, concealing, dogmatic, etc.) are not negative I think we have different dictionaries. And so it is impossible any serious discussion.

Thinking is l'engagement by and for the truth of being. The history of Being is never past but stands ever before us; it sustains and defines every condition et situation humaine. In order to learn how to experience the aforementioned essence of thinking purely, and that means at the same time to carry it through, we must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of thinking. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a techné, a process of deliberation in service to doing and making. — Heidegger: Letter on Humanism.

If getting rid of does not imply a negative evaluation, tell me which dictionary you use.
(And let's piously overlook the "original" statement that according to Plato true thinking is techné.)

If you are accusing me of saying that Heidegger's negative evaluation of Western metaphysics implies that nothing it says has any value, I would ask you to read what I write. That way we will not get into useless discussions because they are repetitive.

What is an ideal/physical entity? How far can you indulge in a form of realism before your idealism becomes nearly synonymous to physicalism (depending on the definition)? — substantivalism

You can't expect definitive answers to your questions. Remember that we are in the philosophical field.

Anyway, my answer:

Two types of materialism are often proposed: metaphysical and epistemological. My option is different --although close to the second-- : I defend a materialism without matter. My definition of materialism is based on Wittgenstein's familiy-resemblance. A semantic perspective, at least.
I suggest abandoning the search for something called "matter" and focusing on this question:
What is called "materialism" in the different branches of knowledge?

This leads to energy and mass in physics; to biochemical processes in biology; to the brain and behavior in psychology; to productive forces in history; to empiricism in epistemology.

All these options are similar in that they are opposed to supernatural: God, the spirit, the ideal. In short, materialism is the thesis of a unique world at hand.

n the West, a large number of philosophers discarded the basic presuppositions of the "perennial philosophy," and developed by contrast what for want of a better term we may call a "sciential" [we would say 'scientistic'] philosophy.

This is a bit of a mess. I don't think the alternative to scientism is perennial philosophy. I don't think the Enlightened philosophes were thinking about the mysticism of perennial philosophy.

It seems to me that to confuse enlightenment with spiritualistic irrationalism is to confuse things. Although the Enlightenment was a movement that allowed many variations, there were things that were common. Especially the defense of reason against superstition and irrationalism.

I think that mixing philosophy with religion, even if you say it's secular (?), is very anti-enlightenment. Even when the Elightened spoke of God it was the God of Reason, the God of philosophes (see Rousseau).

In my opinion.

Quoting Camus is kind of nihilistic, as Camus, though not really a Nihilist, was kind of nihilistic. — thewonder

Oh, boy! This would raise Camus from his grave. He wrote a whole book to combat nihilism because he considered it to be the essence of humanity's ills. I'm talking about L'Homme révolté (The Rebel).

One does not discover the absurd without being tempted to write a manual of happiness. "What!---by such narrow ways--?" There is but one world, however. Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth. They are inseparable. It would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd. discovery. It happens as well that the felling of the absurd springs from happiness. "I conclude that all is well," says Edipus, and that remark is sacred. It echoes in the wild and limited universe of man. It teaches that all is not, has not been, exhausted. It drives out of this world a god who had come into it with dissatisfaction and a preference for futile suffering. It makes of fate a human matter, which must be settled among men. — Camus: The Myth of Sisyphus, Chapter 4

I think Sisyphus' happiness with his absurd rock (life) was more a kind of camouflaged stoicism. Textually Camus says that he is happy because he knows what his destiny is. To be honest, I think Camus was not satisfied with this paradox and all his ulterior work was a kind of auto-refutation.

To return to the subject of this thread: Within this revision of his first book is included the condemnation of philosophy (which was his denied destiny). "If you want to do philosophy, write novels," he said. This sums up his destruction of philosophy which he accused of being abstract and of abandoning authentic life. According to him, life is composed of emotions and individual pleasures and all conceptualization destroys that vital element. Even the existentialist and phenomenological philosophies that seek to return to the lived world are guilty of this crime. That is why he turned to Dostoevsky and his obsessive condemnation of human reason. A bad fellow traveller in my opinion.


Note: Chapter four of The Myth of Sisyphus is a literary jewel. The best Camus' prose in my opinion.

Exactly how does wisdom develop in a society focused on technology but not wisdom? — Athena

With Heidegger's permission, the problem of the essence of technology is nothing mysterious. To begin with, one must distinguish various phases in the problem of technology. There is not just one technological thought, but several types of technological thought. The problem lies in the technocratic ideology of modernity, especially in the last two centuries. And the problem is that there is no generalized technological thinking, but thinking oriented towards technological consumerism, which is based on an idolatry of the machine. It is not that we use machines, which has always happened throughout human history, with Heidegger's permission, but that we get high on machines. The less we understand them, the more we love them, which is the opposite point of view to the enlightened sapere aude.

Another use of technology is certainly possible. But not in this model of society.

I suggest a review of Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove

(Note: I am mentioning Heidegger because I am reading his famous article on technology, which I find particularly flawed.)

So maybe the rest of the world was reacting as strongly to Martin Luther King and the whole civil rights movement, as it is reacting to our racism today, but we were just less informed than we are today? — Athena

European racism has different roots and problems than North American racism. There are notable differences between traditional Polish racism (anti-Semitic) and Spanish racism (anti-Roma). Today it is a new racism that is a product of immigration. It is especially directed against North Africans and people from Asia Minor. It has religious and cultural connotations that are not found in North American racism. (Although it is also strong against Romanians and other Balkan peoples with bad press).


European anti-racist movement, which has existed for a long time, is not the same as the North American one. For example, to a semi-slaved worker in the fields of Almeria, the problem of police violence seems secondary and she does not see that her struggle can be the same. She doesn't care much about the fact that statues of slave traders are being knocked down.
The Black Lives Matter movement has been a mere media product in Europe that has brought about a flash on other forms of racism and will not have much impact on the real battle being waged by European anti-racist organizations. Incidentally, I am sorry to be pessimistic, but these organizations are not at their best at present. Neither with BLM nor without BLM. We should examine why this is the case.

If I mention it, it is because you mentioned it as an indicator of progress towards the enlightenment. For the reasons I just explained, it is not.

Subtly biased? — Isaac

It was a way of talking so as not to be rude.

I do believe the whole world getting behind Black Lives Matter — Athena

We can wait ten years to see, if you like. In the meantime, I think "the whole world" is a bold statement.There have been bigger movements against racism in the past ("I have a dream", you know) that ended up in superficial changes of a situation that remains basically the same. Racism is a system of discrimination and violence against a race. Social discrimination continues. And violence against black men (and other discriminated races) has been passed on to the police from the branches of trees. And pandemics strikes according to skin color.

As you know, progress is one of the key ideas of the Enlightenment. Progress in the material and in the moral. But it's a difficult concept to measure. Steven Pinker published an acclaimed book on the subject that is the most subtly biased I've read in recent times. His indicators were geared to score in only one direction.
I believe that the evolution of morality, for example, cannot be measured because traditional state violence has disappeared from the map... while it has been replaced by new forms of violence against people. For example, current states are less violent in the display of violence in justice, but more violent in the spread of everyday micro-violence. In a sense, it can be said that the practice is directed towards externalizing violence.That is to say, to make violence be exercised among the subjects of sovereignty, while the latter is limited to controlling the rules of the game. Is that progress? For Pinker it is. It seems to me to be a myopic point of view.

What assumptions does Kant not make explicit? — David Mo

What assumptions does Kant make that are explicit? — A Seagull

Answering a question with another is dialectical malpractice. It assumes that you don't know how to answer the first question and try to get rid of it in a bad way.
If you answer first the question I asked you, we will can continue our discussion.

Before 1958 education supported what you said and Christianity was not the problem it is today. — Athena

If we returned to liberal education and an understanding of what morals have to do with democracy and reason, we could realize a New Age that is better than our past. — Athena

I do not know what wonderful country you are talking about that in 1958 had no problems with religion and was liberal in its education system. Where I know the influence of religious intransigence and authoritarian education were two serious problems for a real Enlightenment as much or more than now. What country are you talking about?

I also don't see any foreseeable developments in human behavior due to the pandemic. Neither intellectually nor morally. Quite the opposite: individualism that is indifferent to death o the others is still on the rise and the destruction of the Earth is advancing by leaps and bounds. Social inequalities have also become more evident without anyone lifting a finger to resolve them in the future. What reasons do we have to hope for a rational, communitarian and democratic New Age? I see none.

The problem with Kant is that he does not make those assumptions explicit, nor does he make his arguments clear. — A Seagull

What assumptions does Kant not make explicit?
What is your criterion for considering Kant obscure?

People didn't used to think that arguments for a flat earth was nonsense it was obvious the Earth was flat.

Your argument is solely one of popular agreement, (or at least a lack of dissension) — A Seagull

My argument was based on the relative consensus of the expert community. I don't think it's an argument based on popular belief.

The argument for a flat Earth has always been based on mythical accounts and delusional evidence today (a wall surrounding the ends of the Earth, a universal conspiracy of millions of people, etc.).

You may consider that the consensus of specialists is not sufficient proof of Kant's clarity, but you cannot equate the two types of arguments.

I think the problem is not whether Western culture is enlightened. It's not in the terms that the great thinkers of the Enlightenment thought. A thin layer of basic culture, a rhetoric of good ideals and a formal democracy does not mean enlightened minds. Everywhere the holes in this layer allow us to see the modern and ancient superstitions, aggressive selfishness and anti-democratic powers that are the true ferment of our society.

It would be easy to say that all of this is the consequence of domination (classes) and the strong capacities to control minds (junk culture and consumerism). That may be true, but the philosophical problem is: why do these means of control work? Is human nature irremediably stupid and corrupt?

I confess that my optimism for the future is breaking down day by day.

Well then your proof belongs to the same category as the proof that the Earth is flat. — A Seagull

I don't think so. Between a nonsense and a reasonable indication, there's a lot of space.

I am not only a materialist but also a social-hedonist. I think that so-called moral emotions are the basis of our moral feelings of solidarity. Since animals also suffer, I think the time has come to associate them with our moral feelings. The bet, if it is coherent, is strong. But I think that, also for the sake of coherence, we must begin to walk along this path.

This is much better, in my view, than what you've said before. — Xtrix

Strange. It is the same I have repeated again and again.

But I wonder why you say "perverted the question" — Xtrix

The answer is in the very texts by Heidegger and his commentators that I have quoted here.
For example:

"The verb 'verfallen' is one which Heidegger will use many times. Though we shall usually translate it simply as 'fall', it has the connotation of deteriorating, collapsing, or falling down". (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell, 2001, p. 42, footnote).

"Greek ontology and its history which, in their numerous filiations and distortions, determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today-prove that when Dasein understands either itself or Being in general, it does so in terms of the 'world', and that the ontology which has thus arisen has deteriorated [ verfallt] to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident -merely material for reworking". (Heidegger: B&T, p. 22/43)

If you don't like the word "degenerate," you can take "pervert" or " deteriorated". I don't see the difference. Anyway, the word "degenerate" is also used by Heidegger (Ibid, p. 36/61, for ex.). And "peverted" on a B&T quote I placed above.

Why does Heidegger say this? We should ask him. In my opinion, he wasn't clear. But in his words, it seems that substantialism is to blame for this degeneration, perversion, deterioration or fall. Because it turns the mystery of being into an intelligible "thing". And what is understood made it nervous. He was into mystery, poetry, fog and vagueness.

Reminds me of Dennett's book — 3017amen

Dennet is another example of difficult reading. I got stuck with his book and left it. In my opinion, it's not worth the effort. But I made the effort with Sartre. Why?

Sartre probably writes better. He has impact phrases that can't be summed up. It's easy to find articles by Dennet that are shorter than the book. Not by Sartre. It's easy to find articles about Dennet. It's not easy to find articles on the Critique of Dialectical Reason.

Perhaps circumstantial differences made me consider the suffering of reading Sartre's CDR inevitable. I don't regret it. Not quite.

That hardly constitutes a proof! — A Seagull

"Proof" in a broad sense.

Also, to be completely honest, I have not done enough research to see if places like the one I am trying to describe exist, and if you (whoever reads this) know of any I'd appreciate it if you let me know. — Daniel

I agree. An important part of the solution is to create free and respectful spaces for discussion among ordinary people. Preferably real contacts, not virtual ones. Virtuality is inhumane.

First problem: what does free and respectful mean?
Second problem: how can we create these spaces?
Third problem: were these spaces just verbal encounters or could they be prior to action?

Your question: have this type of meetings ever existed? Have they failed?

This type of encounter exists. Or at least, some that look alike.
For example:

Meetings of neighbors.
Community budgets.
Alternative international forums.

I have attended some of them. In my opinion they all end up failing. Why? If you're interested, we'll continue to discuss this.

But you will only find the utmost respect for Aristotle and Descartes from Heidegger. — Xtrix

I think you're mixing up the moral and epistemic senses of "being wrong". I'm not talking about respect in moral sense. I'm talking about fundamental errors in what ontological truth is. Nor am I talking about particular evaluations but a global consideration of the authors' work. I can have a positive evaluation of the subtleness of Plato's language or Nietzsche's sharpness in criticizing the moral hypocrisy of bourgeois society without accepting Plato's idealism or Nietzsche's will to power. Heidegger respected Aristotle and Kant - I am not so sure about Descartes - but he thought that they were part of a philosophical tradition that perverted the question of Being, which is the mother of all questions. Of course, Parmenides and Heraclitus are an important part of the philosophical tradition, but they were not part of this misleading tradition.

And of course there is no description of a "superman society", since "the goal of mankind cannot lie in its end, but in its highest specimens"- the overman is an individual who is defined, at least in part, by standing apart from the crowd and going their own way. — Enai De A Lukal

Well, that's what I find extremely inconclusive. After having destroyed Judaeo-Christian morality, anarchism, socialism, liberalism and the Prussian monarchy, supermen would float in an ethereal territory above the masses who, having run out of shepherds, would return to the period before the appearance of the blonde beasts.

And back to the beginning. Of course.

As I see it, someone with a social alternative has a strategy and a tactic or is prophesying vagueness. Which is the case with Nietzsche. That's why he could be an inspiration to socialists, anarchists, conservatives and Nazis. They were all fine with it. Strange, isn't it?

Or was Nietzsche just a mouthpiece nihilist?

Although to say that Kant scholars dispute the meaning of what he wrote isn't saying much. — SophistiCat

There may be discussions about isolated points, but the commentators I have read agree on the fundamentals.

I take the liberty of copying for you here an excerpt from an article by one of the sharpest thinkers - not philosophers - in my country.

One day, when he left work, he went into a bookstore. Having overcome his fear of being taken for an intruder (which he was), he took a random volume of philosophy and read a page from which he understood nothing. This must be the culture, he thought, so he bought the book, went home with it and started reading it on the sofa, in front of the mute TV. Within half an hour he was exhausted. Although the book was written in his own language, it had a multitude of words that he did not understand. After deciding that the next day he would buy a dictionary, he closed the volume and turned on the television, on whose screen the drugging caterpillars corresponding to the day and the hour began to flow at once. The man put his legs on the table and let himself be invaded by the sweet evil.
When he had been invaded he looked at the closed volume and had a revelation: the book, even if he did not understand it, was life, while the television, which he understood, was death, so he got up, took the device off the shelf and hid it under the sink, next to the dishwasher. Then he began to read those pages slowly, moving his tongue inside his mouth, without understanding anything. And the less he understood, the wiser he was. Who can explain it to him? — Juan José Millás

Can you explain it?

Why do you think that? For Kant meets the criteria for obscure and writing. — A Seagull

Because it lays the foundation for modern knowledge theory. I share in essence his critique of metaphysical thought.

Kant's ideas are not obscure. Or not as dark as they seem at first glance. The proof is that they have not provoked great disputes about their primary meaning -although they have provoked great disputes about their implications, which is another matter. It is not like Hegel whose sense often challenges the Hegelians themselves. Or like Heideigger who has given rise to radically different philosophies (Marcuse, Arendt, Gadamer, Sartre). and who spent his life disowning his interpreters. Or Wittgenstein, who one day changed his philosophy because he felt like it. Or Levy-Strauss, who admitted at the end of his life that he was not quite sure what he had meant before.

So you can score brownie points with your peers by coming up with a new interpretation of the text, duh. — darthbarracuda

You' re right. This is a good reason... for some.

These are some examples that I have chosen at random. There are some that are harder to swallow.

-If mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter boundlessly destroys them; if mythical violence brings at once guilt and retribution, divine power only expiates; if the former threatens, the latter strikes; if the former is bloody, the latter is lethal without spilling blood. The legend of Niobe may be confronted, as an example of this violence.
Walter Benjamin: Critique of Violence, in Reflections, p. 297.

-The only aspect of speculation visible to common sense is its nullifying activity; and even this nullification is not visible in its entire scope. If common sense could grasp this scope, it would not believe speculation to be its enemy. For in its higher synthesis of the conscious and the non-conscious, speculation also demands the nullification of consciousness itself. Reason thus drowns itself and its knowledge and its reflection of the absolute identity, in its own abyss: and in this night of mere reflection and of the calculating intellect, in this night which is the noonday of life, common sense and speculation can meet one another.
( Hegel: Various Forms Occurring in Contemporary Philosophy, in The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/fs/ch01.htm )

-Being-near-itself of the Idea in Absolute Knowledge would be odysseic in this sense, that of an economy and nostalgia, of a "homesickness", of a temporary exile in search of re-appropriation. Then the gift, if there is any, would undoubtedly relate to the economy.
(Jacques Derrida: Donner le temps, in La Fausse monnai, p. 17)

-The unthinkable (whatever it may be called) is not lodged in man as a twisted nature or a history that would have been stratified there; it is in relation to man the Other; the fraternal and twin Other, born not in him or from him, but at his side and at the same time, in an identical novelty, in a duality without recourse.
(Michel Foucault: Las palabras y las cosas, México, 1968; p. 317)

-What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand ; it is rather the possibiliry of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself. When anxiety has subsided, then in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say that 'it was really nothing'. And what it was, indeed, does get reached ontically by such a way of talking. Everyday discourse tends towards concerning itself with the ready-to-hand and talking about it. That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is nothing ready-to-hand within-the-world. But this "nothing ready-to-hand", which only our everyday circumspective discourse understands, is not totally nothing. The "nothing" of readiness­-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial 'something'-in the world.
Ontologically, however, the world belongs essentially to Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world. So
if the "nothing"-that is, the world as such- exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.
(Martin Heidegger: Being and Time, 187/231-2)

-The fact remains that the first moment (first for the experience: the Apocalypse may present itself as the liquidation of a series of old groups in favour of the amorphous homogeneity of a young group-in-
fusion) suggests some observations: as the group is -first and foremost - a common praxis, but the fact remains that the community, the emergence of the praxis is reflected in the appearance of a group as an interiorization of multiplicity and reorganization of human relations.
(Jean-Paul Sartre: Critique de la raison dialectique, p. 415)