where one believes — Michael

It seems that a strict verificationist can only claim realism in terms of belief. That is, a strict demonstration of the outside world is impossible, but it is a reasonable and universal belief.

TY! — PuerAzaelis

What means TY?

It would be (b) then. It makes more sense to me to just say unfalsifiable since it cannot be demonstrated whether or not a creator of some sort lurks out there somewhere. — Malice

Thank you.
Your position is similar to Thomas Huxley's, who coined the word "agnosticism" to refer to it. According to him, there was no word for it in his day. It's a kind of skepticism.

Of course, you can call yourself whatever you like.

That's better called a memory. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not speaking of the past, but present. Red perception is not a memory.

the person might choose either good or bad actions in relation to the feeling — Metaphysician Undercover

Who is denying that?

Reason alone can be directed in the wrong direction. Selfishness, for example. Moral emotion alone can be stupidly applied. — David Mo

What more is there then, "The evidence has not convinced me"? — CeleRate

Sounds like a good reason to me. You passed the buck to the theist. It's his turn. Although he may ask you if you know many arguments about the existence of God. Then you can ask him to enlighten you. And the debate is on. But you didn't hide behind the excuse that you didn't believe in anything to keep your mouth shut. You did right.

There are people that believe in telekinesis, ghosts, and clairvoyance, but the word a-paranormalist does not exist. There are no a-fairyists, no a-SantaClausists, a-extraterrestrialists, etc even though there are large populations of believers and non-believers for each of these beliefs. — CeleRate

There are some words for all this: mythology, pseudoscience or magic thinking. If they're meant to be something philosophical, metaphysical is their category. It depends on the nuances. There's probably no common word because those nuances exist. Some specialties have their category: sectarians, ufologists, astrologers, parapsychologists, fortune tellers or magicians. There are even some neologisms like terraplanists. It depends on the diffusion that they have had. We are not going to invent a category for every nutcase who invents a mosquito cult. And those who don't believe in these things are usually called skeptics, rationalists or scientists, depending on the case.
So I find it quite normal that there is words for believers, theists, atheists or agnostics.

I'm afraid you haven't responded to the threefold alternative I raised. Could you do it now, please?

But your supposed feeling of "guilt" already has that judgement built into i — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say that feeling includes a judgment. Feeling is the perception of have injured someone. Just as empathy does not include the judgment of feeling what another feels. But it is felt. You see the color red before you are thinking that this color is different from blue. The same is true for moral emotions. May or may not be accompanied for judgments about them.

This is unacceptable. Having two distinct bases, as you propose would lead to inconsistency and contradiction of principles, — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see why. My understanding of what is good can be supported by the feeling of empathy and result in an action that my reason recognizes as good. Where do you see contradiction? On the contrary, it is obvious that some feelings and reason may coincide. It has been said since Socrates, if not before.

What does he mean when he says that verificationism is "anti-realism"? — PuerAzaelis

It refers to the hard version of empiricism. Only what is verifiable is real. The way to verify is observation. Observation is based on sensations. Nothing exists outside sensations. Sensations are in my mind, then nothing exists (or can be known) outside my mind. Signed: Berkeley.

(Summarily said).

I believe that the possibility of a creator agent is unfalsifiable. — Malice

What do you mean?
a) God (very) probably doesn't exist.
b) You can't tell if God exists or not.
c) The existence of God is a pseudo-problem.

Thank you.

We know that it's pain, or that it's pleasure simply from the feeling, — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a feeling of shame or guilt. This is the psychological fact. After that you can think about what you've had and categorize it as shame or guilt. What you called "knowing" is the latter. Obviously you need to think about it to know what it is. But to be X and to think what X can be are different actions.

Feeling good is not doing good. Feeling that I'm doing good for someone is not the same as feeling good about hurting someone. The first is empathy; the second is sadism. They are different things with different implications. So what?

The contradiction is in saying that morality is based in reason, yet emotion gives us the impulse to do good. If emotion gave us the impulse to do good, then we would not need reason for morality, we could just follow our emotions, and therefore do good. Morality would not be based in reason it would be based in emotions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have already answered this. There are two bases of morality: reason and emotion. I used the metaphor of a tandem.

For example, Spinoza: passions are stronger than reason. So reason needs to ally with them and reinforce the passions that aim at rational or moral ends.

You can disagree but you can't say that this is a contradictory theory.

Hume says that reason tells me that if I eat too much chocolate it will raise my blood sugar level. But I can answer that I prefer a shorter and more pleasant life to a tasteless long life. Reason can't say anything against a radical hedonistic choice. Listen, I've already written this for you. Did you read it?

Christian ethics, which tell us to be guided by eternal truths of the intellect, — Metaphysician Undercover

According the Fathers of the Church, intellect is a servant of faith. We're not getting into theologies now, I hope.

Being a thinking thing is not necessarily an absolute truth because when you die you will cease to think. — rikes

The undoubted truth is that if you think now you are "something" that thinks now. What happened before and what will come after are no longer undoubted truths.

But this is a philosophical problem that has long been overcome. It was an obsession of classical rationalism. What I propose is to understand the undoubted truths in terms of modern empiricism. Something less radical, but more useful.

Atheists of the mid-20th century decided they did not want to be saddled with a burden of proof for their "beliefs"...and decided to change the meaning of the word.

Its use does not derive from its "usefulness" as you outline it. It derives from the usefulness of people who use the word to be absolved from having to defend a position that cannot logically be defended. — Frank Apisa

If that is the main reason, it is absurd. Sooner or later the atheist/agnostic - that is, the one who simply declares not to believe in God - will be forced to argue his position and define himself as a "gnostic atheist" or "atheist agnostic. Unless he chooses not to enter the debate, in which case he need not define himself in any way. So, I don't know why he participates in debates like this with such passionate manners.

The choice is so irrational that I suppose other psychological reasons are hidden.

My conclusion is that atheists/agnostics - that is, those who simply claim not to believe in God - should argue their skepticism and stop fussing with "the true meaning of atheism" and "the burden of proof". These are pseudo-problems.

I’d say you don’t have true knowledge unless there’s absolutely no way for that belief to be false. — rikes

That is the definition of an unfalsifiable proposition, that is, without empirical meaning. Empty.

Descartes spoke of a proposition whose opposite was contradictory. For example: I think therefore I am. The problem is that, admitting that it is not a tautology, he could not go further. Well, he went further, but by cheating.

Therefore I supposed it was better to look for a less strong concept of indubitable. I don't know if it's possible. In practice, we consider it absolutely true that if you put your hand in boiling water you get burned. What makes that proposition unquestionable in practice?

There are people that have stated that they are uncomfortable with using the word as it gives credence to the idea of a God. One might say, "I don't need the word A-fairyist to declare that I don't believe in fairies, so why do I need a word to indicate that I don't believe in a God or Gods"? — CeleRate

I would like to know why defining oneself as an atheist in one way or another favors belief in God. This is a statement that I have read at times with no one to back it up. Would anyone like to explain it to me? Thank you.

I suppose that coining the word atheism is useful so as not to have to repeat "person who does not believe in the existence of God" or "person who believes that God does not exist". These are very long expressions. If belief in fairies were as common as belief in gods we would surely have a term similar to "fairist" and "a-fairist". It is a matter of usefulness.

If morality is truly based on reason, then it is contradictory to say that it is emotion which gives us the impulse to do good. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see any contradiction. It's one thing to know and another to want. The person who says "I know very well that I shouldn't eat chocolate, but I can't resist" is expressing that difference. On the other hand, Hume showed that you cannot rationally prove that you should do something. Reason can show the consequences of drinking chocolate, but not that you should prefer to refrain from eating chocolate than to face the consequences. There is no contradiction in preferring a short and intense life to a long but insipid one.

Therefore, if you want to live a moral life you will have to base it on moral emotions. It will be based on reason, to the extent that it can rely on them. Reason must know how to use the emotions that suit it in order to reject those that do not. Without this reason is morally useless. Beautiful, but useless. Pure idealism.

Don't give me platonisms. Plato was very intelligent and wrote very well, but his idea of the Ideal Good seems to me to be pure illusion.

In my opinion, reason and moral emotion are a tandem. If one stops pedaling, we're not going anywhere.

I might get an uneasy feeling, an uncomfortable feeling, and associate this feeling with the judgement that the action is wrong, but I do not believe I've ever really had a feeling that what I am doing is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

And anytime we use a word to describe a particular situation, this requires a conscious judgement that the situation fulfills the requirements of using that word. So when I say "that's a house", "that's a car", "the colour of that thing is red", or "that action is wrong" — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying that until you think "This is a house" you don't have the perception of a house? Your life must be hard. You should see a specialist.

Joking aside, when you perceive anything you get a complex of intuitions and mental constructs without having to reflect on them. Only people with brain damage dissociate (sensations from) forms and (perceptions of) things. Similarly, when I experience a feeling of discomfort it is intentional: that is, it has a specific sense. For example, fear is very different from guilt. They have different causes and effects. A further analysis is verbal, of course. "This is a panic attack" is a reflexive verbal act. It is even possible that this analysis is wrong. I can believe that I hate a woman even though a further analysis may show that my feeling was really a frustrated love. It is wrong because it doesn't reflects the very feeling. What means that the feeling exists before and without the reflective analysis.

I don't think you don't have differentiated feelings. When a feeling is associated with some characteristics (of fear or guilt) - as you said - it is because they are in the very same feeling. You don't need to say "I had a panic attack" to have had a panic attack. You can rest assured: you don't need a specialist. You just need to think better about what you're saying.

First we would have to define certainty. I'm afraid if you set the bar at Descartes we'll have no certainties (practically).
Second: that god does not exist; if he existed he could not be known and if he was known he could not be expressed. It's not much use.

your answer better have actually answered the intended question and not a different one. I think that it is common for philosophers to do so — Douglas Alan

You said that it is very common for philosophers to answer a question without answering this particular question. After that, you raised the question of what identity is in a very tangled way. So, what the philosopher needs to do is clarify the question. How does Parfit respond to this? Usually here the layman starts to get exasperated. He wants a clear and simple answer to a confusing and complex question. But this is not the philosopher's fault. It's a problem of mass culture and political demagogy. Factual powers are not interested to teach people to ask questions.

Don't shoot the philosopher. He's doing his best. Although he's not always very good.

I cannot say that I ought to do what the feeling inclines me to do, as you seem to imply. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't realize that I'm not in the field of morals or ethics. I'm not recommending anything. I'm explaining what moral emotions are and how they work. I mean, psychology.
There can be a contradiction between a moral feeling and a rational judgment. It is the obsessive leitmotif of Dostoevsky's novels and the center of Hume's ethics. Dostoevsky was an irrationalist. Therefore, he gave absolute primacy to the feeling of Love (with a capital letter). Hume was an Enlightened one, but he was aware of the importance of sympathy for morality. The same with Spinoza. Both believed that morality is based on reason, but without moral emotion there can be no impulse to do good. Therefore we can say that they called for a synthesis between them. If they split up, both of them could be wrong.

I don't need to say that I agree with them. Reason alone can be directed in the wrong direction. Selfishness, for example. Moral emotion alone can be stupidly applied. A synthesis is necessary. Finding the right synthesis is not easy, but it is necessary.

if someone did not recognize one's own actions as culpable, — Metaphysician Undercover

This sentence doesn't make sense. What is guilty is not the action but the person. I recognize myself as guilty of having done something wrong. Please submit your objection correctly written. When you've done that, we can discuss what you mean.

You are distinguishing judgement, as the measurement of does x qualify as good or bad, from the knowledge of what constitutes good and bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not made this distinction. One can rationally judge (or make a proposition, what is the same) about what is good or bad. But there is also the feeling that what I am doing is wrong, which may happen in a direct or non-reflective way, as you yourself will later acknowledge. But this is not a judgment about right or wrong, but about my action.
This has nothing to do with ethics, which is a philosophical discipline about what good means, but with the way human beings behave and feel. Psychology, if you like. Ethics can consider this as a fact, but it is not its main objective.

This distinction does not make any sense to me. All feelings start with "I". — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not spoken of " starting ", but of a type of emotion that concerns the ideal of the Self. It is shame.

This demonstrates your continued refusal to address "conscience" — Metaphysician Undercover

When did I say such a thing? The conciousness of something does not need to be reflexive. Although it often is. I'm aware that I'm being watched, without having to reflect on it.

The emotion provides motivation to make the judgement, but isn't itself a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

So whatever type of judgement this is, which causes the occurrence of embarrassment, it is not a conscious judgement, and that makes it awkward to even call it a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could escape your contradictions by eliminating the term judgement. An unconscious judgment is not a judgment strictly speaking. It would be more correct to say that there is an evaluation or perception of the situation.

Therefore we throw away your internal feeling of guilt, and we replace this with internal feelings which are derived from perceived relations with others, feelings which are independent from such judgements of wrong or right. — Metaphysician Undercover

No agreement is possible. All so-called moral feelings involve relationships with others and a certain sense of right and wrong. Indignation, pride, resentment, guilt, shame, etc. are different because their cause is different: the evil that I have committed, the ideal of the 'I' that I have violated, the evil that has been infringed upon another person, the harm that has been done to me, the act that others approve of, etc. Consequently they are associated with different ideas and also have different effects. Therefore, moral emotions are mental complexes that cannot be broken down, except analytically. You cannot take away "the judgment" -as you say-or the feeling that is associated with them, because they are part of that emotional complex that psychology studies.

So we can't agree on the basis of a monumental error. You pretend to invalidate all psychological studies of emotions. You don't seem to care about such a feat. I do care.

Do you not see how you contradict yourself? The person here has "the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act", and wants to hide that act because of fear of punishment. So you say that the person does not feel guilt. — Metaphysician Undercover

The contradiction is only in your head. It is not true that guilty is a judgement and not a feeling. The criminal that hide his crime just because he fears to be punished has no feeling of culpability, although he knows he has done something wrong. This is a very common fact between mafiosi and pathological killers. This contradict your claim that guilt is only a judgement.

There was something wrong with me. I just don’t remember being such a monster. I don’t feel evil. — Kendall Francois, serial killer

I think every emotion is a judgement. — unenlightened

This is the absurd conclusion. In fact, the argument invalidates any kind of emotion. They all involve cognitive processes. Fear, for example, also involves an assessment of the situation. I judge that I have done wrong, I judge that there is something dangerous in the situation, I judge that this is outrageous. Then there are no emotions. Neither fear, nor indignation, nor guilt, nor shame, nor love, etc. are emotions, according to your argument. An absurdity.

To say that cognitive processes are present in emotions at some point does not deny that emotion exists, only that it is a complex phenomenon that affects both mind and body.

Well, that's pretty old. — Douglas Alan

Einstein is even older. It happens that in philosophy of science and in science it is convenient to be aware of the theories of the past that are still valid. The thinkers of the past often said things that were clearer and more profound than today stars of philosophy. In any case, on the subject of definitions of "fact", the distinction made by Carnap between formal and factual (natural) sciences is fully valid. See here or here.

This said, I do have something of an interest in Kuhn's revelation that science doesn't work nearly as cleanly as one was taught in high school. — Douglas Alan

I find Kuhn very convincing as well. Especially convincing when he warns that science is more than just what engineers do.

when answering a philosophical conundrum that has been expressed in lay language. — Douglas Alan

Ordinary language is specially confuse when using the word "facts". For example: "mathematical facts" and "a matter of fact". Therefore a more analytic "jargon" is needed.

Which teacher? — Douglas Alan

Right. You mentioned your boss. I understood it was a reference to his master in the degree. I could have used your boss's opinion that you quoted. But it doesn't matter.

I've never heard of such a distinction. — Douglas Alan

Here's a classic: Carnap, Rudolf: "Formal and Factual Science" (1935):

As an example of a problem in the logic of science, we shall deal in what follows with the problem of the relationship between two major fields of science, namely, the formal sciences (logic, including mathematics) and the factual sciences (embracing the totality of all empirical disciplines: physics, biology, psychology, sociology, history, etc.). (New York: 123) — Carnap

It doesn't matches theoretical and empirical, I think. Better deductive-inductive.

that the math department did not seem at all interested in. — Douglas Alan

What you are talking about is how the pure-applied distinction is reflected in university departments. You are familiar with the applied mathematics that falls within the realm of factual science. I don't think you are familiar with the turmoil that caused in the field of philosophy of science the emergence of non-Euclidean mathematics . Or with the problem of how certain purely formal mathematical developments are then applied to empirical reality, which is another problem that has fascinated theoretical scientists and philosophers since Leibniz or before... but leaves engineers or biologists indifferent.

I have no problem with jargon as long as it is explained, used consistently, and understood as jargon and not lay usage — Douglas Alan

If the use of jargon bothers you, you're lost in philosophy... or science. I imagine you'd have a hell with Boolos. I don't understand much of what he writes. Putnam, it seems, doesn't either. I take some comfort in that.

Whether the use of jargon is a result of the need to be more precise in one's ideas or to attract attention is not clear to me. Since I sometimes do not understand it, I tend to think that it is more the latter. But it may be a prejudice of my ignorance. So I'm careful about this. Humility is one of the conditions of the philosopher that they generally don't have.

Now, independently of the abuse of jargon, the problem of the relationship between formal and factual sciences seems to me to be serious. And I don't think it can be solved from ordinary language. "Facts" in ordinary language has a lot of meanings that are continually intermingled. For example: if we talk about mathematical facts on the Internet -9 Amazing Math Facts!, and similar- , it is in relation to applied mathematics. Which leaves the formal-factual problem that is essential in theoretical physics and scientific revolutions in the lurch. That is not good.

You are so full of arrogant shit my head has just exploded and unfortunately I will be unable to engage further. — unenlightened

I'm sorry you take things that way. A debate is just a debate and not having arguments to answer is no shame. It happens to all of us sometime.

How can an emotion be moral or non moral, what even is it for something to be moral? — unenlightened

When we talk about moral emotions in psychology and philosophy, we understand that they are those that affect my relationship with others. In addition to guilt and shame, this often includes pride, moral outrage and so on. Defining what is moral is complicated, but this definition is operative and serves to understand us in this field.

Every emotion can be altered by the use of drugs. This is a problem in psychiatry. What are effective, what are the side effects, etc. If the use of such drugs is morally acceptable, it is to move into the realm of philosophy. I have no problem entering it. I'm very interested in it. But they are two different problems. And don't make me say what I haven't said. Have you read Brave New World? A great novel that raises the philosophical problem.

For the record, the definition of guilt and shame I have given is the one used by philosophers as well. The ones I've read, at least. Scheler, Sartre, Taylor, Wollheim, Heller, etc. It is a universally accepted distinction, unless you have an example to the contrary.

you are aware of the fact/value distinction? — unenlightened

Of course. It is a fact that guilt is a feeling that affects many people, who judge that what they have done is wrong. The fact is the burden of guilt. Value is how the guilty judges the fact. I don't judge if he is wrong in his belief. I am not a priest nor a moralist. I analyze the causes of his discomfort (fact). I am a psychologist.

there are two distinct urges (types of feelings) which follow from one's own judgement of personal guilt, one urge is to deny the guilt and hide responsibility, the other is the urge to face responsibility and make restitution. — Metaphysician Undercover

You confuse two things: the urge to hide the malicious act and the feeling of having committed a truly malicious act. You can try to hide the act without any feeling of guilt because of fear of punishment. They are two different things. This fear and feeling of guilt are not the same.

Guilt is the feeling of being responsible for a wrong committed on someone. Whether or not you want to make amends for that wrong comes after the discomfort of feeling guilty. Some people prefer to endure that discomfort and some people need to take away this charge. But the discomfort of guilt comes before the second step.

Have you ever been on a jury? That's why it's impossible that guilt is a feeling, or emotion, a judgement of guilt involves many distinct feelings and emotions. — Metaphysician Undercover

You confuse the guilty verdict in a court of law with the guilty feeling of the guilty. We're talking about the former. They are very different things

I would ask you once again, instead of wandering on your own, to take some of the examples in the articles I quoted and discuss them.

What does Judas Iscariot feel in the Bible? He feels guilty about giving up Jesus. Yes or no?
Matt 27, 3-5.

Do you want restrict to this biblical example?

Do they not speak for themselves? — unenlightened

I don't understand the question. Please be clearer.

These are not facts. This is a distinction you are making that has some merit in terms of clarity and convenience, — unenlightened

That certain emotions arise in relation to a victim and others do not is not an arbitrary distinction. It is a distinction based on an undeniable and observable fact (except for our colleague, who has a personal logic). That some emotions only arise in function of an observer and others do not, is a distinction based on unquestionable and observable facts. That the emotions that arise in function of a victim are those that arise without the need of external observers but by an internal process is an observable and undeniable relationship. That this internal process is based on sympathy for the victim and the acceptance of certain norms related to it, while the triggers of the first emotions are based on the loss of self-esteem, are undeniable and observable facts that psychology has studied for some time. That the classification of moral emotions has been useful in those studies, is something that anyone who is a little aware of current psychology knows.I don't know of a single study of philosophy or psychology that doesn't make the distinction between shame and guilt. If you know of any, I'd like you to quote it to me. I'd be interested in it. Truly.

Why have they done that do you think? — unenlightened

In ordinary language, art or mythology, guilt and shame are sometimes intertwined. This is due to their proximity as moral emotions and because they have some of their characteristics in common: both are based on a concept of what should and should not be done (that's why they are moral) and both involve self-esteem (that's why they are also called emotions of the Self). In the case of the Bible the confusion is easier because it is the product of a society in which tribal pressure and morality are confused. This refers to the problem of the existence of societies dominated by the sense of shame-honour and guilt societies. Traditional Jewish culture would be among the first.

I have a degree in Philosophy from MIT. — Douglas Alan

I find it very strange that at MIT no one has explained to you the difference between factual and formal sciences, analytical and synthetic propositions or truths of reason and truths of facts. And pure and applied mathematics, of course.

Here is an interesting article on the subject: https://philarchive.org/archive/MARMBP-5 . Given your degree you should not find any problem in reading it.

I keep wondering what your teacher has to say on the subject. What a pity.

but are you guys disputing the meaning of words, the nature of psyche, ethics, or something else? — unenlightened

Honestly, I don't know. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe you, but I'm discussing facts. That shame and guilt are two different emotions. That guilt is not a consequence of shame and that the time sequence does not intervene at all in the definition of both. (By de way, these are facts commonly accepted in psychology).

Whether they are called one way or the other doesn't matter to me. What is absurd is to say that one is a subspecies of the other as Metaphysical Undercover has said. This is a false statement of fact.

In guilt there is implied a victim. In shame there is not a victim. Examples: regret to have raped a woman. Disgust to myself for being a coward. Don't you see the difference, unelightened?

...regardless of the act... — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't make any sense. The act is a fundamental part of shame: being seen (really or imagining) doing something that one shouldn't be doing at that moment by the observer who shouldn't be seeing it. This is the exact definition of the situation that causes shame.

To say that the person has conflicting feelings, and that's what "guilt" is, to have conflicted feelings, does not describe a feeling of guilt. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where did I say that?

Where did I say that?

As I said, there is no guilt without shame. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not true. I've already given you an example.

A criminal may feel guilty but not ashamed if he despises the society that reproaches him for his crime. See Jean Valjean in Hugo's Les miserables. — David Mo

Can you answer to my objection? I doubt it.

The primary judgement by the conscience is that there is a specific type of deprived, unpleasant, uncomfortable situation, and this is shame. — Metaphysician Undercover

That definition serves many different emotions. It's not specific. It doesn't distinguish anything.

A secondary judgement assigns blame for the deprived situation and this is the designation of guilt. — Metaphysician Undercover

Social condemnation can serve to designate both shame and guilt. If they are distinguished it is because social condemnation is based on different things. Your "definitions" do not define anything in particular.

Everything that follows fails because it is based on undefinition from the beginning. It is an empty discourse.

My point is that in "ordinary language" mathematical truths are typically considered to be facts. — Douglas Alan

If you prefer to limit yourself to the ordinary language which is always imprecise, I have no objection. I thought you were referring to expert opinion -your PhD teacher, the scientists... The first one -OL- doesn't interest me much. Which are we speaking of?

Would you like to wager on what his answer will be? — Douglas Alan

Ask him the question as I put it, please. Don't water it down. I'm intrigued by his answer.

f shame is, as you say, involved with external observation, this itself, is a reconsideration of the event, and that's an inconsistency in your description.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? The situation that causes shame can be effective immediately, like a reflex, without thoughtful consideration. Where is your problem?

The inclination to walk away and hide from this, and the inclination to face the person with apology and repentance, involve completely different feelings which are derived from the very same event. — Metaphysician Undercover

The same feeling of guilt gives rise to two different responses: hiding the guilt or acknowledging it. These differences are due to different circumstances and additional feelings: fear of punishment, sense of moral responsibility, the link with the victim, etc. But the original feeling is the same: guilt for having damaged someone. I don't see why you think these are two different feelings.

It requires a further judgement of conscience to produce guilt from shame. Guilt involves the recognition that the cause of shame, hiding the deprived situation, or hiding from the deprived situation, recoiling into one's own presumed innocence, or naivety, is itself something wrong, a pretense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Shame may or may not be associated with guilt. Shame associated to guilt only arises when the crime is public. A criminal may feel guilty but not ashamed if he only knows his crime. There are a lot of examples. A criminal may feel guilty but not ashamed if he despises the society that reproaches him for his crime. See Jean Valjean in Hugo's Les miserables.

Conversely, you can feel shame without any sense of guilt: I can be ashamed when someone tells me that I am a coward. Where is the harm I have done to others? Where is the guilt here?

If there is guilt without shame and shame without guilt, it is necessary to reach a conclusion: they are different feelings.

My boss has a PhD in Linguistics from the aforementioned Linguistics department, and I just asked him if 1 + 1 = 2 is a fact. He replied that yes it is. — Douglas Alan

Ask him for the difference between applied and pure maths and what is the fact behind the irrational numbers and Riemann axioms.