So you don't see a need for any core competencies? — Tom Storm

For example?

So, if I'm interested in biology, that makes me a biologist? — Garrett Travers

If you're both interested in biology and ask/answer questions about biology (and, because it's a science, perhaps conduct research), then yes. What else would qualify you, degrees? In that case, Aristotle wasn't a biologist.

It's not just a matter of interest. Philosophy, if I'm correct, consists not only in the interest, but in really asking these questions. It's engaging and struggling with the questions. That's philosophy. To some degree, perhaps we're all philosophers. If you want to label yourself "philosopher," then I assume it's more than a fleeting hobby -- but something you take seriously, that you are frequently engaged in, that takes priority in your life, that is a top value, etc.

I’m honestly not that interested in the brain science. I am interested in what philosophical hay we expect to make of all this. Thoughts? Why should current findings in neurolinguistics matter to us? — Srap Tasmaner

Because it's the best we can do to study thought. Language isn't the same as thought, of course, but it's related.

But no one has to date proposed anything like Universal Music or Universal Mathematics

Isn't mathematics universal already? — Wayfarer

Indeed.

Tomasello wants to make a name for himself by going after Chomsky, but is as convincing as Everett -- who's a complete fraud.

The reality is that there has been much written about both mathematics and music -- including ideas about how they may be piggybacking off of language.

UG is the name for the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty.
— Xtrix

There is no, and cannot in principle be, a ‘genetic component of the language faculty’. That's the point. — StreetlightX

Try this argument with the visual system or the nervous system. Also complex, and also involves genetics.

True, language could be magic. But that gets us nowhere, so I'm not interested.

children are not born with a universal, dedicated tool for learning grammar. — StreetlightX

That's not UG.

Children are born with a capacity to acquire language. Primates are not. This is why children can learn a language and non-human primates cannot.

Whatever is meant by "grammar" here is not the claim being made. Unless one takes grammar to mean "merge," which is an actual claim being made.

It’s the entire research project, which is trash. — StreetlightX

So the biological sciences are likewise "trash." No need to study the genetics of the visual system, or the navigational systems of insects, etc. That's "metaphysics."

It's clear you just don't know what you're talking about. You're welcome to create some straw man and hurl accusations about -- but it's irrelevant.

“A rational Martian scientist would probably find the variation rather superficial, concluding that there is one human language with minor variants”. This ‘one human language’, is of course, Chomsky’s noumenal language — StreetlightX

So the fact that a human baby can learn any language on earth is irrelevant, apparently.

The capacity for language is a universal human property, regardless of whether it's English or Swahili -- which is trivial. A Martian would indeed look down and conclude the same thing about skin -- all humans have it, despite different colors.

I think philosophy, and therefore philosophers, is simply the asking of certain questions. This predates the word "philosophy," of course.

So a philosopher is someone particularly interested in basic questions about the world. Similar to scientists -- with the difference being that scientists restrict themselves to nature.

But that there exists in the human brain a capacity for acquiring language is hardly metaphysics.
— Xtrix

Isn't the question whether that capacity is specialized to language? — Srap Tasmaner

That the capacity to acquire language is specialized to language? I don't quite understand the question, I guess. Are you referring to things like mathematics and music (i.e., other human properties that it may be more specialized towards?)

You're born with an innate capacity for walking, but the structures needed for walking won't form until you try to walk. — frank

Exactly -- not until you've grown in a normal environment. Not all people can walk, not all birds can fly, etc. -- there are exceptions, depending on environment or genetic disability. But that there's a capacity and a genetic component is just assumed in any other biological system. When it comes to language, or human cognition generally, there's an impulse to become irrational.

So yes, maybe language is primarily a system of communication, and evolved as such. Maybe not. But that there exists in the human brain a capacity for acquiring language is hardly metaphysics.

Chomsky argues that UG is specific to humans and that there is at least one language specific feature in UG. Others argue that there aren't any language specific features in UG. (Fewer argue that it's not species specific, though there are some who do.) — Saphsin

Exactly.

I find this to be such a dodge. Here, substitute anything that we can do for 'language' and you can see why — StreetlightX

Of course you can substitute almost anything for it. It's a truism. Which is why the arguments against it tend to be absurd -- they're simply misunderstanding it.

Again, in any system of growth and development -- the visual system, the immune system, the circulatory system, or the language system -- there is going to be external data (which have an effect on how it develops -- like in the visual system, where if you manipulate early visual stimulation you get totally different visual systems), some sort of genetic component, and natural law.

So for language, the data could be from English or Portuguese, the genetic component is what's being researched (UG), and natural law will be things like computational efficiency.

That's not enough to answer everything, but it's the framework for any answer -- and used in all the rest of the biological sciences.

To argue this is metaphysics, or theology, or creationism, etc., is simply hyperbole.

This stuff is theory-laden as can possibly be: in particular the language of 'faculties' precisely individualizes and anatomizes what is, properly understood, a social technology. Is there a 'faulty of the internet'? A 'faculty of the post office'? — StreetlightX

That's like asking if there's a genetic component to the Internet or the Post Office. Is there a genetic component to a hammer?

If you think this is the same as asking about the genetic component of language, or vision, or walking -- then yes, you've completely lost the plot.

That being said, I think what’s more relevant here is the “theory” part of that sentence. The statement was in response to the claim that Chomsky asserts language is “characterized by universals.” Other than assuming (1) all humans have language (which thus is a universal feature) and (2) that there’s a genetic component to this capacity, I have no idea what that means. Either you disagree with (1) and (2), which I assume you aren’t, or by “universals” you’re referring to universal features (like negation or noun/verb phrases). I assumed the latter — and if so, that’s misleading. — Xtrix

UG is not just the mere idea that there is a genetic component to language. It specifies - gives specificity to - this genetic component, by suggesting that it is composed of - depending on when exactly one were to ask Chomsky, since he keeps dropping elements as they become more and more inconvenient and obviously implausible - sets of rules or principles by which 'external' language becomes articulated. He calls this "I-language" ('internal language'), as distinct from 'E-language' ('external language'). The technicalities of it are whatever, but the whole schema can be captured by recognizing that it is basically a renovated substance-accident model that's just Aristotle linguistically redux'd. — StreetlightX

Recall what Chomsky said, and I was trying to emphasize: UG is the name for the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty.

Obviously a lot has to be clarified here. What is meant by "language"? What is meant by "faculty"? And what, exactly, is the theory about this genetic capacity?

You're right that i-language is a term made up by Chomsky. It is taken to consist, essentially, of merge -- the ability to take two objects and make a new one. (i.e., binary set formation.) Recursion is thought to be a property of the faculty of language -- just as binocular vision is a property of the human visual system.

"Faculty" refers to the system/capacity itself. Again, vision is a good example. We have a visual system, a visual faculty. There's no controversy about that -- any more than there is a circulatory system. Is it something you can cut out, like an actual organ? No. But that doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

I don't see how any of this is related to Aristotelianism.

The ridiculousness of the schema comes clear in Chomsky's insistence, often made, that there really is only 'one' language, whereas the actually existing diversity of languages are basically epiphenomena. In Kantian terms, Chomsky posits a linguistic noumena that underlies the linguistic phenomena, with the former accounting - magically - for the latter. — StreetlightX

This is just another mischaracterization, in my view. Of course there's a diversity of languages. There's a diversity of skin color as well. It's not that this fact is "epiphenomena," it's that it's trivial.

Likewise, no noumena are being proposed.

As for the role of culture and society, it does nothing more than bring out this or that feature of I-language already there from the start ('parameters'). This is of course, pure metaphysics, and of the worst kind too [...] — StreetlightX

I don't see how, really. Culture, society, and the environment in general bring out all kinds of features of human beings, not just language. If you restrict the human ability to be around a language, they will not acquire the ability to speak. If you blindfold a human from birth, they won't acquire vision. The environment is extremely important. But there is still, nevertheless, a biological/genetic component -- and that's true for everything in biology. So if it's true for everything, it's going to be true for language.

In any property, there is a genetic component and the data from the environment. There's no way around it. It's true that this isn't saying much, but that's the basic approach to studying any biological property -- whether insect navigation or aviation or the visual system. Why shouldn't it apply to the language capacity? What's metaphysical about it?

I use my computer everyday, but this says nothing about how it came to be as it is. The same is true of language: the issue is to account for why grammar is as it is. — StreetlightX

It will tell you little about how it evolved perhaps, but that wasn't the point. The point was about language's function. Your claim is that it's for social communication. "Function" is a fuzzy word, of course (what's the function of the bone? To store calcium, to keep the body from falling to the ground...) -- but still, when asking this question we tend to look at how the object in question is used. When we do so, it seems to be more about thought than about speech. Does this tell us how it evolved? No.

Having learnt language through social use, and then putting that learning to use in 'inner speech' is perfectly consistent with the theorized developmental pathway of 'inner speech'. — StreetlightX

We acquire the ability to see through our interaction with the environment. We can then shut our eyes and imagine all kinds of things, internally. This tells us nothing about the human visual system.

No one is debating whether there's an environmental/social component to language.

Jokes aside, I was right about the fact that you cannot read: the quote rightly refers to the fact that UG refers to "the genetic component of the language faculty", the genitive here referring not to language simpliciter but to Chomsky's technical term for the so-called invariant and computational part of language which he just so happens to identify with the genetic component of language tout court. One could see, however, how a vulgar reader could confuse the two, insofar as Chomsky himself would like to arrogate his idealist phantasm - really better named the Linguistic Soul to bring out its status as metaphysical hocus pocus - to the status of genetic fact. So I take my concession point back, and Chomsky can resume his rightful place as being mildly more intelligent than his internet stalwart. — StreetlightX

You make it awfully difficult to admit, but yes — you’re right. I should have said the language faculty, or system. It would be like saying that there’s a theory about the genetic component of vision, when what should be said is the visual system — which is obviously related, but not the same thing. Fair enough.

That being said, I think what’s more relevant here is the “theory” part of that sentence. The statement was in response to the claim that Chomsky asserts language is “characterized by universals.” Other than assuming (1) all humans have language (which thus is a universal feature) and (2) that there’s a genetic component to this capacity, I have no idea what that means. Either you disagree with (1) and (2), which I assume you aren’t, or by “universals” you’re referring to universal features (like negation or noun/verb phrases). I assumed the latter — and if so, that’s misleading.

What people? We’re talking to ourselves all day long. Just introspect for a while.
— Xtrix

I don't think it's quite right or fair to elevate your mental illness to the status of general linguistic theory. Like I said, there are plenty of people for whom this internal dialog is minimal or even absent entirely. — StreetlightX

Mental illness? The article you cite itself says that the vast majority of people do indeed talk to themselves. Why you would characterize the vast majority as mental illness and not the exceptions is strange.

If you wanted to seriously pursue this line, then there’s interesting things to be said about the deaf, who obviously don’t think in verbal terms. (At least those born completely deaf.)

But all of this is missing the point. In all people, whether deaf or otherwise, social communication — through speech or sign — is hardly characteristic use. You can elevate that 1% or so of the time when we’re speaking or signing as characteristic of language, but that’s like arguing the primary function of a screwdriver is to open paint cans.

Again, the contingent pathologies of your idiosyncratic self-chatter isn't science, — StreetlightX

As if internal dialogue is somehow a peculiarity of mine. This is just nonsense.

Also, from your source:

One theory proposes that people who do not produce inner speech are unable to activate those networks without also activating their motor cortex.

Another theory is poor introspection, which refers to a person's ability to examine their own mental processes.

According to this theory, everyone produces inner speech, but some people are conscious of it whereas others are not.

Personally I think there’s something to this, but it’s not relevant — except to show how absurd it is to claim inner speech is somehow “idiosyncratic” or “mental illness.” I realize you value “winning” an argument above all else, but there’s no reason to resort to absurdities in that pursuit.

And in any case the idea that thinking is co-extensive with 'inner speech' is basically a child's understanding of thought. No one takes it seriously. — StreetlightX

Nor do I. Which is why I never once said it.

And in any case, those who do in fact study 'inner speech', recognize as a matter of course that it is nothing other than internalized - albeit it transformed in the process - external or social speech - i.e. language. — StreetlightX

Presumably you mean Vygotsky. But this is strange — because at no point did I say “talking to yourself” isn’t internalized speech. I also talk to myself in English and not Spanish, etc. I learned to speak English as a child, and so my internal speech will, naturally, be in English. This tells us exactly nothing about the capacity to acquire language, its evolution, or — relevant to what’s being discussed — characteristic use, which is almost completely internal.

To characterize language as external speech is therefore still pretty strange. Again, it’s asserting that language is primarily a means of communication. But since speech is so infrequent, and communicative efficiency is so often sacrificed for computational efficiency, it’s an odd claim. Language can be used for communication— of course. But so can gait. It’d be equally odd to claim, therefore, that walking is primarily a social/communicative phenomenon.

Which is why I have already addressed this by noting that language is not just any communicative tool, but one with specific design functions geared towards social coordination across distances in space and time. — StreetlightX

Same can be argued about clothing. That can communicate a lot too, and has very specific functions.

It’s true that language also has specific and unique communicative functions. But again, whether this lends support for characterizing it as primarily a means of communication is, at minimum, debatable.

that is precisely how the Baldwin effect works. — StreetlightX

The capacity to acquire language already exists in infants. Once learned, they internalize that language — whatever it may be. English, Swahili, whatever. While every other animal has means of communication, they don’t have language. If language is simply the internalized system of complex social communication, which evolved gradually, then each step along the way had to somehow effect genetics — otherwise non human primates could learn language (as once thought, and probably still thought). But that’s not the Baldwin effect — that’s Lamarckism.

When we think of words, we often see a string of letters. That too is internalized. Numbers are internalized. The alphabet and mathematical symbols are relatively recent phenomena. Should we assume the capacity for writing and mathematics followed the invention of writing and mathematics?

There is no one who has set the study of linguistics backwards by a matter of decades more than Chomsky. — StreetlightX

Says someone who goes on about “arrogance.”

The father of modern linguistics? A charlatan and fool. Why? Because it’s not to my liking.

Not only do some people simply not have an internal dialog, — StreetlightX

What people? We’re talking to ourselves all day long. Just introspect for a while. We don’t usually notice we’re doing it — but that’s irrelevant. We don’t usually notice we’re breathing either.

any phenomenology of this 'dialog' will recognize it as a low-grade, scattered and fleeting use of 'language' that is more a matter of fragments and shards rather than language-use proper. — StreetlightX

It is indeed scattered. The mind thinks all kinds of things. Similarly, we constantly talk to ourselves.

Again, this is going on close to 100% of the time— that’s just a fact. If language “proper” means what gets communicated, then you’re essentially saying that 1% of the time that we’re actually communicating constitutes proper function. I realize that may be commonly thought — but it’s just a mistake.

it's not that communication is an 'externalization' of language which first finds its home internally; it's that the 'internal' use of language is an internalization of language-use which developed as a communicative capacity between humans in the first place. — StreetlightX

But again, this common story has almost no evidence in favor of it. In fact you’ll find that many of the mechanics of the language system are poorly designed for communication — a fact Chomsky points out repeatedly. You can see this in parsing programs, as an example. Computation efficiency is favored over ease of communication.

Also worth keeping in mind is that nearly every organism on earth, including the insects, have some form of communication. Human speech and sign are unlike anything seen in other species. No other species have language. Given the generic similarity of humans and non-human primates, one could reasonably assume— if the communication story is correct — that apes can learn how to sign if given the opportunity. This too has been tried and has failed.

So whatever is going on with human beings, our ability to think seems interconnected with language — and is unique in nature. It’s mostly an internal process that sometimes gets externalized. But to say language is simply communication is like saying communication is just writing — there’s little reason to do so.

Taking 'internal dialog' as the 'characteristic use of language' is about as sophisticated as considering the Sun revolving around the Earth because that's what you see everyday: a cute bit of so-called 'obvious' folk psychology, but completely wrong when even minimally investigated. — StreetlightX

Forget Internal dialogue and look at the amount of time spent speaking. Compare that to thought. We’re thinking and talking (internally) literally all the time. In fact for any meditators out there, this is one of the first things you notice — along with other mental phenomena.

So you have it backwards. Minimal investigation shows exactly this. Again— that it’s scattered and habitual and mostly unnoticed is irrelevant. It’s still a fact, regardless of the story we tell about language and thought: we simply spend the vast majority of our lives NOT speaking externally.

shows quite clearly how syntactic constraints developed as normative rules to coordinate communication between speakers — StreetlightX

This is almost laughable. By this premise, our communication today should lead to new developments in our language capacity. The genes will come later — once the communication and “normative rules” get internalized.

I’ll check it out to see if it’s indeed as ludicrous as you’re describing. I hope you’re misunderstanding that like you’ve misunderstood and fabricated nearly everything else so far.

What you mean to refer to is universal grammar, which is simply the name for the theory of the genetic component of language.
— Xtrix

Wait, you think UG simply refers to the fact that 'there is a genetic component to language'? My God. I didn't realize I was literally arguing with someone who has no idea what he is talking about. UG does not refer to the mere fact of there 'being a genetic component to language'. That would be trivial and dumb, and thank God even Chomsky is not so vulgar as to describe it as such. — StreetlightX

“Universal grammar is just the name for the theory of the genetic component of the language faculty.” — Noam Chomsky

:lol:

https://youtu.be/vbKO-9n5qmc

Almost verbatim. Didn’t have to look very far, either.

Yeah yeah— This only means Chomsky is as dumb and vulgar as me, etc. No chance that perhaps you’re misunderstanding — as you’ve demonstrated repeatedly.

If only you could teach him a thing or two about linguistics and show him how it’s really done.

The question to rephrase, would be that why does it seem so important that someone who is in higher standing with regards to ethics, should be treated any differently. — Shawn

I see. I don't know if Aristotle really argues that the virtuous man should be treated differently, like some kind of master. From what I've read of the Ethics, he's simply laying out an analysis about the function of a human being, and how to live in accordance with that function (reason), towards the ultimate end of happiness.

The question is whether his theories about language do in fact lend themselves to being understood biologically, or evolutionarily, in any sensible capacity. — StreetlightX

Indeed. And since they do, your fabrications are just that.

Don't look at what he says about his theory - look at how the theory functions, what it entitles one to say. — StreetlightX

It "entitles" one to say a great deal, which is why Chomsky is so influential and his theories have been highly fruitful.

You're not a linguist, and in fact haven't shown you really understand Chomsky's work; nor have your childish insults really been substantiated in any way. So if it once again boils down to some strange vendetta you've developed, I'm not interested.

They do not. — StreetlightX

Ladies and gentlemen...science.

It's true that we talk to ourselves all day long, but how much of that gets communicated (whether through speech or sign)? And how much of that is simply phatic communication?
— Xtrix

This is a total non sequitur. It's like saying that because the function of ears are to hear, it cannot possibly be the case that eyes are also meant to perceive things. — StreetlightX

What? I genuinely don't understand what this sentence is supposed to mean.

I mentioned characteristic use. I'd say that the ears' characteristic use is hearing, and eyes seeing -- which could tell us something about their primary function.

Similarly, the characteristic use of language is internal -- 99% of it. We know that. You can, in fact, check this yourself. So if we want to talk about its "raison d'être", it's function -- it's hardly about communication.

So despite whatever you meant to say, your claim is more like "the eyes' raison d'être is to cry." I suppose we can make up a story that says the 1% of the time we're communicating, phatically or otherwise, is the actual function of language. But there's no evidence for it.

As I said before, there's evidence that suggests that the computational system is not optimal in communication -- it's optimal in linking interfaces. Plenty of work on this.

Chomsky says language is an individual/cognitive capacity; it's not, it's a social one — StreetlightX

This is meaningless. Language can be used to communicate (as can non-verbal behavior), and so is social. It can only be acquired in the presence of a language -- so that's certainly social. But it's still a cognitive capacity. It's genetically determined, which is why children can develop a language and non-human primates cannot, for example. This is not controversial.

Chomsky says language is geared for the expression of thought; it's not, it's geared towards communication — StreetlightX

There's little evidence to support this, as I've already mentioned. Externalization happens maybe 1% of the time. To argue this is what language is "geared towards" is just a fairytale.

Chomsky says language is characterized by universals; it's not: it's characterized by sheer diversity and not a single universal outside of the universality of diversity — StreetlightX

Chomsky does not say language is "characterized by universals" -- this too is completely meaningless. What you mean to refer to is universal grammar, which is simply the name for the theory of the genetic component of language. That language is a universal human property -- i.e., that it's found in every human culture -- is hardly controversial.

Does anyone else think that being influenced by Plato is fine; but, Aristotle's influence on the dark ages, clergy, and religious folks, along with modern day Radians, in a manner of speaking, disturbs you? — Shawn

Not really. Plato had an influence on the middle ages as well, through his major influence on Christianity.

Both men are in a league of their own, and their influence on literally everything in the Western world (and, now, the entire world) is really beyond comprehension. This is almost a cliche now, but it remains true.

Why do you think Aristotle made humanity too dependent on magnanimous men from-which one would derive some privileged status over your brothers and sisters, as seen in the form of master-slave relations or slavery to state it explicitly (according to Russell)? — Shawn

Could you re-phrase this question? I think I'm understanding you but I want to be sure.

:up:

I tried to attribute a metaphysics to him in my work. — Manuel

In a sense we all have a metaphysics. But to describe generative grammar as metaphysical is just nutty.

Appreciate it.

From that article, regarding metaphysics:

I would like to discuss an approach to the mind that considers language
and similar phenomena to be elements of the natural world, to be studied
by ordinary methods of empirical inquiry. I will be using the terms "mind"
and "mental" here with no metaphysical import. Thus I understand "men-
tal" to be on a par with "chemical", "optical", or "electrical". Certain phe
nomena, events, processes and states are informally called "chemical"
etc., but no metaphysical divide is suggested thereby. The terms are used
to select certain aspects of the world as a focus of inquiry.

This is why it's baffling that he can be accused of metaphysical chicanery. He's done more to de-mystify language than almost anyone else in fact.

Indeed. Much like the Bible, in fact. Often revered but never read. Adam Smith also jumps to mind.

in his efforts to make communication a mere auxiliary of language - rather than its raison d'etre - he metaphysicalizes it and places it outside of any natural evolutionary account. — StreetlightX

You keep repeating that, but it's still incoherent. He's said repeatedly that language is a biological capacity, and one that evolved. That's not metaphysics or mysticism or theology.

What he is saying -- as you correctly point out -- is that language is not simply about communication. He defines (1) language as a biological, computational system -- a system for the expression of thought, and (2) that it might have evolved rapidly. Gives plenty of reasons for these claims. Could be completely wrong, but it's not theology.

Incidentally, when looking at the function of language by observing characteristic use, it's not at all obvious that its primary function -- or raison d'être -- is for communication. It's true that we talk to ourselves all day long, but how much of that gets communicated (whether through speech or sign)? And how much of that is simply phatic communication? Rather, it seems the "function" of language is to link interface conditions, where the computational system is optimal in linking the interface but non-optimal in terms of communication -- and there's a lot of evidence for this. But thanks for the references, I'll check them out.

@Manuel - forgive me for this tangent on language. I should probably start a new thread.

Thanks, old chap.

I guess I’ve failed to persuade you once again.

So what do you find more convincing about language evolution, beyond Chomsky?

No— plenty more to say about it, more in depth and with references. But figured I’d give at least a lightning sketch. I never said it was convincing or even anything other than speculation. But certainly not mysticism.

Also, I googled Ray Jackenoff:

Over the years, I have come to disagree with Noam on just about every detail of the formalism (beyond the existence of phrase structure), and as well on many aspects of the overall architecture of the language faculty. I have even begun to wonder (horrors!) whether Zellig Harris’s notion of transformations might be closer to the truth than Noam’s. But I still consider myself to be working within his overall vision of what language is like and how one should investigate it. I still believe that children have come equipped with a brain specialized for learning language, and I find it important to find out what that specialization is. And I still find it imperative to explore the structure of language in rigorous formal terms, even if my technology is quite different from his (and becoming more so). And I’m still in awe of his incredible intellect, which created this crazy field we’re in. I wouldn’t be in the business if it weren’t for Noam.

So I wonder about that aforementioned quote. But no matter.

Unless mutations to regulator genes is considered saying “nothing” and repeating into mysticism.
— Xtrix

Hahahaha, 'evolution happened because some changes took place in genes' = 'evolution happened because evolution happened'. Does your credulity know no bounds? Which genes? How? When? Via what mechanisms? For what reasons? And how do those changes relate to linguistic ability? — StreetlightX

You already conceded that rapid change is possible— so that already takes the claims out of the realm of “magic.” It’s a claim about how the system evolved— not that it evolved. That’s one point.

As for the questions. Which genes? Possibly regulator genes. How? Via mutation. When? We can’t possibly know exactly when— but evidence from paleoanthropology suggests behaviorally modern humans have been around for roughly 200 thousand years. For what reasons did language evolve? Possibly by chance — but that it stuck around is obvious, and so must have had a selective advantage. I find that an odd question though. What “reasons” are there for anything to evolve beyond chance and selection?

How the changes relate to linguistic ability — I can’t say I understand this question. What do you mean by linguistic ability? According to the article, language is given a technical notion. One basic property — called merge — is what is discussed, along with computational efficiency.

If you find tautologies convincing — StreetlightX

I don’t. But I’m not seeing the tautology here. Language evolved — that’s a given. How? Through changes in genes— that’s obvious. Did this happen gradually or rapidly? Chomsky argues it happened rapidly, and provides reasons and evidence (and speculation) — based on findings in genetics, paleoanthropology, cases of rapid evolution, etc. i don’t see how this equates to “evolution happened because evolution happened.” No one is arguing that language didn’t evolve — is that tautological?

Ray Jackendoff has rightly called Chomskys' view on evolution and language a 'retreat to mysticism', which, of course, it is. — StreetlightX

Never heard of him — but didn’t you mention something about “argument from prestige?”

Regardless— if he offers convincing reasons for this claim, fine. I’m not seeing them from you. Frankly I think the accusation is ludicrous, when Chomsky has said repeatedly that language is biological and has evolved, perhaps rapidly. How that’s somehow “mysticism” is yet to be shown.

So Chomsky's 'generative grammar' does, I think, tend to undermine that dogma - if not by suggesting innate ideas, then innate capabilities, which I think are regarded with suspicion by many naturalists on dogmatic grounds. — Wayfarer

True.

Unlike others here, I'm not an expert, but then I don't claim to be. I just made an observation, is all. — Wayfarer

So far the only person who’s clearly read and understood Chomsky - that I see here - is Manuel. There’s a lot of misunderstanding around what Chomsky says about a lot of things, so it’s important to read him directly, listen to lectures/interviews/Q and As, or speak with him directly.

The rest is just speculation and fabrication, based on God knows what (casual reading, secondary sources, etc).

Regarding the article of this thread, don’t take my word for it — it’s all right there:

As the impact of Newton’s discoveries was slowly absorbed, such lowering of the goals of scientific inquiry became routine. Scientists abandoned the animating idea of the early scientific revolution: that the world will be intelligible to us. It is enough to construct intelligi- ble explanatory theories, a radical difference. By the time we reach Russell’s Analysis of Matter, he dismisses the very idea of an intelligible world as “absurd,” and repeatedly places the word “intelligible” in quotes to highlight the absurdity of the quest. Qualms about action at a distance were “little more than a prejudice,” he writes. “If all the world consisted of billiard balls, it would be what is called ‘intelligible’—that is, it would never surprise us sufficiently to make us realize that we do not understand it.”

But even without external surprise, we should recognize how little we understand the world, and should also realize that it does not matter whether we can conceive of how the world works. In his classic introduction to quantum mechanics a few years later, Paul Dirac wrote that physical science no longer seeks to provide pictures of how the world works, that is “a model functioning on es- sentially classical lines,” but only seeks to provide a “way of looking at the fundamental laws which makes their self-consistency obvious.” He was referring to the inconceivable conclusions of quantum physics, but could just as readily have said that even the classical Newtonian models had abandoned the hope of rendering natural phenomena intelligible, the primary goal of the early modern scientific revolution, with its roots in common-sense understanding.

It is useful to recognize how radical a shift it was to abandon the mechanical philosophy, and with it any scientific relevance of our common-sense beliefs and conceptions, except as a starting point and spur for inquiry.

To read this and conclude Chomsky is arguing that because some ideas were abandoned, that somehow everything is mysterious — is absurd.

To read this and conclude that he offers no alternative to the mechanical philosophy or an account of modern understanding— is absurd.

This is what comes of reading to refute, rather than reading to truly understand. So be it.

Yes, it's telling that the only positive thing Chomsky does in fact have to say on the topic of evolution is in regard to it's pace. Which, conveniently, serves as an excuse as to why he cannot say anything else. — StreetlightX

He says much more, in fact.

The pithy article you cited is nothing but a list of excuses as to why Chomsky can't say anything else about language and evolution - because he has categorically placed it outside the ambit. — StreetlightX

I’ll assume you didn’t read it. I think that’s the simple explanation for this comment— which is utter fabrication. The entire article, in fact, is about the evolution of language— just not one you like.

To say he’s placing language “outside the ambit” of science is truly laughable. Unless mutations to regulator genes is considered saying “nothing” and retreating into mysticism.

"it was acquired not in the context of slow, gradual modification of preexisting systems under natural selection but in a single, rapid, emergent event that built upon those prior systems but was not predicted by them". In other words: magic. — StreetlightX

See above. Proposing a rapid neurological rewiring via genetic mutation is “magic”?

Again, this makes sense if we assume Chomsky is a closet priest/mystic who is using all this as a cover and …

an excuse to veil over his theology of language. — StreetlightX

But I see exactly zero evidence for believing that. Why you do, I don’t know.

Perhaps Chomsky is completely wrong about language. But claiming he’s a mystic resorting to magic, while at the same time taking seriously the long-refuted “work” of Dan Everett — that’s just not convincing.

Well, maybe not, but his generative grammar seems at odds with it. — Wayfarer

At odds with naturalism? How? What’s the alternative— that language is supernatural?

The level of misunderstanding here is baffling. No offense— but how much of Chomsky have you really read?

as if lots of thing couldn't be 'based on common sense' or that 'common sense' mandates any technical elaboration of it) — StreetlightX

I’m sure lots of things are based on common sense. That does not mean we formulate technical notions out of them. This is one case in which we did— and they failed. It’s not simply any case— it was the prevailing view at the beginning of modern philosophy and modern science. I’d say that’s relevant.

You're talking about some conceptual schemes foisted upon science from without, while trying to claim the prestige and backing of science to naturalize what is effectively some backwater vocabulary of a limited cabal of European thinkers. — StreetlightX

Foisted upon science? So Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Locke, etc…the founders of modern philosophy and science — all backwater imbeciles.

:up:

Oh I see I've made the mistake of assuming you've ever read the person you're discussing:

At present, however, we see little reason to believe either that FLN can be anatomized into many independent but interacting traits, each with its own independent evolutionary history, or that each of these traits could have been strongly shaped by natural selection, given their tenuous connection to communicative efficacy.

http://psych.colorado.edu/~kimlab/hauser.chomsky.fitch.science2002.pdf — StreetlightX

Apparently the only article you’ve read. As you’ve cited it over and over again.

Nevertheless— he doesn’t once say that:

language cannot be accounted for by natural selection — StreetlightX

Not once. Read the quote again. There’s very little reason to believe that language evolved in parts or for communication.

Of course natural selection played a role in language. It wouldn’t still be here if it didn’t confer an advantage. That’s different from saying it evolved through incremental steps, each through natural selection. Chomsky is arguing against gradualism.

https://chomsky.info/20140826/

Chomsky is not questioning naturalism.

In which case so much for the failure of mechanism to imply anything - literally anything - about our cognitive abilities. — StreetlightX

I’d say a notion of the material world in the early scientific evolution being abandoned, one based on common sense notions — and which hasn’t been replaced to this day — certainly tells us something about our cognitive abilities. It shows us that yet again our intuitions, everyday experiences, folk source, and common sense notions simply don’t work. We have to find other ways of grasping the world — and we have.

Have you opened a philosophy journal recently? There are a blossoming of theories all over the place. — StreetlightX

I’m talking about science, and I’m talking matter, physical, material, “body,” etc. If a new technical notion has been proposed, I’m happy to take a look.

In fact he’s offered plenty of ideas about it over the years. It happened, obviously, through generic changes. Chomsky just doesn’t think it happened through gradual steps.
— Xtrix

Lol, Chomsky literally says that his shitty conception of language cannot be accounted for by natural selection — StreetlightX

Not once does he say this. Not once.

I suppose if your starting assumption is that Chomsky is an idiot, the above sounds reasonable. But what he says is that there’s little evidence to suggest that gradualism explains language. That’s not saying it’s God-created, that it’s a mystery, that it’s beyond science, that it didn’t evolve, or that natural selection doesn’t apply (of course it does).

True, language could be magic. But that’s the opposite of what Chomsky had said for 70 years or so.

Everything about Chomsky's understanding of language is pseudo-scientific, — StreetlightX

Funny you say this. I recall you cited Daniel Everett a while back in support of your claims — who’s shown to be a borderline fraud, and whose conclusions of the piraha language being thoroughly and repeatedly debunked.

He's a closet creationist — StreetlightX

Okay! :up:

:100:

There is nothing - nothing - about object permanence that makes physicalism or mechanism 'common-sense based technical notions'. — StreetlightX

Contact action, like object permanence, is a “common sense” notion. Same with the moon illusion or any other optical illusion— it’s simply how we see and experience things.

That doesn’t mean the mechanical philosophy is common sense. It means the 17th century notion of understanding was based on contact action. Turns out that’s completely wrong — fine. But importantly, nothing has been proposed since to replace that notion.

I don’t see anything chauvinistic about any of this. You’re simply misreading it.

because Chomsky lacks any terms other than 'the physical' or the mechanical to grasp the world, the failure of his pet vocabulary must imply the failure of human understanding and vice versa. — StreetlightX

Theory.

Physical and mechanical are hardly his “pet vocabulary” — he’s in fact arguing that they fail, but we have other ways of understanding the world. Ways that aren’t based on “common sense.” Namely, our explanatory theories — which are revised in time.

Yeah it "evolved", but exactly how is just one of those mysterious things that we'll never know, because his vision of language is Platonic and basically theological. — StreetlightX

His view of language is biological. Never once has he said the evolution of language is a mystery we’ll “never know.” In fact he’s offered plenty of ideas about it over the years. It happened, obviously, through generic changes. Chomsky just doesn’t think it happened through gradual steps.

You’ve now made a number of things up. Platonist, chauvinist, priest, arrogant, etc. Not sure why. But it has nothing to do with Chomsky. It’s fabrication. But that’s your business.

This is going to be a bit long-winded, but hopefully valuable in getting on the same wavelength.

Capitalism is only one system among others throughout history, defined by private ownership and the relationship between masters owners (employers) and slaves workers (employees). It has its roots in the middle ages and accelerated in the industrial revolution. It's largely replaced slavery and feudalism.

There are many variants of capitalism. Saudi Arabia is capitalist. China is capitalist. Sweden is capitalist. Most nations are "mixed economies." The United States is a state-capitalist system, and around 40 years ago, in the 70s and early 80s, began shifting from an era of "regimented capitalism" (managerialism) which existed from roughly the 1940s, to a neoliberal program. "Government is the problem."

If you agree that what I've just described above is correct, then you have your answer: yes, during the 1950s and 60s, there was a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and a larger "middle class." Is that preferable to the neoliberal era we've been subjected to? Yes. Does that mean we're happy with capitalism? No.

FDR and the New Deal was fine, but didn't go nearly far enough. Capitalism should have simply been abolished.

There was also a violent (but forgotten) fight against the New Deal policies, and right away there was a backlash. The owners of this country always resented it, but couldn't do much about it. The late 60s was the last straw for them -- that "excess of democracy" of some black people getting rights and students protesting and so on. Too much to bear.

You see the thought process laid out clearly in the 1970 Milton Friedman NY Times article about corporate governance, and the 1971 Powell memo to the US Chamber of Commerce (and, later, the Trilateral Commission's Crisis of Democracy). The OAPEC oil embargo of '73 and the "stagflation" of the mid 70s provided enough of an opening to start a push for what was always wanted: dismantling the New Deal, shrinking government (tax cuts, deregulation, privatization), and crushing unions. I assume you're aware of most of this.

So -- giiven all this, the question:

I am just wondering what about capitalism is the more important enemy.. the inequality/instability of income or the power differential? — schopenhauer1

is a false one. The power differential between owners and their employees is not just an unequal one, it's also a morally illegitimate one. Just as in the the system of slavery and the system of feudalism.

Sure, there were some nice masters and lords. There are some nice employers today. So what? Ditto for a more "equitable" distribution. The very system is unjust and illegitimate.

Capitalism also stems from a very strange concept of "liberty" and "individuality" that is, at bottom, anti-social (not simply anti-socialist). It has its roots in ideas about human nature -- elevating "self-interest," "selfishness," and "greed" as primary motives. It's more of a psychological sickness than a philosophy. In my opinion. It all reeks of both intense social phobia and anti-social personality disorder.

People are actually voting that an infinite past is more "far-fetched" than something coming from nothing?

Jesus...

Chomsky's not very hidden agenda: innate ideas. — bongo fury

That the human capacity for language is genetically determined, yes. Is that really still "controversial"? He's looking at human beings like we look at any other biological organism. We have a genetic structure. That's basically a truism.

an apologia for his effective creationism about language — StreetlightX

"Effective"? Chomsky has never once, in my reading, questioned whether language evolved. That it came about rapidly instead of gradually, as some propose, yes. That's "effective creationism"?

It’s just really odd to say we can’t refer to the word physical because Newton’s contemporaries once associated the word to mean things in the world worked like wheels and clocks. — Saphsin

It's not that -- it's that no alternative has been proposed since. As a technical notion. Common-sense notions in everyday discourse is a different matter. Of course I know what you mean when you say "physical." I know what you mean when you say I'm going to "work." When it comes to science, however, that no longer applies. So the argument Chomsky is making is that there hasn't been a replacement.

The common sense-based notion of contact action, as a basis for "understanding" the world in terms of mechanics (mechanical philosophy), was abandoned and nothing has been proposed since.

And what, if we can't square our most advanced concepts of understading to the intellectual standards of literal infants this is supposed to be a comment on our understanding other than the fact that infants are literally the stupidest variety of human on the planet? — StreetlightX

You've missed the point entirely. It's not trying to square our technical notions in science with an infant. It's merely pointing out that, much like the moon illusion, or the stick in water that appears broken, this is simply how human beings see things. As adults we realize the moon isn't that big, that the stick isn't really broken, etc., and perhaps infants and children don't -- but we still see the world this way regardless.

These are "common sense" notions. Chomsky is arguing that common sense notions don't help when it comes to science, and in fact "physical" (in terms of contact action) was one of these common-sense based technical notions that was abandoned. Crucially, another technical notion to replace it has never been given. We just have new ways of understanding the world. But we go on seeing broken sticks and making assumptions about contact action nevertheless. That's why magicians can fool us so easily with slights of hand.

Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science.
— Xtrix

Right, and from this he wants to draw the conclusion that there are some things in the world that will always escape us. — StreetlightX

Maybe not "always," but yes -- he argues, as you know, over and over again that human beings have a scope and limit to their capacities. Again I think the rats in the prime number maze is a good example -- it's not easy to understand why they can't do it, perhaps, but they can't. Human beings also have their cognitive limits, and we learn something about what they are. Common sense ways of seeing the world and talking about the world -- some of which is just psychologically pre-determined -- fall apart when we study things scientifically. I mentioned the moon illusion, but there are many others. Likewise for our words -- common words like "work" mean something entirely different in everyday life compared to their use in physics.

Again, the latter stands as a perfectly reasonable position (that things will always escape us), but movement from A to C simply doesn't follow. If bodies and the physical don't have a place in today's science then they were always insignificant from the beginning other than as conceptual holding-patterns whose time is done. We owe them nothing and they speak to nothing. — StreetlightX

I think Chomsky is going from C to A, not A to C. In other words, he's not saying, as you put it, that because a 17th century notion of "physical" was abandoned (A), that this proves human beings have limits (C). Rather, he takes it as a truism that human beings have limits (C) and that this is a crucial example of our limits. Hence the claim that Newton inadvertently made a contribution to the "philosophy of mind."

So if you find the initial position a reasonable one, you're simply disagreeing that this a very good example. But I think that's partly because you've missed the point about infants and contact action mentioned above.

The point is that these ideas are throughly historical - they had a date of birth and they will have a date of death. The idea that these senses of causality are deeply held eternal metaphysical notions is just rear-guard parochialism. — StreetlightX

Are optical illusions "eternal metaphysical notions"? You're mixing categories here I think. On the one hand we, as human beings, have common-sense experiences and notions about contact action; on the other, we have the mechanical philosophy which tried to describe the world in terms of a causality based in this common experience.

Because the latter was abandoned says nothing about the former. It doesn't make the former go away, nor does it make it some eternal notion.

Even if infants develop certain ideas along a relatively stable developmental path, this might speak to nothing other than the fact, of, I dunno, the necessity of avoiding being eaten by lions. Which is, shall we say, a regional issue at best. — StreetlightX

Maybe object permanence is regional at best as well. Is this really an argument?

Everyone was making a decent enough salary to live in a house, buy some entertainment goods, a car, had all their daily living met.. — schopenhauer1

Imagine using this argument in defense of the system of slavery. Would this satisfy you regarding slavery?

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property.
— Xtrix

But this is simply not true. — StreetlightX

That contact action is a human property, or that it was the common sense basis for the mechanical philosophy?

Your citation seems to be addressing the latter case. That physical flux was the "least popular" explanation of causality around Leibniz's time is interesting, but I don't see the relevance here. In other words, I don't see how it falsifies the claim that it (contact action) was the basis for the mechanical philosophy.

Like, our intuitions are useless. Forget them. They're trash and philosophically uninteresting other than a good historical and cultural tale. If you want to read how absolutely bonkers our (by which I only mean Western) schemes of causality really have been, check out Steven Nadler's editied collection on "Causation in Early Modern Philosophy" (you can find it on Libgen). — StreetlightX

Sure. But I don't understand why you apparently think I'm arguing the opposite of this. That's in fact the point about contact action being a "common sense" basis for the mechanical philosophy -- namely that intuition simply falls apart when trying to explain, for example, the force of gravity. Which is why Chomsky talks about Newton inadvertently making contributions to the philosophy of mind, since it (arguably) demonstrates an example of cognitive limits.

Like, maybe bodies and 'the physical' have a place, but that would have to be argued, and not taken for granted - certainly not in the way that Chomsky does. — StreetlightX

Again I don't quite understand this remark. Chomsky is arguing precisely that "bodies" and "the physical" does not really have a place in today's science. I think the following will be helpful to clear away any misunderstanding (this is from Chomsky's lecture in Oslo, which I posted above and which I transcribed -- so any error is mine):

I don't think we can leave materialism behind until someone tells us what materialism is. There was a concept of materialism right through the early scientific revolution, right through Newton -- Newton still accepted it. In fact the great scientists of the next century still accepted it, LaGrange and others still tried to develop a material, mechanistic concept of the universe that went right through the 19th century -- ether theories and so on. It was finally given up in the 20th century. Finally recognized that 'we're never gonna get it.' And totally different ways of looking at things were developed, which have no relation to traditional materialism, if Friedrich Lange is correct -- and nobody has ever suggested another notion.

Materialism is just like anything we more or less understand -- it includes thinking, reasoning, etc. So we can't leave it behind until someone explains what it is. But there's no reason we can't study it. We can study what the human capacity of understanding is. We know some negative things. Like we can't understand how the world works, for example. Because our concept of understanding is too limited to incorporate what Newton described as an absurdity. Newton and Hume and Lock weren't idiots -- we should take them seriously. They regarded it as an absurdity for very good reasons, and modern cognitive science (which somehow tries to recapitulate some of this) finds pretty much that. For example, as I mentioned, an infant, presented with presentations which indicate that there's some kind of causality -- like when the ball rolls this way a light turns red or something -- they will invent a mechanical cause, and they don't care if it's not visible, because infants understand that most of what goes on is invisible but there's got to be some mechanical cause otherwise there's no way to influence anything else. So that does seem to be the way our minds work, and that tells us something about the limits of our understanding; in fact a classical, crucial case -- and it can go on to other cases.

At 1:02:00 on the video.

I think there will be war eventually between the United States and China. — frank

Nuclear war?

Nevermind.

Why what’s wrong?

The implication being that China doing more in fighting climate change will result in a nuclear war?

I didn’t make any claim about whether science works or not.

The idea of contact action, which was the common sense basis for mechanical philosophy, is a human property. It’s not culturally conditioned any more than the moon illusion is culturally conditioned, or object permanence is culturally conditioned.

Pointing out, as Chomsky does, that we can’t understand the world in this way — as was shown by Newton and others — is perhaps one example of the limits of human intelligibility. The claim that humans have scope and limits is essentially a truism.

I don’t see the relevance of “retrofitting.” No one is trying to retrofit our current understanding, concepts and knowledge to that of 18th century England.

China's approach is significant because of the way that it contrasts with the Western approach which is neoliberal.

This contrast will provide future generations with empirical data about which approach works best; central planning or free markets. — frank

Neoliberalism is hardly the same as free markets — which don’t exist, anywhere.

I have no doubt China will handle this better than the US, which is a failed state.

What claim do 'bodies' or 'material' have which make them anything other than a limited European set of ideas that have been in vogue for some time? — StreetlightX

I suppose we can argue that science is just a Western invention— and there’s something to that. But I’d argue it’s a better example of possible human limits than any of the many examples one could use.

But again, I don’t think the claim is that because one 17th century European conception is obsolete, that all of human intelligibility is lost. It’s that this is one example of something that may demonstrate limits — and a particularly interesting one. You’re saying it’s not particularly interesting — no more so than qi or karma or corpuscles or alchemy. Here again I’d simply say that I do think there’s something sui generis about science. But perhaps that’s another conversation.