:up:

Given that S was an excommunicated Jew, the first openly secular philosopher in Christendom in the last half or so millennium and the father of biblical (Tanahk & Xtian NT) criticism, he certainly wasn't "struggling with Christianity" (Judaism, Islam or any 'religious faith'). — 180 Proof

I don't think that's true. Maybe "struggling" is too imprecise, but within the context of a Christian worldview- otherwise why mention "God" at all, even if meant in a quasi-pantheistic way?

If nature or existence generally is "god," then I'm certainly a believer.

based on H's 1976 revisions of SuZ instead of the 1927 manuscript on which Macquarrie's & Robinson's translation was based, I'll stand by Stambaugh's as more authoritative (pace Dreyfus et al). — 180 Proof

Fair enough. Perhaps in further discussion we'll come across examples where Stambaugh is more clear - I wouldn't be surprised.

If you say so. Clearly, neither of us is convinced of the other's bona fides. — 180 Proof

If you say you've read B&T twice then I believe you, but you haven't said stated where he's off the mark, given his thesis.

For me, sir, H is not worth my time delving any deeper than I have - e.g citing chapter & verse - in order to more thoroughly critique his work ( — 180 Proof

But that's exactly what this thread was created for. You don't have to necessarily cite "chapter and verse," but something a little more concrete or perhaps elaborated more (like your point about wu wei) would be appreciated. If you're not interested, you're not interested - I can't help that. But you apparently cared enough to comment, so we're left where we are.

A philosophy which is either of no consequence to or concerned even tangentally with its own implications for "politics, ethics, social issues, etc" is not worth bothering with — 180 Proof

But that's not the case. There are plenty of connections. It's simply that politics ethics are not his main thesis, as you know. He claims only to be doing "fundamental ontology." Later he will say that this is connected to the "spiritual fate of the West."

If one is serious, one doesn't choose philosophers a la cart or from a buffet table; rather serious study includes running down significant sources wherever and whomever they are. If you are serious, Xtrix, then you know that, and that your question is disingenuous. — 180 Proof

So you had to bother with Heidegger at some point for various reasons- fine. I'll rephrase: given your claim to have read him, and your finding his thought on par with postmodernist babblings, and further your unwillingness to give any potentially valuable elaboration on his shortcomings, then again I ask: why come here? Why bother? If it's simply boredom, so be it.

as Freddy Zarathustra might say, H is a "priestly-type" of human, all too human "underhanded (onto)theologian" decadent one must overcome in oneself in order to affirm the whole of life - amor fati! — 180 Proof

This is a good example of what I wrote above. "Onto-theologian" has the potential to be a criticism, but I can only guess as to what you mean. Where's the theology in Heidegger? I don't see it. Any examples would be helpful, as maybe I missed something important. But as far as I can tell, I don't see where the "priest-type" comes into play.

If one were to criticize him for being a stuffy, scholarly type man, I wouldn't deny it. But again, this is pretty superficial.

Yes Banno, because I love the Nazis. Run along.

The eugenics theme is fascinating. Elaborate if you feel like it. — path

That requires another thread, I think!

But oddly enough, this is something Heidegger worried about. With the advancements in genetics, the only thing that stands in our way (truly) are ethical (philosophical) concerns. Eventually the taboo will be lifted, and we can in a sense "engineer" human beings. I think that's probably the next stage of our evolution.

I agree that tech won't save us. If something can save us, I (also) think it will be spiritual in the philosophical-artistic sense, which will manifest politically. — path

And thus we come full circle, in a sense. Philosophy and politics in some ways seem like polar opposites, but are connected in very clear ways. The latter is far more pressing to deal with these days, no matter how knowledgable or familiar one is with philosophy (or history) -- but having that knowledge certainly doesn't hurt. I'd argue that, like with any decision, the more information one takes into account, the better the decision will be. The same is true about where we go as as species and how we should therefore organize society.

The connection is that the powerful people of the world who are currently making the key decisions for hundreds of millions (and in fact billions) of human beings, are not aliens -- they have ideologies. They have belief systems. Thought systems, perspectives, in which they interpret the world and set their agenda. Much is tied up with values, and the values with "religions," but I'd argue they are really philosophical at bottom (even the Christian "ontology" in the sense of a worldview).

Worth keeping in the back of our minds when making the decision in November:

https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/

Definitely truth in that. There's lots of interpretation, projection, and re-assessing whenever studying something hard. How we do so is also shaped by our purposes, values, and goals. What I said earlier about "usefulness" was a little misleading because while true, it doesn't necessarily mean what's most "useful" and what's the most important "part" of what's been said.

Lots of famous people being influenced and interested is of course no proof that Heidegger or whoever is great, but it might give one pause. — path

I love this. Exactly right. I know it gives me pause. In the same way that a good friend who knows your taste makes a recommendation for a place to travel or a book to read or a movie to see -- something I may have otherwise considered garbage, and therefore ignored, now I'm much more likely to want to take a look at.

'That fad didn't suck me in. I'm too shrewd.' I don't know if we are ever done deciding if we are lying to ourselves in either direction. — path

I think there's personal reasons involved perhaps, but also the question should be asked: What is most useful not only to me now (and to the current world), but the future world?

At least with this more future-oriented sense of "useful" in mind, I keep gravitating towards a handful of people in various domains, and I'd like to think I have good values and good instincts. To me the names Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Chomsky are the most relevant and interesting, if I were forced to choose only the essentials. But I may be completely wrong as well -- I can live with that.

Again so there's no huge mystery: I think the key to the future isn't space travel and artificial intelligence as far as technology goes, but eugenics (not in the Nazi sense!), and in terms of spirituality (in the philosophical-artistic sense) in the most general sense.

To me this passage just destroys our mentalistic assumptions. We don't have some isolated subject gazing on Platonic meanings. The inside is outside. — path

From my reading I don't see him saying there is no "inside" or "outside," but that indeed there is an "inner" and that "inner concepts" can't be really linked to objects. But I don't know the full context of Wittgenstein to be confident in that reading.

I do agree with you, however: there really isn't an "inner" world separated from an "outer" world. This is very hard for some people to accept, as is the subject/object dichotomy. We love our dualisms.

Perhaps we focus too much on the authors and not enough on the intensity of reading. I'm used to people hating on Nietzsche, because Nietzsche can be outright obnoxious. But if one stays with Nietzsche and grows up while reading Nietzsche...one uses Nietzsche to criticize Nietzsche. — path

Exactly right. One should react against and criticize only something they understand, otherwise they're whacking at straw men. While no one has infinite time to read everything, and carefully, one should be careful to rely on secondary sources, pop culture philosophy books, etc., and form a "stance" on the thinker in question on that basis alone. It's risky business, and at best you are left with an extremely general view. Better to reserve judgment or acknowledge your superficial engagement, rather than feign expertise. This happens far more often on this forum than I would have expected, even for "amateur" philosophy people. It's just ego I suppose.

I’m interested in definitions of Besorgen and Sorge and the use of “care” and “concern”. These seems to me, in spirit, more like engagement. Any thoughts? — Brett

I think it's definitely related. Anything we engage with or "comport" ourselves to involves "care" and "concern," or "concernful circumspection." In the simplest sense I can think of, any time we're doing anything at all, there's some kind of "attending" involved and thus "caring." Unfortunately there are many connotations with "care" as well, in the social sense of "caring for one another." I think it's worth keeping in mind Husserl's "intentionality" here, because it's in this context that Heidegger is defining "Sorge."

Not that I can tell. I know there's been a lot of backlash, and continues to be, for his being a member of the Nazi party. I'm no apologist for him in this respect, but I do think his work contributes much to philosophy. If some guides leave him out, that's their decision, but I don't see it as widespread "cancellation."

I'm not sure why you include Spinoza, however. Surely not the clearest writer either.
— Xtrix
Read S. His latin is crystal clear as are the excellent english translations by Stuart Hampshire & Edwin Curley. (Also, S is the ontologist par excellence.) — 180 Proof

I can't read Latin very well unfortunately. But if you say Spinoza is clearer in Latin, I believe you.

As for ontologist par excellence -- one of the greatest, no doubt. But the fact that he's still very much (like Pascal) struggling with Christianity makes me less likely to delve in further. I've only (partly) read his Ethics. But he's certainly on my list, with Augustine, Anselm, Suarez, Duns Scotus, and Aquinas. (I realize he's not defining "god" in the way the Church Fathers did, by the way.)

H's german, on the other hand, is as clear as mud, which many scholars have also attested to, such that even very fine translators like Joan Stambaugh could not render H's meandering mumblings into serviceably lucid english. — 180 Proof

Unfortunately German isn't a second language of mine either. But from what I've come across, there are many scholars who say his German isn't unclear, it's just very idiomatic and extremely hard to translate into English. I've also heard from Dreyfus, and others, that the John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson version is still the best we have (although quite a few adjustments need to be made there as well -- for example of their translation of "woraufhin"). So perhaps that's worth a try, if attempting to take a serious look at it.

And so H uncharitably interprets N in his own 'onto-theological' terms rather than in N's philological-genealogical & psychological-axiological terms — 180 Proof

When? I never see him translating Nietzsche's ideas about values into ontology. Heidegger argues that Nietzsche eternal recurrence is ontological; that's debatable, of course -- and Heidegger is the first to admit this. He acknowledges Nietzsche did indeed believe the concept of "being" was a vapor and mistake -- and agrees with him in the sense of how it's been handled in Western thought.

But you haven't really shown you've read his works -- have you?

Apparently I have not "shown" anything to you since clearly you've not studied H's works enough (or any of the philosophers I've cited in my previous post) to recognize the pearls I've cast before you. :roll: — 180 Proof

But I have studied Heidegger, carefully, at length, and in detail. I think I've demonstrated that as well, numerous times on this thread and in this forum. If you have as well, you've been very non-specific in your critique. You made a few claims, like the one about wu wei, which may indeed be true, but which I have no way of checking or fully understanding because, again, it's so vague.

Where does [Heidegger] go wrong?
You've already answered your own question, Xtrix:

Heidegger discusses "being" a lot where Nietzsche thought it was a "vapor" and "mistake" ...

As for Nietzsche's ideas about values, [Heidegger] doesn't have much to say about that.

[Heidegger] ignores social and political issues [implications] ... That's just not his concern.

As for obscurantism -- yes, a common charge, and one he anticipates ... the same charge has been made against Kant and Hegel as well, not completely unfairly.

... the neologisms and awkwardness of translating a complex analysis of "being" from idiomatic German ... — 180 Proof

Yes, but I've also started this thread and mentioned from the beginning I think Heidegger is an immensely deep and important thinker who has taught me a great deal. So if these are truly your criticisms, then I repeat: that's fine, but superficial. Why? Because Heidegger is up front about what he's doing: his question, repeated over and over again, is that of "the meaning of being." If that's not what you're interested in, and prefer learning or thinking about politics, ethics, social issues, etc., then why bother with Heidegger at all? You won't find it there.

But that's much less a criticism of his thought than it is a reflection of your interests.

I was just going through a book that’s a guide to philosophers and their work, not one mention of Heidegger. Is it that bad? — Brett

Is what that bad?

I think you touched on it: the analysis of capitalism. So probably Marx being an important read.

I do notice that the Heidegger haters have stopped by. I don't blame them. But I suggest that thinkers like Heidegger, Hegel, Derrida...the ones that people love to who hate...can be appreciated without being worshiped or endorsed as a whole, as flawless human beings or philosophers. — path

Yes of course -- everyone can think whatever they want. Hating him personally for being involved in the Nazis is a good reason to hate him, and his dense and often cumbersome text is another reason to be frustrated. But that's pretty superficial -- I'm really only interested in opinions of those who have made a real effort to read him, hence my request in the OP that a requirement should be having read Being & Time. If you can't get through that, that's fine -- not you're cup of tea. But then why bother announcing your disapproval?

Incidentally, I think Derrida is very much a posturing charlatan -- just as Zikek is now -- and I've tried hard to understand him.

Excellent. I agree with all of that. I've been talking about consciousness in other threads, and I think it's close to the issue of being. People use familiar words in a loose way without noticing just how haze these words are. For practical purposes that's fine, but philosophers build metaphysical systems on foundations of fog. I like to think of it as dragging our ignorance into the light. — path

Definitely. I think at the very least one of the most invaluable contributions of Heidegger is his etymological analysis of classic philosophical words, especially of course from Greek. Nietzsche was doing some of this as well, but as far as I can tell not many others -- which is kind of mind-boggling given both their obvious importance and the rise of "linguistic philosophy."

I wasn't going to write anything in this thread, since the less oxygen given Heidegger, the better; but than you for your summation as to why. — Banno

Interesting. So you agree with that rather nuanced criticism of being dressed-up wu wei? or with the very common accusation (especially of those who have read only secondary sources) of obscurantism?

:roll: Nevermind. Thanks for the input.

'History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.' (Joyce) Or we are the history from which we are trying to awake. It's only our prejudices that allow us to think against such prejudices. The most potent prejudices are the ones we don't know we have. What is ontically closest is ontologically farthest. It's the glasses we don't know we are wearing, the water we swim in without noticing until a strong philosopher can make it visible and only then optional.

I'm riffing, but hopefully some of this speaks to you. — path

It does. The "water we swim" is exactly right -- it's right there around us at all times, and for just that reason is the last thing we notice. The method of "unconcealing" these hidden features of life is how I see him defining phenomenology.

I can't cite a passage at the moment (sorry) but as I get to the end of B&Y I keep feeling like his sense of potentiality and reality go backwards, almost as if we live life in reverse. — Gregory

Well I still don't quite understand fully, but perhaps you're referencing his conception of "temporality," which doesn't view the future as "after" or the past as "before," and so in that sense gives the connotation of going "backwards" somehow?

In the light of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Peirce, Wittgenstein-TPL & Dewey, I've found Heidegger spectacularly redundant and obscurant. — 180 Proof

Well you're in good company in that assessment. I'm not sure why you include Spinoza, however. Surely not the clearest writer either.

Also, his 'interpretation' of Nietzsche is also egregiously anti-Nietzschean. — 180 Proof

Where? I didn't get that at all. I see only the utmost respect for Nietzsche. If you mean the opposite of what Nietzsche thought, then all I can say is that Heidegger discusses "being" a lot where Nietzsche thought it was a "vapor" and "mistake" -- but that's Heidegger's entire philosophy, so that shouldn't be a surprise. As for Nietzsche's ideas about values, he doesn't have much to say about that.

Jaspers & Marcel, then later on Levinas, Merleau-Ponty & Gadamer, do 'hermeneutical daseinanalysis' so much better, less - or counter - solipstically by comparison (Adorno), and therefore morally, even politically, more cogent and relevant to any 'existential project'. — 180 Proof

I'm not sure what "existential project" you're referring to. Heidegger is clear about his question, so to criticize that he ignores social and political issues is like criticizing him for not writing more about biology and astronomy. That's just not his concern.

Most of those you mention acknowledge a large debt of gratitude to Heidegger. Derrida and Foucault as well, and of course Sartre. (I don't necessarily care for any of them.) Regardless, whether they did "daseinanalysis" better or not is debatable. I think many of them, with perhaps Merleau-Ponty as an exception, are rather bloated and overrated. But to each his own.

Heidegger's crypto-augustinian fideism via metaphysical 'de(con)struction of metaphysics' (e.g. Seyn) amounts to little more IMO than a sophistical derivation of 'wu wei' (or 'satori-kenshō'). — 180 Proof

The idea of wu wei does have similarities to the ready-to-hand activities Heidegger describes.

By "destruction of metaphysics" he means basically a historical analysis of the concept of "being" in philosophy; I'm not sure how that amounts to fideism. Maybe unpacking this a little would be helpful.

Read works by The Kyoto School thinkers (e.g. Nishida Kitarō) instead for the comparative philosophical clarity lacking in most of Heidegger's writings, especially after his so-called "die Kehre". — 180 Proof

I've heard there are similarities to Zhuangzi as well. I wouldn't be surprised. But I doubt very much what he or Kitaro are discussing is ontology, especially in the context of the history of Western thought.

I've been grateful to Heidegger, nonetheless, since my earliest philosophical studies in the late '70s for his monumental oeuvre as a/the paragon of how NOT to philosophize - or think-live philosophically (as Arendt points out) - as manifest by the generations of heideggerian obscurant sophists (i.e. p0m0s e.g. Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard, Rorty et al) who've come and gone in and out of academic & litcrit fashion since the 1950s - apple-simulacra don't fall far from the tree-simulacrum (or is it "Ye shall know them by their fruits" :chin:), do they? — 180 Proof

Yes, all that's fine. I think postmodernism, poststructuralism, Derrida in general, is almost completely without value. I don't include Heidegger in this camp, nor in the "existentialist" camp at all -- in fact I'm sure he'd disavow almost all of it.

As for obscurantism -- yes, a common charge, and one he anticipates outright in Being & Time. I think the same charge has been made against Kant and Hegel as well, not completely unfairly.

But you haven't really shown you've read his works -- have you? What exactly is troubling besides the neologisms and awkwardness of translating a complex analysis of "being" from idiomatic German to English? Where are you disagreeing? Where does he go wrong? I'm much more interested in that; so far everything you've said you could easily have based on either secondary sources or from a casual glance.

Which is fine too if that's all you want to say. I was hopeful for something more in-depth.

The closest thing to Heideggers thought in the history of philosophy before him was Aristotle's idea of final causality. Instead of saying the prime mover started everything, Aristotle turned causality on its head and said the prime mover acted as a posterior cause instead of a prior one. Modern philosophy is essentially about putting the cart before the horse. I like that because it's counter intuitive — Gregory

I didn't quite understand this.

Very true! I found B&T quite difficult. It's huge, rich, and a bit overwhelming. — path

Agreed.

So naturally I looked for help, found out about earlier lectures and shorter, earlier drafts. That really helped open my eyes. I could go back and read lots of Div One especially feel that I was getting it. I found Dreyfus's Being-in-the-world quite helpful, but there are some great papers in the Cambridge Companion too. I'm pretty fond of Kisiel's and Van Buren's work too. — path

Dreyfus was an excellent teacher. I'd check out his Berkley lectures as well -- they're online (YouTube et al) for free. His Being-in-the-World is valuable.

I'm not familiar with Kisiel's or Van Buren's work, but thank you for the references. I'll look them up.

Also, just to put this out there, I like to think of Wittgenstein pointing to language as a ready-to-hand tool that we tend to try to gaze at as something occurent. (Our blind skill with language is more absent than present, perhaps...) — path

That's interesting. I hear Wittgenstein mentioned many times in this Forum; his influence here is obvious (and perhaps everywhere). However, I haven't read more than a few pages of his Tractatus.

(5) Dasein is mature; there's little discussion of learning and socialisation.

Seeing a human being as "a Dasein" misses out a lot which is relevant...
— fdrake

That sums up my thoughts rather nicely as well... — creativesoul

But he made clear this is an existential analytic with the question of the meaning of being as an aim. So plenty will be left out of this, necessarily.

My own understanding of Sorge as Heidegger used it would be "having an interest in," as opposed to having zero interest in. And this at all kinds of levels, some of which Heidegger troubled to focus on and explicate. — tim wood

It's true that "care" and "concern" do have unintended connotations, although I wouldn't say he's misunderstanding the world. But I agree with you that it's much more related to "comportment" towards both present-at-hand entities and towards ready-to-hand equipment. All are tied in some basic way towards our purposes, projects, "needs," and engagements -- there's no way to understand it otherwise.

In some ways it's an accident of history that that particular book became so central (his lectures leading up to it just weren't available, even if they are often clearer and one can follow the genesis of his thought.) — path

That's true, but remember that this is because he didn't publish anything else until much later. In any case, I only mentioned Being & Time because it's the most likely thing anyone has read or has access to, and because I doubt very many will have read his other works and exclude that from the list.

Anyway I think I could add something to an informal conversation. — path

Well then, welcome!

I'm almost finished reading Being and Time. I think "care" is properly translated. Caring, or giving a fuck, is the essence of the world — Gregory

Sorge is the German word. I don't mind it either as far as translations go. One can talk about "concern" as well, but always within the context of a larger"for-the-sake-of-which" in which we're always acting. I always want to equate this concept with "willing," but so far in my reading that doesn't really cut it. Heidegger actually seems to think of "care" as more broad than "willing" or "wishing."

Regardless, after flushing out the "structure" of being-there (existence, human being) as being-in-the-world, this gets reinterpreted as "care" in a three-fold way, which as you know itself later gets reinterpreted as temporality, which is ultimately the basis for any interpretation or meaning of "being" in general and human being. So it's an important concept indeed.

The OP's question assumes Heidegger is a figure of special interest to us. — TheMadFool

Not really. I'm asking about Heidegger's thought, not Heidegger as an individual personality. In fact, I think his personal biography often works against him due to his being a Nazi for a while, as you know. That being said, yes I don't consider him a "god" any more than Kant or Newton or Einstein. This thread wasn't intended as a venue for hero worship.

Personal experience; division 1 B&T is one of the most eye opening things I've read in metaphysics. The formal structure of experiential time in Div 2 is profound. — fdrake

I like your use of "experiential time" for "temporality."

Have some frustrations with him:

(1) Scientific/conceptual knowledge being relegated to a present at hand understanding and away from the "core tasks" of philosophy. — fdrake

I think he includes most of philosophy in this relegation as well, and so nearly all of Western thought since the inception of philosophy with the Greeks. His main thesis is that the question of the meaning of being has been forgotten, that it's been covered over as self-evident or useless or indefinable, and that even the desire for stating this question is lacking.

So it's not only a matter of science, which Heidegger has great respect for -- it's all of Western metaphysics at least since Aristotle.

(2) How he approached the history of ideas is very fecund (retrojecting; linking discourse analysis and metaphysics), how he equated that with the history of the understanding of being is not. — fdrake

I don't quite understand what you mean here. Can you elaborate?

(3) Little to no politics and social stuff. — fdrake

I agree -- I would have liked to see more there, but that never seemed to be his focus and he only makes thin connections to politics. Even in his Nietzsche lectures, you would expect more -- but his focus remains with ontology even there.

(4) There's a lot of "formal structure" that piggybacks off suggestive examples that maybe don't generalise as far as he wants ("ontological moods", the centrality of anxiety and being toward death). — fdrake

Again here I'm not quite sure what you mean.

(5) Dasein is mature; there's little discussion of learning and socialisation. — fdrake

That's true, although he does talk much about the "They" or "Das Man," which takes for granted culture, socialization, norms, conformity, etc.

it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy.....
— Mww

I think we can, metaphysically.
— Xtrix

How would that be arranged, that escape?

ontology of "mind" and "nature" (....) I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science.
— Xtrix

Ontology of mind and body? The study of the origin and existence of mind and body?

If the mind/body dualism isn’t thought to be the foundation of all knowledge, but almost certainly the foundation of modern philosophic and scientific knowledge, suggests there is yet another kind of knowledge that isn’t grounded in philosophic or scientific principles. What form would such knowledge have?

Nevertheless, I agree the study of the mind/body dualism isn’t sufficient to ground knowledge of any kind; it merely serves to establish the theoretical conditions under which the possibility of it may be given. — Mww

I consider the "mind/body" dichotomy of Descartes a dualist substance ontology. The "res" is precisely that in Latin (or at least how it's often translated).

This being the foundation of modern philosophy and science just means this is the framework modern science and philosophy uses. There was thinking and philosophy before Descartes, of course. In fact, Descartes was heavily influenced by Scholasticism, as you know -- and so I don't think it's a suggestion of a kind of knowledge other than philosophical or scientific knowledge, but rather a different kind of philosophy, a different ontology.

I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity"
— Xtrix

Of course not, it is impossible. Human thoughts are always singular and successive; engagement in any activity, except pure reflex and sheer accident, requires thought, so I cannot think myself thinking. I can think myself possibly engaged, or I can think myself having been engaged, but never think myself simultaneously thinking with respect to a present engagement. — Mww

That's interesting. I imagine you're right -- and so a different word for whatever is going on internally, while fully engaged in an activity, should probably be invoked here. I use "junk thought," but that has negative connotations. What's really happening is we're simply drifting on a kind of unfocused autopilot. But you're right, it's certainly not the kind of thing we have in mind when we use "thought" (as abstract, rational thinking).

the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted
— Xtrix

That can never fly as a philosophical principle, for such should then be the case that anything that is, thinks. — Mww

Yes, I didn't mean that exactly. What I'm saying there is that the "sum" is even more primordial than "thought," and thus the Cogito should be inverted in that sense. I didn't mean to imply everything that "is" is a conscious, thinking being.

Ya know....poor ol’ Rene, sometimes so demonized. Given that the primary source for that infamous missive is “Principles of Philosophy”, 1, 7, one is well-advised to continue on through 8, in which he tells us what he means by “mind” from which we derive the “I”, and 9, in which he tells us what he means by “thought”. Taken as a whole, the only thing claimed to exist necessarily, is the “I” itself....not the body, not anything else. If that is the case, you have no warrant to claim being “thrown into a world and start with it” with the same absolute certainty as the existence of the thinking self demands. — Mww

Here I'm taking Descartes' use of "thinking" (cogitares) as what he mentions in the Principles: essentially conscious awareness. So "I am consciously aware, therefore I am" still privileges conscious awareness over being. It's not that we exist because we're conscious, we are able to think and perceive and sense because we "are," because we exist. Even an infant, prior to thought or language, exists. A zygote exists, etc.

As soon as you posit an "I" that thinks, or an "I" that is a conscious subject, you're only positing a certain conception of a being, and so presupposing the existence of some-thing that you're now labeling "I."

we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time.
— Xtrix

I dunno, man. We can only start with or in time, if it is possible to prove with apodeitic certainty we are not ourselves responsible for the creation of time as a mere conception. — Mww

That's interesting, but how would you go about "proving" it? I think it's clear we've invented a lot about "time" in terms of measurement -- seconds, minutes, predictable changes, etc -- but I think there's a more "existential" way to look at the basis for these measurements, and the ordinary conception of time. Aristotle's essay on time in the Physics is an important point to see where our concept of "time" comes from, in part.

By "existential way" I mean by looking at what we do as human beings. We do appear to be, any way you slice it, temporal beings. Phenomena changes all around us "in" time. I think that's why both Western and Eastern philosophies so often emphasize time as being fundamental. It's fundamental in science as well, but in a different way -- quantitatively. But Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger -- then in the East with Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc. All emphasize time and change.

If we cannot do that, we can see it is impossible for us to be started with....to be initialized by.....that which wouldn’t even exist if not for us. The ol’ cart before the horse routine, doncha know. — Mww

I see what you mean, yes. In that case I'd say that time is embedded in our existence -- we exist as temporality and interpret the world (and "being" and "time" itself) on this basis. This is why I used quotation marks when saying "in" time -- I don't believe time is a container of some kind, or an object, or some kind of clock in our heads.

This probably sounds absurd or confusing. Heidegger is much better at the analysis than I am, but I don't want to simply quote from an "authority." This is the best I can do!

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things (....) leading to problems that have been with us for a long time.
— Xtrix

No doubt; the dyed-in-the-wool physicalist won’t grant the time of day to “mind”, which is fine, there being no such real empirical thing. Which just makes philosophy that much more fun......how to close explanatory gaps by making sense out of something we can never put our fingers on. — Mww

That's interesting as well. When you say "physicalist," I view that as almost synonymous with "naturalism" and "materialism" really. It all amounts to very similar concepts: what we can "know" with our senses, with empirical data, is all that can be known -- and that the world is made of substance, matter, "physical" particles (atoms, etc), and so on. This has to be true in some way. I'm no mystic. But on the other hand, perhaps we've gotten too complacent in our accepting of this approach.

we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy.
— Xtrix

I submit it is altogether impossible to escape the subject/object dichotomy, or dualism. Can’t re-enter what’s never been vacated. Metaphysically speaking, of course. — Mww

I think we can, metaphysically. The Cartesian ontology of "mind" and "nature" ("body" -- res extensa), while like I said is powerful and important, I don't think is the unmitigated foundation of all being, or even of all knowledge -- although almost ertainly for modern philosophy and science.

But even on a mundane, everyday level, it's not as if we're subjects contemplating objects -- we're not seeing ourselves that way. I don't think to myself "here I am as an individual engaged in this activity" -- in fact much of what I'm doing is often completely habitual and second-nature (mostly unconscious).

We can explain this type of thing using the subject/object distinction, but this assumes a lot of things -- like an "I," an "external world," an "inner and outer," etc. --in turn leading to problems that have been with us for a long time.

I think there are alternative analyses that get closer to the phenomena, are more accurate, more holistic, and (possibly) more useful. Again, here I mean Nietzsche, but especially Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and even Dreyfus and Kierkegaard perhaps. I'd include Pascal, but I still haven't got through all of the Pensees -- however I feel he'd shy away from the Cartesian ontology, from what I've read so far.

So as not to be mysterious: the "I think, therefore I am" should be inverted -- we start with (and "in") being (as human beings) and with (and "in") time. Thus we're thrown into a world and start with it -- i.e., with the "am", the "sum" of the Cogito ergo sum. I am, therefore I think (in the sense of not only abstract thought but conscious awareness generally).

Maybe it’s as simple as finding no profit in questioning the experience of our observations. — Mww

No doubt there's much truth in that.

But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense?
— Xtrix

Relations? And if it is humans that are asking, then that which is asked about must ultimately reduce to a relation between it and humans. It follows that at least some fundamental genus of philosophy relates what is, to what we think of it. — Mww

So you mean a kind of relation between "thinking" and "being," or more of a questioner in relation to what's questioned?

I would say "what is" and what we "think of it" does seem to be a very fundamental and important distinction. I also think perhaps here we may be entering back into the subject/object dichotomy.

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist.
— Xtrix

That's because you don't know what positivism is. (Make a note of that). — David Mo

:roll: Okay...

If I were a positivist I would say that all possible knowledge comes down to science and that all human problems can be solved by science. — David Mo

Yes...

That's not what I'm saying. — David Mo

Fair enough. Notice I said "more of a positivist" -- meaning more in alignment with that tradition, not necessarily encapsulated by it. I still think that's accurate, but I see my ambiguity now.

I'm saying that all "objective" knowledge -about facts in the world- comes down to science. Which leaves the field open for other types of knowledge, including philosophy. What I agree with the positivists is that metaphysics, more specifically ontology, is a false science that has done much damage to the reputation of philosophy. But Kant already said this in his Critique of Pure Reason: a scandal. And he was not a positivist. — David Mo

Fine -- you're not a positivist. That's not the important point here -- I'm not interested in labeling anyone and being satisfied with that. But it's in part this area of agreement, towards ontology and metaphysics, that led me to associate your perspective more closely with this tradition than, say, what's called "continental" philosophy (I agree in advance: a pretty vacuous term, but I think you'll take my meaning). Maybe analytical philosophy would have been a more accurate term, who knows. But that misses the point entirely -- I only bring up these broad labels to demonstrate what very different perspectives we're approaching this issue ("What is philosophy?" "What is science?") with.

And of course I agree with you, and Kant, and Nietzsche in fact, that metaphysics and ontology (at least as commonly understood) have been both damaging and rife with confusions. Heidegger in fact agrees as well. This is not a shift in position -- it simply means that what started in the inception of Western philosophy, with the presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle, has gradually become more and more confused, and it's important to re-awaken the "question of being" again.

Of course, if you put norms and language into being, everything is being and your definition is perfectly useless. — David Mo

I haven't attempted to define being in general. But every particular being or class of beings "is," including language and norms. A pre-theoretical understanding of being permeates everything we do and everything we think; philosophy thinks and interprets being. That shouldn't be controversial.

And because Aristotle wrote on ethics, logic, biology, etc., doesn't mean he's excluded from this definition.

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn.
— Xtrix
I'm sorry I don't have time for the huge task of correcting your comments. I'm probably not qualified either. — David Mo

But qualified enough to recognize them.

But if this is any indication: you did not understand (I think you still do not) the concept of intuition in Kantian philosophy and its consequences in contemporary philosophy. — David Mo

I don't remember discussing the Kantian use of intuition in this thread. I don't see how I can be mistaken about something I've made no claims about.

Nor did you know the importance of controlled experimentation in the emergence of the New Science. — David Mo

Who doesn't know that? Where did I say that experimentation wasn't an important factor in science, or the beginning or modern science? Of course it's important. You're projecting a position on to me which I simply don't hold. I never said it wasn't important, I said that making it the basis for a "scientific method" which is supposed to separate science and philosophy is unconvincing, no matter how often it's repeated, and that there are plenty of exceptions in science -- i.e., where controlled experimentation isn't used or isn't possible.

That's not saying experimentation isn't important, whether in the 17th century or now.

You claim to be Heideggerian, but you do not handle the concepts of the ontological and ontic as Heidegger does. — David Mo

I do. You're simply wrong. I've explained the distinction a couple of times very clearly: the ontological concerns being as such, the ontical concerns beings.

Here's a quote from Heidegger himself, lengthy but helpful:

"We must be able to bring out clearly the difference between being and beings in order to make something like being the theme of inquiry. This distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology. We call it the ontological difference--the differentiation between being and beings. Only by making this distinction -- krinein in Greek -- not between being and another being but between being and beings do we first enter the field of philosophical research. Only by taking this critical stance do we keep our standing inside the field of philosophy. Therefore, in distinction from the sciences of the things that are, of beings, ontology, or philosophy in general, is the critical science, or the science of the inverted world. With this distinction between being and beings and the selection of being as theme we depart in principle from the domain of beings. We surmount it, transcend it." (Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 17)

I find very interesting the study of ancient philosophy. It is a sensitive subject to me for family reasons. But if you don't understand that current philosophy is very different you are lost. And what I was trying is to speak of philosophy now. What philosophers do now? — David Mo

Which is fine, but you know as well as I that we cannot understand what philosophers do now without a historical context as well. It's like studying the human being without any attempt to understand evolution, or growth and development.

A lot of questions. But not relevant until someone tells us what "consciousness" is. It's like asking the difference between rocks and ectoplasm.

All that to say this: I’m pretty sure scientists don’t care all that much about being qua being, and I’m almost positive Everydayman doesn’t give a damn about it at all. — Mww

And probably many whom we call "philosophers" today. I hope that's not true, but it may very well be. In school I encountered plenty of philosophy teachers, but for the most part they were interpreting and popularizing the great thinkers of the past and their texts, almost as part of a "history of philosophy," but with no clear indication that they ever thought "being" for themselves. I think that's a shame.

philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other.
— Xtrix
No science deals with the Being as a Being. — David Mo

Right, because being isn't a being (an entity) at all.

Each science has its own particular field. If you think the opposite, give an example. — David Mo

I don't.

Do you know of any scientific article published in a scientific journal dedicated to the Being as a Being? — David Mo

No, because I have no idea what "the Being" would mean, nor why it's capitalized.

Therefore, scientists who study a parcel of reality (I prefer to talk about reality than about the undefined Heideggerian Being) do not care at all about the "being as being". They work on atomic particles, allergies, nebulae or electric cars. And nothing else. — David Mo

That's probably true in most cases, yes. Most scientists are really not interesting in philosophy. But I think that's a very unfortunate mistake.

It's also interesting you use "reality" -- Heidegger has a lot to say about that concept and its history as well.

If you want to say that at certain levels scientists are interested on questions traditionally attributed to philosophy, the concept of matter, of truth or the role of induction in science, this may be true. It is also true that these questions cannot be answered today without scientific knowledge. — David Mo

It's the last part that has me thinking you're more of a positivist. But of course it depends on what you mean by "scientific knowledge." If you mean objective truth, or finding mechanical or material causes, rules, principles, etc., then no -- science simply can't explain everything, given its ontology (for example, the being of the "ready-to-hand" -- our dealings with equipment, our concern, our purposes, etc). If by science we mean "trying to understand the world," then sure -- no questions can be answered without science.

So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why?
— Xtrix

Because if you exclude by definition most of the class of objects that are usually called X, what the hell should we call them? That's what's called making a persuasive definition. An anti-philosophical vice. — David Mo

Making a persuasive definition is an anti-philosophical vice? That's puzzling, if that's what you're saying.

But as far as the first sentence goes -- I'm not necessarily excluding anything. Whatever we call "x," we look to history, to etymology, to our own experiences, and see if the term has a broader meaning that includes X as a subset, whether it's being mis-labeled or misunderstood, how the meaning has evolved, etc.

When you do that with the word "philosophy," for example, you see how the meaning has changed in part by the influence of the sciences, in part by professionalization and specialization, university departments and majors, etc. Most of those we call "philosophers" of the past weren't professors of philosophy, after all -- with obvious exceptions (Kant, Hegel, etc). So who cares about professorships and Ph.D.s? If they're not saying anything new or interesting about the core of philosophy, or haven't at least thought the question of being through for themselves, then we may still label them as "doing" philosophy, but to me it's a pretty strange thing. It's the difference between teaching literature and writing.

So while we shouldn't exclude anything on the basis of what it has been in the past (as I think you believe I'm doing), we also shouldn't exclude what's past simply because it doesn't correspond to what's contemporaneous.

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological.
— Xtrix

If you define philosophy as ontology (which I don't know if it's Heidegger's or your own invention) — David Mo

It's Heidegger's.

you leave out of philosophy most of today's philosophers, who don't talk about being as such, but about particular issues such as ethics, for example. — David Mo

But if they're philosophers, then they don't study ethics or beauty or knowledge in a vacuum. If they do, then yes I wouldn't consider them philosophers at all. I'd call them perhaps "teachers" or even "scientists," concerned with whatever domain of beings they're interested in without any questioning of being.

An important clarification, though: The best philosophers (if I could make a value judgment) are not exclusively concerned with 'being,' of course -- in that case I'd be arguing that Plato and Aristotle aren't philosophers, since they engaged in political theory, ethics, aesthetics, etc. Is that what you think I'm arguing?

Your definition is exclusive, that is, a bad definition. — David Mo

I don't think I'm doing that in the sense you mean. One can certainly study mainly ethics, or optics, or aesthetics, or civil engineering, anything else one pleases and still be a philosopher. This is what I was referring to above.

But regardless: what definition doesn't exclude something? (Besides "being" perhaps.) If all definitions that exclude something are "bad," then nearly all definitions are bad. "Tree" is bad -- it excludes bushes. And rocks.

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion
— Xtrix
I could point out a few things you've written that an expert in philosophy would not have said. — David Mo

Well then please point them out -- I'm happy to learn.

You haven't studied philosophy in a faculty and it shows. It's not serious. — David Mo

You mean as part of a faculty? Or in a university? Yes, I'm not part of any university faculty, that's true. I did, however, study philosophy in college, but only as a minor concentration.

I don't see how this is relevant, though, until it's clear where I go astray. In fact, most of what I've said is quasi (if not at times verbatim) Martin Heidegger, who was a tenured professor (if that's important to you) and, in my opinion at least, a very important philosopher indeed. So it's not about my credentials, really. Yet I repeat: I don't see where my mistakes are.

I've read everything you've written in response to me, and carefully, and have responded in turn. I mentioned one clear error I can recall: writing "Aristarchus." I'm fairly confident that what you claim are mistakes are simply your misreadings (of which there are plenty of examples in this thread).

Otherwise my point stands. And again -- happy to stand corrected.

I'm not a philosopher by profession either, and this is not a forum for professionals. But I'm not trying to belittle amateurs like me. It's not humility. It's common sense. Because sometimes they can show me that I'm arguing about things that I don't master and if I've pretended before that I'm the wisest I'd be very embarrassed. It's a matter of self-esteem. — David Mo

Sure. But why do you associate this with me? If I've "belittled" anyone it wasn't intended, and I've never claimed to be the "wisest" person.

Therefore, you try to cheat. You take some philosophers of the past who were also scientists-when science and philosophy were not clearly differentiated, as Pfhorrest told you- and put their books under the old name of "philosophia naturalis". Of course this is not a special subject of study. There is no faculty of Philosophia Naturalis in the world. No subject, no science. If you want to invent a name for this nothing I suggest "Totumlogy". or "Totum Revolutum". Because for the "science" of Being as Being there is already a name: Ontology. And it has nothing to do with Physics or Biology, but it is a particular branch of philosophy. Well differentiated, by the way. It is a name from the times when many priests disguised as philosophers were trying to say the scientists and free thinkers what they could think and what they couldn't. A timeworn name, it is clear. I think this is the main reason why today is not a very popular name among philosophers. — David Mo

I don't put their books under "natural philosophy," they do. If nothing else, is that not an interesting historical fact? Just take it as that alone. That doesn't mean I'm saying philosophy and science are the same thing. Philosophy and natural philosophy aren't the same thing either.

I don't understand what you mean by "there is no faculty of [natural philosophy] in the world." There's clearly a faculty of the human mind (call it the "science-forming capacity") that's conceiving an idea of "nature" and attempting to understand it in various domains, like "life" (biology), "stars and planets" (astronomy), "matter" (chemistry), "language" (linguistics), etc. All of these things scientists would say are part of nature -- unless they're "magic." So I don't see your point. Call it natural science if you want -- makes no difference.

As for ontology -- yes it is often viewed as another branch of philosophy. But what does philosophy really "think" if not existence, if not "being" in the broadest sense? How can philosophy not be ontological in that case? And if this isn't happening, and the focus is solely on a domain of beings -- then the pursuit is ontical. Natural philosophy (or natural science) is one such domain, along with all subdomains. But an interpretation of being pervades all of these fields regardless of whether it's questioned or thought about at all.

However, apart from the intuitive clarity with which one immediately sees that science and philosophy are not the same, according to the author of the text, I think I have given you plenty of reasons to justify that distinction. But you have preferred not to see them. Don't blame me. — David Mo

I have heard you loud and clear. You've said repeatedly that mathematicization and experimentation are key features of at least modern science. I myself gave a list of possible attributes of science, which you stated you thought were accurate. But I could have "intuitions" about things and make attempts at "defining" them as well -- like "energy" (how much stamina I have at any point) or "work" (somewhere you spend 40 hours a week) or "the meaning of life," etc. All the while giving perfectly sensible reasons. But that doesn't mean I'm using "energy" or "work" as it's used in physics. In fact, the guy next to me on the train could come up with a different definition based on his intuitions.

There is no rule for you to differentiate philosophy from science because when some more or less precise criteria are given - even by yourself - you turn a blind eye. — David Mo

Because I (1) don't believe any of those criteria are "precise," and (2) I see both philosophy and science as also similar in certain respects: like the use of abstraction, de-"worlding," assuming a subject/object dichotomy, assuming the "world as rational" or that we're the rational animal, and (most importantly) treating the world as a present-at-hand "fact" -- meaning privileging the present -- e.g., the "unchanging," the "permanent," the constant, the "persistent," etc. -- or, from the history of philosophy, the "idea," "substance" (ουσια), "God," "matter," etc.

To define science or philosophy is to do so already in a philosophical tradition (inheritance from history) -- we all have our influences and assumptions, we all use the words and concepts of the past. I feel like you're minimizing or ignoring this point, and so trying (like others on this thread) to offer a definition of philosophy (and science) without explaining the larger philosophical context in which you're giving said definition. Now if I were to guess -- based on your mention of Wittgenstein, your wanting to clearly separate science and philosophy, and your boredom with, or outright derision of, Heidegger -- I would imagine you yourself would acknowledge more affinity to the analytic philosophers -- perhaps Russell, Quine...maybe Tarski, Kripke, etc. Is that not so?

I think at this point it would do well to flush out that larger context, given that we've now written plenty of words about what we think science and philosophy are. Without that context, and the extra work it entails, one can define things any way one likes -- or even appeal to the dictionary. I don't think that's very interesting -- we'll run in circles.

Maybe this is all a matter of common sense. Don't be so dismissive of common sense, because even philosophers use it. — David Mo

The "come on" was perhaps too colloquial, but what I meant there is that we cannot only appeal to intuition when attempting to formulate a technical notion, which is partly how I see the question of this thread, namely "What is a good technical definition of philosophy?" Many have offered very interesting answers -- but like in science, while common sense notions may be important (in folk science, psychology, etc), within an explanatory theory, they cannot be the final word. I'm sure you agree with this.

So then we have to ask: what is your "theory" or perspective, in which you're defining a technical notion, like "philosophy" and "science" themselves?

If we're not asking ourselves that question, or we don't fully understand it (perhaps in part by ignoring history), then we turn that perspective into a matter of faith, as it's off limits to inquiry.

I've been clear from fairly early on from what perspective I approach these issues, and even put a label on myself: I approach all of this very much as a "Heideggerian" -- which I think is a very important and enriching perspective, but could also be completely wrong. Nevertheless, Heidegger is a central influence.

Since it is from within this framework that I start giving a definition of "philosophy" or "science," and both these and peripheral notions are defined very differently than yours, I think we're often talking past one another. You're coming at the same words from a very different tradition.

Philosophy isn't a subject so much as an activity, in which muddled ways of saying things are exposed and analysed.
— Banno

Spot on.

To be more precise it is a mind activity. An activity of expressing your mind. The output of philosophical thought is information about the mind activity of the philosopher. — Pop

What Banno is presenting, if I had to pick a category, is similar to what's called "analytic philosophy," of which I imagine you're familiar. Personally, the traditions of materialism, empiricism, positivism, naturalism, analytical and perhaps "linguistic" philosophy and even what's called "scientism" (not meant pejoratively) seem to share many features in common, and are all incredibly powerful perspectives.

What you say is similar. There's an emphasis on concepts of "mind" and "information" (of which I assume you're using as a synonym for "knowledge", but correct me if I'm wrong), and you seem to agree about the muddled ways of "saying things" (which I read as "propositions") and the identifying, analyzing, and clarifying of those assertions being central to the mind activity we're calling "philosophy."

If I've got all that right, then I think this conception of philosophy is in that tradition and is a very important and very powerful interpretation.