“Baseless” is maybe a bit too harsh, but the point is that Democritus wasn’t presenting something that we today would call a scientific theory, with proposed observable consequences that could (dis)prove it. Nor was he engaging in a priori reasoning about abstract concepts. He was just saying “hey I think the world is like this”. That’s fine for his time, I don’t knock the guy, it’s just neither good science nor good philosophy by today standards. — Pfhorrest

Well I don't necessarily agree with that characterization, but I understand what you're getting at. Again I'd revert back to what I said before: appealing to common notions of what philosophy does now doesn't prove much and is in fact what we've all been trying to define. You notice there are multiple definitions, so it's not as if we're in total agreement even today.

"Science" wasn't even a word until I believe the 15th century. That doesn't prove much either.

In general, that kind of baseless speculation is seen as fitting of neither science nor philosophy today. — Pfhorrest

I don't know why you say "baseless" -- it was speculation on what the world is made of based on at least some observation, experience, deduction. And however we classify it, it turned out to be very close to what we currently believe about matter.

Well that's debatable too. Is logic a kind of philosophy? Many have tried to reduce mathematics, at least arithmetic, to logic.
— Xtrix

Logic is a tool of both mathematics and philosophy. That bit of overlap doesn’t mean the two are the same though. — Pfhorrest

When have I said they're the same? I fully concede that mathematics and logic are different things, regardless of any reduction.

Likewise Newton’s Principia is not a work of philosophy as we now use the word, even though it has “Natural Philosophy” in the title, because what was once called “natural philosophy” is now considered a different field outside of philosophy in today’s sense of the word: something we call “science” instead. — Pfhorrest

But that's the point of this discussion, to find out what we mean by philosophy right now. I fully agree that how we think of philosophy now is different than in the past -- that doesn't make it correct.

So I'm interested in what the moderators think of the following:

Fuck fuckity fuck fuck 'em both. Pair of cunt white supremacists that deserve each other. — StreetlightX

This doesn't violate any forum guidelines? If you can ban people for not capitalizing their words, what happens in this case? And how is this person allowed to be a moderator in the first place?

I've seen this behavior repeatedly from this person. What is the protocol? I genuinely ask.

Tangent, but; do you think there are interesting philosophical questions about the metaphysics of objects that don't strongly emphasize human interaction with the objects, or the fact that it's a human asking the question? — fdrake

Yes to both, if I'm understanding you correctly.

Speculating about an indivisible unit which constitutes the world was what Democritus was doing
— Xtrix

Democritus lived in a time before philosophy and science were clearly differentiated. — Pfhorrest

True, but this is completely irrelevant.

Pythagoras did mathematics under the name of “philosophy” too. That doesn’t mean that, today, math is just a kind of philosophy. — Pfhorrest

Well that's debatable too. Is logic a kind of philosophy? Many have tried to reduce mathematics, at least arithmetic, to logic.

No, that’s just science, presuming they aim for the things they speculate about to be testable and eventually tested, and aren’t just armchair positing things to be so without respect for whether observation agrees or not. — Pfhorrest

And the latter is what philosophers supposedly do?

on this hand, fact, on the other, soaring speculation
— Xtrix

I think you missed my entire point, which is that philosophy done properly isn’t at all about speculating on the same subject matters that science investigates. — Pfhorrest

Science investigates domains of beings in nature -- physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology. Hence branches of natural philosophy -- which is indeed different from "general" philosophy in the sense of dealing with being. The "natural" part indicates a difference: the investigating, thinking about, speculating about, hypothesizing about, etc -- "natural" beings, beings in "nature" (which in the modern sense means essentially matter in motion; from the same word we get "physics").

The subject matter of natural philosophy is indeed different, but in itself has a philosophical basis -- in this case, "nature."

Such speculation is either philosophy overstepping its bounds, or badly done attempts at science. That kind of baseless speculation is neither proper philosophy nor proper science. Science investigates the same subject matter in a better way. Philosophy investigates a different subject matter entirely: higher-order question about conducting such investigations. — Pfhorrest

Speculating about an indivisible unit which constitutes the world was what Democritus was doing -- I assume you don't call this science. Certainly testable, however. Turns out, centuries later, albeit very differently formulated, we have come around to a similar view. Both the same subject matter: what the world is made of. However you'd like to categorize it is irrelevant -- call what Democritus was doing "philosophy" or "speculation" or primitive science, or anything you like -- but they're not separate subjects.

Speculative philosophy happens when philosophy tries to cross over into the domain of science, without “doing as the scientists do” when there. If your philosophy is making claims of the kind that science could possibly prove wrong, your philosophy is overstepping its bounds. — Pfhorrest

If "speculative philosophy" is making claims about the world that can be proven wrong, it's natural philosophy. Science engages in speculations all the time -- in hypothesizing, in explanatory theories, etc. Sometimes it takes years to test these ideas. Is this all "speculative philosophy" until an experiment is conducted?

You claim there's a clear line, but I see little evidence for one. I see only a matter of definition, with questionable motivation: on this hand, fact, on the other, soaring speculation. Think that way if you must.

The relationship between philosophy and science is not one of two different approaches to the same questions. Rather, philosophy is (in part) about the questions that underlie science’s approach to its questions. Philosophy is (in part) meta-science: the study of how to do the things science is trying to do and why to do them that way instead of some other way. — Pfhorrest

OR -- philosophy is ontological while science is ontical. That's not the same thing, no, but you can't do one without the other.

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.
— Xtrix
By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics.
— David Mo

And this is not a good argument. — Xtrix

It's a very good argument that you only solve by getting rid of most of the contemporary philosophers. If you give a definition of philosophy that does not correspond to what philosophers do, you eliminate the philosophers and the definition fits you. — David Mo

So citing what "contemporary philosophers do" is a good argument against philosophy being ontological. Why? Who's to say they're doing philosophy anything? You? Academia? Degrees?

Regardless, I'm sure there's plenty of interest in ontology in contemporary scholarship, just as there is in the sciences. So what? This isn't even an argument, really -- it's just a fatuous remark.

The dog is an animal that flies low when it rains.
Hey, dogs don't fly.
I'm not interested in dogs that don't fly.

That way it's easy to make "natural philosophy" dictionaries. — David Mo

Philosophy is what contemporary philosophers do. This is essentially your response to my (and Heidegger's) statement that philosophy is ontological. If you can't see how this is, at best, irrelevant -- I won't bother explaining it.

You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well.
— Xtrix
Because of the mistakes you make, I don't see that you know so much about the history of philosophy in general and of that of the last centuries in particular to give lessons to others. — David Mo

If I've made mistakes, you've certainly not demonstrated them in this discussion -- except perhaps writing "Aristarchus" instead of "Eratosthenes," which I conceded. The rest is your illusion, including the remarks about Descartes, which I anticipated immediately after giving that example and which you ignored.

You've repeatedly misunderstood what I've said, however, even after I clearly laid out what I was NOT saying to aid clarification.

You've chosen the worst example of all for your interests. Descartes was fully aware of the difference between his metaphysics and his treatise on optics. — David Mo

Yes, because there is a difference: one is concerned with beings and beings as such, one is part of natural philosophy, namely the questioning, theoretical and experimental attempt to understand light and vision. The latter has now been classified as "science," and the former to "philosophy" -- mainly in academia and mainly for practical purposes. But not because of an adherence to a mythical method. There are many methods in our attempts to understand the world -- theoretical methods, experimental methods, social methods, etc. To argue that Descartes stopped doing philosophy the moment he started experimenting with light is fine, but the fundamental beliefs, conceptual and theoretical aspects don't therefore disappear. So at best we can say he was doing natural philosophy, namely the science of optics. You can't do science without philosophy, even if defined by the aspects I mentioned.

Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which?
— Xtrix
Just because France and Spain have relations does not mean that they are the same state. Ditto for philosophy and science. — David Mo

I'm not saying philosophy and science are the same.

You can define them any way you like, without evidence, and be satisfied with that. If you want them to be completely separate, that's fine. It says more about your psychology than anything about philosophy or science, though. As I said, personally I think it's a minor issue and rather silly. If it has any impact at all, I think it's a poor one -- namely that scientists are dismissive of the philosophical underpinnings of their technical work.

The term intuitive in philosophy does not mean apparent as opposite to essential. Intuitive is immediate, without the need for supporting reasoning. — David Mo

So we're now appealing to intuition and common sense? Come on. I prefer a historical perspective, with plenty of evidence.

In any case you yourself contributed some characteristics which do not intuitively point out the difference between philosophy and science. Let's stick to them. I'm doing it and it seems like I'm creating some problems for you that you don't know how to solve. — David Mo

Oh, is that what's happening? Too bad for me.

I don't see any unsolvable problems that you're presenting. The point stands exactly as it was at the beginning of this digression: philosophy and science do appear very different, but there's no rule or method to determine which is which -- nor should there be, in my view. If we in the 21st century want to take seriously the clear lines drawn by schools and believe this has some bearing on how human beings approach the world, that's fine. I don't take that seriously. Historically speaking, science has developed as different from philosophy for many reasons, but they can never be separated completely in my view -- even if we accept the inductive method. Unless of course we want to relegate philosophy to the realm of the superstitious.

Whatever Descartes was doing, or Galileo, or Newton, they themselves viewed as "natural philosophy." They're usually agreed to be the founders of modern science. We don't have to take this seriously, and things have certainly changed in the last 400 years, but I'm far more inclined to take them seriously when determining how to categorize human inquiry than I am the modern university curricula and the widespread scientism of our day.

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.
— Xtrix
By the way, this is not a good distinction. Most contemporary philosophy does not deal with Being as Being, but with particular branches: philosophy of science, anthropology, philosophy of history, ethics, etc. You have an archaic concept of philosophy as the old metaphysics. — David Mo

And this is not a good argument.

It's not "archaic" because no one has described philosophy that way -- besides Heidegger, perhaps. Is the 20th century archaic?

I'm not concerned with what "most contemporary philosophers" write about. I'm not convinced there are many philosophers, although there are plenty of philosophy scholars, historians, lecturers, etc. Regardless -- let them do what they want, much of it is decent work.

Experimentation is often involved in the natural sciences, but a great deal isn't. Controlled, careful observation is also important. I'd say the peer review process is also a very important one. Falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, the use of mathematics, and so on...all very important. — Xtrix

You're falling into an absolute contradiction. — David Mo

That doesn't sound too good for me.

A clear distinction cannot be vague. Clear and vague are antonyms. — David Mo

Really? I could have sworn they were synonyms.

But seriously - yes, of course you're right, but I don't recall saying that the distinction between philosophy and science is a clear one. It may appear clear, it may be "intuitively" clear -- we may feel it in our guts that a very clear distinction exists -- all that I agree with: it does feel that way. But is it in fact clear? No. Especially when a "method" is invoked that is supposed to account for this "clear distinction." On closer inspection, it's rather vague, rather fuzzy, the boundaries are blurred, and the motivation for wanting there to be a clear demarcation line is itself questionable.

All of the factors I mentioned above do indeed seem to be involved in what science "is."

There is no science of the Being qua Being, but many philosophers (in the past) dealt with it. — David Mo

There is: ontology - the science of being.

There is no philosopher (qua philosopher) who supports his philosophy with experimentation, who expresses his theories in a mathematical way or who makes precise predictions. If you know of a book on philosophy written in this way I would like to know about it. — David Mo

Principles of Philosophy, by Descartes. But it doesn't matter anyway, because the "qua philosopher" part is nonsense. You simply want to confine philosophy to speculations -- which we all can do if we choose to. But as I've repeatedly said, I think at best it's questionable to do so.

So in that case, anything Descartes or Liebniz or anyone else writes that's mathematical or experimental or predictive will simply not qualify as philosophy.

If I'm archaic, you're certainly taking the current university department organization too seriously. Modern physics is indeed different than modern philosophy -- but back in the 17th century what Newton was doing was considered natural philosophy. So pick your starting point -- are you talking about what "philosophers and scientists do NOW," as you stated at the beginning of this discussion, or about what they did in the 17th and 18th centuries? If the latter, then you won't have to go far looking for books. Unless of evaluate the writings using a 21st century criterion -- in which case you'll have to sort out Newton's "science" from his "philosophy," as well as Descartes' and Galileo's. But that's anachronistic, and no better than my claiming because their writings were considered natural philosophy then that it should be considered natural philosophy now -- as you alleged I was doing before. (And I do think there's something to it, but as long as we're ruling it out...)

I know you believe there was, at one time, a point where "philosophy" (all the soaring speculations that seem laughable today, like monads -- by your interpretation) and "science" (an activity characterized by a method involving experimentation and mathematics) parted ways. I believe this is a matter of definition mainly due to increased specialization, a division of labor within academia that, as I've said before, is fine for organizing college majors and departments, but really shouldn't be taken that seriously.

The fact that some connection can be established between philosophy and the natural sciences (in the field of theoretical physics, or the interpretation of scientific theories, for example), that there is an undefinition in some special cases does not support your theory that science and philosophy are not clearly differentiated activities. — David Mo

It does.

It certainly doesn't support your thesis. Because if they are so clearly distinct, why the confusion about which is which?

They are, and the obsession to erase all distinction lies in the hidden attempt to grant philosophy powers that it does not have. — David Mo

No obsession. Personally it's a minor issue. Since "philosophy" and "science" aren't clearly understood as practices anyway, there's little point in arguing about whether they're separate, interconnected, or the same. You have to know something about these subjects beforehand, and this means not only knowing the questions and problems about which they're concerned, but their history as well. I see little understanding of either, both in the general culture and on this very forum, so once again we're left with people throwing "definitions" around without a context, based solely on "intuitions" and maybe a few philosophy books.

"Natural philosophy" is still a fine way to think about it -- If it was good enough for Galileo and Newton, it's good enough for me. Science deals with nature, in a reflective, abstract way. Sometimes they perform experiments, sometimes they don't. Sometimes they simply cannot perform the obvious experiments (in studying the human language capacity, for example). The very term "nature" comes from philosophy, as a Latin translation of the Greek term for being, "phusis." Nature is now conceived as matter in motion, as atoms and molecules, acted on by forces.

It's not about giving philosophy more "power" -- this is exactly what underlies your intense desire for a clear distinction, a kind of fear of religious-like superstition and mysticism creeping into the "truth" and "facts" that science gives us.

So again, by all means define them any way you like. As far as making a compelling argument, I'm not at all convinced. But maybe I'm just archaic!

How someone who treats the sociopath in office like a cult leader isn't embarrassed to make a joke like this isn't surprising. You don't see the irony, I suppose.

The difference between ontical and ontological in Heidegger is as confusing as everything about him. I'd like to know how you understand it. — David Mo

But without quoting him. ;)

Heidegger can be confusing, no doubt. A lot of the difficulty is the translation from German to English. But this is one case where he's clear. The "ontological difference" is how he refers to it: the difference is between being and beings.

Science is "ontical" in that it studies various domains of beings: nature, matter, life, humans, etc

Philosophy, or metaphysics, is ontological in that it thinks being.

If you have understood that, you will arrive at a clear difference between philosophy and science in terms of method: the use of controlled experimentation (or controlled observation in its absence) to test the validity of statements.
Not that the scientific method is reduced to that. But it is a first step. — David Mo

Experimentation is often involved in the natural sciences, but a great deal isn't. Controlled, careful observation is also important. I'd say the peer review process is also a very important one. Falsiability, predictive power, duplicability, the use of mathematics, and so on...all very important.

All are features of reflective thought aimed at understanding aspects of the ontical world, which is also deeply interconnected with philosophy. Where the "switchover" is said to take place - exactly where the demarcation line is - is completely unknown and, frankly, both a fruitless and pointless pursuit. It's only a vaguely defined word, and the human pursuit of understanding the world around us goes on one way or another, whether we say "natural philosophy" or "science" or episteme.

Chomsky's not a historian. — David Mo

Yes, he is. His writings are not restricted to the history of science.

you had quoted him correctly you — David Mo

I never quoted him.

"Intuitively fairly clear." Sure, who would disagree?
— Xtrix
So you recognize that there is a clear difference between the method of science and that of philosophy? Case closed. — David Mo

It appears "intuitively fairly clear," yes. That's not saying much, nor did I ever claim there were no differences or that it doesn't indeed seem that they are district from one another.

You still haven't shown there is a method.
— Xtrix
Hey, didn't you say there was a clear difference between the scientific method of experimentation and observation? Now there is no difference? — David Mo

There is no method that accounts for the distinction, intuitive or otherwise. There certainly are differences and plenty of examples of such. I've said that from the beginning.

So they apply this "method" how? Unconsciously?
— Xtrix
One can speak in prose without knowing the difference between prose and poetry. . Moliére. — David Mo

So they're using this method, but it's invisible. And they started to do so around the 16th century - unconsciously.

Sounds less like a method and more like a mode of thought.

And if you don't know exactly what Putnam is saying, why do you quote him? — David Mo

I quoted Putnam because you asked for one, and seemingly never watched the video - which I said from the start was merely an introduction to the philosophy of science. Putnam has a number of books on the subject, if you're interested. Philosophy in the Age of Science: Physics, Mathematics and Skepticism is a decent start.

Your quote from Putnam is nothing more than a series of opinions poured out on a television show, which is not very interesting unless they are more reasoned. — David Mo

If you watch the entire video, there's much more context and it's well reasoned indeed -- unlike, say, your claims about "experimentation and mathematization" being the essence of the so-called "method."

Stating "that's just your opinion" is a true sign that one has no argument left. As is attacking the format. (Who cares if it's television or not?)

You can apply the concept of science to whatever you want. You can apply it to the ritual dance of the geese in heat, if you like. As you expand it it will become more and more vague until it becomes meaningless. If you want you can put philosophy, science, alchemy, parapsychology and Donald Trump's twitters in the same bag. But that only serves to create confusion. — David Mo

I agree wholeheartedly. That would be meaningless indeed.

For example, Putnam repeatedly speaks of philosophy and science as two different things. What is the basis for this difference? That's what's interesting. — David Mo

I think so to. They have similarities and differences. But like I've said before, a major difference is that one is ontological, the other ontical. Here I agree with Heidegger. Given this provisional distinction, the questions, problems, methods, observations, data collection, experimentation, mathematical formulations, etc, of physics, chemistry, biology, neuroscience, linguistics, etc, are certainly not philosophy, even though they have an ontological basis.

You may disagree with the wording, but fundamentally I'm sure you agree. That leaves us only in disagreement about the existence of a scientific method as being the distinguishing factor between philosophy and science. I don't see us coming to a consensus on that point, but I'll gladly stipulate its existence if that's helpful to moving the discussion further along - it makes no real difference to me. The topic of the thread is "What is philosophy?"

To loop it back to where this digression started:

Philosophy is not religion
— Pfhorrest

Philosophy is not science
— Pfhorrest

See, here it's tricky in my view. On the one hand, of course philosophy isn't science or religion -- they differ in many ways. But on the other hand, they deal with very similar questions. — Xtrix

But like many things, we don't have a real rule or solid "definition" for determining which is which -- although we may feel like there's one. — Xtrix

I see no reason to change these statements.

I've read about Chomsky in both linguistics and politics. If you go to this bibliography and to Chomsky's official website at MIT, you will see how these are the subjects of his work. I don't know that he has written an article on science and Galileo - a book, of course not - but if you have that reference I would like to know about it. — David Mo

https://chomsky.info/201401__/

Chomsky is also a historian. There are others, and videos online as well. He discusses the mechanical philosophy of the early scientific revolution, and how the concept of mind-body dissolves when it's realized that there is no concept of "body" after Newton.

I can link up others if you're interested, but I'd have to look for them.

And a word of advice: you should be careful about your risky claims about what your opponent has or has not read. The shot may hit you in your own foot. — David Mo

In that case there's no risk: I'd be happy to be proven wrong. It's less work for me if my interlocutor knows whathe or she is talking about.

Basic confusion: hypothesis can be speculation, but what differentiates it from metaphysical speculation is that it can be proven through experience. — David Mo

All you're doing is defining anything that can't be "proven" as "metaphysical." In that case, monads are either still a metaphysical proposition, or they've been disproven and thus were never metaphysical.

That's a matter of definition, and in my view quite a useless one.

Saying "mathematization" repeatedly is likewise vague and devoid of context.
— Xtrix
Don't you know what it's like to write a formula mathematically? — David Mo

This is irrelevant, but yes. I also know that plenty of science goes on without mathematical formulas. So again, context matters.

What Muhadhdhab Al-Deen Al-Baghdadi was doing was not experimentation, but observation. — David Mo

Oy. Okay. See my prior post about examples being dismissed. You've defined it all out of existence. So have it your way: no experiments or science happened prior to the 16th century and the development of the "new science." In that case, Archimedes, Aristarchus, etc, were all doing something else- call it "primitive science" or whatever you like. I have no qualms with defining things however we like. I can also claim there was no real transportation prior to the development of the car if I chose to. Would make sense given that premise.

I'm also very impressed that you put his full name. I'm sure you didn't look that one up. ;)

The observational/experimental distinction would probably be difficult to make precise 1, as the notion of an ‘intervention’ is not easily defined, but it is intuitively fairly clear, and is frequently invoked by scientists — Samir Okasha: Experiment, Observation and the Confirmation of Laws

"Intuitively fairly clear." Sure, who would disagree?

I am not giving you more details of the article because it is one of hundreds you can find on this subject in an academic search engine. — David Mo

The implication being that I wasn't aware of this until you cited it? What were you saying before about "risky" assumptions?

You are attacking a vision of the scientific method that did not defend even its worst enemy: Willard Van Orman Quine. — David Mo

This is incoherent. Could you rephrase?

. It is absurd to pretend that all scientists "consciously" apply the scientific method. No one defends such a thing. — David Mo

So they apply this "method" how? Unconsciously?

Or, perhaps, the notion of a "method" is honorific to begin with?

If you can't offer something else, I'm afraid there's little to discuss here. — David Mo

What's becoming more interesting to me is your attachment to such a notion.

You still haven't shown there is a method. Now you're saying there is one and it's not used consciously. Before you said you want to restrict this to "natural sciences," that there are always exceptions, etc. So what's left other than what I initially stated: it's fine to talk about, and there are indeed examples, but we shouldn't take it too seriously.

What’s the difference? Rules may become public, but they never initialize publicly. — Mww

They do initialize publicly. Rules get created or destroyed all the time based on experiences. The 3-second violation in basketball was created based on what was happening in the game - namely, players hanging out under the hoop.

This happens all the time. If this counts as "a priori," what isn't a priori?

Therefore, they exist only because they had at one time been thought by rational agency, hence they are a priori in origin — Mww

That doesn't make them a priori in origin at all. It simply means a human mind conceived them at one point. If we count any rule as a priori that human beings think up, then my rule of not eating after 8pm is an a priori truth. That's a strange way of describing things.

Besides, experience is certainly involved in rule formation in many respects, like cooking or sports. They're not created by deduction alone and are certainly not true by necessity, as 2+2=4 is.

I'm really interested in knowing the medieval experiments you're talking about. I'm not joking. — David Mo

Not until the late middle ages do you have experiments in medicine. Al-Baghdadi and others performed interesting studies in anatomy and physiology, although with very different assumptions.

If there are experiments during the 7th or 8th centuries, I'm not aware of them. But I wouldn't be shocked to find it happening, even in monasteries.

You mentioned a number yourself during the Greek and Roman eras. But I already anticipate any examples, say from Archimedes or whomever, being disqualified as they were, as they won't meet your post hoc criteria. (Incidentally, as many experiments from the modern era don't ether.)

So if Eratosthenes or Aristarchus weren't scientists or weren't "doing" science, and weren't performing experiments in the right way or the making the "right" observations, etc., because of some notion of "mathematicization" or whatever you like, then so be it. All that proves to me is that the notion of "science" has become completely useless -- even restricted to the "natural sciences."

While waiting for you to concretize your criticisms I will advance you that they have a flaw in principle: if you recognize that science and philosophy are not the same, it will be because they have different methods. Why else?

I would appreciate it if you would repeat the reference where Putnam says that science does not follow inductive methods. I can't find it. — David Mo

No one is saying science doesn't often involve inductive methods. There are all kinds of methods used in the sciences -- for example, the questions, problems, and methods of climatology are very different from those of archeology, geology, or linguistics -- so what?

In any case, here's what Putnam says:

“People talk about the scientific method as a kind of fiction, but I think that even in physics where you do get experiments and tests that pretty much fit the textbooks, there’s a great deal that doesn’t and a great deal that shouldn’t.” —

And further:

Bryan Magee: "What’s the point of continuing to use the category, or the notion, or the term “science” anyway? Does it any longer clearly demarcate something differentiable from everything else?" —

Putnam: “I don’t think it does. If you’re going to distinguish science from non-science, that makes a lot of sense if you still have this old view that there’s this 'inductive method' and that what makes something science is that it uses it and uses it pretty consciously and pretty deliberately, and that what makes something non-science is either that it uses it entirely unconsciously (as in learning how to cook, you’re not thinking about inductive logic) or perhaps doesn’t use it at all, as metaphysics was alleged not to use it at all (I think unfairly). But both say that there’s a sharp line between practical knowledge and science and to say that the method which is supposed to draw this line is rather fuzzy, something we can state exactly— and attempts to state it by the way have been very much a failure still; inductive logic cannot be, say, programmed on a computer the way deductive logic can be programmed on a computer. I think the development of deductive logic in the last 100 years, and the development of the computer, have really brought home very dramatically just what a different state we’re in with respect to proof in the mathematical sciences which we can state rigorous canons for, and proof in what used to be called the inductive sciences, where we can state general maxims but you really have to use intuition, general know-how, and so on, in applying them.” —

I think that's exactly right.

I realize that, yes. “Rule”, ”being”.......one no more a mere a priori human logical construct than the other. — Mww

Then we really are using "rule" in radically different ways. I don't see the rules of chess being a priori, whether held consciously or implicitly. I assume you're referring now to the rules of physics and the like?

If you want to deny that sciences are inductive and methodical you are alone. — David Mo

It can be, and there are examples. But there's no method to distinguish science.

Chomsky is speaking of linguistic and social sciences, Kuhn speaks only of periods of scientific revolutions and Feyerabend is a rara avis without many influence in philosophy of science. — David Mo

You haven't read any of them, I see. Chomsky is not talking about linguistics and the social sciences, for example. When he talks of science, he's going back to Galileo and discusses mainly the development of physics.

Regardless, if you want an entire list I'll provide one, as perhaps the names I mentioned don't count somehow. But I'm far from alone. Again, Putnam's introduction is a good one: few creative scientists accept such a thing as an "inductive method."

suppose you must know what it means that "natural philosophy" includes the sciences. If you don't know it, the idea is "a little" confusing in your head. — David Mo

This is incoherent.

central in Leibniz and one hundred percent metaphysical. — David Mo

Lots of things are speculative, until confirmed. Many hypotheses are speculative. The fact that some turn out to be completely wrong is part of science. To call all ideas (like geocentrism) that have been proven wrong "metaphysics" and thus philosophy, and everything else " science" is again simply a matter of definition, and quite useless in my view. But if it makes you happy, carry on.

Don't quote Heidegger to me, please. After fighting hard with his unpalatable Being and Time I learned that he himself acknowledged that he didn't know what Being was. For gurus, the ones from India. — David Mo

Not sure what that last sentence means.

True, Heidegger doesn't give an easy answer about what being "is," because "it" isn't a thing. He never "acknowledged" anything like that, however. It's a silly statement.

Sorry about your struggles with being and time; you're in good company. It's actually a fascinating work, and no wonder (to me) why it's considered the great work of the 20th century.

It all comes down to vague quotes and vague disqualifications. — David Mo

No, you're thinking of yourself and the scientific method. Saying "mathematization" repeatedly is likewise vague and devoid of context.

Philosophy is always involved in science; this doesn't mean they're the same. — Xtrix

Again, the sciences being different[..] as branches of ontology (philosophy) — Xtrix

Philosophy does not includes the natural sciences. — David Mo

I'm not sure what "include" means here. I'm not saying the questions and problems of physics is "philosophical" work. As I said, they're different, but they're connected. Natural philosophy, which we now call the various branches of science, always presupposes something about the world.

Or perhaps a better way to put it: philosophy is ontological, the sciences are ontical. But that doesn't make the work of biologists, physicists, chemists, or anthropologists "philosophy."

Moreover, you give it a totally inappropriate name of scholastic origin: ontology. Ontology was the science of being qua being. Totally speculative. It was substituted little by little by natural sciences -mathematics is another thing-, which do not speak of the being as being but of concrete aspects of reality. — David Mo

A very common view of the history of science and a rather common attitude about "being," which in fact was anticipated by Heidegger nearly a century ago:

"That which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and hidden has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method."

"It has been maintained that 'being' is the 'most universal' concept[...]that it is indefinable, [...] and that it is held to be self-evident."

He goes through these one by one, and then asks whether instead the question of being is rather than the most abstract and speculative actually the most concrete thing.

So not "totally speculative" at all -- in fact we live with a "vague, average" understanding (pre-theoretical understanding) of it every day.

And if there is one I would like you to give an example.Because vagueness like "science and philosophy" are "careful" doesn't say anything. And to say that philosophy is "precise" requires saying in what way. My mother is also serious and precise in making chocolate cake and we're not going to say she's a philosopher or a scientist. Words are meant to clarify similarities and differences, not to make indiscernible molasses. — David Mo

We're in a different state or mode of being when doing philosophy and science -- that doesn't mean all rationality, logic, problem solving, clarity of terms, etc., are only philosophy or science. You could very easily be following rules in cooking -- recipes are exactly that. Of course that's not philosophy. But it's also a very different state than an expert chef who needs no recipe, much like Hendrix or Clapton didn't need to remember their guitar lessons when playing. They're different states. This is the only point. And as it happens, the state we're in when "doing" science is the former state, not the latter. Ditto with science. This does not make them the same.

Leibniz was halfway between metaphysics and modern science. — David Mo

I'm glad you've retracted your statement that Leibniz was a 'metaphysicist.' But I'm afraid the story you tell about the history of science and philosophy is pretty confused. It's not worth pursuing other than to re-state the idea that there's no such thing as a "method" that got created or discovered some time in the 16th century. Or at least I see no evidence of that. There are many factors involved, historical, technological, cultural, etc., but defining something out in space and saying "this is the method" while it's still a rather controversial topic in the philosophy of science just isn't interesting.

Today's philosophers usually know where the limits of philosophy lie better than you do. — David Mo

Yes -- the philosophers of science also notice something about science as well: that a "method" is an illusion that even few scientists accept.

As for the limits of philosophy - I've already mentioned, philosophy is not physics or biology. Philosophy is ontological; it thinks being.

Before the New Science, the scientific method of experimentation was not used. — David Mo

There were plenty of experiments before the 16th century, long before any myth about a special method that scientists employ in order to be "counted" as science.

the Pythagoreans experimented on sounds and the length of strings. But they did not create a method that applied to all fields of natural knowledge. — David Mo

True. But neither did anyone else.

That's why it's not the same as the hypothetical deductive method that Galileo devised and Newton perfected. — David Mo

Or the mechanical philosophy that Galileo accepted and Newton (unintentionally) destroyed.

Also, see https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-009-9799-8_1

The same questioning, observation, experimentation was being done in antiquity. Many things were different. But to ask whether these examples were "really" science or not and then coming up with some post hoc explanation for why it isn't (or is) is a waste of time. Call it whatever you like. If you prefer to believe in the invention of a special recipe that coronates an activity "Science," you're welcome. You're not alone. It's completely unconvincing to me but, most importantly, completely irrelevant.

Let's call anything prior to the 16th century "old science" - if it makes us happy. Maybe it's useful for teaching, like dating the fall of Rome or determining the "beginning" of the Renaissance. We can define things any way we like.

But the simple fact remains: human beings care about understanding the world, and have been asking questions about it for thousands of years. If we want to say none of it counts as philosophy because they didn't have university departments, or "science" because they didn't have laboratories, that's our privilegby . But forgive me if I don't take it seriously.

This explains Eratosthenes' success in calculating the circumference of the Earth (you were wrong: it wasn't Aristarchus). — David Mo

Yes, my mistake.

But they limited themselves to the mathematical formulation of the problems and their application to observation. They did not move on to the method of confirming legal hypotheses, which is that of the New Science. — David Mo

Again the issue here is whether this method really defines science. Turns out it doesn't. So there's no sense going on as if this is premise I accept.

By your homegrown definition, archeology is certainly excluded as a science. Where economics falls is questionable. But who really cares anyway? Most physicists will probably tell you sociology isn't a science. Medicine is another matter. Astronomy another. Etc.

But again this misses the point. This isn't about science but about what philosophy is. Turns out they're not completely unrelated, but not the same either.

If you agree with this point, either we have reached an agreement or we have had a misunderstanding. — David Mo

I agree that human behavior is complex. Maybe it's helpful to state clearly what I'm not saying:

I'm not saying the sciences don't exist.
I'm not saying rules and rationality don't exist or don't play a large role in human life; they do.
I'm not saying that philosophy and science are the same thing.
I'm not saying that sensation and perception are the same thing.
I'm not saying that the everyday lived mode where we mostly find ourselves and the rational, abstract mode are completely separate (nor are philosophy and science).

What I am saying is that modern science is not always easily separated from philosophy, especially in its basic concepts, and in fact presupposes what's called "philosophical," and especially that what makes science what it is is not a special inductive method, however popular that idea is. Incidentally, on this last point especially I'm not alone -- so if it's modern scholarship that impresses you, there's plenty of it. I gave you a link to a discussion about the philosophy of science with Hilary Putnam, for example -- but there are many others who argue that the concept of an inductive method is shaky indeed. Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn (to a degree), Chomsky, etc., and plenty of others have interesting things to say about it.

(“...Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics (...). It is a stranger who has been long a guest; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology...”) — Mww

Interesting. Reference please?

If rules don’t play a part, how does one even become an expert? — Mww

By simply doing things in a different way. This sounds like a cop out, and indeed it is in a sense because it's an open question. I think we're finding out more and more about what's happening in the brain when one is in "flow" for example. But to talk about driving, tying your shoelaces, or even walking as "rule following," even if pushed into some unconscious realm, seems to me of no value. But I grant you that mine is the minority position.

"it's something that does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground."(Being & Time, p. 35.)
— Xtrix

Seems like “rule” would fit into that definition just fine. — Mww

But here Heidegger is talking about being, not rules.

Two previous data:
Where does he say experience is "based on" memory?
— Xtrix

Aristotle, Metaphysics A1. 980aff. : "It is from memory that men acquire experience", — David Mo

This is meaningless without a context. We have memory - experience is what's happening right now, shaped in part by past experiences.

As you can see, the distinction between sensation and perception — David Mo

You didn't say sensation, you said a "sense" of the door. That's not the same thing.

Again I'll repeat in case you didn't catch it: my background is in psychology, and my profession is psychotherapy. I say this to prove nothing except to save you from unnecessary exposition. Better to assume I know as much as an undergraduate.

If this is so, a radical distinction cannot be made between the lived world and the rational-abstract world. Both form part of a complex and inseparable world. And if I understand you correctly, this is what you denied at the beginning of our discussion. — David Mo

No radical distinction, just very different modes of being.

In an obtuse fashion that might be a statement of the issue with which philosophy deals, but it's not philosophy. Philosophy isn't a subject so much as an activity, in which muddled ways of saying things are exposed and analysed. — Banno

:ok:

This isn't saying much. But yes, I agree it's an activity - the activity of thinking being.

Returning to the thread's main topic again, the proposal I put forth earlier was not mine, but Heidegger's. I wanted to gauge reaction to it. Other than "clarify your terms," there hasn't been much reaction, which is surprising -- because it's a bold claim indeed. As a reminder of the claim: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology" and "Philosophy is the science of being."

I agree with Heidegger also that ontology and "metaphysics" are essentially the same thing. So in a way, philosophy = metaphysics = ontology. Philosophy is the science of being, "science" here indicating a theoretical, interpretative (hermeneutic), phenomenological inquiry. In fact, "Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible." Phenomenology is the method of ontology (i.e., philosophy).

So what is "phenomenology"? Seems obvious: the study of phenomena. But "phenomena" in what sense? In the sense of not only what shows itself in appearance -- but rather "it's something that does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground." (Being & Time, p. 35.)

So the subject of phenomenology is something that does not show itself but can be made to show itself. It's all the things we take for granted, are not conscious of, are utterly mundane, routine, habitual, etc. -- it's what's hidden in this sense, in the sense of being overlooked and "transparent." In a word, it's not "just this being or that, but rather the being of beings" that is phenomenology's aim. It studies the background (because being is usually concealed) and does so through hermeneutics. This makes sense if it is to be considered the method of philosophy, which likewise "studies" being.

So to summarize:

“Negatively, this means that philosophy is not a science of beings but of being or, as the Greek expression goes, ontology.” (p. 11 of Basic Problems of Phenomenology)

Regarding science:

“All the propositions of the non-philosophical sciences, including those of mathematics, are positive propositions. Hence, to distinguish them from philosophy, we shall call all non-philosophical sciences positive sciences. Positive sciences deal with what is, with beings; that is to say, they always deal with specific domains, for instance, nature. Within a given domain scientific research again cuts out particular spheres: nature as physically material lifeless nature and nature as living nature.” (p. 13)

Two things: something is stored somewhere, and, nothing is ever learned twice. — Mww

I don't know -- things can certainly be re-learned. The second premise only follows from the first -- because if something is stored somewhere, the rest is a matter of "recall" of some kind. But again, I'm rejecting the first claim. The phrase "something is stored somewhere" really isn't saying much, or at least isn't any different than saying what I mentioned earlier: rules have gone to some underground cache.

It's not that this formulation is absurd, it's that I see no evidence for it. The rules and principles of theory, reason, and other cognitive functions we use when dealing with the world consciously, scientifically, explicitly, etc. -- for example when we're formally learning a new skill (like driving, hammering, playing basketball) -- just do not seem to play any role once we've reached expertise. You see this when observing people in "flow," you see it in brain studies (different regions are being used than when problem-solving), and you hear it from experts themselves in that they don't have to "think" at all.

Where rules fit into all this I don't know, unless we view the mind as a computer that compiles data. It's very true that the brain and nervous system are involved, but bringing in the concepts we use to describe rational, conscious, theoretical, rule-following just doesn't work.

I agree, in accordance with the theoretical tenet that reason is a conscious mental activity. That which happens on the other side, is not reason per se. Precursor to reason, ground of reason, that which makes reason possible.....take your pick. — Mww

All good, really. In Heidegger, it's evident in the "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit) activity of dealing with equipment.

The brain stores stuff, but it is only because of our own need to understand each other, that “rules” is the name given to that which is stored. If neural pathways are the means for storage of “rules”, and we are hardy aware of our neural pathways and the employment of them in the facilitation of extant knowledge rather than re-learning from each successive set of empirical stimuli.....what is it that is completely wrong? — Mww

The use of "rules" really. Neural pathways are certainly involved, but to say the rules are "stored" there is the wrong picture of the mind. It's a kind of computer model of the mind, which is why AI continually fails. May sound nit-picky, but I think it matters.

Whatever it is that changes the brain from a theoretical understanding of driving (rules, principles, etc) to the everyday driving we all engage in (i.e., once the skill has been acquired), I just don't see how the former somehow goes "underground" and is thus stored in the brain. It reminds me a bit of Plato's theory of recollection.

There is a transcendental argument which says reason is the entirety of the human cognitive system, from perception to knowledge, so at least some people think reason, or at least some part of the system to which it belongs, may be something that is happening when we’re not aware of it. — Mww

Sure. I think it's an unjustified move, but I'm aware it exists -- in fact it's probably the predominant view.

Granting all that, the assertion that we reason constantly becomes clear, for otherwise we must have a system informing us of that which we already know, and a separate and distinct system informing us of that which we do not know. Just because we reason much faster under conditions of extant experience, as opposed to having to process new representations in order to cognize merely a possible experience, doesn’t mean we’re not using reason in same way. — Mww

Yes, this is exactly the above: reason now become "implicit reason," working below consciousness somehow. So it's like saying when we learn something, we have to learn the rules and put conscious effort into practicing -- but then once we master the skill (let's say driving), the rules become stored in the brain somewhere, working unconsciously.

I think that's completely wrong.

this "intelligent biological creature" is still more intelligent than anything else in the animal kingdom, if only for the simple fact that we all have the faculty of language.
— Xtrix

We have no right to make that claim, that doesn’t smack of anthropomorphism — Mww

Fair enough. I'll rephrase: we're the only biological creature with the faculty of language. "Intelligence" is another matter -- look at who we've elected President.

I think you've lost sight of what we were discussing. We were discussing whether it's possible to capture the singular without prior abstractions. What I'm telling you is that our perception of the world is determined by our previous preconceptions. — David Mo

That's not what we're discussing - it's what you keep interjecting.

You don't have a sense of a door, but you perceive a door in a complex of sensations and preconceptions that implicit memory provides. Please note "implicit" and don't turn to me for reflection. — David Mo

"You don't have a sense of a door" but "perceive the door" -- I won't try figuring out your semantics here.

No one is arguing about the neuropsychological processes involved in perception. I mentioned before that there's no reason to believe the brain isn't involved in these activities. But it's not "reason," nor is it "implicit reason." It's not that it's impossible to talk about the phenomena this way, but it's not what you see when you observe activities like hammering, driving, etc. To say reason is still involved, but it's just "unconscious, implicit reason" is a move that I see no evidence for. Reason and consciousness just aren't involved in any way.

Procedural memory is a different matter. but it doesn't get us to reason, comparison, or even "remembering." Talking about "preconceptions" in this context is likewise unjustified and misleading.

The world we live in is not naively given, but is mediated by our conceptualisation and assessment of it. That is, by the world in our own way a priori, with Kant's permission. — David Mo

No one is arguing for naive realism.

By the way, Aristotle is the first to point out that experience is based on memory. You see, even your idols take away your reason. — David Mo

Where does he say experience is "based on" memory?

No one is arguing that human being's don't have memory, nor "procedural memory," nor "muscle memory." If that's all you're trying to show, then I agree wholeheartedly.

That at certain levels of science there is an interaction between science and philosophy does not mean that they are the same. — David Mo

It's not that they're the same - as I've said before, there's also plenty of examples where they're quite different- given the common notions about what they are. But they're not separate either, nor is there any clear way of determining a boundary. Philosophy is always involved in science; this doesn't mean they're the same.

It's worth remembering that both activities come from the human mind. They both attempt to question and understand the world consciously. Both are very careful, try to be precise, etc.

Whether a question like "Why does the cup fall but the steam rise?" can be classified as "doing" philosophy or doing science is a silly endeavor. You, and others like you, want to relegate philosophy to being completely theoretical, and so as soon as one tests ideas in any way the activity suddenly "switches" over to science. If that's how we choose to define things, that's fine. But as I've already said, I see no motivation in doing so beyond education curricula and to clarify division of labor. There's no method that is agreed upon anyway, philosophy and science often interact as you say, etc - so who cares?

Again, the sciences being different of as branches of ontology (philosophy) is perfectly good for specialization purposes and ease of communicating what one is studying. Very useful to universities, etc. But we shouldn't take it too seriously.

Leibniz was a metaphysicist, and you won't tell me that monads are a scientific concept. ( — David Mo

The distinction is pointless. There's little evidence for monads in Leibniz' s formulation, if that's what you mean. Of course it's easy to make fun of minds far greater than your own after centuries of new knowledge, but the proposal wasn't unreasonable at the time. Not a huge leap from monads to atoms if you think about it.

Also, to simply declare Leibniz was this or that is pretty ridiculous. What was the invention of the step reckoner, or calculus for that matter - metaphysics? "Leibniz was a metaphysicist" - sure. And also a mathematician, logician, inventor, natural scientist, and even to some a computer science pioneer.

That technology has nothing to do with philosophy is demonstrated by the fact that those who work in it do not employ a single concept of philosophy. In fact, the vast majority of scientists today have no idea about philosophy. — David Mo

Baseless assertion. But let's take it as true - so what? Computer programmers don't need to know anything about quantum mechanics or electrical engineering. Doesn't mean electrical engineering isn't at work.

Aristarchus may be considered a scientist, but not in the same way as Galileo. The proof is that his heliocentric theory did not go beyond being a hypothesis until the New Science appeared in the Renaissance. (You could have chosen a better example). — David Mo

It's perhaps a bad example if all you know about him is what you read for a few minutes on Wikipedia. But take a look at how he calculated, with great accuracy, earth's circumfrence. Was that an accident? Was it not science? Was it not the "same" science as Galileo's thought experiments of frictionless planes?

Also, the fact that a hypothesis isn't confirmed until a later period says absolutely nothing about whether something is science or not.

If Aristarchus wasn't "doing" science, neither was Copernicus or Galileo. But there is one major difference: Galileo had a telescope.

That New Science can be clearly defined as different from the previous one because it is based on two new concepts: controlled experimentation and mathematization of variables. — David Mo

At long last, you alone have solved the mystery.

But seriously: experiments were performed long before the Renaissance. Galileo in fact performed very few, if any, experiments. Most were thought experiments. Mathematics has been used since the Egyptians and Babylonians.

I keep repeating: it's just not so simple. Here's a decent introduction: https://youtu.be/et8kDNF_nEc

I've never once claimed they were the same. The policies are different, and even if by a small degree, in an otherwise powerful country this makes a large impact.

Possibly you don't recognize that what used to be the Republican party now is in and part of the Democrat party. — tim wood

Sure, there's been a rightward shift for years. Democrats are now "moderate republicans," and what's called republican is now pure neoliberal with, at least after 2011 and the Tea Party influence, a touch of utter craziness. Its result is this surreal state we're living it with Trump as president.

Message me.

I'll be holding my nose too, buddy. Believe me. Same in 2016, same in 2012 and 2008 and 2004, etc. I wanted Bernie and I loathe the DNC and most democrats. If there's one thing I resent the Republicans for, personally, is that they've gone so extreme that they make voting for them impossible. And so we're essentially forced to caucus with Democrats.

I think anguish is caused by reading Sartre--dread being caused by thinking about reading Sartre, as I noted previously. Behold this knowledge of the causes of anguish and dread. — Ciceronianus the White

That had me chuckling a little.

I see reason....as....abstract thought.
— Xtrix

So reason plays an important role, but it's not the only one.
— Xtrix

In the synthesis of the two, are we not then left with one of two inevitable conclusions: either there are times in our conscious living when we don’t think, or, the constant mental activity called thought, implied by being conscious, isn’t necessarily reason? — Mww

An important quesiton. I think the latter is the case. If reason is abstract thought, then all this means is that what we call "thinking" is not always conscious, abstract thinking (reasoning). I think we all see this is the case if we introspect a little -- we're always talking to ourselves, for example. We're in the past, remembering things, we're imagining things, projecting in the future, a tune is "stuck in our head," etc. -- it's a fragmented, messy affair. Hardly "reasoning," but still considered thought nonetheless. I call it "junk thought," but I'm sure there're better terms for it. Some researchers in psychology (neuroscience) call it a "default network" -- daydreaming being a key element of this.

I agree reason is conscious abstract thought, but I rather think we reason constantly, all else being given, whether or not we are aware of it, which makes explicit that not only does reason have an important role, it is the necessarily determinant one. Without it, we have no justification in calling ourselves human, as opposed to merely existing as some kind of intelligent biological creature. — Mww

I would nit-pick a little here and say that if you agree reason is conscious abstract thought, then if something is happening when we're not aware of it -- is that still "reason"?

In any case, I didn't quite understand the entirety of your first sentence. As for the second, I think we certainly can call ourselves human -- just with the caveat that we're not always rational. Besides, this "intelligent biological creature" is still more intelligent than anything else in the animal kingdom, if for no other reason than the simple fact that we all have the faculty of language.

Aristotle places metaphysics at the top of his classification of forms of knowledge. — David Mo

No, he doesn't. Aristotle talks about φθσισ. You have to remember that "metaphysics" is a later designation, and has connotations that simply can't be applied to Aristotle if we're at all serious about trying to understand his thought.

It's not that I have to "remember" how to drive a car -- I just do it. I don't have to think about it at all;
— Xtrix
Of course you remember when you open a door. It is your memories that allow you to recognize what is in front of you as a door and not a wall. — David Mo

Remembering and memory, at least in psychology (and as they're commonly understood), play no role opening a door any more than they have a role in breathing. If we want to argue that we have to "remember" each time we walk, or drive, or eat, it's a very strange way to look at things. It's far too abstract. If you say that it's not abstract, but simply compiled somewhere in the brain, and still call it "remembering," it's very misleading. I have to "remember" my to-to list, which the best route is to get to Cape Cod, and what this person's favorite ice cream is -- I'm not doing that when driving, in fact it's so transparent I can think and talk about anything I want. Am I still subconsciously "remembering"?

I don't see why we would need to invoke this term, given the above.

This indicates a kind of computer model view of the human mind. I reject that wholeheartedly.

If you hadn't had previous training you couldn't drive in an unreflective way. — David Mo

Very true. At least when it comes to driving, playing basketball, etc. Whether things like acquiring language requires "training" is another matter.

What I'm trying to explain to you is that there is a form of non-reflective "consciousness" that conceptualizes sensations to turn them into perceptions. — David Mo

Yes, I'm quite familiar with the arguments your presenting, which are mistakes. It's not "consciousness" at all.

What the central nervous system does with perception is an interesting topic; but again, not relevant here, any more than the the way the visual system creates images from sensations of light is relevant.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty has some interesting things to say about this in his Phenomenology of Perception, in fact. — Xtrix

Indeed, Merleau-Ponty has a lot to say for me when she discusses the merely automatic character of conditioned reflexes. In the Phenomenology of Perception, to be exact. — David Mo

Well he was a man, but maybe that was a typo. And yes, he has very interesting things to say about that indeed. Have you really read the book? Because it undermines everything you've said so far about consciousness and "implicit" abstraction.

And when did the change occur between then and now? When was this special method "discovered"?
— Xtrix
In the renaissance. — David Mo

I already mentioned Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, and others of the early scientific revolution. Remember the renaissance itself, including these men, was influenced by Greek thought. It's no surprise the Bacon and Galileo reference Aristotle so often, for example. So were the Greeks not doing science? Again, I always like to ask about Aristarchus. Was he not doing science? He didn't have the technology of later generations, of course, and he certainly lived before this special method was "discovered" in the Renaissance. But if he wasn't "doing" science, then it simply proves that we shouldn't take very seriously how we in the 21st century choose to define it. Which is my point.

Science is still natural philosophy, in my view.
— Xtrix
There's little motivation for such an unjustified demarcation.
— Xtrix
Do you think a philosopher can teach atomic physics only through philosophy? Do you think philosophy is what has created the technified world in which we live? Just to cite two obvious differences. — David Mo

"Only through philosophy" is meaningless. Yes I think philosophers can contribute to science and often have been scientists and mathematicians. Kant taught astronomy, Descartes founded analytic geometry, Leibniz invented calculus, etc. etc. Even more recently, take a look at Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Planck, et al. Were they "only" doing science? Not at all: they actively engaged in philosophical thought and were explicit in who their influences were. That's in part what made them so trailblazing, I'd argue.

And yes, of course "philosophy" has created the technological world in which we live. One simply has to reject confining "philosophy" to 20th century university departments, completely separated from the "science" being done in other departments.

If you live in a world where science and philosophy are the same, you are a bit old-fashioned. You are a few centuries out of date. — David Mo

Yet no one can explain what the "scientific method" is, including you. And this is what's supposed to separate "doing science" from "doing philosophy." I'd be happy to be proven wrong. Poppers and others have tried to show how science differs from other activities, but I don't find much of that convincing. It also differs quite a lot from what you've claimed.

In reality, there's simply attempts to understand the world -- the rest is fine for abstraction and categorizing for convenience.

I understand that someone may express doubts that the scientific method can be defined rigidly (nobody pretends such a thing today) but to pretend that the method of philosophy and science are the same is an absurdity. — David Mo

People do indeed pretend that it can be rigidly defined. But if it isn't, and so philosophy and science as currently understood often interact simultaneously in thought and inquiry, then it's also absurd to talk about the absurdity that these "methods" are the "same."

The sciences study various domains of beings -- life, nature, rocks, stars, cells, etc. Philosophy is the study of being -- ontology in the Greek sense. This is the only "difference" I can see, and even here it's very difficult indeed to mark a clear distinction.