As expected, none of them mention Heidegger, which reinforces my initial statement: Heidegger's Greece is only suitable for Heidegger fans. — David Mo
Of course they do. — David Mo
but they say that what Heidegger sees in the text is not in it. — David Mo
It happens that they are not "his critics", it is practically all the experts on the subject. — David Mo
Now you're shifted tone a bit, feigning expertise
— Xtrix
I haven't pretended any such thing at all. I'm not an expert on Heidegger and I've said so several times. My knowledge of Heidegger is limited to three books of him, two monographs and about four articles on him. Regarding Introduction to Metaphysics, I am reading it now -due to your kind recommendation- and I comment on what I am reading. — David Mo
I am sorry I cannot continue this interesting debate right now. But I'll be back, as Patton said. — David Mo
It is not true, then, that in order to use the word "tree" one must have a knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees that have been presented to the speaking subject. The concept is formed from them and used in a process of continuous variation. It does not exist as an immutable entity and prior to the use of language achieved by who knows what mysterious intellectual intuition. The same with "tree" as with "being". — David Mo
First of all because it is not true that the use of a term means any defined "intuitive" understanding. — David Mo
As Carnap says, the problem with Heidegger is that he makes a jumble of all these uses to build a fictional "entity", which is-but is not-one thing or a "fact": the " Being". — David Mo
In the Heideggerian explanation any use of "is" is confused with "exist". — David Mo
Now, when a theologian speaks of God's "being" he can say two things: his existence or his essence. God exists or God is immutable, eternal, etc. When a normal person wants to say that a communist exists or is in the garden he uses expressions like "there is," "is in" (or he names it while pointing it out!), but he does not make "Existence" a problem. In fact, the problem of the existence of something is easily solved because it is understood as the "absolute position of the thing"--I think the phrase is from Kant--the relationship that is established between one thing or event and others in the world. When I say that "there is a communist in my garden," I am not referring to a mysterious quality of being of that communist, but I am putting it in relation to the context of the world of speakers. If I say that God exists, it is because I establish some relationship between God and my world. — David Mo
Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem. — David Mo
Heidegger's conclusion is totally fantastic. He assumes that "being" implies the designation of something (a substantive use of the word) and that there must be a common essence to that something. That the word is polysemic does not even occur to him. What a lack of imagination! — David Mo
Just because Heidegger makes a pseudo-problem his modus vivendi doesn't make him a charlatan. I would say it's some sophisticated form of delusion. Much less when he's able to transfer his monomania to many intelligent people. Complicating one's life with false problems seems to be part of the human condition and the smartest are not exempt. So I see no reason to insult anyone for it, unless their monomania becomes a danger to others. — David Mo
it sounds to me like you're hit this particular issue more to "refute" than learn. — Xtrix
So Heidi says."For the Greeks, ..." — Xtrix
"Presence" of ???"'Being' fundamentally means presence."
The true world — we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one.
(Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.) — Twilight of the Idols, How the True World Finally Became A Fable. The History of an Error.
So Heidi says. — 180 Proof
"'Being' fundamentally means presence."
"Presence" of ???
Perhaps it's my stumbling-block too, Xtrix, like Heidi's references to "what is" - what is ??? — 180 Proof
However, if this read of him uncharitably misses the mark, why didn't he just come right out and say, paraphrasing Laozi's nameless dao and Buddha's anatta-anicca, or Schopenhauer's noumenon (à la natura naturans), that "the meaning of Being" is ... Bergson's la durée? Why the (crypto-augustinian re: "time") mystery-mongerer's career? All that rambling, oracular, mystagogy just buried the lead, as they say, making it easier for everyone (even old Marty at the end mumbling, bumbling & stumbling through 'das Geviert') to lose the plot. — 180 Proof
The true world — Twilight of the Idols, How the True World Finally Became A Fable. The History of an Error.
The essence of Buddhist philosophy of nature is that everything is completely impermanent. These Buddhist thinkers say there is nothing underlying every thing. The principle at the bottom of the universe is that A causes B, B causes C, and C causes A. So a circle. This takes the bottom out of the universe. I'm wondering how far Heidegger would agree with considering that he thinks Being is real — Gregory
Hegel posits nothing and being as the abstract form of the Idea which sublate each other into the world, which is pure becoming (Shunyata). I am very interested in reconciling Buddhism, Hegel, and Heidegger — Gregory
I don't see how this is rejecting "reality" while Heidegger is somehow accepting it. — Xtrix
Heidegger has much respect for Hegel and published a great deal of lectures on him. — Xtrix
Who's claiming that one must have a "knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees"? Or to translate: Where does Heidegger say we have an "independent knowledge" of being when we talk about any particular being? — Xtrix
How are we supposed to discover the much-invoked particular, the individual trees as such, as trees—how are we supposed to be able even to look for such things as trees, unless the representation of what a tree is in general is already lighting our way in advance? (…) Earlier we stressed that we must already know in advance what "tree" means in order to be able to seek and find what is particular, the species of trees and individual trees as such. This is all the more decisively true of Being. — Martin Heidegger: Introduction ot Metaphysics, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 84
Not "defined," and not just any term -- but when speaking of anything at all, in fact. What else could be presupposed but the "is"-ness, "such"-ness, or "being"-ness of what is talked about? It doesn't mean there's a special knowledge about something "behind" or "beyond" things, as with Plato's Ideas, but it does indeed signify a pre-theoretical understanding that something is there. In any culture and in any language. — Xtrix
The word "Being" is thus indefinite in its meaning, and nevertheless we understand it definitely. "Being" proves to be extremely definite and completely indefinite. According to the usual logic, we have here an obvious contradiction. — Heidegger, Op. Cit., p. 82
I can't think of any examples where "is" doesn't imply that something appears, is there, or "exists" (as in being) in some respect. — Xtrix
Said in this way, the problem of "Being" loses all its semantic mystery. It is nothing ineffable, unless we understand that the only words with meaning are those that refer to "something". When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem. — David Mo
What "problem"? — Xtrix
Being isn't a "fact" or an "entity" at all. — Xtrix
In fact, Heidegger's claim is that "Being" has been discussed and interpreted in many different ways. That's hardly "ineffable." It's either taken, theoretically and abstractly, as something "present" - like a substance, or God, or energy, or an "object," or "will," — Xtrix
... he "assumes that 'being' implies the designation of something" is itself rather "fantastic," assuming one's read Heidegger. — Xtrix
The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth. — Op. Cit., p. 96
How Witty of you. :up:When we understand that language is a mechanism for using words in very different ways -relations, copulations, commands, expressions, etc.- so that they are shared by a community of speakers, the problem of Being becomes a pseudo-problem. — David Mo
A reification fallacy common to platonists & sophists alike.Heidegger's conclusion is totally fantastic. He assumes that "being" implies the designation of something (a substantive use of the word) and that there must be a common essence to that something. That the word is polysemic does not even occur to him. What a lack of imagination.
Well, "smarts" isn't mutually exclusive with respect to stupidity - often it's the enabler (re: Kahneman-Tversky, Dunning-Kruger). I agree that Heidi isn't a "charlatan"; rather he was a 'great philosopher' who, like e.g. Hegel, IMO, shows another way how not to do philosophy.Just because Heidegger makes a pseudo-problem his modus vivendi doesn't make him a charlatan. [ ... ] Complicating one's life with false problems seems to be part of the human condition and the smartest are not exempt.
And poor Heidi adds nothing - yeah, he's interpreting it too, don't believe his hype - that either improves upon or invalidates these other 'ontologies'; that there are so many (much more than I'd care to list) both within the European philosphical tradition and other traditions, makes it clear that the "forgetting of being" is only, or mostly, a parochial Wilhelmine anomaly which, no doubt, the Nazi movement under the spiritual guidance of the good Herr Rektorführer was "called by destiny" to remind das Herrendasein, das Man und andere Üntermenschen that “das Nichts nichtet". :eyes:Good questions: because those are all interpretations ofbeing. — Xtrix
A reification fallacy common to platonists & sophists alike. — 180 Proof
My understanding is that being reveals itself to us (according to Heidegger), while there is nothing to be revealed for a Buddhist — Gregory
Where can I get those lectures? — Gregory
Who's claiming that one must have a "knowledge of its meaning independent of the particular trees"? Or to translate: Where does Heidegger say we have an "independent knowledge" of being when we talk about any particular being?
— Xtrix
How are we supposed to discover the much-invoked particular, the individual trees as such, as trees—how are we supposed to be able even to look for such things as trees, unless the representation of what a tree is in general is already lighting our way in advance? (…) Earlier we stressed that we must already know in advance what "tree" means in order to be able to seek and find what is particular, the species of trees and individual trees as such. This is all the more decisively true of Being.
— Martin Heidegger: Introduction ot Metaphysics, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 84
It is obvious that the postulation of a special Being whose meaning does not depend on particular entities forces Heidegger to invent an extra rational knowledge that I have called "intuition" to make it intelligible. To speak of "pre-ontological", as Heidegger does, seems to me to introduce an unnecessary neologism for what classical philosophy defined as what is neither empirical nor discursive: intellectual intuition. — David Mo
Not "defined," and not just any term -- but when speaking of anything at all, in fact. What else could be presupposed but the "is"-ness, "such"-ness, or "being"-ness of what is talked about? It doesn't mean there's a special knowledge about something "behind" or "beyond" things, as with Plato's Ideas, but it does indeed signify a pre-theoretical understanding that something is there. In any culture and in any language.
— Xtrix
The word "Being" is thus indefinite in its meaning, and nevertheless we understand it definitely. "Being" proves to be extremely definite and completely indefinite. According to the usual logic, we have here an obvious contradiction.
— Heidegger, Op. Cit., p. 82
Therefore, there is a special knowledge ("pre-ontological") that goes beyond the individual entities.
This means opposing the empirical to the irrational intuitive which is becoming more and more complicated. Because if Heidegger recognizes here a logical contradiction he does not have any other choice but to impugn the own logic, which he does in another part of the book. He has already challenged philology and the history of philosophy. Now logic and experience fall. Open field for irrationalism. — David Mo
In fact, Heidegger's claim is that "Being" has been discussed and interpreted in many different ways. That's hardly "ineffable." It's either taken, theoretically and abstractly, as something "present" - like a substance, or God, or energy, or an "object," or "will,"
— Xtrix
... he "assumes that 'being' implies the designation of something" is itself rather "fantastic," assuming one's read Heidegger.
— Xtrix
I would say that the problem is not only with Heidegger, but also with you (so much love gets contagious). You cannot deny that Heidegger speaks of Being as " something " and say at the same time that it implies the designation of " something ". — David Mo
In fact, Heidegger is forced to adopt a substantialist language to define Being. But as he had said before that it was "ineffable" he now has to camouflage it as a "common horizon" to all the diverse meanings of being (this is just what meaning is):
The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth.
— Op. Cit., p. 96
Didn't you say that Being has nothing to do with substance? Well, here it is said with all the letters. — David Mo
And from contradiction to contradiction this Being is becoming more and more like God: ineffable, an entity different from the entities but by which the entities are what they are, the object of an intuitive knowledge and the end to which all things must tend. Without God, I mean without Being, even nations sink into the darkest decadence. And, of course, this Being also has his prophet: Heidegger. — David Mo
You affirm, with Heidegger, that the concept of being has a meaning ("horizon", he says) only that you assimilate to the existence. Heidegger, who never wants to be clear, adds to the existence ( presence ) the substance. — David Mo
Good questions: because those are all interpretations of being.
— Xtrix
And poor Heidi adds nothing - yeah, he's interpreting it too, don't believe his hype - that either improves upon or invalidates these other 'ontologies'; that there are so many (much more than I'd care to list) both within the European philosphical tradition and other traditions, makes it clear that the "forgetting of being" is only, or mostly, a parochial Wilhelmina anomaly which, no doubt, the Nazi movement under the spiritual guidance of the good Herr Rektorführer was "called by destiny" to remind das Herrendasein, das Man und andere Üntermenschen that “das Nichts nichtet". :eyes: — 180 Proof
There is no "independent knowledge," as you claimed -- being is simply understood when referring to any entity. — Xtrix
To put it another way: the being of any object or entity whatsoever is presupposed or implied when talking about anything at all: — Xtrix
Also: babies and animals have an innate sense of causality. Is that entering the realm of the "irrational intuitive"? — Xtrix
Lastly, I appreciate the time you've taken to actually read Introduction to Metaphysics and your take on it. In case there's any doubt, I do respect your views. — Xtrix
o confuse this as being his own view is just a misunderstanding. Understandable, given his way of lecturing, where it's not always clear if he's speak from the perspective of the Greeks or giving his own thoughts. In this case, it's certainly not his own thought, — Xtrix
Because the understanding of Being fades away, at first and for the most part, in an indefinite meaning, and nonetheless remains certain and definite in this knowledge—because consequently the understanding of Being, despite all its rank, is dark, confused, covered over and concealed—it must be illuminated, disentangled, and ripped away from concealment. — Heidegger: Introduction to Meatphysics, p. 63/87
How can one not when "being" is only a word (undefined, no less) and not a definite object or fact? Heidi conjures up "the meaning of" and meaning is synonomous with interpretation. And then, in a tediously long way around, goes nowhere with it.He's not interpreting being, no. — Xtrix
I also appreciate your efforts to answer my questions, even when I feel they are not correct or as inextricably confused as Heidegger himself.
I also appreciate your recognition that Heidegger is not "always clear". I would say that he is almost always confused. But I am predisposed to give the benefit of the doubt and to think that this confusion is not a deliberate device to leave the door open to a possible retreat, but the result of a basic misguided approach to metaphysical pseudo-problems. — David Mo
o confuse this as being his own view is just a misunderstanding. Understandable, given his way of lecturing, where it's not always clear if he's speak from the perspective of the Greeks or giving his own thoughts. In this case, it's certainly not his own thought,
— Xtrix
You're getting lost here. Why is Heidegger making this long journey to the Greeks' vision of Being? — David Mo
In general Heidegger thinks that the Greek philosophy - Parmenides and Heraclitus especially - was in the right direction and only with "lanitinization" Western philosophy lost its way. — David Mo
The boundary drawn around the sense of "Being" stays within the sphere of presentness and presence, subsistence and substance, staying and coming forth. — David Mo
Didn't you say that Being has nothing to do with substance? Well, here it is said with all the letters. — David Mo
Based on my study of Heidegger, I can easily see what he's describing here is not his view at all, even without referencing the book in this case, but from the quotation itself one might believe it. — Xtrix
He'll then go on to discuss the history of being, from the Greeks onward, and conclude that being has been interpreted as "constant presence, on as ousia." (p. 216) To confuse this as being his own view is just a misunderstanding. Understandable, given his way of lecturing, where it's not always clear if he's speak from the perspective of the Greeks or giving his own thoughts. In this case, it's certainly not his own thought, it's precisely what he's trying to un-do by pointing out that time (temporality) is the perspective that guides the Western way of interpreting Being (as presence). — Xtrix
As far as I know, there are three forms of knowledge: rational discursive, empirical -- also known as empirical intuition -- and intuitive. It is obvious that Heidegger's "pre-ontological" knowledge of Being matches the third type. — David Mo
In particular, this path is especially marked at the end of this chapter: The "horizon" of Being was "pointing our understanding" on the path of "presence and subsistence". It is not necessary for him to write the word, although he does: "substance". This is exactly what pressure and subsistence mean.
Strong arguments are needed to change this conclusion. I do not see them. — David Mo
Your example does not add any clarification. Babies and animals have no "definite" knowledge of the causes. They are simply conditioned to respond to certain stimuli with certain behaviours. Something like a pre-concept of cause slowly makes its way into children's minds through a repeated process of generalising responses. We have to wait for the formation of abstract language to talk about a "definite" knowledge of the concept of cause that is accompanied by a defined understanding of the word "cause". Dissociating one thing from the other is impossible. — David Mo
I think your effort to personally interpret Heidegger is most interesting assuming you are willing to defend Heidegger's theory of Being. In this assumption I would ask you what the Self means to you. Why is it so important? — David Mo
Nothing. I think I explained that. It's a dirty trick of the word processor program of auto-correction. It has a mania for change "Being" for "Self". Also "pressence" for "pressure". Although I correct its mistakes, sometimes I miss one. I should take out the auto-corrector, but sometimes it comes in handy.As far as the self goes -- I have thoughts on the self, but what's the connection to Heidegger?. — Xtrix
I don't see Heidegger necessarily thinking Parmenides or Heraclitus somehow got it "right" — Xtrix
I think it is impossible to understand Heidegger without his personal version of them. However, it is possible to discuss Heidegger's philosophy without Heraclitus and Parmenides if someone wants to defend him. I am not sure you want to do so.Once again, we will rely on the two definitive thinkers Parmenides and Heraclitus, and we will try once again to find entry into the Greek world, whose basic traits, though distorted and repressed, displaced and covered up, still sustain our own world. — Heidegger: Int to Meta, p. 96/132
But I don't think Heidegger does have a theory of Being. — Xtrix
Here ya go :point:This is Heidegger's problem for me:
There is no definition of "Being".
There is no intersubjective method of knowing Being.
No theory of Being...
... And a continuous insistence in rejecting every opponent because he does not understand or despises this mysterious (though essential) Being. — David Mo
As far as the self goes -- I have thoughts on the self, but what's the connection to Heidegger?.
— Xtrix
Nothing. I think I explained that. It's a dirty trick of the word processor program of auto-correction. It has a mania for change "Being" for "Self". Also "pressence" for "pressure". Although I correct its mistakes, sometimes I miss one. I should take out the auto-corrector, but sometimes it comes in handy. — David Mo
I don't see Heidegger necessarily thinking Parmenides or Heraclitus somehow got it "right"
— Xtrix
There are many Heidegger's passages on the capital importance of correctly understand the "concealed" message of Greeks. An example:
Once again, we will rely on the two definitive thinkers Parmenides and Heraclitus, and we will try once again to find entry into the Greek world, whose basic traits, though distorted and repressed, displaced and covered up, still sustain our own world.
— Heidegger: Int to Meta, p. 96/132
I think it is impossible to understand Heidegger without his personal version of them. However, it is possible to discuss Heidegger's philosophy without Heraclitus and Parmenides if someone wants to defend him. I am not sure you want to do so. — David Mo
What Being means to you? Why is it so important? — David Mo
But that's all different from saying they're "right," — Xtrix
The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein' s very understanding of Being-that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle.
At the same time, however, we must not overlook the fact that while this way of understanding Being (the way which is closest to us) is one which the Greeks were the first to develop as a branch of knowledge and to master, the primordial understanding of truth was simultaneously alive among them, even if pre-ontologically, and it even held its own against the concealment implicit in their ontology-at least in Aristotle. — Heidegger: Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 225/268
I think it means what we want it to mean -- how we interpret it. I think history bears this out, in fact, in terms of the history of ontology. Here it's "substance," there it's "idea," or it's "god," it's "energy," it's "will," it's perhaps the "thing in itself," it's rationality, it's "nature," etc etc etc. — Xtrix
What "is" being apart from our interpreting it? Well, it's not a "thing" (a being) at all, or an object at all. That's why the confusing statement that "Being is not a being." Is it a kind of "nothing," then? Sure, but even the idea of "nothing" is something. — Xtrix
If after this quotation you continue affirming that for Heidegger Heraclitus, Parmenides and the Greeks who were in this line were not right, it is that we do not understand the same for "being right". — David Mo
I will continue with the rest of your commentary when I have time to read it. — David Mo
Your first two paragraphs have a lot to talk about. You'll allow me to stand on them. — David Mo
You define the method of interpretation as going anywhere in any way. That's very Heideggerian, but it doesn't work for me. The act of knowing is supposed to be reasonably shared, but if all is fair the result can be chaos and confrontations can take us anywhere. I don't think you're serious about this. — David Mo
The proof that you don't seriously mean it is that in the next paragraph you put "apart from the interpretation". But here too you are remarkably confusing. From what you write next I get nothing. That Being is neither this nor that. The conclusion does not seem to be very conclusive, truth be told. Besides, how do you arrive at the question of what Being really is apart from the interpretation? Is there any other method that you have not told us about? I hope it would be more precise that interpretation. — David Mo
If Heidegger is doing anything he's pointing out that there has been something overlooked — Xtrix
Well I'm not sure what you mean by the first sentence, but I'm not advocating for irrationalism or mysticism if that's what you're hinting at. — Xtrix
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