Methinks (along the lines of the paper I linked to, on the assumption more detail might interest you) that Benatar's antinatalism rests on a fallacious rejection of the commonsense symmetry I mentioned several posts ago: if the absence of pain is good, then the absence of pleasure is bad.

Methinks the assumption of asymmetry is simply false. See https://www.academia.edu/38291449/How_to_Reject_Benatars_Asymmetry_Argument

Not procreating prevents suffering which is good. Not procreating prevents good experiences which is only bad if there is an actual person to be deprived. — schopenhauer1

Methinks I smell a rat here: preventing good is only bad if an actual person exists who could be benefited; yet preventing evil is good even in the absence of an actual person who could be harmed.

Methinks if perfect application of the NHP is purportedly impossible post-birth, then, since ought implies can, NHP is nonsensical. If perfect NHP is applied globally to eliminate procreation, then, at ieast within a couple of generations, it is a reductio of the principle. Silliness.

Methinks antinatalism is simply a radical, and somewhat silly, variant of nihilism.

Right. There is at least no deductive, non-circular proof for x=x, because a deductive proof requires formal logic and all of formal logic rests on the assumption that x=x is true/valid. — Artemis

Methinks you got it!

Methinks it is axiomatic that everything is self-identical. No proof is required or possible -- hence all of the so-called proofs above simply assume the principle of identity holds for each of their premises.

Methinks you're entitled to the semantics of your choice; but know that philosophical tradition restricts negative/positive characterizations of actions to duties or freedom. Negative duties are duties of noninterference; positive duties are duties of assistance. The question you pose, in the parlance of the tradition, is whether paternalistic imposition of perceived goods on an unknowing or uncooperative other is ever morally justified.

Methinks you confound positive and negative duties (or freedom) with the inchoate distinction between "positive and negative ethics." After all, the good life entails the avoidance of suffering.

Doesn't a conceptual scheme dictate what we call "real"? — frank

Methinks what we call real and what is real are distinct categories.

"Can anything ever be identical?

Beyond the necessary truism that everything is self-identical, methinks the answer is no.