I will answer just a few of these questions, to keep the comment somewhat short:

Is hair included in the height measurement? Up to you: John is taller than Bob if hair is included. If not, then not. The object whose tallness is measured might lack details, but the concept of tallness is itself clear and does not change.

Is somebody that is 1 micrometre taller [taller] than average tall? Objectively yes, because you even included the word 'taller' in your question. I trust you understand the words in your own question.

What if their excess over the average is smaller than can be measured by any human instrument? You could say the difference in tallness is not perceivable. But perception does not change truth, and thus the tallness of a thing is not dependant on our perception of it.

Do a whole bunch of non-tall people become tall when a 2 metre person dies? As per the essence I suggested, "tallness" is relative to X. So relative to living people, yes; relative to the dead person, no.

Let's generalize: If the statement "the categories typically referred to by words have fuzzy boundaries" were to be objectively true always, then the words used in that statement, and consequently the whole statement itself, have fuzzy boundaries. In other words, we could logically never be certain of this conclusion.

A monotheistic god is not alive by the list above since there is no reproduction. — noAxioms

It is true that my list is only comprised on material properties, and thus is adequate only for material lives such as plants, animals and humans. It does not address possible non-material lives such as angels and God. I suggest to limit the discussion to material life for now. This is only for the sake of taking simpler steps, and not to restrict the whole truth of what life consists of.

Maybe a we will create a truly self-sufficient computer life form that manufactures new members at full size, so no growth, and no organic matter. — noAxioms

Point taken again. I forgot that in the past comments, I already acknowledged that if the life of a simple cell is nothing but "the proper functioning of its parts", then a car engine fits the definition as well as simple cells. And a car engine cannot grow, reproduce, nor is it made of organic matter.

So the new list for material life is as follows:
- proper functioning of the object's parts
- needs a form of energy

Fire fits this list. — Banno

Almost, but not quite: A fire is not made out of organic matter, because it is not matter at all but energy. Granted, organic matter is one of the causes of fire, but not the thing itself, as an effect is a different thing than its cause.

I would argue against this "fuzzy boundary" idea. Let's take the example of 'tall'. I propose its essence to be: "that which is greater in vertical dimension, relative to X". Thus MJ is tall relative to the average human being. Remove the words 'vertical dimension', 'greater', or 'relative to X', and we no longer have the concept of 'tall'. But are any of these words unclear?

So back to what distinguishes a lifeform like a cell from a functioning car... — noAxioms

So you want to find essential properties that distinguish lifeforms from non-lifeforms right? How about these:
- can reproduce,
- can grow,
- is made of organic matter (DNA, carbons, proteins ...)
- needs a form of energy

The notion of essence is philosophically defunct. We simply do not need to be able to present a definition of life in order to do biology. — Banno

'Not needed' does not imply 'impossible'. Essences exist, insofar that words point to real concepts, or real objective meanings. If "The notion of essence is philosophically defunct" is saying that words don't have objective meanings, then this statement is itself meaningless; and that is a self-contradiction.

Not sure how you're defining consciousness. I can be rendered unconscious, yet continue to live. So no, consciousness is not what defines me to be alive. — noAxioms

Consciousness has two separate meanings. One meaning is, as you point out, the difference between being conscious and unconscious, as in being awake or asleep. The second meaning is between a conscious being and a non-conscious being: the fact of awareness by the mind of itself and the world. I was referring to the second meaning.

How about an oyster? It quite seems to have life as a whole and can be killed, yet has no apparent consciousness. — noAxioms

How is it that is seems to have a life as a whole, if it has no apparent consciousness? Having apparent consciousness was my reason to support having a life as a whole. What other reasons are there? Note: I am not here including humans just yet, only animals and lower life forms.

A "dead" car engine can be resurrected, not so for a dead organism it seems. — jkop

Actually, my point was the opposite; that just as a dead car can be resurrected by replacing the deficient part, so can the dead cell, by replacing its deficient part. This seems to logically follow from the definition that the life of a simple cell is nothing more than the proper functioning of its parts.

See the comment string here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/65014

At what point does a zygote attain more of a life than what just a collection of cells have? — noAxioms

This seems to be a good next step to the discussion. I suggest to add the concept of consciousness. If an organism does not an apparent consciousness, say a plant, then there is no reason to believe that the organism attains a life as a whole, as opposed to being a mere collection of living cells.

But if an organism has an apparent consciousness, say a dog, then the truth could be in one of two possibilities:
1. This consciousness is only apparent, and the dog is nothing more than a large system composed of living cells, like citizens in a state.
2. This consciousness is a real thing, and thus a "life" is added to the system. This new life is more than the life of simple living cells, which we have defined earlier as "the proper functioning of its parts".

Thoughts?

One may think of a car engine as an analogy to the living cell. If the air supply, fuel supply or spark plugs malfunction, then the other systems which depend on this one can no longer function either, and the engine "dies". If the life of a simple cell is nothing more than the proper functioning of its parts, then the parallel with a car engine is valid.

All the cells in a cow might be alive, but something else is still missing if there is no way to restore the cell collection as a functioning cow. There is life in the cells, but the cells do not comprise a life anymore. — noAxioms

I suppose some cells are primary for the life preservation of the organism, and some are secondary. If the secondary ones die, then the life is preserved by the primary cells, and these may even sometimes replace the secondary cells by new ones. But if the primary cells die, then the life cannot be preserved and the secondary cells will soon die thereafter.

Interesting. This would explain how a living cell is composed of non-living parts, and how it is created in the first place. Does it however explain the difference between a live cell and a dead cell?

I now see the misunderstanding, in the word 'material'. I understand the word material to mean anything that is observable, or empirical. In that sense, I place matter, energy, arrangements and all the likes in the category of material. As I understand it, you meant only matter when you said "I don't think there is a separate material that distinguishes a live cow from a dead one."

So the living state of an organism is the ability for its primary parts to function properly? Let's say a cell has died because one of its parts has a drastic change in function which is irreversible. Under the above definition, would it follow that the cell would come back to life if the deficient part were to be replaced by a properly working part, like replacing the deficient spark plugs on a car engine? If so, does it follow that there is no difference, with respect to living, between a cell and a car engine?

Yeah, I agree that life can be used in all these meanings in every day discussions. For the purpose of this discussion, I would leave out the third meaning "My life" and retain the first two meanings "spirit or soul" and the more scientific "set of capacities", and then figure out which one is closer to truth.

I see. And so the DNA, proteins, and other cellular apparatus are the properties that distinguish non-living things and living things (and then the degree of living things). I think carbon is another essential material property of all living things. Now what could be the essential difference between live things and dead things? Say a live virus and a dead one.

I don't think there is a separate material that distinguishes a live cow from a dead one. That belief does not preclude that the difference in state is not strictly a material one. — noAxioms

Maybe I am misunderstanding your comment, but as I see it, it does logically preclude a non-material thing:

• A difference exists between a live cow and a dead cow
• There is no separate material that distinguishes a live cow from a dead cow
• Therefore the existing difference is non-material

It could be the case indeed that it is a gradual thing. For my knowledge, would you know what makes viruses a 'borderline case' in contrast to non-borderline cases?

Why would our inability to restore a complex material state imply that it must not be material? — noAxioms

Let X = the body of the cow, and Y = the material thing that gives it life. Then a live cow is X+Y and a dead cow is X without Y. To resurrect the dead cow, we would just need to add the material thing Y back to X to result in X+Y. But this seems absurd. Therefore, Y is not a material thing.

The recently dead cow has life. One can isolate a good cell and grow a new cow from it, just not restore the original cow by most definitions of what makes one cow not the same as another. — noAxioms

It is indeed interesting if we are able to do that. What about restoring a live cell from a dead cell?

I am guessing that 'axioms' is synonymous to 'essential properties'? I would be very interested to know what these axioms are, if you ever find them again.

Hello.
Aristotle tried this definition (I am paraphrasing): If one says it is that which objectively is, and isn't that which objectively isn't, then he speaks the truth; but if one says it is that which objectively isn't and isn't that which objectively is, then he does not speak the truth. In other words, if judgement reflects reality then truth, if not, then untruth. But this explanation seems circular to me, because to say "that which objectively is" is the same as saying "that which truly is".

Pascal says that some concepts are so fundamental that attempting to define them results more in confusion than clarity. I think truth is such a concept, as shown above. Maybe the best is to acknowledge that we all have the implicit knowledge of what truth is, even if we don't have the explicit definition. As such, we can still apply the concept correctly.

inasmuch as they are deductive arguments for the existence of God, then they must be certain. — Thorongil

Deductive arguments yield to conclusions which are only as certain as their premises. I don't know of any deductive arguments for the existence of God which have certain premises. Do you know of any? As a christian, I would like to hear them.

Speaking very roughly, Aristotle held that the ultimate metaphysical objects are those which are never found in the predicate position of any true judgment (e.g. "the statue is the clay"); they are only ever the subjects of judgment (e.g. "God is all things"). — Glahn

That makes sense to me. The relationship between subject and predicate can be seen as a master and slave relationship, in that order. Thus the subject is greater than its predicate. On a similar note, I heard from a christian philosopher that we should never say "God is like X", but should rather say that "X is like God", because God is not mimicking anything, and rather, things are mimicking parts of God.

Maybe the term 'observed' by itself was misguiding in the first meaning. I should say that the object is the thing either observed, or discussed, or thought of, or in other words, the object of knowledge. Respectively then, the subject is the observer, or the speaker, or thinker, or in other words, the thing that knows the object.

Thus when I see or say or think "the ball is red", then the ball is the object, and I am the subject.

You guys can correct me if I am wrong, but I think as a general rule, an argument is an opinion backed up by reason; and then an argument becomes a proof when it gives certainty, or close to certainty. Proofs can be scientific proofs, logical proofs or mathematical proofs. Maybe there are others too? If not a proof, then the argument gives either probability or mere plausibility.

Haha. This is where the arguments for the religion come in. They don't give certainty, but help to think about it, and build 'methodical faith', in contrast to 'blind faith'.

Don't get me wrong: I think that proving any religious proposition is not only acceptable but also beneficial for the religion. We just need to take one look at Thomas Aquinas, who spent pretty much his whole life coming up with logical arguments for christianity. My point is that once a specific topic is proven with certainty, then faith becomes redundant. Example: it is non-sensical to say "I have faith that the earth rotates around the sun", because it has been proven to be true already.

Arguments for the existence of God are logical, but do not give certainty (none that I have heard anyways). This is why faith is still necessary along with these arguments. They help build what I have heard called 'methodical faith', which is better than mere 'blind faith'.

When it comes to christianity, you can pretty much prove that you cannot prove the religion to be true, because faith is among the three christian virtues. And faith is, by definition, believing in something that is not (yet) proven. You do not have faith in something that you already know to be true. The day christianity is proven to be true, even among christians alone, is the day that faith will no longer be one of the christian virtues.

Very well. I just find it odd to find such potentially misleading terms in a field that attempts to have clear and distinct ideas. Thank you.

So you are starting with universal doubt, Descartes' style. How about finding a starting point to uncover truth? A good start is the laws of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction: If a proposition is self-contradictory, then it is necessarily false, then its opposite is necessarily true.

Example 1: "Truth does not exist". This is a self-contradiction, because this would mean that this very proposition is not true. Therefore its opposite "Truth exists" is necessarily true.
Example 2: "I think I don't exist". This is a self-contradiction, because I cannot think "I don't exist" if I don't exist. Therefore its opposite "I think I exist" is necessarily true. This is essentially Descartes' cogito argument: I think therefore I am.

But is it not a self-contradiction to say "everything changes"? Because this 'everything' would include this very proposition, which means that at least one thing would not change, being this proposition. And if it is a self-contradiction, then it is necessarily false by the laws of logic. Therefore, the proposition "not everything changes" is true.

Hello. I think you are correct that a lot of abstract words point to real concepts, such as love, justice, suffering etc. Maybe not all though? For example, if I call you a 'jerk', I don't think the word 'jerk' is pointing to any real attribute of yourself, and it merely gives my subjective opinion about you. Other words however, do point to real things, and the way to prove it is to find the 'form' or 'essence' of these concepts. This method goes all the way back to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

That sounds correct. I guess all physical things will disappear, given enough time; and thus change. What about eternal truths, such as the truth that "2+2=4"? We would observe this continually.

Even more fundamental than the cogito, is the fundamental law of logic: the law of non-contradictions. If a proposition is self-contradictory, then is it necessarily false, then its opposite is necessarily true. Let's apply it to the cogito: I think "I don't exist" is a self-contradiction because I cannot think "I don't exist" if I don't exist already. Therefore the opposite thought "I exist" is necessarily true.

Let's now apply it to the case of free will: the proposition "I don't have free will" is not a self-contradiction, because it is logically possible for a being to say this without having free will. EG: if a computer says it. Note that the opposite proposition is also not a self-contradiction. Therefore neither propositions are as certain as the cogito. There are arguments for and against free will, but they are not as strong as using an argument from non-contradiction, because they are based on premises, which need to be proven by other premises etc.

Sorry, I don't think I can personally help. I don't know much about quantum mechanics, but it sounds more like physics than metaphysics. Physics is science. Metaphysics is philosophy.

What is happening is that observations are changing and differing from other observations, which is impossible to avoid, as everything continuously evolves. — Rich

In other words, Heraclitus: You could not step twice into the same river. Is that what you mean?
What about consistency in nature? All laws of physics are based on observations which are consistent every time we repeat the same experiment.

How is an observation itself not an interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I differentiate the two as separate events. The interpretation is caused by the observation. And an effect is separate from its cause. i.e., nothing causes itself. Thus the observation comes prior to the interpretation. It is passive (step 1) and the effect of interpretation is active (step 2). Only interpretations are subject to be right or wrong.

If a person improperly takes note of what is going on, don't you think that the person's observation is wrong? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree. And that is because the act of taking notes is active and fits in step 2. But the observation comes yet again prior to that.

One more example: If I feel pain in my stomach, it could be for numerous reasons that I am not certain of, because I am not an expert on the subject. I can attempt to describe the pain or guess the cause, but I could be wrong in doing either. But one thing I am certain of: I feel pain in my stomach.

Ok, I am still trying to understand your point. Do you mean something like Kant in his critique of pure reason? That is: Things-in-themselves exist independently of the subject's mind. Let's call these X. But the subject may not directly perceive X, but a modified thing. Let's called these Y. In my argument with colours, colours are Y because that is what we perceive. Thus my argument only proves that something exists, but not necessarily colours themselves, because they are Y and not X.

And if idealism does not claim that things-in-themselves don't exist, and only claims that all that we perceive is dependant on the mind, then my argument does not refute idealism. Am I correct so far?

how do you account for these differences? — Metaphysician Undercover

These three perceptions are different but are not wrong because, prior to making an interpretation, these are mere observations. It is at this point only a passive event, and these are neither right nor wrong (if you exclude dishonesty) because no active event (interpretation or judgment) has occurred yet. Best is to give a full example in which all three persons have different perceptions, yet all have the right interpretation:

-Person 1: "I perceive the star are twinkling. But I know that this is an effect of atmosphere, and I conclude that stars in themselves don't twinkle."
-Person 2: "I perceive the stars are not twinkling. I conclude that stars in themselves don't twinkle."
-Person 3: "I don't perceive any stars. But I know I have bad eyesight and will rely on other people's sight and conclude that stars exist and in themselves don't twinkle."

All three persons are correct, because they are right in the interpretation of the perceptions, and are not lying about what they claim to perceive. Thus nobody is wrong, even though all three perceptions are different.

to perceive, by itself is essentially an act of interpretation, and like any other act of interpretation, it is possible that one could be wrong in such an act. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree that the perception is an act of interpretation. The perception comes before the judgement. Step 1: I perceive the stars twinkling. Step 2: I interpret that stars twinkle. Step 2 has the potential to be incorrect because, as you say, it is an act of interpretation. But step 1 cannot be incorrect. It is a simple fact. If I am incorrect about the interpretation, the fact remains that I perceive the stars twinkling.

If I have bad eyes, and do not see the stars as twinkling, which does happen because my eye sight is bad, and then I put on my glasses, and see them twinkling, am I not correct to say that I was mistaken in my perception, before I put on my glasses? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you were not mistaken in the perception. Only in the interpretation, if you did such a thing afterwards.

I admit that there is a mode of argument on this subject which claims that an interpretation is never right or wrong, it is always purely subjective, and the rightness or wrongness of an interpretation is something imposed by a further judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you mean, but this is not what I am arguing, so we can drop this. Let's stay on the ground of "common sense".