Hello.
But some things CAN be perceived. And the PUP connects the perception to conclusions about reality, which is metaphysics.

Hello.

What they wonder is whether or not what they see is a mirage, which is a form of illusion, not a hallucination. — unenlightened

This is missing the point (which admittedly with hindsight is unsurprising when using the desert example). We could have used the perception of a unicorn in a room instead. If I am the only subject, then I would second-guess my perception, but if many subjects perceive the same unicorn, then it is reasonable to suppose that it is real, until given a reason to believe otherwise.

Furthermore, the case of a mirage does not work against the PUP. First, if there is a mirage of an oasis, then the oasis must still exist. Second, different subjects are not expected to perceive the mirage-oasis in the same fashion if they are seeing it from different locations. Third, is it not still more reasonable to believe the perceived oasis is real, if given no reason to believe it is caused by a mirage? Remember the PUP gives reasonableness, not certainty.

Hello.
Yes, this "intersubjective agreement" is very much what I am trying to describe in the PUP.

Hey there.
I am not sure if your post is intended to address my quote, but if it is, I must admit I don't understand anything you are saying. Sorry bro. Perhaps it could be a bit more concise?

Hello.

So how does the fact my mind does not appear to be my body provide evidence that my mind is eternal? — Bartricks

This is not in the OP, but here is my answer. It does not claim that the mind is eternal (for I believe it begins to exist), but that it survives the event of death.

- The human body can be defined as "all the physical parts of a person".
- Thus if the mind is not the body, then it it follows that it is non-physical.
- Since death is, as far as we know, only a physical event, then it does not affect non-physical things, and thus the mind must survive death.

So you claim that subjective topics, that is, matters of opinions, regard things for which we have little-to-no experience or knowledge, is that right?

I disagree with that. Sticking with the same apple example, even if we both take a bite out of the same apple, I can still make the honest claim "this apple tastes good", and you can make the honest claim "this apple tastes bad"; and this can simply be explained by the fact that I happen to like apples and you happen to dislike apples in general. Another classic example: we both look at the same piece of art, and you claim "this is beautiful" and I claim "this is ugly", and neither of us is wrong, because as the saying goes, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, that is, the subject.

Conversely, I can have zero knowledge and experience about angels, and yet making a claim such as "angels exist" is objective, because it is a matter of fact: they either exist or they don't.

Greatest degree: I know falling out of a tree certainly can hurt because I fell out of a tree once and it hurt like hell.
Lesser degree: I believe falling out of a tree hurts, but never having fallen out of a tree....I might get lucky, fall on a pile of leaves, and suffer no hurt.
No degree at all: experience and possible experience having been accounted for, there is no other degree of truth available, so there is no opinion on falling out of trees. Nevertheless, it is my opinion these statements are true. — Mww

Nevertheless, I mostly agree with these above statements on the degrees of knowledge. I would call the top one "certainty", the middle one "probability or reasonableness or methodical faith", and the last one "blind faith".

Assignment of a property to an object is indeed the activity of a subject, but I don’t think it is merely a matter of opinion. — Mww

That depends on the properties; but maybe the term "property" is confusing. It could be replaced with the term "predicate". Here are examples of subjective properties/predicates:
This song is good. This joke is funny. This story is interesting. Strawberries taste better than bananas.
People could disagree with all these statements, and there would be no right or wrong.

Contrast it with the following examples of objective properties/predicates:
This song is 5 minutes long. This joke is stolen from someone else. This story is in english. This strawberry is smaller than this banana.
If someone disagrees with these statements, then one person must be right, and one must be wrong.

Have you noticed that the propositions “This apple tastes good" and "Samuel thinks this apple tastes good" have the same message, and yet the first one is subjective and the second one is objective?
— Samuel Lacrampe

I’ve noticed it now, insofar as the message is the telling of something about the taste of apples. I’ve also noticed that seemingly the first is objective and the second is subjective. — Mww

To clarify, I am using my definitions of objective/subjective here. So the first proposition is subjective because it is a mere matter of opinion - some people could claim that this apple does not taste good; and the second proposition is objective because it is a matter of facts - it is either true or false that I think this apple tastes good.

reductionism mandates that for the simplest objects, or complex objects perfectly congruent, the particularity of identity reduces to the space and time of it. — Mww

I think this reductionist idea seems correct. If the cause of individuality is the particular matter, and no two physical things (which matter belongs to) can occupy the same space at the same time, then it follows that no two particulars can occupy the same space at the same time. As such, finding the space property of things at a given time is a good way to determine if things are identical or distinct.

E.g. You saw a brown dog at such time, and I also saw a brown dog at that same time, but yours was at location A where as mine was at location B. This is sufficient to conclude we saw two different dogs.

The subjective conscious activity is reason in general, and opinions, beliefs and knowledge are mere matters of degree reason judges of truth. — Mww

Understood. So one definition of subjectivity can be something like "an act that is internal to the thinker (the subject), and is not reducible to a physical act"; and a second definition can be "a property assigned to an object, that is merely a matter of opinion from the subject".

These two definitions overlap in that they both involve an internal act from the subject, but yet seem to be different enough to remain two separate definitions. Shame...

Wonder what the opening salvo would be. — Mww

Here's a candidate.
Have you noticed that the propositions "This apple tastes good" and "Samuel thinks this apple tastes good" have the same message, and yet the first one is subjective and the second one is objective?

If you call out, “here Sparky!!” and I call out “here, Fido!!”, the dog comes to you but ignores me, we have gone further than the establishment of identifying a general conception, that is, we have given an identity to a particular instance of a general conception. — Mww

That's right. This would be naming a particular, for which the main cause of its individuality is the particular matter that dog is made of. That's all that is needed for an object, such as a particular soccer ball. I think in the case of a dog, we could also add its particular set of memories and habits.

At the end of the day, when it’s all said and done, we cannot abide being confused with something that is otherwise identical to us. — Mww

I think we're safe, because I hold that as long as we are made of particular sets of matter, then we are particulars. But things get ... fun, when that matter gets substituted. E.g. I heard that all the atoms in our bodies get replaced every 7 years. This recalls the puzzle of the Ship of Theseus.

Close, but a little further down the line. I agree to identifying a thing by its name, which is the same as my conception of it. Or, I identify a thing by means of its concept. [...] — Mww

I think that is correct. In addition, we name general concepts with common nouns, (e.g. a dog) and particulars with proper nouns (e.g. Fido). The identity of general concepts is their essential properties, and the identity of particulars is their essential properties plus their particular matter. E.g. Pointing to a particular set of matter when saying "Fido is that dog".

Agreed. But what is it that is lost? That is, of what is identity comprised? What is an essential property? — Mww

I think you are asking how to determine if a property is essential or not? In general, a property is essential if, should that property be lost, then the thing would lose its general identity (called "species" as per Aristotle). This can be tested in a thought experiment. Say a particular triangle is made of the following set of properties: "surface with 3 straight sides" + "yellow". If the triangle loses the first property, it is no longer a triangle, where as if it loses the second property, it remains a triangle. Therefore the first property is essential, and the second one is not.

For the objectively valid, the conscious activity of a thinker, the internal domain, is responsible for those objects of reason, which is subjectivity. For the objectively real, the world, the external domain, is responsible, for all that which occurs without any thinker. — Mww

Interesting. While I think your definition of "objectivity" matches with mine, it doesn't quite match for "subjectivity"; because the activity of a thinker is not necessarily a mere matter of opinion; neither in act (it is either true or false that I am thinking), nor in content (my thinking process could be right or wrong). I'll think about it some more and see if the definitions can be reconciled somehow.

Which is why metaphysical investigations are so much fun. How to tell the difference, and what to do about it when the difference is told. — Mww

Yeah this is could be a whole discussion in itself.

If I don't reply to some of your previous paragraphs, it is implied that I agree with them.

[...] are identical twins one-and-the-same? Even if their parents couldn’t tell them apart by their properties, is it permissible thereby to say they have the same identity? — Mww

No; in the sense that I give, "two" things would be identical if they are numerically one. E.g. you say you saw a brown dog at such time and such place, and I say I saw also saw a brown dog at the same time and place, then we conclude that your dog and my dog are identical, that is, we speak of the same dog. In the case of identical twins, "identical" just means that all or most of the properties are similar, yet the twins are numerically two. I'm okay using the term identical in either sense, so long as we are on the same page.

I doubt you think of yourself as “Samuel LaCrampe” just because you are a certain height, because “Samuel LaCrampe“ has been many heights. — Mww

Correct. While I believe that things must have the same identity to be identical, the reverse is not necessarily true. I retain my identity even if I have a few different properties from 2 years ago. The answer, as per Aristotle, lies in the distinction between essential properties and non-essential (or accidental) properties; where if you change non-essential properties, like weight, you retain your identity, but if you change essential properties, like dying, then you lose your identity.

Therefore, some other condition must determine why we are separately identifiable as particulars in the set of all general instances. — Mww

As per Aristotle again, when it comes to things other than persons, the cause of particulars is the matter. E.g. two triangles are numerically two because they are composed of separate atoms. When it comes to persons, I add the soul in addition to matter as the cause of particulars or individuality (but we can leave that can of worms alone).

What do you mean by subject of thought? [...] I offer subjectivity to be the conscious rational activity of a thinking subject. The object of thought is a cognition, an empirical cognition grounded in phenomena is an experience, a rational cognition grounded in abstractions is a judgement, all of which requires a thinking subject, that to which those cognitions, without exception, all belong. — Mww

Ah. So subjectivity means abstract, rational, non-empirical ideas, and objectivity means empirical things, is that more or less correct?

So we are not on the same page on these terms. Here is what I mean. "Object" is the thing observed, thought about. "Subject" is the observer or thinker. E.g. when I think "This apple is round", the object is the apple; the subject is me. From there we get the terms "objective" and "subjective", where a property is objective if it is about the object, and subjective if it is really about the subject. In the previous thought, the property "round" is objective, because roundness is a property of the object. On the other hand, in the thought "This apple is interesting", the property "interesting" is subjective, because it is really saying something about me when I think of the apple, ie, the apple interests me. Objective claims are about reality, and can be true or false, right or wrong. Subjective claims a mere matters of opinions, and cannot be true or false, nor right or wrong.

How about perceiving two things that each have 4 legs, wings, and speaks. It is entirely possible for such things to exist, because there is nothing contradictory about them, which makes explicit the possibility of perceiving them. Damned if I would know what they are [...] — Mww

It sound to me you equate the identity of a thing with its name. In your example, you can describe the things by listing their properties, but then the only thing missing is what they are called, am I correct? A name is only a symbol or sign that points to the identity, but is not it. E.g. say I just learned to speak english, and don't know what the word "bird" means, ie, I don't know what identity it points to. You describe it by saying it is the type of animal that has two legs, a beak, feathers, and can fly. I say "Ah! I get it. We call it 'oiseau' in french." You have described its identity by listing its properties, and now I know it.


Sorry for the long post.

[...] no metaphysical proposition can be shown to be valid without empirical justification. — Mww

If by that you mean the original data must come from empirical observations, then I agree. If you mean that the concluding metaphysical claim must be empirically verifiable, then I disagree. What is metaphysical is not directly observable; it can only be deduced.

Then you should be able to tell me about a real thing unknown to you. — Mww

Of course I can't do that; but I can tell you about a real thing that existed before I knew about it: dinosaurs. My point is that the existence of a thing is not caused by our knowledge of it. So in the stool example, it doesn't matter if a subject does not know if the stool was previously assembled or not.

Then why are you and I not identical? Are our respective identities really from the properties we have in common? — Mww

No; the opposite: our identities are distinct precisely because you and I have different properties. Matter, for one thing: my body is not yours. Then a few other properties I'm sure, like height, weight, etc.

It follows that if either class has even one incongruent thought (properly conception) or perception (properly intuition), the things cannot be identical, for the simplest of reasons that they cannot have the same identity. Assuming correct judgement, naturally. — Mww

I agree with the perception part (assuming true perception), because this informs about a property of the object perceived. But I disagree with the thought part, which I believe you categorized as subjective. Subjectivity by definition refers to the subject of thought, not the object of thought.

Furthermore, whether we grant two things are identical or not, we are given nothing from that, that we can use to establish the identity of just one of them. I can perceive two things which seem identical without knowing what those things are. — Mww

How could that be? As per P1 from this post, "identical" means they have the same identity, which is the list of their properties. It follows that the identity must be known in order to determine if the two things are identical. Could you give an example where we perceive two things which seem identical without knowing what those things are?

I don't understand why you are bringing knowledge and perception in a metaphysical topic. A thing is real/not real independent of our knowledge of it. In my hypothetical example of the stools, it is about facts, not perceptions. Let me try one more time to clarify the reasoning.

P1: "Two" things are identical or one-and-the-same if they have all the same properties that make their identity.
P2: Stool(t1) and stool(t3) as described here have all the same properties.
C: Stool(1) and stool(t3) are identical, one-and-the-same.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but my guess is that your objection is with P1. But in which case, what is your definition of "identical"?

I think your understanding of my scenarios is correct. But now I'm thinking the example of snowball is not adequate, for its complexity creates tangents such as spacetime non-equivalence, Feynman’s sum over histories, and other things I don't fully understand but are likely not relevant for the current enquiry.

Let's try again with a simpler example. Consider a stool composed of only 5 parts: 4 legs and a sit. The stool at time t1 is fully built, then deconstructed into its 5 parts at time t2, and then reassembled with its original parts at time t3. The question is: Is stool(t3) identical to stool(t1)? I would say yes, for all the properties are the same (with the exception of time, but time is not really a property of the stool).

Based on the quote below, I understood that your answer would be no. But maybe I misunderstood?

If I make a snowball, heave it at the barn wall and it explodes, it has immediately ceased to exist as a snowball. If I gather up all the snow from the former snowball, make another snowball from that, there is then a snowball containing the constituency of the former, but not the identity of it. A snowball exists again; the snowball really does cease to exist. — Mww

To be clear, by "identical", I mean not that they are similar, but that they have the same identity, that is, they are one-and-the-same.

With that, two snowballs side by side would not be identical, because even though they share the same properties of material, size, and shape, they are not composed of one-and-the-same matter (ie they have distinct molecules of snow). But when we compare the snowballs in the two hypothetical scenarios previously described, they are then composed of one-and-the-same matter. So it would seem in that case it is correct to call them identical. Granted they have different histories, but this is like two different paths leading to one-and-the-same location.

If I make a snowball, heave it at the barn wall and it explodes, it has immediately ceased to exist as a snowball. If I gather up all the snow from the former snowball, make another snowball from that, there is then a snowball containing the constituency of the former, but not the identity of it. A snowball exists again; the snowball really does cease to exist. The arrow of time does not allow snowballs in general to exist, cease to exist and exist again as the same thing. — Mww

If I may. This is a nice illustration, but how does it demonstrate that the second snowball is not identical to the first one? Let's call your scenario scenario 1. Let's compare with scenario 2, in which the initial snowball was never thrown at the wall, thereby never got destroyed. What is different, property-wise, between the final snowball from scenario 1, and the snowball from scenario 2?

How can pre-existence have a property? — Yohan

The term "nothing" is defined as "that which has no properties". Insofar that pre-existence is not nothing, then it has some properties. Or another way to look at it, if a term is not meaningless, then it has an essence, that is, some essential properties.

How can non-existence BE a property? Do not only things have properties? Non-existence isn't a thing. It refers to an absence of thing. Or rather, it tells you that not anything is being referred to. Like a finger that isn't pointing at anything. — Yohan

Sure, you are correct. "Non-x" is the absence of x. So pre-existence is similar to non-existence in that they both lack the property of existence.

Explain to me how an empty bowl is any way different than a pre-filled bowl. — Yohan

As mentioned above, the essence of a term is found by listing its essential properties. The essence of "empty" can be "absence of being filled". The essence of "pre-filled" is "absence of being filled" + "potential of being filled that will be actualized eventually".

A unicorn and a phoenix are exactly the same while NOT existing. — Yohan

This disagrees with common sense. In real life, neither a unicorn nor a phoenix exist, and yet the definition of a unicorn is different than the definition of a phoenix. The only property (or lack there of) they share is the absence of existence. To use yet another example: A bowl is empty; a bottle is empty; yet a bowl is not identical to a bottle despite both being empty.

1. Pre-existence = non-existence
2. Post-existence = non-existence
3. Pre-existence = post-existence — Yohan

You should be careful with "=" signs. It means "identical", which is not the case here. Pre-existence has non-existence as a property, but is not identical with it. Pre-existence implies a thing will exist eventually. Non-existence does not imply that. With that, point 3 does not follow from points 1 and 2. Consider this other example:

1. A unicorn has non-existence,
2. A phoenix has non-existence, therefore
3. A unicorn is a phoenix.

Point 3 is not true.

But if I truly didn't exist before, yet now I do, then I came into being from nothing... — Yohan

Why from nothing? Why not from your parents?

Could we call non-being a sort of being at rest?
If so, something must have "pushed" me into activity, into a "being".
This implies that "non-being" is actually a sort of proto-being. — Yohan

This sounds like the notions of Essence vs Existence. A unicorn has an essence - it is defined - but does not have existence; although it could. If it begins to exist, then existence is added to the essence. On the other hand, a meaningless notion like a "triangle-that-is-not-a-triangle" has neither essence nor existence, and cannot ever have existence.

Absolutely nothing should remain absolutely nothing, forever..... unless this "nothing" is not truly nothing. — Yohan

This sounds correct. For even an essence without existence is not nothing, and is therefore a being, when a being is defined as "that which is not nothing".

Just because you can imagine your consciousness being separate from your body doesn't mean that this really can be the case. — SophistiCat

Yeah I agree.
The laws of logic are really called "laws of thoughts", and as such, the test of imagination is an effective way to determine if the thing imagined is logically possible. I.e. if imaginable then possible, and unimaginable then impossible. That said, a thing being possible does not mean it is actual.

I don't believe the "I" is eternal, for it begins to exist, but I believe it survives death.
Let's assume as the starting point that we have free will, then here is the argument.

• All that is physical is determined by the laws of physics and only that (otherwise these laws would not be laws).
• To have free will is to not be determined, by definition.
• Therefore the thing possessing free will is not physical.

Since death is, as far as we know, only a physical event, it does not apply to non-physical things, and thus the "I" survives death.

I think it could maybe be argued that the unhappiness that results from such behaviour causes a reduction in the amount of information produced - people who are down in the dumps/unhappy/depressed generate less (high quality) information than happy people? — Devans99

Hmmm... Is this claim ad hoc, or is it defendable?
On another related note, would you make the distinction between true and false information? Such as real news vs fake news, or correct vs incorrect belief systems.

That seems consistent. I'll keep testing your hypothesis. Let's say a person did not kill people like Hitler, but tortured people a lot and made them miserable. He also lied, cheated, and kicked puppies in the face. I would imagine it reasonable to call this person a bad person, and yet no information was lost in this case.

Hello.

information is the meaning of life — Devans99

By that, do you mean that our life's purpose is to gather and produce information?

Here is my objection. For any thing that has a purpose, we call that thing "good" when it fulfills its purpose correctly, and "bad" otherwise. E.g. the purpose of a paper-cutter is to cut paper. We call it a "good paper-cutter" when it is able to cut paper correctly, and a "bad paper-cutter" otherwise.

If the purpose of a person was merely to gather and produce information, then anybody that does that should be called a "good person". But that is absurd. I'm sure Hitler gathered and produced as much information as any other person (if not more, being that he is famous), but he is nearly-universally judged to be a bad person.

actually my conscious experience is that we often have no clue about our intentions, 'why did I do that?" "what was I thinking there?" — dazed

This happens to me too, but when I ask such questions, I mean it to say "even though I know my intentions were good (let's suppose), why did I believe that such act would lead to a good outcome?" Alternatively, it is possible to forget our intentions when they occurred a long time ago. E.g. I cannot tell you what my intentions were for an act that occurred 10 years ago (although I fully knew them back then).

Are you proposing that a "good" brain damaged person who is now prone to violence knows that they have good intentions even where they commit violent acts ? — dazed

This is a complex question, and the answer depends on the level of mental damage. The explanation below is a bit butchered but hopefully gets the point across.

• Low level of damage: I am oversensitive and thus more prone to access of anger, but I rationally know better, and therefore I would be responsible if I acted upon these oversensitive feelings.
• Medium level: I can no longer discern true from false perceptions. I can still intend to be good, but my false perceptions have convinced me that my neighbour is trying to kill me. Thus fighting him is perceived to me as being self-defence, which would not be immoral. It would be an error and I would be dangerous, but it would be an honest error.
• High level: All my rational powers have disappeared, and thus by extension also my power of intentions, leaving only the basic animal instincts. Although I am still alive, my rational self is no longer there. No more intentions means no more responsibilities.

Should we not imprison and jail such a person because they are in fact acting properly? how can we judge their acts since we don't have access to their intentions? — dazed

Technically speaking, since we cannot know other people's intentions with certainty, it follows we cannot judge their intentions. In christianity, only two beings are able to judge my heart: myself and God. However, we can judge the act in itself, and also put people in jail if we judge it is safer for society. Finally, we can still reasonably judge the intentions of others if we know them well. For one thing, we can ask them directly: "Did you intend to harm your neighbour?" -"Yep. He got on my nerves, and I never claimed to be a good person".

And what about the analogies with other complex primates? [...] — dazed

I think I can answer, but this is kind of a separate topic, so I suggest putting it on hold for now for the sake of keeping the discussion more focused.

in such a scenario, it's not actually our final acts that can be judged but rather our soul signals, but then how do we know when we are sinning or not since all we can experience is our acts and we can't experience our soul signals? — dazed

Good question. A common saying in christianity is that "God judges the heart of men"; where "heart" in religion is roughly equivalent to "intentions" in philosophy. As you say, we are not wholly responsible for our acts due to the brain's health, but we are wholly responsible for our intentions to act; intentions which come from our soul, and for which we are always in full control.

Much better than knowledge of our acts, we have full knowledge of our intentions; since by definition it comes from us.

Hello.
If I understand correctly, you are asking if, if it is possible for some constant to change, then can the laws of logic change too?

The answer is no, because asking if a thing is "possible" is to ask if it is "logically possible". Thus the statement "it is logically possible for logic to change" is nonsense. The laws of logic is the reference point around which everything can possibly change. The reference point cannot change around itself.

Is it not logically possible that the soul is the primary source of free act, but then the brain is also necessary for its final product? Consider the analogy of the brain, the tongue, and speaking a language. The primary source of the act of speaking is the brain, but the tongue is also necessary to produce the words.

Sounds good to me. It seems to only be a matter of definition of the term "being". Using the scholastic definition, being is "that which is not nothing". As such, if God is not nothing, then he is a being. It sounds like you use the term "being" the way I would use the term "creature", that is, "that which is created, or begins to exist".

Faith is uncritical, unquestionable belief. — Pfhorrest

I understand. But I persist to say that your definition of religion is therefore too broad, because sportball would be a religion for Alice and Bob in the second alternate universe; but this is not how people commonly use the term "religion", is it?

"Ultimate reality" is a topic that non-religious studies like physics and (irreligious) philosophy also investigate. — Pfhorrest

Actually the study of reality is metaphysics, not physics; and indeed it is not strictly religious. But that is why another essential component to "religion" is the act. The mere study of topics even about gods would be called theology, for which the theologian who does not act in accordance to the findings from the theology is technically not religious.

Well technically, disbelieving P and believing not-P are not equivalent; if we write it in functional notation that becomes clear, the opposite of believe(P) is not-believe(P), which is not necessarily equivalent to believe(not-P) — Pfhorrest

We need to make the distinction between the terms "disbelief" and "non-belief". A rock is in a state of non-belief, for it can neither believe nor disbelieve in anything. On the other hand, the proposition "disbelief in p" is the opposite to "belief in p". As opposites, they are also mutually exclusive.

I was saying that the Thomists think that. That wasn't my opinion, that was my report of their opinions. — Pfhorrest

I understand that you discuss the Thomists' view, which is not necessarily your own view. But my point was that Thomists, who are somewhat competent at logic, would not make the simple error to believe that reason supports faith when, under the definition of faith you have given, reason destroys faith.

Anyways, to close this part of discussion about what Thomists believe, here is an extract about Aquinas: "The theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas did not hold that faith is mere opinion: on the contrary, he held that it represents a mean (understood in the Platonic sense) between excessive reliance on science (i.e. demonstration) and excessive reliance on opinion." - Source.

Bro. If you think I misunderstood your claim the first time, then repeating it in the exact same way does not help my understanding. If you are merely saying that, since a proof by definition gives certainty, then an argument that gives probability or reasonableness is not a proof, then yes, I agree; but that is merely a tautology.

With that said, faith, the beliefs supported by the probable or the reasonable, is quite necessary. Very few beliefs are supported by absolute proofs.

The problem with using any terms other than "being" after the term "perfect" is that any other term is "defined", that is, has boundaries, is limited. E.g. a perfect maggot is just that, a maggot; which is not commonly seen as a high being on the ontological scale. So unless you claim that a person is the highest species ontologically, then it automatically ranks our god definition lower than the highest level.

That said, since god as I have defined possesses all abilities that exist (or more), and since persons exist, then god must possess the ability of persons too. But as the perfect being, it is not limited to possessing the abilities of persons only.

"religions are belief systems that appeal to faith" definition — Pfhorrest

The problem with this definition is that it is too broad. It sounds like believing in bigfoot, or believing that this football team will win tomorrow's game, are religions. On the other hand, adding "the gods and related topics" (along with behaviour) fixes that, and should be able to include Buddhism if the "related topics" include the after-life, ultimate reality, and such things.

there cannot be sufficient reason to believe anything, there can only be sufficient reasons to disbelieve things. — Pfhorrest

Don't these two claims contradict? To disbelieve in p is to believe in not-p. E.g. "I have good reasons to disbelieve in an atheistic world; this must mean that I believe in a god."

faith (even blind faith), as the vehicle of revelation, is a valid source of knowledge to tell you what is true, and that is strictly speaking sufficient for purposes of salvation and such, but reason is there to deepen your understanding of why it is true — Pfhorrest

I think your are attempting to say that reason can support faith; and even though I agree with this under my definition of faith, this cannot work under your definition: If faith is belief devoid of reason, and reason serves to explain the belief, then faith and reason are in contradiction, for a belief cannot be both without reason and with reason at the same time.

Just because Tom Aquinas says it doesn't make it so. All of these arguments are easily deconstructed these days: probability and reason cannot prove the contents of faith. — uncanni

Right back at you I'm afraid. Merely saying this doesn't make it so. There are many arguments that defend the objects of faith (I'm thinking particularly of the christian faith). The people doing so are called "apologetics", and they are still kicking to this day.

in the meantime I can at least relax in my favourite armchair (or God, as I call it). The armchair than which no greater armchair can exist. — Isaac

Supposing your armchair is indeed the perfect armchair, it still does not fit the definition of god I have given, because it is not perfect in every way. "4" is the perfect answer to the question "what is 2+2?". This does not make it god either.

God: Is that which nothing greater can exist; where "greater" means the most "powerful" in the sense of abilities. — Samuel Lacrampe

Ridding Anselm's notion of inconsistency is a work of ages... — Banno

I interpret your comment as saying that it is not a proper definition of god; is that right? Would you have a counterexample, in which the term "god" in the common language does not fit this definition? I would imagine that even for pantheistic religions, which belief is that all that exists is god, still fits under this definition.

If we define "religion" merely as "a response to the holy", then I suppose it is indeed only man-made. But this would omit religious acts and rituals, which I believe is essential, for a man is religious insofar that he acts according to the religious doctrine.

While I agree that the religious acts were created FOR humans, it is not always believed they were created BY humans. Unlike the disbelief that 2+2=4, I don't think that this religious belief constitutes a small minority. E.g. take christianity and the eucharist. The belief is that Jesus Christ is God, and that the ritual of the eucharist was instructed directly by Jesus. "Take this bread and eat, for this is my body". Similar rituals instructed by the gods are found in the other western religions as well.

I concede that since this discussion is about religions in general and not only about catholicism, then we may include "blind faith" as part of "faith". So "faith" could be defined in this context as: the beliefs regarding claims about the gods and related topics, which are not known with certainty to be true.

that just means that faith is any belief about religious topics, which would then make religion defined in reference to faith circularly defined. — Pfhorrest

I have removed the term "religion" from the above definition of "faith" to avoid any circularity.

The thing that distinguishes faithful belief from other belief is its independence of good reasons. Thomists may claim that you should strive also to have good reasons in addition to your faith, but that is just saying not to go on faith alone, as faith alone (without reason) is blind. Faith per se is thus exactly what they would call “blind faith”, and it is only in fortifying a belief with something besides faith that it becomes not blind. — Pfhorrest

But if faith is always blind faith, and you should not go on faith alone and should also use reason, then why use faith at all and not just always use reason instead? The Thomists are not that bad at logic.

Abilities? Able to leap tall buildings in a single bound, faster than a speeding bullet. Those abilities? Or do you mean that at the maximum of ability, nothing beyond that can exist? — tim wood

Mainly the latter. Of course this implies the former, but it is less important. Also I assume we are excluding dead religions like the ancient greek religions.

By "scientific (rational) study of truth," do you mean putting the question to what you suppose is the truth to see if it is - or can be - truth? — tim wood

Not sure I understand your question haha. To give my definition in other words, it is finding what conclusions can be inferred from divine revelations, which serve as the premises.

Religion: a set of behaviours. Based on? Entirely? Or does religion add to theology? — tim wood

Upon reflection, I now think the term has two meanings. (1) is the subject matter itself, and (2) is the practice based on the theology, as per my first definition. E.g. Christianity is a religion, but also a christian is religious strictly if he practices the acts described in the theology.

Let me know if any objections.

I believe faith applies to secular topics as well. E.g. trust that your spouse is not cheating without hiring an investigator to confirm, is a type of faith. That said, to stay on the topic of religion, we could say that "faith", in the context of this discussion, is the belief supported by the probable or the reasonable, regarding religious claims.

Faith is taking “because X said/thinks so”, i.e. the absence of any reason [...] — Pfhorrest

The christian catholics would not agree with this definition of faith. As described, this would be called "blind faith", which is not regarded as a good thing. As per Thomas Aquinas, faith falls between zero knowledge (ie blind faith) and certainty about an object. Strong faith is supported by reason; reason which, while not achieving a full proof, yields to the probable or the reasonable. Thus any act based on a belief supported by the probable or the reasonable is an act of faith, which is good; where as any act based on a belief devoid of any reason would be blind, which is foolish.