Excellent!

If we say "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" is true, then the being or not being of that event, the referred sea battle, violates the law. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not quite. Running the statement through the law of excluded middle gives: "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will not possibly be a sea battle tomorrow (i.e. a sea battle tomorrow is impossible)". If, in reality, a sea battle is possible, then the first statement is true and the second one is false.

My point is that most people do not question that causes exist and do not ask what causes are because the word is already clear. I don't see a reason to defend a belief that is uncontroversially accepted. If you have a solid reason to defend the claim that causes are not in fact real, I'm ready to hear it. But if not, then I don't see a point of investigating this issue further.

If I understand correctly, the fundamental laws of logic exist in all possible worlds, and they are contravened only in impossible worlds. Is that right?

I'm pretty sure most people agree that causes are real. And this statement "causes are real" can be understood exactly as what is meant when used in the common language. No need to complicate things without necessity.

The law of excluded middle implies that it is necessary that one or the other is true, therefore real possibility is excluded. — Metaphysician Undercover

But there is a shwack load of situations with real possibilities. This would make the application of the law of excluded middle to be so infrequent that it would be no law at all. Which sounds absurd.

Here is my alternative solution: There is ambiguity in the terms "there will be".
The statement "there will be a sea battle tomorrow" either means "there will necessarily be a sea battle tomorrow" or "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow". Both statements are either true or false.


Thanks for the summary of Peirce's triadic system! I'll dig further someday.

You say here:

Why shouldn't there be rules that apply in one world, but not in another? We then use the rules of each world to talk about that world. Does there then have to be at least one rule that applies in every world? Why? — Banno

But you say here:

So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened. — Banno

I personally side with the second claim.

I would have thought that, even though there are many sub-branches of logic, all the branches are compatible with each other so that logic as a whole is one coherent system.
— A Christian Philosophy

That's a point of some debate. It will not do simply to assert that this is so, and the arguments thereabouts are a topic of much recent work. — Banno

If we allow the fundamental laws of logic to change and not be part of fundamental reality, wouldn't that make all mentions of possible worlds meaningless? Unless there are some underlying rules that must be present in all possible worlds, then it seems to me that there is no rule we can use to determine anything about them.

The question is, how exactly do the laws make them bond together? — tim wood

It is not necessary to know the "how" in order to know the "why". For a simpler example: Ball A hits Ball B which then moves. We don't know exactly how the cause transitions into the effect because there is no inherent logical necessity between the two. Yet, clearly, Ball A is the cause of the movement of Ball B.

The point being that the laws are descriptive, not effective. [...] And the "because": the laws cause the rock to be? — tim wood

Whether the laws of nature are descriptive or effective does not change the fact that they cause the rock to exist. To say the same thing in a different way: The agglomeration of molecules which we call a rock, is the result of the laws of nature acting on those molecules, whether those laws refer to something forcing the molecules into place, or they merely describe the ordered behaviour of those molecules.

The two important aspects of reality which are placed in this category are future events which require a choice or decision, and matter itself, which provides the capacity for change, by being the real existence of potential at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could you provide a specific example of future event not following the rules?
Using Aristotle's sea battle example: Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. Today, it is possible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. And thus, it is not impossible that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not. To me, all three propositions obey the fundamental rules.


I read up on Peirce's triadic system a bit, and I don't see how it allows violation of the fundamental laws of logic. If it's not too much to ask, could you explain how it does?

final cause will need to be allowed to reenter through the back door — Metaphysician Undercover

For sure - I believe in final causes. As per reason type 2 described in the OP, a thing that exists by design is designed with a purpose, i.e., it has a final cause.

As a counter argument to your line of argument, one could argue that there is no necessity of understanding the cause of something. Maybe humans just can't understand some things. — Brendan Golledge

I accept that humans can't understand everything. However, as per the OP (if there is no error), the PSR must be fulfilled and there are only 3 types of reason. By eliminating 2 types, we conclude that the laws of nature must be explained by type 2, i.e., explained by design. That said, the argument does not go so far as to claim that the designer is God.

This argument also presupposes the existence of free will, which is itself disputed. — Brendan Golledge

True, but that only applies to explaining man-made things and man, not to explaining the laws of nature.

It could be that impersonal laws of physics exist without cause. — Brendan Golledge

As per the PSR, the fundamental laws of physics must be explained; and they do not exist necessarily because they are not tautologies.

Or reality could be circular (like somebody goes back in time to start the big bang). — Brendan Golledge

Circularity in cause and effect violates the law of causality that an effect cannot occur before its cause.

So what? — MoK

You asked here how do I know that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds, and I answered.

Based on some (admittedly little) research, my understanding is that aside from classical logic, all other logical systems (e.g. intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, fuzzy logic) are not systems dealing with reality as such but dealing with computer programming. That's fine, but this so-called "change in axioms" is merely a change in the fundamental command lines in the program, and it does not remove the laws of classical logic underneath the programming itself.

As an example, let's take a program using paraconsistent logic where a command line sometimes excludes the law of noncontradiction, so that a database can accept contradicting entries without crashing. E.g., entering datapoint "Patient A has allergy B" and datapoint "Patient A does not have allergy B" will not crash the program. Fine; but if the datapoints are entered, it is false to state that the datapoints are not entered, and it still remains a true fact in reality that Patient A cannot both have allergy B and not have allergy B at the same time.


If that's okay, I'll drop the efficient cause/final cause cause topic to avoid going off on a tangent.

It is unnecessary to define terms that are already clear. We only need to define terms that are unclear or used in a specific sense; otherwise, we'd get infinite regress in demand for definitions. The term "explanation" means exactly what it means in the common language. It is almost synonymous with "cause" except an explanation can also be internal (reason type 3).

"A rock exists because molecules are bonded together by laws of physics and chemistry": I think most people would agree that this explanation is clear and scientifically correct. So I am not quite sure what your objection is about.

Even if that is true, it is also true that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds.
— A Christian Philosophy

How do you know? — MoK

Since the laws of nature are not tautologies, they do not exist necessarily, and therefore do not exist in all possible worlds.

So the laws of nature for a given possible world are designed.
— A Christian Philosophy

That does not follow from the previous statement. — MoK

That's fine. The conclusion is not based on the previous statement alone but from the discussion as a whole.

Notice that I say "systems", plural, because there is a number of possible ways to approach the reality of possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would have thought that, even though there are many sub-branches of logic, all the branches are compatible with each other so that logic as a whole is one coherent system. Much like how there are many branches of mathematics (calculus, statistics, etc.) that are compatible with each other and mathematics as a whole is one coherent system.

So the truth of inductive premises escapes the certainty for "necessary". — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed. Unless the premises are based on tautologies or pure mathematics, then they are based on induction/abduction. This makes the premises uncertain, but they are the most reasonable given the information we have.

There is a fundamental difference between efficient causation which is studied by physics, and final causation which is studied in social studies, and by metaphysics. Since there is a gap between the two, meaning that we do not understand how one acts on the other, the designation of "every possible cause" is sort of meaningless or misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover

Final cause, also called function, purpose, motive, or end, only applies to things that are designed by an agent with free will. In which case, the efficient cause is called a designer, agent, or thing with free will or free choice. E.g. I choose to go to work instead of staying in bed in the morning for the purpose of making money. In this example, "going to work" is the thing that exists or occurs, "making money" is the final cause, and "the chooser (me)" is the efficient cause. I made a video about this if interested.

And what exactly is intelligent design? — tim wood

A thing exists out of "design" (reason type 2 in the OP) if it is the result of a free choice. The alternative is that the existence of a thing is explained inherently by its own definition (reason type 3), e.g. a necessary being; or it exists out of causal necessity (reason type 1), from the progress of processes. A design is conventionally called "intelligent design", where I believe the term "intelligent" means that the thing designed is created deliberately for a purpose.

But if you want it to be real, then make it real. Show it, prove it, demonstrate it. — tim wood

This is what I attempted to do in the OP. If you think some of the propositions in the OP come from mere belief, you can point them out.

Even if that is true, it is also true that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds. So the laws of nature for a given possible world are designed. — A Christian Philosophy

I think you mean that the last sentence in the above comment does not follow from the first sentence alone. I agree, but it was in reference to the whole discussion with MoK, not in reference to this comment alone.

To clarify, the OP only aims to defend the existence of intelligent design, not the existence of a necessary being. Having said that, I accept your demonstration that Plantinga's ontological argument is not valid. So, if we were to defend the existence of a necessary being, we'd need to use another argument.

Total non sequitur. — AmadeusD

Can you point to where, in the conversation between me and MoK, there is a non sequitur?

We cannot accurately portray it as "a first principle" because it consists of a number of principles which are applied. We can describe human beings as using logic, and use that as a first principle, i.e. human beings use logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe the first three laws of logic combined, "a thing is what is it, not what it is not, and there is no in-between", constitute the first principle. The other laws of logic, like modal logic, are sub-branches of this first principle, much like the laws of causality are sub-branches of the PSR.

Logic is not only a first principle of epistemology (i.e. deduction) but also of metaphysics. This is why we can speak of possible worlds. E.g. a four-sided triangle is a contradiction and thus cannot exist in any possible world.

we could restrict the meaning of "logic" to deduction, and class the other two in a broader category, as reasoning, along with deductive "logic" as a different form of reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I'd prefer to restrict "logic" to deduction to clearly differentiate it from the other two types of reasoning. This leaves the other types of reasoning, induction/abduction, to be associated with the PSR, because they aim to find the best or most sufficient explanation to account for the data, i.e., they appeal to the PSR. Then, the general term that covers all types can indeed be called "reasoning".

if we place severe restrictions on "logic", we cannot say "everything must necessarily be logical", then we exclude the things which are understood by other forms of reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

We must clarify a possible confusion here. Things can be non-logical (they can be reasoned without deduction but with induction/abduction instead) but not illogical (they violate the laws of logic). Thus, inferring the existence of a fire from the existence of smoke is not strictly speaking "logical" because the smoke could be caused by something else, but it is also not "illogical" like inferring the existence of something that is both a fire and not a fire.


With that, since both deduction and induction/abduction are first principles of epistemology, and these types of reasoning appeal to logic and the PSR respectively, then correspondingly, both logic and the PSR are first principles of metaphysics.

So the question is, how would we be able to determine that there is no reason for something. If we cannot find the reason, or even judge ourselves as incapable of finding the reason, that does not mean that there is no reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose we could identify every possible cause of a given outcome and eliminate them by testing them individually. But this could still leave room for a possible non-physical cause that could not be identified in the field of physics.

I agree with your defense of the PSR. But I think we can build a stronger defense by showing that the way we infer that the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics is no different than the way we infer that logic is a first principle of metaphysics. What do you think of the following argument?

On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.

We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

Similarly, we should accept the PSR, not merely because we observe that things in reality have reasons to exist or occur, but because our voice of reason, specifically our inductive/abductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some things exist or occur without reason, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

This attitude would provide a reason not to seek knowledge of things which are difficult to explain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. To draw a parallel with logic again, we sometimes encounter situations that seem illogical, called a paradox. We could adopt an attitude that not all outcomes are logical, or we can hold on to the belief that nothing stands outside of logic and make an effort to solve the paradox.

But life is possible whatever the laws of nature are! So my objection about the design is valid. — MoK

Even if that is true, it is also true that not all laws of nature exist in all possible worlds. So the laws of nature for a given possible world are designed.

Alright. It's too bad we did not reach an understanding. Thanks for the chat.

I agree that the laws of nature are enforced by an entity called the Mind, but I wonder how this can be called intelligent design. In fact, I can argue that given any laws of nature and considering that the universe is infinite, one can expect a form of life soon or late so I wonder what the design is about. — MoK

In this context, what is directly designed are the laws of nature. The things that result from the laws of nature would not be directly designed.

And the "sufficient reason" for (every instantiation of) the "PSR" is what exactly? — 180 Proof

A full defense of the PSR is provided in this post under the section called "Argument in defense of the PSR". But here is a summary:

There is a strong parallel between logic and the PSR. They are both first principles of metaphysics and epistemology. On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.

We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

Similarly, we should accept the PSR, not merely because we observe that things in reality have reasons to exist or occur, but because our voice of reason, specifically our inductive/abductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some things exist or occur without reason, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

PSR is not a principle of logic. [...] Further, and infamously, induction is not logically grounded. [...] Abduction - forget it. — Banno

It is acknowledged that the PSR is not derived from logic. As previously said, logic and the PSR stand side by side; one is not underneath the other.

Likewise induction/abduction is a separate type of reasoning than deduction (i.e. logic). But induction/abduction is also necessary to find truth. Using logic or deduction alone would only result in empty formulas in formal logic and mathematics. For concrete truths about the actual world, we also need to use induction/abduction.

Notice that you have not actually set out the how in your claim that PSR is supported inductively. Were is the inductive (or abductive, whatever that might be) argument? — Banno

My argument in this comment is not an inductive argument. Rather, it says that since induction/abduction is necessary to find truth, and since it is equivalent to the PSR (inference to the most reasonable explanation), then we can trust our voice of reason when it says that everything must have an explanation. Logic can be defended the same way.

The trouble is that it remains unclear when a reason is sufficient, and what a reason is. — Banno

A reason is sufficient if it covers all the data in the topic inquired. It also should not be more than sufficient, i.e. it should not explain more than what the data can support, otherwise it is superfluous.

A reason is what can explain the existence or occurence of a thing. E.g. the reason for the existence of a chicken egg is a chicken.

I accept that the laws of nature can explain the existence of life forms. But we need a reason for the existence of the laws of nature in the first place.

For instance, try to evidence that natural laws are not in fact the global result of all cooccurring existents acting as their material, bottom-up, cause – which, as global laws, then simultaneously in turn formally cause their respective constraints to apply in a top-down fashion to all individual existents in the cosmos. — javra

This cycle of "bottom-up cause to top-down natural laws" does not seem to have inherent existence (reason type 3 as described in the OP) since it can be denied without contradiction. If so, then it needs an external reason to explain its existence (reasons type 1 or 2).

While it might be true that humans design things, so too do some species of termites intentionally create termite mounds, intentional creation being a from of designing (the list of intentional creations in the spectrum of lifeforms is vast). — javra

Real metaphysical intentions imply free will, since an intention must be freely chosen. So, if animals do not have free will (which I believe most people accept), then this apparent intention from termites is not a real intention, and can be reduced to mere instinct.

And there is no noted reason for why evolution cannot of itself serve as sufficient reason for this ability to intentionally create within the domain of life. — javra

I accept that the laws of nature, including evolution, can explain the existence of life forms. But I don't believe it can explain the existence of freely chosen intentions. As described in the OP, a process that is fully determined cannot give rise to a non-determined thing.

As to the question of how it all began, I’ll again mention the possibility that [...] it could nevertheless potentially be utterly devoid of any beginning — javra

An infinite regress of causes does not fulfill the PSR. Like chasing a carrot on a stick, every prior cause adds the need for one more explanation, and the gap to fulfill the PSR never closes.

You have not given sufficient reason for us to accept he principle of sufficient reason. — Banno

A full defense of the PSR is provided in this post under the section called "Argument in defense of the PSR". But here is a summary:

There is a strong parallel between logic and the PSR. They are both first principles of metaphysics and epistemology. On the epistemology side, logic is associated with deduction, and the PSR is associated with induction/abduction.

We accept the laws of logic, not merely because we observe outcomes in reality to be logical (otherwise we could not say that everything must necessarily be logical; only that things happen to be logical), but because our voice of reason, specifically our deductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some outcomes could be illogical, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

Similarly, we should accept the PSR, not merely because we observe that things in reality have reasons to exist or occur, but because our voice of reason, specifically our inductive/abductive reasoning, tells us to. If we entertain the idea that some things exist or occur without reason, our voice of reason says "That's illegal".

Further, it is not a law of logic nor of rationality, and so we are not under any obligation to accept it. — Banno

Being that logic and the PSR are both first principles of metaphysics, they stand side by side; one is not underneath the other. Thus, we cannot derive logic from the PSR or vice versa. However, it is a law of rationality on the epistemology side, called induction or abduction.


You've asked other questions but I'll stop here for now for the sake of brevity.

On the assumption you buy your own argument as valid - not a good look for you - what, exactly, do you think you've proved? — tim wood

That if we accept the PSR as a valid first principle of metaphysics, then we infer the existence of a designer and of a first cause with inherent existence (which may or may not be the same). Now, this is still far from the notion of God, but it is a step towards it.

Why should the first cause, of all possibilities, be a god and not the universe itself or chaos itself or any other fluctuation itself? — Quk

The OP argument only concludes that something designed the universe. It does not extend so far as to claim that the designer or the first cause is God. I happen to believe it is God, but that will be an argument for a later post, to not derail the current discussion.

I agree with you that the argument only aims to demonstrate the existence of a designer, which is far from the notion of God. Now, I happen to believe this designer is God, but that will be an argument for another post :)

Who designed the intelligent designer?
Who designed the designer of the intelligent designer? — Quk

You are asking how to solve the problem of infinite regress. Infinite regress is avoided if we posit that the first cause has inherent existence. In which case, the reason or explanation for the existence of the first cause is an internal one (type 3): The statement "the first cause which has inherent existence exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true. And no prior cause is needed to fulfill the PSR.

Let's take a step back. Purely physical things have only 3 components: matter, energy, and the arrangement of matter. When we speak on man-made things, we really refer only to the arrangement of matter since man did not create the raw matter or energy.

With that, when we say that man creates scissors, we mean that man creates the specific shape of scissors which is designed to cut paper. Even when scissors are used for another purpose, say as a door holder, it retains its shape which is designed to cut paper.

I claim that it is an argument against intelligent design. — JuanZu

Even if I were to agree that the scissors lose their identity of scissors as soon as they are used for another purpose, it does not change the fact that were created from intelligent design in the first place.

Here's a simple example. Data: A thing looks like a duck and sounds like a duck. We posit two explanations. Explanation 1: It's a duck. Explanation 2: It's the DH disguised as a duck. Both explanations account for all the data, but Explanation 1 is more reasonable because all the data supports the claim that it's a duck and none of the data supports the claim that it's a hippopotamus or divine. The DH explanation is therefore superfluous. — A Christian Philosophy

According to whom and by what standard? — tim wood

According to Occam's Razor, or the principle of parsimony, or abductive reasoning, or even the duck test. I can understand that you do not accept the PSR, but do you honestly deny all of these other standards?

Infinite regress is avoided if the first cause has inherent existence. In this case, its existence is explained internally (reason type 3). — A Christian Philosophy

This is called Deux ex machina. As argument it won't do, as being essentially a kind of begging the question. — tim wood

Why do you say that positing a first cause with inherent existence begs the question? It is not arbitrary if it is derived from the PSR and avoids infinite regress.

If every possibility is compatible with PSR, then PSR is methodologically useless. — Banno

Being that the PSR is categorized as a first principle of metaphysics, it's expected that it should cover everything in reality, actual and possible. But I don't see why that would make it useless. Let's compare it with the laws of logic. Being that logic is also a first principle of metaphysics, it also covers everything in reality, i.e., nothing can break logic. Yet, applying the laws of logic is not useless.

WHat you are saying is that whatever occurs, there must be a reason, even if we don't know what that reason is and don't have any evidence or justification to claim there is such a reason. — Banno

Correct. Reality exists even if we don't know the specific about it. But we can often find the specific reasons or explanations. That's the job of abductive reasoning: inference to the best explanation. We would not start looking for explanations if we did not believe that explanations existed.

Further, as pointed out above, physicist do not look for, nor expect to find, any cause for such results. They are not needed; and physics does not fail as a result of this failure of PSR. — Banno

That's fine; that doesn't make the principle false.

PSR is not needed, and indeed not useful. — Banno

The PSR can be useful. Among other things, it can be used to draw conclusions about intelligent design as per the OP.

I admit I have a bit of trouble understanding your comment. Perhaps the following example will help, and hopefully, you can build on it if it does not address your objection.

Consider a paper cutter. It's a man-made device designed for the purpose of cutting paper (its final cause). That is the reason why we brought it into existence. Suppose that, over the years, through wear and tear, the device is no longer able to cut paper. At that point, it is no longer correct to identify it as a paper cutter. It is now junk or recycling material. Thus, the existence of a thing as a paper cut is determined by its function which is the ability to cut paper.

see Chalmers, Reality+ — Richard B

Interesting. I'll check it out!

Prove the DH is superfluous. — tim wood

Here's a simple example. Data: A thing looks like a duck and sounds like a duck. We posit two explanations. Explanation 1: It's a duck. Explanation 2: It's the DH disguised as a duck. Both explanations account for all the data, but Explanation 1 is more reasonable because all the data supports the claim that it's a duck and none of the data supports the claim that it's a hippopotamus or divine. The DH explanation is therefore superfluous.

Nothing requires an explanation. [...] "The principal of reason reads nihil est sine ratione. One translates it: nothing is without a reason." (The Principal of Reason, Heidegger, p. 3). He qualifies reason as, "that [which] one can always render as to why the matter has run its course this way instead of that" (p. 119). I submit the DH as the reason. — tim wood

I'm unclear on your position. Do you believe that nothing requires an explanation or do you observe the principle of reason?

Which presupposes a designer, yes? You do realize you're on the first step of an infinite regress, yes? No? — tim wood

Infinite regress is avoided if the first cause has inherent existence. In this case, its existence is explained internally (reason type 3).