Yeah, it may be the case that after a while, through good habits, we perform a morally good act with little to no reasoning. The ability to rationalize the act may still be present, but not necessarily activated.

Says the argument in the OP.

The criteria for moral value is justice; and justice is equality in treatment among all men; thus equality in treatment is the criteria for moral value.

Hello. I like your post, and want to analyze it.

the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the fruition of these same rights. — Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, Article IV

This is good. It is another way to interpret the golden rule.

So your morality consists in total freedom of the individual, with the exception of harm. I have a couple of questions on your no-harm morality.

(1) Is it morally wrong to eat animals and plants? (2) Is it morally acceptable to lie to others if they never find out? (2) Is it wrong to give an employee a raise, and another no raise, due to favoritism?
Is it wrong to do harm to the nazis to prevent them from killing more jews?

"Equality in treatment" is the criteria of moral value (goodness/badness) specifically, not value in general. There are other types of values, and you are close to the mark when it comes to physical values. I would say the criteria for that one is more accurately health and safety of the individual, but you can indeed extend it to the species.

We know that moral value is different than physical value because the nazis, which are (almost) universally labelled as morally bad, would still be labelled as morally bad, even if they had successfully preserved and expanded their reign.

I have decided to stop taking your comments seriously. With that, thanks for increasing the Replies count on this discussion. I suspect this attracts more readers. :blush:

I think you are begging the question here. There might be disagreement about what constitutes 'an objective judgement' for many kinds of reasons. But here you're more or less insisting that objectivity is self-evident or that there are some objective criteria which just naturally everyone will agree on. And I don't think you've established that. — Wayfarer

I may have misunderstood your point, but are you saying that the right factors that influence the act are not obtained objectively? Maybe an example might help.

A policeman arrests a black man that was present at a crime scene, and does not arrest a white man that was not at the crime scene. If the reason the policeman arrested the black man and not the white man was because of race, then the act was not just, because race is not a valid reason to arrest someone. If on the other hand the reason was because one was at the crime scene and the other was not, then the act was just, because this is a valid reason to arrest someone.

Even if my position were to have changed, it does not entail that morality is neither absolute nor objective. But regardless, my position has not changed. Can you describe how you think it has changed?

So reason is present in the topic, even if it is not made explicit in every moral actions.

This is question begging nonsense. — charleton

This is merely an opinion or position. An argument is a position backed up by reason.

A MASSIVE error. You omitted children and women. Did you realise that it was international women's day this week? — charleton

I was aware. As previously stated, by 'men', I mean mankind. This is a conventional term in traditional philosophy. Thus I am not omitting children or women. But what is the point to linger on this? Do you want me to apologize? I can if you want. My intent was not to offend anyone.

As I said earlier, "To preserve equality in treatment, if you treat others and yourself as you please only, then you would be forced to accept others to treat you, others, and themselves as they please only." In your response, neither A nor B are accepting the same treatment from the other. Thus equality in treatment is not preserved.

To generalize: "Equality in treatment in all men" means that for a given situation, a just treatment is determined such that all men must follow it for others and themselves, as well as from others. This is really nothing more than the golden rule.

Haters gonna hate, but not philosophize. :groan:

I don't say morality is subjective. I say that moral feelings, impulses, attitudes, judgments, values, ends.... vary from one person and from one cultural context to another, though it seems there are common biological bases to all that variety, rooted in our nature as human animals. — Cabbage Farmer

I agree. Inasmuch as if the human eye sees an object, it is likely that the object seen is real, so it can be that if humans have a moral feeling, it is likely that it points to a real morality. That said, I do not use this argument in the OP.

For instance, if a man assaults anyone who looks at him crooked, I don't call his action "just" and "good" in light of the fact that he treats all his victims the same. — Cabbage Farmer

You omit that equality in treatment in all men includes the very man treating others too. If the man wouldn't want others to treat him the way he treats others, then he is not just, because he treats himself differently than he treats others.

All we know is, a concept of equality or proportionality must factor into the characterization somehow. But how? And what else can or must factor into our characterization of justice? — Cabbage Farmer

See example 2 in the OP. Justice can be relative to the factors that determine the act. Those factors are found rationally. As long as for a given rational factor, everyone is treated equally, then justice is done.

One of us says the pieces should be the same size. Another says the size of the cake should be proportionate to the weight of the consumers. [...] — Cabbage Farmer

In example 1, you omitted the phrase "all else being equal". This example was intentionally over-simplified to introduce the concept. Example 2 gets more complex and introduces the factors you mention. If you have a valid argument to introduce a factor that makes justice relative to it, then the acts remain just as long as everyone involved is treated equally relative to those factors.

As I've argued above: Even if we grant that the morality or "goodness" of an act can be evaluated purely in terms of a conception of justice, and even if we grant that equality or proportionality is essential to any conception of justice, it has not been shown that there is an objective standard by which to arrive at a single noncontroversial definition of justice adequate to this purpose. — Cabbage Farmer

Justice: equality in treatment in all men, even when it is relative to some factors which were arrived at rationally. The factors are determined through objective reasoning; the persons are compared against those factors objectively; therefore justice is determined objectively.

The principle of the matter can co-exist, though. If I and everyone treated everyone and themselves exactly as they pleased there is nothing contradictory in that. It's completely equitable in that everyone is treating people in the same manner. Whether we succeed is another matter altogether. — Moliere

Let's use an example. Person A wants to live. Person B wants person A to die. How do either person A or B can act so that the equality in treatment is preserved at all times?

To preserve equality in treatment, if you treat others and yourself as you please only, then you would be forced to accept others to treat you, others, and themselves as they please only. But the two behaviours cannot co-exist mutually because what pleases you does not necessarily coincide with what pleases others. Therefore this behaviour is incompatible with justice.

The first thing that strikes is the word "men". These days in most civilised societies justice is also offered to women. Odd that you you should hold such an outdated notion. — charleton

Justice should also be offered to children you know; why are you omitting children? :joke:
By 'men', I mean mankind. A minor misunderstanding.

Secondly, you strangely use the word "all". I suggest that there is not a single society that has offered justice to all men and women, let alone 'all men'. — charleton

You may be right, but that would merely suggest that no society is completely just; not that justice is subjective.

Third, I think you have a big task ahead if you think that people who the society deeds as worthy of justice, shall receive that justice equally. — charleton

Are you saying that just people are not necessarily treated justly? Once again, you may be right, but that only speaks of the injustice in the world; it does not entail that justice is subjective. Since morality is about 'what-ought-to-be' and not about 'what-is', you cannot defend or attack a morality based on historical facts.

As per example 2 in the OP, justice can be relative to some rational factors. In this case, it is relative to how starving some people are. Giving unequal pieces of cake relative to how starving people are can still result in equality in treatment, because anyone would get a larger piece if that person was starving too.

To generalize, we can always rely on the golden rule: "I should treat others in a way I would like to be treated if I were in their situation". This is always just, because you treat others as equal to you.

Yeah thanks. I think you are correct that I could have used the term 'fairness' in this case too. I think 'justice' is the more general term to account for the treatment of all beings, and 'fairness' is the more narrow term to account for the treatment of beings of the same species only. E.g. It is fair to treat all men as equal, and it is just to treat man as man and animals as animals.

Killing someone as a revenge might be just, but not moral. — BlueBanana

If by 'revenge' you mean "a desire for justice (and nothing beyond it)", then it is not immoral. But if you mean "a desire that goes beyond justice (i.e. swinging the pendulum the other way)", then it is immoral, but also unjust because you are now treating the victim differently than how you would want to be treated.

I don't see how that is unequal just because there's someone deciding about the nature of that equal treatment. — BlueBanana

To impose your desires on others against their will results in unequal treatment.

Another example, what if you can choose to help one person or multiple people, but if you only help the one person, their gain from the help is greater than the combined gain of the multiple people? — BlueBanana

This case is similar to example 2 in the OP. The justice is relative to the predicted net gain, and this does not entail unequal treatment, because if the predicted gain was equal in both options, then I would help everyone equally.

The practical solution is found through the Golden Rule: "How can I act in a way that I would want others to act towards me?". The golden rule is directly derived from justice, because it demonstrates an equal treatment between yourself and others.

So I'm arguing that objectivity as a criterion tends to imply a quantitative, rather than qualitative, judgement. — Wayfarer

I agree that what is quantitative is objective, but a thing does not need to be quantitative to be objective. The proposition "what is not quantitative is not objective" is itself not quantitative, which would make it not objectively true; thus making it a self-contradiction.

Say you're adjudicating a dispute between claimants to native title of some lands against an industrial interest that wants to develop them for commercial reasons. [...] — Wayfarer

Your example points to a moral problem that is challenging, but not subjective. Any judgement which has an objective criterion implies a 'better' or 'worse', depending on how close it gets to meet that criterion. Judgements with subjective criteria don't enter the realm of 'better' or 'worse'. In your example, while the ideal solution may be challenging to attain, there are nevertheless solutions which are clearly better or worse. E.g., siding with one of the two parties is clearly better than kicking both parties off to build your own private mansion. Therefore the problem remains objective.

Regarding 'impartiality': I agree that it has a place in the topic, but it is not incompatible with 'objectivity'. I argue that a judge must remain impartial precisely because the criterion of judgement is objective.

Subjective. — charleton

Are you saying the definition of justice is subjective? Definitions of concepts are always objective. If not the case, then the Socratic Method of finding correct definitions would be in vain. At worst, you could say that my definition is wrong and then proceed to explain why.

Alright. What if the information told by your conscience contradicts the information told be somebody else's conscience. The usual way to resolve a conflict is through reasoning.

But if you claim that conscience informs you without the use of reason, then it seems you are told what to do, by the conscience, without understanding the reason why it is morally good. In which case, how could you know that the information is morally good, and not information rising from some selfish desire?

What would be an example from your experience?

To my knowledge, conscience only gives general principles; it does not inform us of the specific morally right action for the specific situation; which can only be obtained by reason. And I think the first principle is "act justly" or "obey the golden rule".

Example: For a given situation, even if lying would make things easier on me, I choose to tell the truth, because truth is what I would want to hear in that situation.

(1) The criteria or standard to evaluate the moral value (goodness or badness) of an act is justice.
— Samuel Lacrampe
That's your opinion. — BlueBanana

Example: mercy isn't always just, but it could be argued to be morally right. — BlueBanana

Can you give a concrete example of merciful act? I cannot think of one where the morality is contrary to justice.

(2) Justice is defined as: equality in treatment among all men.
— Samuel Lacrampe
No, that's just equality. Is killing everyone for no reason just? Justice is defined through morality, not the other way around. — BlueBanana

I think you agree with me that killing everyone for no reason is unjust. And it is unjust precisely because there is an unequal treatment. In this case, because you treat the victims as what pleases you; not them.

It's not clear whom you are responding to. — T Clark

My bad. I was responding to the OP. I have changed my previous response above.
While I am here, I might as well respond to your previous post.

For me, impulses from the heart underlie all moral action. It may or may not pass through reason on its way to implementation. — T Clark

I agree. The first principles of morality come from our 'conscience', or likely what you call 'heart'. Then reason is used to determine the correct actions that comply with these principles.

That said, reason is necessary for morality because only reason can know universals, as is the case for first principles of morality. I think 'ethics' is also called 'practical reason'.

Hello. You are correct that intention or will is a necessary ingredient to morality.

In general: Morality is treating each being according to its proper ontological value (value as being). I.e., treat God as God, man as man, animals as animals, plants as plants, and objects as objects. Any other combination would be immoral. E.g., treat God as an object or an object as a god.

Concerning man only: All men have equal ontological value, therefore it is moral to treat all men as equal, including yourself. Thus we get the Golden Rule of ethics: do unto others as you would want them to do unto you. Failing the Golden Rule entails that there is an unequal intention of treatment somewhere.

[...] If they coincide with real things, then they are particulars. That is what I was arguing, if we want to give concepts real existence, we must reduce them to particulars, either as the form of a particular thing, or as an ideal universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

You presuppose that all beings are particulars. Why is that necessary? I would agree that all physical beings are particulars, due to having particular spacial-temporal properties. But this would not apply to non-physical beings.

All this demonstrates is that we judge these few things in a similar way. It doesn't demonstrate that we have the same concept. However, the fact that we each described our concept of "triangle" in a different way does demonstrate that we each have a different concept of "triangle". — Metaphysician Undercover

It can also mean that we judge these things in the same way. I thought we previously agreed that different descriptions can still refer to the same thing.

I think we've been away from this discussion for too long, and we've both lost track of what each other has been arguing. perhaps we ought to give it up. Why must a concept be connected to a "real being"? A concept may be completely artificial. An architect designs a building. The concept is completely in the architect's mind, then on the paper. it is not connected to a "real being". Or do I misunderstand you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand that it has been a while. It is unfortunate, but it's reality. Yes, we can leave it at that. This was fun. I think I will post a new discussion at some point, to start fresh with the things I have learned here. I have still answered below your questions for completeness, but I don't expect a response afterwards.

Concepts must be connected to real beings, because if not, then no proposition ever spoken can be said to be true, because truth means reflective of reality. Thus if I say "the apple is red", there must exist a real being for the apple, and a real being for the property red, in order for the proposition to be true.

Yes, concepts may also be artificial, as is the case for man-made things like a house or guitar. In this case, the concept precedes the being that is built from the concept. But for non man-made things like 'apple' and 'red', the being precedes our concept of them. E.g., we would not grasp the concept 'red' if red things did not exist.

So your argument is that we each describe the same thing with different words. But this does not necessitate that the thing we are each describing with different words is the same thing. So your argument just creates a possibility, it doesn't produce anything conclusive. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, it does not make it necessary but possible; and this possibility is sufficient to refute your argument that, since we give different descriptions of concepts, then the concepts must be different. We are therefore back to the starting point obtained from the principle of parsimony, namely that concepts coincide with real things, because it is the simplest hypothesis.

Now, in the case of a concept, how are we going to point to it to determine whether it's the same thing which we are each talking about? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that for particular physical beings, we can validate that we are talking about the same thing by pointing to its spatial-temporal properties. Also, this cannot be done for universal concepts because I argue that they are not physical beings. However, we can get close to certainty by testing numerous particular physical beings that have the universal concept as its genus. For example, we can test if my judgement of the shapes here, here, and here match with your judgement that they have 'triangle' as their genus. Since our judgement is based on our respective concept, then the more objects we test, the closer we get to certainty that our concept is the same. Another way is to see if we agree with each other's description, despite their minor differences. I personally believe this way is also legit, but I know you don't because you demand complete sameness in descriptions. So on to the next section below.

I do not believe that different description can refer to the same concept because I believe that the concept is the description itself. [...] If you want to support your position, in which the concept is something other than the description, something referred to by the description, or described, you need to point to the concept, show it to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I find that position surprising. Recall that if the concept is not connected a being in reality, then the consequence is that no proposition ever spoken can be true, that is, reflect reality. Up to now, I thought your position was that our concepts are connected to real beings, and although they may fail to accurately match the real beings, they nevertheless come close to it. I was willing to take that position seriously. But now, it seems your new position is that a concept is nothing but the description itself, not referring to another thing, thereby completely severing its connection to any real being. Consequently, no truth can ever be spoken. I hope I am misunderstanding something, because as it stands, your new position leads to absurdity. It forces you to give up on metaphysics (which is ironic given your name), and by extension, truth, and by extension, philosophy, which is the search for truth.

Just to clarify, I was not accusing you of self-contradiction, but rather pointing out the limitations of such a topic as whether truth can be attained. Yes, scientific topics also start with hypotheses, but do not end there, because these hypotheses can be validated empirically. This topic on truth however can never be validated, by its very content. This is why we are reduced to rely on the principle of parsimony. There is simply no better approach here. But it's not as bad as what you make it sound. The principle states that it is more reasonable to retain the simplest hypothesis that explains all the data. Your "dark spot" example is not a correct one, because it gives no explanation, and so does not satisfy the principle. But a simple explanation would be adequate, and would still leave the inclination to investigate further for validation (if possible).

In your example, we both have different descriptions, and you are assuming that we are describing the same thing. That assumption is not sufficient. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

My point was that even when we are describing the same thing like a duck (and we know this by pointing to the same object), then it still happens that we can give different descriptions.

In the case of the concept, I point to the idea in my mind, and you point to the idea in your mind, and we are pointing to different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure what you mean by "pointing to the idea in my mind". Concepts or ideas are like signs that point to something else. If I have the idea of a specific chair in mind, I would not "point to the idea in my mind", but point to the specific chair in reality, which the idea is about.

However, the whole point of my argument is that there is a distinction to be made, between "similar" and "same". If you agree that there is a distinction between similar and same, then in making this distinction there can be no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference, because this would allow that two similar things are the same. And that would negate the distinction between similar and same which we would have agreed to uphold. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are making an error. Yes, you are correct that it is impossible for similar things to be one and the same thing. However, it is possible for similar descriptions of a thing to be about one and the same thing. And as shown previously, it is very probable that our description of the same duck will have insignificant differences in words and order of words.

I accept your clarification about "coming to an agreement" on things that were not previously agreed upon.

I don't see any problem with this, no self-contradiction. It's like the statement "any statement may be doubted". That statement may be doubted too. But there is no self-contradiction unless I state that it is undoubtable that any statement may be doubted. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are correct that there is no self-contradiction in the sense that the statement "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing toward reality, is implied by human agreement" must be necessarily false. However, there is a self-contradiction in the assertion of the statement, as in "it is completely true that we cannot obtain complete truths". To escape the contradiction, the statement must remain in the state of hypothesis. Now on the other hand, there is also a flaw in saying "it is completely true that we can obtain some truths completely", because it creates circular reasoning. Indeed, the very nature of the topic is such that we will forever remain in the state of hypotheses regardless what position we take, and never be able to rise to a higher level of certainty. And this brings me to the point on the principle of parsimony.

The principle of parsimony is very weak as a proof. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but given the nature of the topic as shown in the previous paragraph, this principle is unfortunately the best method we have left. As such, if I perceive some thing, it is more reasonable to assume that the thing perceived is the real thing, than not, until a flaw is found in the hypothesis. And you claim to have found one, as follows:

I say that the differences, the peculiarities, which we each have, "point to" the lack of a real universal form. I support my claim by pointing to differences, and saying that there are no examples of human concepts which are "the same" between individuals. So the assumption of "the same" is faulty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This depends on the degree of difference. Let's take a common-sense example: You and I both observe the same duck, and we describe it to a third person. I say "it has a beak, two wings and is brown". If you say "it has a trunk, leaves, and is green", then I agree that this type of difference is significant enough to debunk the 'sameness' conclusion, and by extension refute the 'complete truth' hypothesis. But if you say "it has wings, a beak, and is beige", then even though there are differences in the description (different words in different order), this type of difference is not significant enough to debunk the conclusion that we are describing the same thing, by common sense. As such, your demand for complete sameness is unreasonable. Then I claim the differences are for the most part insignificant, as demonstrated in the example of 'triangle' way back then, where I described it as "a flat surface with 3 straight sides", and you described it as "a plane with 3 sides and 3 angles". Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions.

Agreement is necessitated by differences. — Metaphysician Undercover

That does not sound right. You and I surely agree that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 and nothing else. Here is an example of agreement with no difference. Are you perhaps mixing the concept of 'agreement' with 'tolerance' or 'compromise'? Regardless, I think the first two points above are more decisive to the topic.

Hello MU. I am back; at least temporarily. Though it has been a while, I hope you are okay to resume this conversation. I will resume it in the next post below.

Hey MU. Sorry for not being as responsive as last year. Obligations are getting in the way. This trend may continue for a while, but I do plan to answer all the objections above at some point.

(1) Yes, but I was raised in a society in which monogamy is valued.
(2) and (3) I think that you might have understood me in my "genetic tool for survival" claim-- I am talking about empathy, a real biological phenomenon; your given examples have nothing to do with how empathy works. Levels of empathy vary by individual, but the vast majority of the human race feels emotional distress when they see that another is in pain, the same way we feel nauseous when we see someone vomiting. This is natural for social animals. But again-- the amount of empathy one feels depends entirely upon the individual, and some individuals lack it entirely. They have no intuitive understanding of what is considered right or wrong, and no qualms whatsoever about harming other human beings. — bioazer

Your explanations are incomplete as they only push the mystery one step back. (1) Why is monogamy valued? (2) and (3) Why do we feel empathy? For both questions, the answer can be 'justice', which completes the explanation.

...so the Golden Rule is the plumb line between good and evil, huh? How does that apply at all in the Trolley Problem? Whatever happens, you are still running people over with the trolley, no matter how altruistic you might be-- does "do unto others as you'd have them do unto you" really apply here? — bioazer

If you did not place the people there, then you are not morally responsible for the outcome, because your intentions were not bad, and you did not fail the Golden Rule. If you did place them there, then you are morally responsible, because that was your intentions, and these failed the Golden Rule. After that, one may argue that we should choose the path that saves the most amount of people; but this is once again a rational problem, not a moral one.

What about war? — bioazer

See the Just War Theory. War is sometimes the right thing to do, as would be the case when going to war against the Nazis. Its underlying principle is still justice, as indicated in the name.

It is certainly not true that people will always want you to do unto them what you'd like them to do unto you, which is why rape is a crime. — bioazer

You misunderstand the term 'rape', which is defined as non-consensual sex. By definition, nobody wants to be raped. The rapists themselves cannot consent to rape, because that would be consenting to non-consensual sex, which is contradictory.

What is your reasoning for using specifically the Golden Rule? What line of reasoning led you to that "objective" conclusion? — bioazer

As stated in a previous post, 'justice among men' is defined as equal treatment. The application of equal treatment can be found objectively, and therefore justice is objective. Then the Golden Rule is simply a derivation of the concept of justice, and is a practical test that ensures we act justly.

If you use "true" or "truth" in a less strict sense, then we can say that if human beings agree, that this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand you correctly, your position is that our concepts are not completely true, but are consistent among all humans, and this indicates that we are close to truth. I see a few flaws with this view.

(1) There is a self-contradiction in the assertion that "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement". If complete truth can never be obtained, then this statement can never be validated to be completely true.

(2) It fails the principle of parsimony: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. Thus if everyone perceives the same concept, it is reasonable to assume the concept is pointing to the real thing; until it is invalidated. But it cannot be invalidated, for the same reason that your position cannot be validated, as shown in (1).

(3) You wish to escape the absurdity that no judgement can ever be determined as true or false, by arguing that we can have mutual agreements among everyone, and claim "this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality". I agree that we can have mutual agreement among everyone, but why is this an indication that we are pointing toward reality? If the concept of a single individual is not true, then why would the whole group, which is nothing but the sum of all individuals, be any more true?

I will once again opt out of the "problem of induction" discussion, for the purpose of focusing on the one above.

If morality is objective-- universal-- where do you draw the line between good and evil? — bioazer

Golden Rule.

How do you solve the Trolley Problem? — bioazer

As I said in the OP, intention of good and evil is a necessary component of morality. As long as your intentions are not evil (don't violate the Golden Rule), then there is no moral mistake, only possible rational mistakes.

we also know that the basics of morals are remarkably similar across cultures — Pseudonym

To add to this statement, the Golden Rule "do unto others as you would want them to do unto you" is called that way because it "occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition." Source.

Additionally: Occam's Razor, please.
Are we required to make more assumptions by asserting that moral codes [...] are sets of taught acceptable behaviors and views, coupled with a genetic legacy for survival in social groups — bioazer

Yes; your hypothesis that our moral sense is merely a genetic tool used for survival is insufficient to explain the complete moral sense. Do you agree that your moral sense tells you that the following acts are immoral?
(1) Cheating on your spouse, even if it is guaranteed that he/she never finds out about it.
(2) Turning a nation into farming animals for quick reproduction, and thus securing the survival of the species through sheer numbers.
(3) If your own survival is guaranteed (by, say, super powers), then all acts become moral because the end of surviving is already met.

Finally, what do you reply to a person that says "I don't care about the survival of the species, and so don't act towards that end"? You cannot say they are objectively wrong, if you do not believe in an objective morality.

This is not a disproof of the subjectivity of morality-- in fact, it is the opposite. Your logic is deeply flawed. The contradiction you think to be so crippling to the philosophy of subjective morality only presents a problem if you actually presuppose that morality is objective! — bioazer

Hello. You are correct that my argument (1) does not disprove moral subjectivism. However, it does showcase the consequences of believing in our western moral system in a subjective way, namely, that it is contradictory. And there is no need to presuppose the objectivity of the moral system to see the contradiction; just logic. In other words, either the western moral system is objectively real, or it cannot exist, even in a subjective way, without contradiction.

That is right. Moral principles, like "do unto others as you would want them to do unto you", and "treat everyone equally", are innate. Then in practice, acts are judged either morally good or bad by checking if they abide to the moral principles or not, for a given situation. Since this is relative to the situation, determining the morally good course of action can sometimes be challenging if the situation is complex. Nevertheless, morality is objective as actions can be judged objectively against the moral principles.