If an automatic response is called a "choice" (and no one in their right mind would call it that), it is not a free choice, because it is necessitated by the thing it is a response to. — Metaphysician Undercover

so, sounds like you do not agree w/ @Zelebg that a robot operating 100% deterministic on its program is acting out 'free will' because it actions are necessitated by the thing it is responding to. is that right?

And once again, the point is that a person does not need to know oneself to be making a free choice in order to actually be making a free choice. So you've just gone off on a tangent here. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, would you say that human type/level of 'free will' is pretty much equal to the 'free will' of, say, a bee? Why so or why not?

Why do you assume that the person must understand what it means to be "choosing", in order to be actually choosing? — Metaphysician Undercover

'free will' is not about only about anything that makes a choice. If it were then you can say the Earth is an agent and it has 'free will' to make weather of its choice. If the choices always happens automatically then no 'choice' by an agent is ever made at all. If you disagree with that then everything like inanimate objects have 'free will' according to your (et. al.) definitions and you've thereby reduced the term to be meaningless wrt how it is used for humans.

Does breathing require that one be conscious that one is breathing? Do you see what I mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

is that a bad example? I mean, are you saying that breathing is an example of carrying out our 'free will'. That example actually makes my point, that is breathing is a pre-programmed part of the agent's system so cannot be part of the agent's free will. If you believe otherwise, please try hard to use your will power to stop breathing for more than 5 (or even 10) minutes and let us know how successful 'you' were at that test of 'free will'. I'm sure you have the 'will power' to do so... If we do not hear back from you anymore then we will assume you were right and you have ‘free will’ the way you say you do.

The point is that I do not accept your argument. You seem to be proceeding from the false assumption that only a self-conscious being can act freely. — Metaphysician Undercover

are you saying that the standard definition/meaning of "free will" does not require an agent? do you believe the standard definition/meaning of "free will" requires "will power" to act on and carry out the 'will'?

I actually do not see there are two distinct interpretations on the question of the existence of colors. — Zelebg

I think you are right that your question was non-trivial, but only b/c of your "b" part. This part I was saying was trivial:
"a. we actually see colors (colors exist)"

for which I said:
"is it not so obvious that colors as we perceive cannot 'exist' in the mater itself? I mean, if nothing else, our eyes only receive all the light wavelengths (color) that was rejected by the object's surface, so by physics and definition that object cannot be said to have a color for which it rejects. Hence, obviously, no objects have the phenomenon of being/having the colors our eyes see."

e.g., see this passage quoted below.

Besides that, if panpsychism was true then would not you expect that the lowest forms of animals with brains could share very similar abilities of material consciousness and experiential consciousness as do humans b/c they all have practically the same hardware (neurons, nerves, connectivity, etc.)? However, we already know that few animals are even self-aware (e.g., few are able recognize themselves and ID their own agency) let alone having EC.

panpsychism supporters should start by experimentally making the above case before going to untestable near supernatural theories of quantum/atomic sources, etc..

Why are you so convinced that qualia consciousness must arise from things like quantum effects instead of simply being a macro-scale phenomenon w/o requiring the quantum effects to do its cool stuff?

There is nothing about panpsychism continuity or some kind of universal qualia that precludes machine implemented emergent AI conscious agents. If anything, they could be more in touch with the quantum continuum via things like q-bits, quantum wells, single particle systems, etc.

Anyhow, the panpsychism continuity concept seems unworthy of serious consideration b/c for it to matter the continuum chain would have to transmit a continuum of meaning, which I posit is impossible to preserve between dimensions and even between orders of magnitude in scale. For example, Peirce’s synechism concept fails in the simplest of examples like the party game where you get many people (say 10) side by side and have one at one end tell a message to their adjacent, and each repeats the same message to the next. The meaning of the message always is altered, even if subtlely, by the time it is repeated at the other end. Thus, it fails even in that ideal case, of nearly identical cognitive agents speaking the same language living in the same culture. So, we should have almost zero confidence in any kind of meaning existing in subparticles, in far remote locations, being able to communicate their meaning through quantum mechanical random fluctuations to neurons that communicate that as the same meaning to the conscious agent.

Bishop quote:
------------
That this result leads to panpsychism is
clear as, equating FSA Q(I) to a specific computational
system that is claimed to instantiate phenomenal states as it
executes, and following Putnam’s procedure, identical
computational (and ex hypothesi phenomenal) states can be
found in every open physical system.
Formally DwP is a simple reductio ad absurdum argument
that endeavours to demonstrate that:
– IF the assumed claim is true: that an appropriately
programmed computer really does instantiate genuine
phenomenal states
– THEN panpsychism holds
– However, against the backdrop of our immense
scientific knowledge of the closed physical world,
and the corresponding widespread desire to explain
everything ultimately in physical terms, panpsychism
has come to seem an implausible view...
– HENCE we should reject the assumed claim.
The route-map for this endeavour is as follows: in the
next section I introduce discrete state machines (DSMs)
and FSAs and show how, with input to them defined, their
behaviour can be described by a simple un-branching
sequence of state transitions. I subsequently review Putnam’s
1988 argument [52] that purports to show how every
open physical system implements every input-less FSA.
Then I apply Putnam’s construction to one execution trace
of any FSA with known input, such that if the FSA instantiates
genuine phenomenal states as it executes, then so
must any open physical system. Finally I apply the procedure
to a robotic system that is claimed to instantiate
machine consciousness purely in virtue of its execution of
an appropriate program. The article is completed by a brief
discussion of some objections to the DwP reductio and
concludes by suggesting, at least with respect to ‘hard’
problems, that it may be necessary to develop an alternative
metaphor for cognition to that of computation.

1. How do emergent properties result in self-awareness ( of colors)?
2. What kind of survival value is essential in choosing colors for cars; guitars, houses, clothing hair color, makeup, et al.?
3. Do human's exclusively rely on colors in the successful search for their food ?
4. Was prehistoric man concerned about the color of their prey before they chose to kill it?
5. What do you think Darwin would say about the metaphysical features of red evoking or conveying excitement from the color wheel? — 3017amen

Darwin's theories do not apply to #1 or #5. I already hinted at #2 in my above reply to you. See:

It is well known that primates effectively use color to ID a wide variety of foods (incl. fruits and other edibles). Color is used by many hyper poisonous creatures to warn others (who can see color) don't mess w/ me, or you die. — Sir Philo Sophia

re #3, certainly not. re #4, color and vision genes are highly preserved from our primate cousins, so Darwin (et. al.) would say your #4 is pretty irrelevant b/c they already had color vision/qualia inherited from their primates, whether it helped them to kill prey is not so material as to Darwin's theories. I personally would think, for example, that if there was a light brown animal hiding within green bushes it would be much more effective it have color vision.

If this pattern - having a mind - is part of the fractal structure then organs, cells, atoms, electrons, quarks, in fact everything, should have a mind.

Panpsychism, both in upwards, towards greater complexity and downwards, towards greater simplicity. — TheMadFool

wasn't Panpsychism thoroughly proven to not be viable by this author's publication below?:

Bishop, J.M. (2009). A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and Panpsychism, Cognitive
Computation, 1, pp. 221–233.

What in the world is not clear about better vision being better than worse vision? — Zelebg

if better vision has more (e.g., energy) cost than its survival benefits then Darwin would say that better performing vision is even worse than worse vision.

I would say we see color for the evolutionary reason that reflectivity of that small band of the electromagnetic radiation is really useful for navigating the environment. — Marchesk

that is not an ontology between colors and electromagnetic radiation. You instead seem to be stating a utility.

recall:

how would you say the colors we 'see' are ontologically "related to the reflectivity of electromagnetic radiation in the visible range"? — Sir Philo Sophia

Free will would be an illusion. the agent would only be responding according to its program. — Metaphysician Undercover

you got misdirected and hung up on me saying I 'created', which had nothing to do with my rhetorical point/example to Zelebg re the robot not having true self-agency irrespective of who/why made its programming.

The — Zelebg

It looks like another hint our ‘selves’ are virtual entities, virtual characters like in computer games. Living in a simulation, built not by evil machines, but by our own brains. Our personality, identity, ego, soul... it’s just a virtual little homunculus inside our heads. — Zelebg

sure, pretty clear our 'selves' is virtual entity (even panpsychist should agree with that); however, how do you logically tie that into "purpose of sentience or consciousness is so our brain can learn, which is how we "make choices". In other words, the purpose is so we can have "free will""

an agent can certainly learn and make choices w/o sentience or consciousness, and you seem to be contradicting yourself by saying that the purpose of sentience or consciousness (which the robot doesn't have) is so we can have "free will" (which you said the robot does have) . Maybe you did not express what you really mean/think. Please restate it in more clear terms.

So the essence of the problem is really, or should be, about defining what is a ‘person’ or 'self', rather than with the determinism per se. — Zelebg

I agree, but is that not implicit in how we use/mean the word 'will'? According to your definition, a crystal growing has 'free will' because it has "actions [that are] are determined autonomously, that is mostly by personal identity or character, instead of whatever else" because you say "body doesn’t matter except in the degrees of freedom" . The growing crystal "on its own" with a high degree of autonomy, where it is going to grow. So, does a self-replicating crystal have free will?

re robot, your robot is operating 100% deterministic on its program. So, your robot cannot represent or know itself. So, your robot cannot know what or why it wants. So, it cannot know itself to find ways modify its behavior according to new principles that have it go against its (prior) default programming. What about ‘will power’? Your robot has no struggle in implementing any new goals because it is completely rule driven so no ‘free will’. Something that is not rule driven will have conflict in deciding to execute a rule and will experience failure in trying to change its own rules.

Further consider the bee whose behavior is dictated by the hive social rules. Most would say it effectively has no free will, even if it certainly has the degree of freedom to not obey them. What do you say?

Again, I posit to you, how can one say it made a willful choice when it does not have self-consciousness to know it is choosing anything? thus, no free will there b/c you don't have a sentient free agent.

What you seem to be (re)defining as ‘free will’ seems to be a trivial game of semantics, nothing deep or meaningful b/c it lacks an agent that has true free agency.

Yes, that is free will, program does what program wants — Zelebg

so, how can you have a 'will' w/o a sentient agent?

Standard definitions seem to require the "I" be present in the agent. So, my robot example won't cut it, esp. since it cannot ever have the cogito ergo sum dilemma. That is, how can one say it made a willful choice when it does not have self-consciousness to know it is choosing anything? thus, no free will there b/c you don't have a sentient free agent.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

It looks like you mixed me with someone, — Zelebg

sorry about that. My head is spinning with all the threads I'm conversing on, like a game of whach-a-mole. So, if you actually consider imagination to be a virtual experience then must it have qualia to render the experience part? Panpsychism would seem to say yes, and it comes from our cells, atoms, etc. Or is, access consciousness enough to do human level imagination?

What exactly do you mean by “wisdom”? — Zelebg

that is for another thread. I have been debating that with @Possibility on another thread, but we are currently stuck at "information". Once we clear that hurdle, we'll debate knowledge then get to le piece de resistance, 'wisdom'.

Here is a pertinent (redacted) copy from that thread, towards answering you good enough for the purposes of this colors related discussion:

However, many in this thread seem to throwing around various definitions of info/data/knowledge/wisdom, apparently thinking that just 'relating' data/info is enough to do the transforms. Yet, that seems way too vague for a concrete discussion of ...

For me, the below definitions are a good starting place.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data
Knowledge is the understanding based on extensive experience dealing with information on a subject. For example, the height of Mount Everest is generally considered data. The height can be measured precisely with an altimeter and entered into a database. This data may be included in a book along with other data on Mount Everest to describe the mountain in a manner useful for those who wish to make a decision about the best method to climb it. An understanding based on experience climbing mountains that could advise persons on the way to reach Mount Everest's peak may be seen as "knowledge". The practical climbing of Mount Everest's peak based on this knowledge may be seen as "wisdom". In other words, wisdom refers to the practical application of a person's knowledge in those circumstances where good may result. Thus wisdom complements and completes the series "data", "information" and "knowledge" of increasingly abstract concepts.

Data is often assumed to be the least abstract concept, information the next least, and knowledge the most abstract.[9] In this view, data becomes information by interpretation; e.g., the height of Mount Everest is generally considered "data", a book on Mount Everest geological characteristics may be considered "information", and a climber's guidebook containing practical information on the best way to reach Mount Everest's peak may be considered "knowledge". "Information" bears a diversity of meanings that ranges from everyday usage to technical use. This view, however, has also been argued to reverse the way in which data emerges from information, and information from knowledge.[10] Generally speaking, the concept of information is closely related to notions of constraint, communication, control, data, form, instruction, knowledge, meaning, mental stimulus, pattern, perception, and representation. Beynon-Davies uses the concept of a sign to differentiate between data and information; data is a series of symbols, while information occurs when the symbols are used to refer to something.[11][12]

So what claim do you want to make? — Zelebg

I made it in a reply to @3017...

which is along the lines of:

it is converted into some set of symbols, or say, some molecular structure, then the conclusion is colors do not actually exist, but we only perceive something else as if it is a color. — Zelebg

I might add that, of course, all our mental representations of 'reality' operate this way, so as I mentioned to @3017..., your question seems to be stating the obvious. Or am I missing something deeper that you are getting at in your original question?

The sound of a bass woofer could just same have been assigned and experienced as the color 'red' and the mind would (or at least could learn to) be just as happy with that 'hearing' of the bass sound.

To learn by imagining, that is mental / virtual experience in advance, — Zelebg

in a previous reply to discount me saying that we cannot imagine infinity you said that was b/c "Well as we are talking about what can be imagined, not experienced, it seems you can imagine infinity.", but now you say imagination is almost synonymous w/ virtual experience in re 'To learn by imagining, that is mental / virtual experience in advance'. I strongly suspect you are confounding distinctly separate and different human faculties into one, which has you flip-flopping on definitions.

free will should really mean actions are determined autonomously, that is mostly by personal identity or character, — Zelebg

OK, so I make a robot that evolves its own personality, goals, and decision making by way of a genetic algorithm, and then have it makes its own final action decisions based on its personal/unique personality, and goals, and, in part, on a random number generator to help bias it to action when split decisions are experienced (likely not too different than what most humans do). So, according to your definition, have I not invented/created a robot which has 'free will'? I suspect your next step will be to start including definitions of agency in 'will'. Be careful, that path is a house of cards.... :wink:

Well as we are talking about what can be imagined, not experienced, it seems you can imagine infinity. — ZhouBoTong

So, you think 'imagination' is about math formulas and recursive algorithms (such as limits to infinity), and not about simulating the experience?

To me, this is just saying that we can't describe something that can't be described. — ZhouBoTong

I do not believe that is correct. The theory of relativity is completely imaginable by the human faculties, right? However, the Greeks could never imagine even the basic concepts of space-time or quantum mechanics on their own, despite the fact that they would have had the words (same language we have, don't need the math) to express the concepts back then even if they did imagine it.

In this way, I'm saying that the only reason that Einstein could imagine space-time fabric relativity is because he existed and learned in an environment where the public imagination included sufficiently close knowledge and metaphors for him to imagine how to incrementally do some analogical morphing/variant/extension of (combination) of the thing(s) that were known/experienced at the time. Had Einstein lived in the time of the Greeks, I am saying there is no way he could have imagined even the basic concepts of relativity, not for lack of language or faculty of imagination, but for the handicap that Human imagination is (almost strictly) limited to evolutionary thought grounded by the framework of what is known/experienced by the culture around you.

has little to no survival value — 3017amen

color, where apparently other species only see in black/white/grey(? — 3017amen

Darwin would answer that Humans do not need to perceive color for the Aesthetics, but do for the optimal survival. It is well known that primates effectively use color to ID a wide variety of foods (incl. fruits and other edibles). Color is used by many hyper poisonous creatures to warn others (who can see color) don't mess w/ me, or you die. That said, Aesthetics may well be a secondary driver in things like sexual attraction.

c. We actually see colors, but they are properties of our visual system, not the objects or environment itself, although they are related to the reflectivity of electromagnetic radiation in the visible range. — Marchesk

how would you say the colors we 'see' are ontologically "related to the reflectivity of electromagnetic radiation in the visible range"?

Existence is not a condition or a state of being, it is the phenomenon of being, itself. Something must exist in order to have a state of being, and if being is necessary in order for change to occur, then cause and effect is derived from and thus subordinate to the more fundamental phenomenon of existence. — 3017amen

well put as to external, physical 'existence'. However, is it not so obvious that colors as we perceive cannot 'exist' in the mater itself? I mean, if nothing else, our eyes only receive all the light wavelengths (color) that was rejected by the object's surface, so by physics and definition that object cannot be said to have a color for which it rejects. Hence, obviously, no objects have the phenomenon of being/having the colors our eyes see. So, in your terms, the OP was asking an easy, obvious, trivial non-question... right?

The more interesting, and non-trivial, question to me was how does our qualia of color (mentally) exist.

We say that there is "relative information" between two systems anytime the state of one is constrained by the state of the other. — Carlo Rovelli

This is just one type of info. This is not a complete definition of information. Moreover, nothing new about this idea. Seems to be just one type of information where there are cross-correlations or causal dependencies between things.

nformation from interacting with a particular ‘apple’ experience, for instance, reduces your uncertainty wrt that apple — Possibility

Not necessarily. Here is an example where uncertainty might increase: assume you believed all apples were red and anything spherical and greenish is a Lime. You go to bite what you thought was a greenish lime, but you discover and confirm it was a green apple. This new info that apples can be other colors now makes you uncertain as to whether other properties you believed apples have are true, and you even question what does it mean to be an apple, let alone the red type. Not a great example, but I hope you get the gist of what I mean that new info on something can also make you more uncertain (lest confident or trusting) in your truth or knowledge of that something.

Again, I'm still looking for your explanation of how you believe "Information is the resolution of uncertainty"

thx.

So sure red will convey excitement on a subconscious level, but unfortunately that tells us nothing about the nature of it's existence. — 3017amen

the color wheel is just a reflection of the existence of a collectively consistent human qualia/emotive experience of the colors. So, please clarify what you mean by "nature of it's existence". We all already know that photo vibration frequency don't exist as colors any more than sound pressure waves do. Obviously, the existence is in the person's personal qualia reconstruction of "reality" which is, of course, a useful illusion as to modeling/abstracting upon the true physics of matter. So, what is your point?

Information: ‘the resolution of uncertainty’ Is a simplified definition of information, although it invariably leads to a demonisation of entropy and a subsequent rejection of this uncertainty. — Possibility

I don't see how information is directly and necessarily related to any monotonic change in entropy. I see info as being more about the binding of data values in a certain configuration as a property of something.

information on something might reduce your uncertainty/entropy wrt to knowing that something, which may at the same time increase your uncertainty/entropy (e.g., if the info contradicts many more facts/info you thought were true of that something). So, in this context, please explain by example how you find, by definition "Information is the resolution of uncertainty’".

My one line hypothesis is that we filter information a priori from an external energy source. Much like Schopenhauer's theory of Metaphysical Will in nature... . — 3017amen

that is too supernatural for me. I'm finding a path towards qualia that is something that I can model and see a plausible utility/mechanics; that is, we are genetically coded to attribute arbitrary, yet largely consistent, value/experience/emotions to various data value phenomenon as a way to create an experience that enables a personal empathy/emotives to data values to make them real (to us as emotive/social creatures) and to share a common experience. So, for the color red, we might be genetically coded to have energetic, aggressive feelings with the data value of red, which may have come (like that for Bulls) about by evolution selecting for such defensive responses to the sight of red blood. Blue feels like a cool/cold color like ice, and peaceful like the sky. etc. To the extent data values in our perceived sensory/motor have been (genetically, by personality, or by nurture) been associated with certain emotive states then they become part of our qualia experience for it, making it feel much more real to us. I find it particularly interesting that synesthetes not only love the cross sensory invocation of emotives and colors on, say numbers, that it actually helps them greatly to process the value data (e.g., out of a vast field of random numbers, they might see all '7s as red and instantly can spot one # 7 out of 1000s of other #s). So, attaching an arbitrary qualia can even have practical utility, beyond my other point of enabling/enhancing the formation of wisdom.

:chin:

The correlation drawn between touching the fire and the ensuing pain makes both meaningful to the creature drawing the correlation. The correlation need not be drawn in order for touching fire to cause pain. — creativesoul

you are confounding so many things there it is incoherent. Introducing qualia adds needless further complexity and confounding. Pain alone, of course, is programmed to have meaning to the sentient agent. So, that is a non-statement. When it comes to the agent wanting to gain knowledge of how to best avoid experiencing that pain (or worse) again, it has to figure out that cause of it, so it has to seek out meaningful predictors of causing that event, and when it associates its touching the fire it creates meaning in the fire object as a meaningful source, touching as the meaningful process creating the causal nexus resulting in the qualia pain, thus the causal meaning created knowledge of how to avoid that pain/harm problem. In this way, you still have not provided us a concrete example which does not relegate causal relationships as one (of many) mode of creating meaning for use in building knowledge.

I used your own example to make my point. If you cannot focus on point out and correcting where you think my logic is wrong then, I'm afraid, we will not converge to anywhere productive.

Everything is necessarily ‘meaningful’ to us if it is within our scope of attention. That — I like sushi

not true. attention is paid in hopes of finding something meaningful worthy of the attention, often we pay and expand the scope of our attention try figure out the meaning of something we initially had to little scope of attention to make any sense of. The quest for allusive meaning almost always expands the scope of our attention.

Causality needs no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. All meaning does. — creativesoul

now I see why you think all I said was incoherent, b/c you are off topic and missing the point of the thread. The thread is concerning only 'meaning' to (human) creatures, not some abstract inherent meaning in the universe of things. In that light, your statement is nonsense. To further a meaningful discussion on this top, please restate your position on the relation of 'meaning' and 'causality' to each other in the context of its import to (human) creatures who use observations of causal relationships to infer meaning between the causally linked entities. Anything else is off topic.

Causality is not a type of meaning. — creativesoul

why not? give me a concrete, detailed example, not abstract, circular, statements.

No — creativesoul

then you have to indicate which part of my clarification is not clear enough to you. I'm not going to play a guessing game on that after trying once.

The distinction between meaning and causality is one of elemental constituency. They are existentially dependent upon very different things. — creativesoul

logically that does not prove, or even evidence, that they are part of the same thing/process (e.g., forming knowledge). There can be multiple very paths/ways to the same result (e.g., knowledge). So, if 'causality' is one type of 'meaning' then they are not distinguished by elemental constituency differences but by hierarchy in a path for transforming information to knowledge.

Meaning is a consciousness phenomenon, — Qwex

not true. Datamining algorithms discover tremendous meaning out of otherwise meaningless data-sets/bases.

I already told you where/why I think you are wrong. "5. Program B: consciousness & free will -> feeds into 6.& 2" does not equal "a visual recognition program" and it is Zelebg job to explain to you why not, or your job to explain to us why you logically conclude they are equal or highly similar.

No, explain it to me please. — Sir2u

I think Zelebg will explain it to us when he replies. stay tuned...

do you not appreciate the difference between pattern recognition (e.g., an AI neural network detecting the presence of a orange) and the abilities human Consciousness?

The purpose of sentience or consciousness is so our brain can learn, which is how we "make choices". In other words, the purpose is so we can have "free will". — Zelebg

I think you are wrong about that. You certainly do not need sentience or consciousness to learn good enough "make choices". I assume you know better than that, so please better articulate what you mean, esp. wrt have "free will", which would only seem to require the agent (e.g., robot) to have control of the direction of its own program (easy to code that!).

it seems logically impossible that nerve signals can generate a subjective observer while at the same time enabling that self to have its own distinct powers. — lorenzo sleakes

upon what 'logic' do you conclude that? My model only requires the brain to do it.


If panpsychism was true then would not you expect that the lowest forms of animals with brains would share very similar abilities of MC/EC as do humans b/c they all have practically the same hardware (neurons, nerves, connectivity, etc.)? However, we already know that few animals are even self-aware (e.g., few are able recognize themselves and ID their own agency) let alone having EC.

panpsychism supporters should start by experimentally making the above case before going to untestable near supernatural theories of quantum/atomic sources, etc..

no. that is pattern recognition, which current AI robots routinely do.