Imagination and Intellect are responsible for scientific and technological developments – combined with Emotions, latter can have destructive results. — waechter418

so, you think scientific and technological developments were driven by Intellect ???? LOL! They were driven historically by warfare , and scientist primarily driven by ego greed and glory and winning pure competition and the emotive rush of conquering the unknown. What about reproduction? Take out emotion, and I say you would not have humanity's intellectual achievements.

Also, I posit that you cannot have human qualia consciousness w/o emotive states.

any solid counterpoints/evidence?

You missed @Zelebg's magical module which your cellphone is missing:
5. Program B: consciousness & free will -> feeds into 6.& 2.

He's not going to tell you how he programmed that, though, until you pay the piper, which I think I've done. Now, we're hopping for more than crickets in return..

Conceptually I want to make a division here. Into the material consciousness and the experiential consciousness. Let's call it MC and EC. (maybe there's terminology for it already, I'm such a noob). — TheHorselessHeadman

If panpsychism was true then would not you expect that the lowest forms of animals with brains would share very similar abilities of MC/EC as do humans b/c they all have practically the same hardware (neurons, nerves, connectivity, etc.)? However, we already know that few animals are even self-aware (e.g., few are able recognize themselves and ID their own agency) let alone having EC.

panpsychism supporters should start by experimentally making the above case before going to untestable near supernatural theories of quantum/atomic sources, etc..

5. Program B: consciousness & free will -> feeds into 6.& 2. — Zelebg

I'm not trying to explain anything until someone points to something that needs explaining. — Zelebg

I really like where you are trying to go, but I believe your premise is not only malformed but misguided. That is, your (circular) question is really asking for a definition of consciousness, and you are trying to imply the AI solution will not require qualia, just agency.

Before I take a stab at it, I'll ask you to clarify a few things:
1. what does 'free will' mean in your program? I suspect you are talking about a sense of agency, and I think that is where your system blows up. Unlike others, I don't expect self-awareness and agency requires qualia; however, I do believe it requires a holistic state of being which you will never get in any kind of conventional coding or AI systems.
2. How will your system be able to know to question/doubt it is consciousness, know if it is communicating with a sentient being or not, and know what any of that really means? I doubt qualia is needed for this line item, but you have to detail how you would do it (and let me shoot you down!) :grin:
3. how do you program it to have an ego "I" in all of its glory and ugliness, which is not what 'free will' is about?

In any case, suffering of the pain may just be a side effect. The purpose of qualia I expect to find in functions like intention and imagination, something along those lines, something that can not be computed, for some reason. — Zelebg

I can see some need for qualia in certain kinds of imagination, but I currently see concepts of access consciousness as able to do most types of imagination. Why do you think intention might require qualia? I can understand it needing a sense of agency, which might require qualia. Is that how you are getting there?

I'm starting to build a coherent hypothesis that qualia and emotive phenomenon are logically (e.g., evolutionary) needed to optimally create and convey wisdom, but not at all needed to create data, info, or knowledge.

So, under my above hypothesis, experiencing a qualia and emotive phenomenon for the color 'red' might be needed to create and convey wisdom concerning the data value/info of red. This same line of thinking could be extended to pain. There is a wisdom to pain; e.g., if you treat pain like an data value then you might be a psychopath, b/c the qualia of pain imparts the wisdom of empathy against torturing our own kind, or even animals. How about that as a best working theory to answer your question?

On an aside, I have been entertaining a hypothesis on that for many years, and I still hold it possible, if not plausible, if not actual. That is, in my model of consciousness as quasi-stable, dynamic standing wave resonance w/in our brains, anything that disrupts the stability of the resonant condition may be experienced as a qualia pain. One evidence for this hypothesis includes the fact that pain forces (consumes) ones conscious to focus on and experience nothing but the (discord) pain. Another evidence I have for this hypothesis is the actual pain people suffering from Epilepsy experience during an Epileptic seizure (discord in brain waves), which pain can be removed by electric shock to the brain like a defibrillator restoring the resonant heart beat condition. Also, the mental pain of a 'broken heart' causes a discord in consciousness thought.


hope this elevates the discussion here...

I have recently found myself being more aware of my mood swings, changes of my states of mind and I felt as if this "I" one identifies with, is but a collection of selves that keeps getting in front of the wheel of the car that is Me - the entity - caused by life events. — TheMadMan

In my current model, consciousness is an emergent 3rd entity that forms as a dynamic standing wave resonating with our internal and external configurations as its boundary conditions. I am also leaning towards our internal cognitive consciousness being (maybe slightly) different than our social consciousness being (maybe slightly) different than our mind-body consciousness. So, Kant's cogito 'thinking' is far too simplistic, and misleading, to reason on what/if the internal "I" consciousness exists simply by virtue of his social consciousness questioning it, b/c they are possibly (likely) independent consciousness states, in my model. So, any reasoning applied to them might be like comparing apples to oranges to conclude bananas.

In this model, if you try to be all things to all people your social 'I' may create many alter-egos to minimize the discord in each social context, often at the expense of the hiding drives/needs from our mind-body consciousness. Then the our internal consciousness has its personality and purpose in life might get complete suppressed/ignored, which often results in a sense of emptiness, being 'lost', no meaning in life, etc. Unifying these different emanations (faces) of ourselves into a more coherent state of being and action that best aligns all 3, should bring about a greater sense of peace, happiness, and meaning to one's mind/body consciousness.

Theorem: The attempt to represent Substance with perfect objectivity necessarily fails.

Proof: The mind tries to use its memory as a map to represent the territory of the field of perception. The problem is that the conscious being is one element in this field. If the mind tries to represent itself representing itself, it runs into an infinite regress like two mirrors facing each other. Even if the mind were a perfect cartographer, it must necessarily represent the point where it represents itself by a metalinguistic symbol that stands for something like "self-description goes here". If it does not, it gets stuck in an infinite loop until it runs out of memory and returns an error. QE — absoluteaspiration

Not true under my current model. My hypothesis explains a different model for such infinite regressions, it is simply put as a standing wave resonant condition.

In my hypothesis/theory/model under development, consciousness is effectively pure energy patterns as an entity in-and of itself. That is, in my model, consciousness, esp. the qualia kind, is pure energy create as a sort of new, and separate entity within the physical entity, yet part the system as a whole. In my model, the 'consciousness' entity is pure energy, being in a resonant whole with the cognitive and sensory/motor systems such that they are effectively a whole, unified entity with all parts in tune and sensing all other parts all at once. This is a physical 'thing' not a process b/c it is an instantaneous resonant wave system inseparable from the physical boundary and propagating media properties/constraints.

The closest analogy I can think of is a macro version of a Bose-Einstein condensate, so maybe a 6th state of matter. Can't say with confidence yet, but I currently see this, along with many other frameworks/mechanics, as a promising framework for me to achieve the qualia aspect of consciousness. For the access aspects of consciousness, I'm modeling that under a sophisticated non-verbal linguistic framework, which are mostly data-structures and processes and I do not expect those will be part of the 'qualia' experience.

You can think of the boundary conditions as an internal cognitive boundary/shapes on one side and sensory/motor boundary/shapes on the other side and when tuned to a particular ‘meaning’ waves that pulse the system a resonance condition may form that captures the character of the system as whole in one standing wave, which could be read out with connectionist networks recognizing the various interference patterns. In short, I’m hypothesizing that qualia/experience consciousness is the resonant sound you here when you thump a container, which resonant sound (e.g., holographic phased standing wave patterns) richly characterizes not only the shape of the container but its material parameters, this resonant sound waves is effectively coherently ‘aware’ of its whole system in a way that you never could be if you separately analyzed all the causal molecules and connections that form the container and the propagation medium the way that Integrated Information Theory suggests is consciousness; thus, at least one reason why (IMHO) their model is devoid of the qualia/experience.

I imagine I'm in a room with my nan, my nan's presence is presumed around me. If my target is my imaginary nan, then that's what I believe is being talked to. — Qwex

Sorry, in my prior post, I thought this was on the thread re imagination vs concepts. Any how, when you imagine, you are playing games of known things with yourself. In a room... that is known. 'nan's presence' is a person, which you project as an instance of yourself or someone you know, so that is known. talking is known. then you imagine you talking to a projection of yourself. all based on known things, so just you playing with abstractions your own conceptualized imagery. Nothing but playing games of known things with yourself. Like counterfactual simulations, or dreams even.

OP did mention creation of an imaginary character. — Qwex

OK, what does that imaginary character look/act like? I'm saying the more form/process you give it the more you will find it is actually based on what is already known/experienced.

Is there nothing we can say about it? Is it process, succession of separate events? Is it feeling, sensation? Can we not even say yes or no to those questions? — Zelebg

In my hypothesis/theory/model under development, it is energy

patterns as an entity in-and of itself. That is, in my model, consciousness, esp. the qualia kind, is pure energy create as a sort of new, and separate entity within the physical entity, yet part the system as a whole. In my model, the 'consciousness' entity is pure energy, being in a resonant whole with the cognitive and sensory/motor systems such that they are effectively a whole, unified entity with all parts in tune and sensing all other parts all at once. This is a physical 'thing' not a process b/c it is an instantaneous resonant wave system inseparable from the physical boundary and propagating media properties/constraints.

The closest analogy I can think of is a macro version of a Bose-Einstein condensate, so maybe a 6th state of matter. Can't say with confidence yet, but I currently see this, along with many other frameworks/mechanics, as a promising framework for me to achieve the qualia aspect of consciousness. For the access aspects of consciousness, I'm modeling that under a sophisticated non-verbal linguistic framework, which are mostly data-structures and processes and I do not expect those will be part of the 'qualia' experience.

The only “I” that is present as you think about and pose your question is completely related to your conscious self. Under the cognitive framework that I am developing, the ‘I’ is not much more than a qualia resonant condition that takes form and flows within a cognitive architecture that requires a closed loop (potentially virtual) sensory-motor experience that grounds and shapes the metes and bounds of the cognitive agent into an embodied agent experience. Under my model the “I” starts from a random or ground state and starts extending itself into whatever has the highest degree of spacio-temporal correlation with the cognitive agent’s intentions. In this way, while the embodied experience is an illusion, it is an integral part of what you have grown to call “I”, even if embodied parts of ‘you’ become physically removed; e.g., much like the phantom limb phenomenon, or how a prosthetic limb becomes part of ‘you’. Hence, this “I” that has come to be in the integrated qualia state as an embodied agent cannot be one and the same with that soul-like concept which is thought to be in a non-physical, energy state, existing in another dimension, possibly (highly speculative) linked/synchronized quantum mechanically. That is, the only connection between the two that I can (wildly) imagine are purposeful patterns of non-random quantum fluctuations in your brain that could come from your ‘soul’ in another dimension, which may bias your embodied agent’s behavior in important yet very general, qualitative ways, but such a ‘soul’ (or non-local) connection cannot be directly part of your conscious ‘I’ as they operate in different dimensions.

I have been entertaining a hypothesis on the qualia of pain for many years, and I still hold it possible, if not plausible, if not actual. That is, in my model of consciousness as quasi-stable, dynamic standing wave resonance w/in our brains, anything that disrupts the stability of the resonant condition may be experienced as a qualia pain. One evidence for this hypothesis includes the fact that pain forces (consumes) ones conscious to focus on and experience nothing but the (discord) pain. Another evidence I have for this hypothesis is the actual pain people suffering from Epilepsy experience during an Epileptic seizure (discord in brain waves), which pain can be removed by electric shock to the brain like a defibrillator restoring the resonant heart beat condition. Also, the mental pain of a 'broken heart' causes a discord in consciousness thought.

As for the qualia of colors (like how we 'see'/experience 'red', seems to me such experiences boils down to 3 main factors:
1. The frequencies of light that (most) humans are pre-wired to call red, do indeed exist in the physical world. So, the verbal linguistic 'red' does exist as an analog symbol of that.

2. The 'red' category of color that (most) humans are pre-wired to have the qualia sense of red color, do mayexist in the person's cognitive world as a visual object. There are color blind people who see no red. There are also synesthesia people who experience other senses as (e.g., red) color. So, I figure if we had research evidence of color blind people who later gained color vision, saying they experience the qualia of 'red' color prior to gaining color vision, then that might evidence that the cognitive 'red' category does exist at birth. Or if a color blind synesthete 'saw' qualia colors that would also be strong evidence. I've never come across of such experiments or lines of investigations, but if anyone knows anything about that, please post it here b/c it should be quite instructive metaphysically as well.

3. The internal qualia projection of 'red' color is what we intuitively consider 'red' and that almost certainly exists only in our qualia projected internal reality, which is likely commonly shared b/c of common visual/mental systems genetic coding.

I'm starting to build a coherent hypothesis that qualia and emotive phenomenon are logically needed to optimally create and convey wisdom, but not at all needed to create data, info, or knowledge.

So, under my above hypothesis, experiencing a qualia and emotive phenomenon for the color 'red' might be needed to create and convey wisdom concerning the data value of red.

For the past 15+ years I’ve been, on and off (mostly off), developing various simulation models for all aspects of the human condition. I’ve put off consciousness for the backed of my work b/c it is the hardest area to make progress upon, but, realizing it could affect my global architecture, I recently (starting ~6yrs ago, and more seriously past 6mo) put in some preliminary effort to work out a first order model.
I am avoiding any direct quantum mechanics as being part of my consciousness simulation model. I that way I’m thinking differently than the mainstream ideas often mentioned (including Penrose, et. al). However, I do find the need to use macro-quantum mechanic like systems theories to help establish a framework enabling the kind of flowing resonant conditions I’m looking for. As of now, the ingredients of my first order consciousness simulation model include the following:
• Holographic phase space as the main cognitive fabric
• Meaningfully manipulating confinement Boundary conditions to perform calculations and selective state phase changes.
• Employing pilot-wave theory to achieve the macroscopic wave-particle duality I need to achieve a sort of global “I” (particle) state resonating with the global phase-space milieu capturing the whole at a point and the path taken (maybe like a quantum knot) being like a unique qualia experience.
• I’m initially avoiding entanglement concepts in my model. Instead, thinking to use soliton wave theory to transmit unique wave packet signatures within this phase space to bridge distal parts of the system (possibly unifying a multiplicity of sub-module pilot waves) with a common, unified “I” ‘experience’.
• Thinking to model each cognitive sub-module, of the multiplicity, as Bose-Einstein condensate types of phase change particle systems where they can only achieve quantum-like abilities (e.g., cognitive resonance, cognitive interference, cognitive tunneling, particle/wave duality, etc.) when they have been trained/cooled to a ground state truth (e.g., maybe like Boltzmann kind of thermal annealing learning, etc.) . As the sub-modules phase change to the Bose-Einstein condensate state they may interfere and tunnel with/to each other to form a global Bose-Einstein condensate state comprised of a resonating subset of the cognitive sub-modules with a global pilot wave path (quantum knot) which may simulate the unified “I” access and qualia consciousness ‘experience’.
• A parallel linguistic framework.
• A parallel statistical framework.
• A parallel reasoning framework.
• A parallel emotive framework.
• A parallel sensory-motor framework.
• A parallel imagination framework.
• And much more…

In this way, I’m looking at macro-scale quantum mechanics analogues as the most fruitful way I can build a consciousness system. I have no doubt that actual quantum mechanical effects (as many ponder) would naturally work with, and or enhance the macroscopic version I’m thinking of.

I do believe that consciousness exists internally w/o external reference. I believe there are (at least) two major problems/flaws w/ the cogito and solipsism (beyond the presumption of 'I'), that is they assume two things which break down in their framework. That is, they false define/assume what 'Thinking' actually is, and they mistake what cognitive agency is all about. Also, I believe there many levels of consciousness, which also depend of your level of cognitive development in an external world (or not). In my current framework, it is a complete illusion and misnomer to talking about 'thinking' implying 'existing' of anything. For example, among others, the existence of agency requires creative intention and the control of the flow and nature of the thought. In this aspect, I like looking for intentionality, but I would direct it internally and add a few (maybe at least 2) other dynamic requirements to establish one's existence as an "I" without presupposing it.

Under my current framework, to establish one’s self-consciousness we have to be able to explore all our boundary conditions that ware resonating within and their nature must be accessible/determinable wrt their form, function, or purpose in influencing the landscape that the consciousness agent in question is resonating with and within. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to observe a time-evolution history path where their ‘thought’ could in-fact modify those boundary conditions and that had a correlated, esp. if *expected*, effect on their conscious state of being to ‘feel’ they are alive and the executive center of the (resonating) system. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to learn and use those associations as tools to manipulate itself (the best it can) to achieve goal states of being. Towards a definition qualia consciousness, I’m thinking that the degree that the consciousness agent in question can do the above, it has ever higher orders of qualia "I" consciousness.

You're talking to the imaginary character, but because that's in your own mind, it can be confused with talking with yourself. — Qwex

so, you are not yourself when role playing or acting? you think is a kind of controlled, temporary schizophrenia?

so, then, if consciousness as quasi-stable, dynamic standing wave resonance (quantum, entangled, or whatever) w/in our brains, why would inducing altered states of mind (alcohol, drugs, pot, hypnosis, meditation, etc.) reduce or lessen or remove the qualia sense of pain. e.g., how could hypnosis program your brain/consciousness to not let pain sensors disrupt it? That is, if the qualia of pain is relatively easily mentally programmable then it would seem not be be a resonant state disruption mechanism, but more of a connectionist upregulation/downregulation circuit model The standard connectionist model pretty much has no qualia requirements or capacity. so, there is something more...

but to me it seems that as you describe the limits, you have given your mind a way to think beyond them. — ZhouBoTong

not really. I can imaging the concept of infinity, but can never enable my mind/imagination to in any way experience it. we just imagine it as an overwhelming amount of what ever we already know (gains of sand on earth, etc.).

I'd be very interested if anyone as even one example of anything imagined that is not some analogical morphing/variant/extension of (combination) something(s) known/experienced. Sadly, I don't think it exists.

I suspect that the kind of disconnected "blue sky" creative imagination you seem to be reaching for might be more in the subconscious than conscious minds. However, the definition of that I strongly suspect would not fit the ones you proposed above. I have not given much thought (yet) to modeling all forms/sources of creativity.

why is damage to the body or satiation accompanied by a qualitative feeling rather than simply being perception — Enrique

I have been entertaining a hypothesis on that for many years, and I still hold it possible, if not plausible, if not actual. That is, in my model of consciousness as quasi-stable, dynamic standing wave resonance w/in our brains, anything that disrupts the stability of the resonant condition may be experienced as a qualia pain. One evidence for this hypothesis includes the fact that pain forces (consumes) ones conscious to focus on and experience nothing but the (discord) pain. Another evidence I have for this hypothesis is the actual pain people suffering from Epilepsy experience during an Epileptic seizure (discord in brain waves), which pain can be removed by electric shock to the brain like a defibrillator restoring the resonant heart beat condition. Also, the mental pain of a 'broken heart' causes a discord in consciousness thought.

hope this elevates the discussion here...

without THE APPEARANCE OF resonating with other external embodiments/minds — Arne

nope. That is not the hypothesis I am positing there. See my reply to TheMadFool for some detailed mechanics of my hypothesis on the qualia conscious experience.

2) Wouldn't conflate imagination (faculty which entails insight or creativity) and conceptualisation, because while imagination entails insight (metacognitive comprehension), it doesn't entail understanding (experiential comprehension). Reflection (examination of experience) entails understanding. — Galuchat

I can appreciate your intuition as to why those may feel/seem different, yet I disagree. I think imagination is mostly, if not completely, degrees of less constrained, more abstracted, reality. You simply cannot imagine anything completely outside of analogical experience. For example, when you imagine you can fly, you are simply conceptualizing yourself ‘as is’ except with the ability to fly like birds or planes. No insight there, just less constrained by the ‘reality’ of gravity, as if you were in space.

Information is meaningful difference — Gnomon

I don't believe that is true. I think information primarily about detecting a useful or causal difference. Many differences are only thing useful or causal yet have no intelligible meaning to us.

The emotive phenomenon of color choice, may or may not be logically necessary. — 3017amen

I'm starting to build a coherent hypothesis that qualia and emotive phenomenon are logically needed to optimally create and convey wisdom, but not at all needed to create data, info, or knowledge.

So, under my above hypothesis, experiencing a qualia and emotive phenomenon for the color 'red' might be needed to create and convey wisdom concerning the data value of red.

Anyone have arguments/evidence for or against my above hypothesis?

the meaning of which I care not — Arne

that is not a meaningful relationship, definition, or framework. What you 'care'' about has nothing to do with the metaphysical/logical/causal/scientific relationship between information and meaning .

though information and meaning are certainly related — Arne

I'm not sure (I'm thinking not at all) they are related as nouns. How would you say they are related?

The ‘meaning of life’ is broader than that: to pursue the ‘truth’ and express it in how we relate to the universe, regardless of the limitations of ‘being human’. — Possibility

I think you are defining the meaning of a philosopher's life, not human life. At the risk of sounding like a reductionist, the genetically programmed, thus default, meaning of life is to develop and employ a cognitive framework sufficient to acquire and use information to build enough knowledge on how to gain enough food and shelter sustenance to survive good and long enough to acquire a mate and reproduce. The rest is icing on the human cake, so to speak (in metaphors).

So, the premise of this thread is talking about the icing, think the self-actualization in Maslow's pyramid, not not the primal cake (survival). After survival is fulfilled, then the meaning of that post-survival life can step up once in Maslow's pyramid, where info is used to serve more comfort, personal entropy reduction needs, but that is not the primal meaning of life, by any stretch.

eager to hear any solid counter examples/arguments.

Utility is the reduction of information from meaning to knowledge via conceptual systems. Determining an actionable path to beneficially use information is a process that ignores, isolates or excludes possible information according to a subjective perception of potentiality. Yes, it’s a necessary process for utilising knowledge at a subjective level, but no, it isn’t necessary for meaning. — Possibility

I applaud where you are trying to go with this, but I have to respectfully disagree with your model/ideas on that. For one thing, I'm not seeing 'utility' as being necessarily based on 'meaning'. I see it more based on pattern matching and degrees of causal correlations.

That is, I do not think that meaning or intelligibility is primal when it comes to building knowledge. I expect utility is much more primal because it requires less energy/work/knowledge to enable us to reduce/increase certain entropy as desired to achieve desired outcomes.

For example, quantum particles and their behavior is completely intelligible and has almost no meaning to us; however, we can develop and detect statistical (math) generalizations that predict their observed behavior good enough to use them in useful devices/methods or to predict when/where they may occur with what likelihood and at what energy level, all w/ little to know understanding of what they really are about.

I can think of practical situations where knowledge is formed from sources of information that has no meaning and is not intelligible; that is, I do not believe that it is a requirement that the info must have meaning or is capable of being understood or comprehended by the cognitive agent.
It only matters, for example, that the info in question can be pattern matched and associated (even correlated) with something useful or meaningful or reduces the entropy of something else.

As another example, consider a pattern/event/object 'A' is observed and found to occur semi-periodically; however, 'A' is not understood in any way and has no intrinsic meaning, we can only detect its occurrence (think like a sub-atomic particle in an accelerator collision). We notice that most of the time shortly after pattern 'A' is observed occurring a desirable, yet otherwise completely temporally unpredictable, resource/object 'B' will be available for a brief moment. Having knowledge of this causal association we prepare ourselves to take advantage of 'B', and right after detecting 'A" we were, finally, able to acquire 'B'. Pattern 'A' is like a sign, we don't have to know what the sign says or means, we just have to uniquely recognize the occurrence of that pattern which we don't at all understand (i.e., pure pattern matching, no comprehension or meaning needed).

what do you say about that?

I don't think there is clean break between the mental and the physical or between the self and others. — jjAmEs

I would tend to agree with that belief. In my current model, consciousness is an emergent 3rd entity that forms as a dynamic standing wave resonating with those as its boundary conditions. I am also leaning towards our internal consciousness being (maybe slightly) different than our social consciousness being (maybe slightly) different than our mind-body consciousness. So, Kant's cogito 'thinking' is far too simplistic, and misleading, to reason on what/if the internal "I" consciousness exists simply by virtue of his social consciousness questioning it, b/c they are possibly (likely) independent consciousness states, in my model. So, any reasoning applied to them might be like comparing apples to oranges to conclude bananas.

On the other hand, the search for a theory of everything does presuppose that the world is intelligible, even if we can't make sense of it right now — Andrew M

Sorry, but I would not tend to agree with that statement either. I do not think that intelligibility is primal when it comes to building knowledge. I expect utility is more primal because it requires less energy/work/knowledge to enable us to reduce/increase certain entropy as desired to achieve desired outcomes.

For example, quantum particles and their behavior is completely intelligible to us; however, we can develop and detect statistical (math) generalizations that predict their observed behavior good enough to use them in useful devices/methods or to predict when/where they may occur with what likelihood and at what energy level, all w/ little to know understanding of what they really are about.

I believe that the only way to overcome solipsism or extreme subjectivism is by starting from Husserl's intentionality — David Mo

good explanation/summary, thanks. I can why you'd want to attack it this way, but I'm not so sure that is the best way b/c I do believe that consciousness exist internally w/o external reference. I believe there are (at least) two major problems/flaws w/ the cogito and solipsism (beyond the presumption of 'I'), that is they assume two things which break down in their framework. That is, they false define/assume what 'Thinking' actually is, and they mistake what cognitive agency is all about. Also, I believe there many levels of consciousness, which also depend of your level of cognitive development in an external world (or not). In my current framework, it is a complete illusion and misnomer to talking about 'thinking' implying 'existing' of anything. For example, among others, the existence of agency requires creative intention and the control of the flow and nature of the thought. In this aspect, I like your instinct to look for intentionality, but I would redirect it internally and add a few (maybe at least 2) other dynamic requirements to establish one's existence as an "I" without presupposing it.

I gave you one, actually.
see

we can only detect its occurrence (think like a sub-atomic particle in an accelerator collision) — Sir Philo Sophia

so, we detected presence of a particle having a collision pattern like a Higgs boson would have with very high probability, so we conclude we have knowledge now that the theoretical Higgs field exists to give gravity to particles, never knowing or understanding what that Higgs particle really was, only that something having that mass/energy exists was enough it gain knowledge.

makes sense?

sure. Pattern/event/object 'A' is observed and found to occur semi-periodically; however, 'A' is not understood in any way, we can only detect its occurrence (think like a sub-atomic particle in an accelerator collision). We notice that most of the time shortly after 'A' is observed occurring a desirable, yet otherwise completely temporally unpredictable, resource/object 'B' will be available for a brief moment. Having knowledge of this causal association we prepare ourselves to take advantage of 'B', and right after detecting 'A" we were, finally, able to acquire 'B'. 'A' is like a sign, we don't have to know what the sign says or means, we just have to uniquely recognize that pattern which we don't understand (pattern matching, no comprehension needed).

knowledge is not possible without intelligibility. — Andrew M

The intelligibility of the natural world is not the same as knowledge of the natural world, however, and because of that, I reject the notion that the latter is even possible without the former. — Mww

I disagree with that. I can think of practical situations where knowledge is formed from information that is not intelligible; that is, I do not believe that it is a requirement that the info is capable of being understood or comprehended by the cognitive agent, it only matters, for example, that the info in question can be pattern matched and associated (even correlated) with something useful or meaningful or reduces the entropy of something else.

Likewise you can see a color to experience it. And in describing both experiences, how do we prove its experience? — 3017amen

see my #2 above for my proposed experimental ways to get closer to the qualia truth wrt color.

fine with you having the last word. I am not a competitive, confrontational person. — Mapping the Medium

that is obviously a cop out... if I call your prior answer hogwash that is discounting what you reply as being nonsense, not being confrontational. you should expect that your extraordinary claims require your extraordinary evidence (plausible logic or at least holding your claims/definitions up to scrutiny). I'm sure you know very well you cannot define consciousness well enough to avoid it applying to AI machines yet still capture 'living' consciousness as your dogma needs to. Thus, seems like you have a cult...

a. we actually see colors (colors exist)
b. we only think we see colors (colors do not exist) — Zelebg

Seems to me this boils down to 3 main factors:
1. The frequencies of light that (most) humans are pre-wired to call red, do indeed exist in the physical world. So, the verbal linguistic 'red' does exist as an analog symbol of that.

2. The 'red' category of color that (most) humans are pre-wired to have the qualia sense of red color may exist in the person's cognitive world as a visual object. There are color blind people who see no red. There are also synesthesia people who experience other senses as (e.g., red) color. So, I figure if we had research evidence of color blind people who later gained color vision, saying they experience the qualia of 'red' color prior to gaining color vision, then that might evidence that the cognitive 'red' category does exist at birth. Or if a color blind synesthete 'saw' qualia colors that would also be strong evidence. I've never come across of such experiments or lines of investigations, but if anyone knows anything about that, please post it here b/c it should be quite instructive metaphysically as well.

3. The internal qualia projection of 'red' color is what we intuitively consider 'red' and that almost certainly exists only in our qualia projected internal reality, which is likely commonly shared b/c of common visual/mental systems genetic coding.

hope this helps further the discussion...

Two words used to describe living consciousness — Mapping the Medium

For such a bold, sweeping conclusion, you need to define what you mean by Perception and what is Responsiveness. Otherwise, sounds like self-serving, dogmatic nonsense.

Perception' and 'Responsiveness' are two words used to define 'Consciousness'. — Mapping the Medium

so, according to your definition, you would say that an AI robot machine that has Perception and is Responsiveness to that perception is presumed to be 'Consciousness'?

Not all thinking is formal-deductive. That would be a serious misconception. I guess that most thinking is probably even not. — alcontali

I thought that is what you meant. your conclusion above is correct, which is why formal logic has only been useful in math theorem proving. FWIW, the big problem in applying formal logic frameworks to the real world is that it cannot handle context and/or the purposeful ambiguity of humans and the real world .

The next paragraph actually uses sound as their example. See below . In my above example, one of the cochlear hairs/nerves will detect and convert a specific frequency, say 10 KHz, and say the neural circuits, up the abstraction chain to verbal, assign a verbal linguistic word of 'High Pitch" to signify the 10KHz detection . The fact that verbal communication is done using symbols does not mean that the word "High Pitch" is purely ‘psychological’ having no material substance analog for which is represents exists in the external world b/c conveying 'I hear a High Pitch" is equal to the physical fact that a 10 KHz sound wave impacted your ear. They are one and the same, grounded in the physical existence, not some sign/symbol of some psychological impression.

I read that whole chapter and am not impressed. Saussure’s original framework was clearly not workable or realistic, and his modern supporters fix only the most obvious flaws (e.g., admitting the signified can also be a physical object/event, not just a sign of a sign).
Again, can you (anyone) overcome my above concrete and simple counter examples? Seems pretty nonsensical to me otherwise.

----------------

the fact that it is some times more efficient to say what something is not does not mean/prove that it is always done that way in the brain. Often simpler to positively identify; e.g., color Red has such and such value ranges, vs. Red is not an infinite list of other colors.

re "signs. He argued that ‘concepts . . . are defined not positively, in terms of their content,
but negatively by contrast with other items in the same system. What characterizes each
most exactly is being whatever the others are not’ (Saussure 1983, 115; my emphasis).
This notion may initially seem mystifying if not perverse, but the concept of negative
differentiation becomes clearer if we consider how we might teach someone who did not
share our language what we mean by the term ‘red’. We would be unlikely to make our
point by simply showing that person a range of different objects which all happened to be
red – we would be probably do better to single out a red object from a sets of objects
which were identical in all respects except colour."
------------------------------------------
My cited passages where I see fails my counter examples:
"A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept
[signified] and a sound pattern [signifier]. The sound pattern is not actually a
sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer’s
psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his
senses. This sound pattern may be called a ‘material’ element only in that it is the
representation of our sensory impressions. The sound pattern may thus be distinguished from the other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is generally of a more abstract kind: the concept. (Saussure 1983, 66)

For Saussure, both the signifier (the ‘sound pattern’) and the signified (the concept) were
purely ‘psychological’ (ibid., 12, 14–15, 66). Both were non-material form rather than
substance. Figure 1.2 may help to clarify this aspect of Saussure’s own model.
Nowadays, while the basic ‘Saussurean’ model is commonly adopted, it tends to be a
more materialistic model than that of Saussure himself. The signifier is now commonly
interpreted as the material (or physical) form of the sign – it is something which can be
seen, heard, touched, smelled or tasted – as with Roman Jakobson’s signans, which he
described as the external and perceptible part of the sign (Jakobson 1963b, 111; 1984b,
98).
....
As for the signified, Umberto Eco notes that it is somewhere between ‘a mental
image, a concept and a psychological reality’ (Eco 1976, 14–15). Most commentators
who adopt Saussure’s model still treat the signified as a mental construct, although they
often note that it may nevertheless refer indirectly to things in the world. Saussure’s
original model of the sign ‘brackets the referent’, excluding reference to objects existing
in the world – somewhat ironically for one who defined semiotics as ‘a science which
studies the role of signs as part of social life’ (Saussure 1983, "

I'll share a link with you. It's pointless to debate Saussure without you looking into him and getting the big picture. Also, if you read over the last few pages of this thread, you'll have some context. — jjAmEs

Sorry, but I've started reading your cite of Pierce, and, off-the-bat, the opener already tells me that it fails to overcome my above counter examples; e.g., my linguistic "High pitch" example. No sign was involved in that pathway from sound to word. Semiotics seems to be much more about dogma, and its ardent supports much more interested in being in the cult of that dogma than seeking the reality of how practical cognitive systems can and do robustly work. Until a Semiotics supporter logically and sensible overcomes my counter examples, I'll pay little respect/credence for it as a viable explanatory principle.

Can you (anyone) overcome my above concrete and simple counter examples?

see:
" Distinctively, we make meanings through our
creation and interpretation of ‘signs’. Indeed, according to Peirce, ‘we think only in
signs’ (Peirce 1931–58, 2.302). Signs take the form of words, images, sounds, odours,
flavours, acts or objects, but such things have no intrinsic meaning and become signs
only when we invest them with meaning. ‘Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a
sign’, declares Peirce (ibid., 2.172). Anything can be a sign as long as someone interprets
it as ‘signifying’ something – referring to or standing for something other than itself. We
interpret things as signs largely unconsciously by relating them to familiar systems of
conventions. It is this meaningful use of signs which is at the heart of the concerns of
semiotics."

This is incoherent. — creativesoul

sorry, let me rephrase more clearly:

For example, one type of meaning regarding something physical is if one observed a physical process that in-and-of-itself, w/o any need of signs or symbols, contributes to or completes, an explanatory principle of something else; i.e., a structural or causal reason or explanation for a process being triggered or explained is not a symbol or sign. e.g., think of observing a missing piece of a puzzle that exactly structural fits and contributes information that completes the empty part of the puzzle whereby you thereafter can understand what the whole puzzle means and how to use it. That (last) piece of the puzzle is not an objectified symbol/sign of anything, it is an analog of the source object.

is this clear enough now?

where does 'knowing' fit into that? — Wayfarer

under my framework, to establish one self-consciousness we have to be able to explore all our boundary conditions that ware resonating within and their nature must be accessible/determinable wrt their form, function, or purpose in influencing the landscape that the consciousness agent in question is resonating with and within. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to observe a time-evolution history path where their ‘thought’ could in-fact modify those boundary conditions and that had a correlated, esp. if *expected*, effect on their conscious state of being to ‘feel’ they are alive and the executive center of the (resonating) system. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to learn and use those associations as tools to manipulate itself (the best it can) to achieve goal states of being. Towards a definition qualia consciousness, I’m thinking that the degree that the consciousness agent in question can do the above, it has ever higher orders of qualia consciousness.

How does it come about? — Wayfarer

you can think of the resonant condition as a time-evolving holographic standing wave pattern within the agent's cognitive vs sensory/motor 'container' boundaries.

If you need formal knowledge in order to discover new formal knowledge, — alcontali

why are you limiting the definition or process of knowledge building to formal knowledge? Very little of our initial, formative knowledge is formal. And what do you mean exactly by 'formal'?