You know what, I have some spare time, so I might as well:

Pro: Some sort of mental determinism is implied by the experiments of Benjamin Libet (you can look this up yourself).

Counter: We still don't know how the brain operates specifically. Neural activity can be measured and correlated to certain functions but claims of the sort Libet makes are very liable to be post hoc fallacies.

Contra: Determinism doesn't exist because we have what's called "free won't", the ability to veto actions at any point.

Counter: Free won't also is predetermined by as yet to be uncovered neurological structures (Weaksauce argument, I know. But: "Because of his love of humanity the Skeptic wishes to cure by argument, so far as he can, the conceit and precipitancy of the Dogmatists. Accordingly, just as the doctors who treat physical symptoms have remedies that differ in strength, and prescribe the severe ones for people with severe symptoms and milder ones for those mildly affected, so too the Skeptic sets forth arguments differing in strength." -Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 3, ch. 32)

What does this leave? Well, I don't know. Better to postpone judgment imho. So let's just bracket the issue and move on to phenomenology instead of running around in circles.

So your saying the psychological agency of figure-ground is a phenomenological act, because it's an act in the mind relevant to the way we experience the world right?
And your saying determinism is irrelevant to figure-ground? — Tyler

Did you read the link about bracketing? No? Well then, I guess you should. Otherwise we are going to keep talking past each other.

But in the context here, of distinguishing and explaining consciousness. If the functions of the mind, including figure-ground, are worked out, that is evidence for determinism and against any unexplained agency.

Yeah, that's a non sequitur. Figuring out how the mind operates on a phenomenological level doesn't imply ontological determinism in any way whatsoever.

Anyway, since you want to argue, fine. You conceded this point already when you stated:

Spinning eyes in a circle would be a "conscious decision", but I was referring to subconscious or instinctual action (as I specified "without attentive direct"), because I thought that is what your point was about gaze shift etc.. When you mentioned gaze shifting, was your point, that it occurs without conscious thought, or with?

... So, since you insist on some form of determinism, you'll have to account for said "conscious decision" as being predetermined in some way or the other or risk being inconsistent in your views (which would be your problem, not mine). And if you're going to insist on some kind of "illusion of choice", well then, we are back to bracketing, making the whole "illusion" part nonsense.

to be totally frank... — Abdul

You're better at being Abdul.

What is it about the past that fascinates us? — Abdul

We are hardwired to do so. We have multiple memory systems, and they play a pivotal role in both behavior and cognition.

Why is it so hard to just “leave it all behind?

"Each moment is fragile and fleeting.
The moment of the past cannot be kept, however beautiful.
The moment of the present cannot be held, however enjoyable.
The moment of the future cannot be caught, however desirable.
But the mind is desperate to fix the river in place: Possessed by ideas of the past, preoccupied with images of the future, it overlooks the plain truth of the moment.
The one who can dissolve her mind will suddenly discover the Tao at her feet, and clarity at hand."
-"Hua Hu Ching", ch. 21, Walker translation.

'm guessing you dont believe in determinism, since you seem to believe we have free agency? — Tyler

That's one of the issues I postpone judgment on since I'm not particularly interested in running around in a philosophical cul de sac.
The psychological agency I'm talking about, the one that allows you to distinguish objects from their sensory surroundings, has nothing to do with determinism though, be it neurological or otherwise (ontological). Figure-ground is a phenomenological act, and that's all it needs to be, since the rest is "bracketed" out.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bracketing_(phenomenology)

I am grateful knowing that when my login into TPF does not work, it is simply a typo, rather than the drop in your tummy when it happened at PF and you might possibly be banned. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

I don't think you ever came up as a problem member so no idea why you where anxious about that... :)

I have often thought that skepticism, given its typical rhetorical purpose in philosophy, can be profoundly misleading. — Pneumenon

Yeah, well, maybe, maybe not. :rofl:

What is faith? What is education? What is the purpose of education? What is scientism? What is a philosophical question? What is common sense? What is Google?

Help! I've suddenly forgotten everything I know, and I'm powerless to do anything about it. — Sapientia

... That's what you get for asking too many questions at once (j/k). :grin:

Is there something about philosophy which invites or attracts a sort of pretence?

Are you kidding? Try philosophizing with the Dunning Kruger crowd on Facebook. Better yet, don't.

Erwin Levy, a gestalt psychologist, provides a nice analysis of the way questions work from a gestalt perspective, in an essay titled "Some Aspects of the Schizophrenic Formal Disturbance of Thought". I'll post the relevant paragraphs here:

"An ordinary question intends its answer. It calls for it, requires it. In itself it is incomplete and establishes a vector towards completion. Once a proper answer is given, question and answer form a complete closed whole. [1] As long as the answer is missing the whole is incomplete, has a gap which is not simply a hole but is a dynamic gap that needs and wants to be filled. The question is not an isolated piece but the opening part of an intended whole.

The questioner may not know the answer. A number of answers may be possible, but not just any answer at all will fit into the gap. [2] If the question is "How is your health?" the answer, "Thank you, two times two is four," does not fit.

Obviously the question contains factors which determine what answer is consistent and what is not. Firstly, the answer must have something to do with the question, it must deal with the question's topic. But that does not suffice. The answer, "My health depends on the number of calories I get," is concerned with the same topic as the question, but still it does not fit. It deviates from the direction of the question and is not a "good continuation" [3] of this direction. [4] The vector set up by the question really tends in a different logical direction, and the direction of the answer must be in good continuation of the question in order to achieve its closure. The answers, "My health is fine," or, "I have terrible pains," fit into the gap both with regard to the identity of the topic and direction of the question. They meet the requirements of the whole and complete it. In the other two cases the gap is not fittingly filled, continues to be sensed, and the whole remains incomplete.

This is true only for simple cases. In more complicated cases, as, for instance, in that of a scientific question, the answer to which requires a lengthy paper, detours involving temporary changes of the topic as well as of the direction may become necessary. But what these changes are is not arbitrary but determined by the inner nature and structure of the problem and by the whole-structure of the problem of which each detour is a part. And, too, these detours must fit into the complex question-answer system as a whole; they are determined by, and must be consistent with, the structural requirements of the gap.

Sometimes a change of topic and direction may be sensible, if, for instance, the question itself does not go to the heart of the problem. The question may be just too peripheral, too unessential, it may not fit right, it may not face the problem squarely enough. If the answer improves upon the question in the direction of the structural requirements of the problem situation it is a good answer even if, or just because, it does not stick to the topic and direction of the original question."
http://www.gestalttheory.net/archive/levy_schiz1.html

... He then goes on to talk about his actual topic, which is what it said on the tin. So. If we are to follow the spirit of the previous paper, what then would be considered a "philosophical question"? A philosophical question would then be a part of a question-answer pair with an internal structure suited to tackle the relevant philosophical problem. As such, it's required to be neither peripheral nor unessential to the issue at hand. Optimally, its squared up to the problem in such a way as to entice a relevant philosophical answer, in line with the internal structure of both the question and the problem.

I was wondering what other members think about college, if it's worth it, the reasons why one should go to college, and some such matters? — Posty McPostface

You're asking me, a high school dropout? Probably not. I don't have any experience with college. As such, there also is a distinct lack of opinions on the matter.

We need to understand the brain better, but the mind which the brain contains... leave it alone. — Bitter Crank

I'll decide that for myself, thanks. It's my own mind anyway so you don't have much say in the matter. :)

In order to have complete knowledge of your own consciousness you have to be able to observe yourself being conscious. How can you observe/perceive yourself?

"It is obvious that in this respect psychology appears to be at a great disadvantage compared with the other general sciences. Although many of these sciences are unable to perform experiments, astronomy in particular, none of them is incapable of making observations.
In truth, psychology would become impossible if there were no way to make up for this defciency. We can make up for it, however, at least to a certain extent, through the observation of earlier mental states in memory. It has often been claimed that this is the best means of attaining knowledge of mental facts, and philosophers of entirely different orientations are in agreement on this point.
Herbart has made explicit reference to it; and John Stuart Mill points out in his essay on Comte that it is possible to study a mental phenomenon by means of memory immediately following its manifestation. “And this is,” he adds, “really the mode in which our best knowledge of intellectual acts is generally acquired. We reflect on what we have been doing, when the act is past, but when its impression in the memory is still fresh.”
If the attempt to observe the anger which stirs us becomes impossible because the phenomenon disappears, it is clear that an earlier state of excitement can no longer be interfered with in this way. And we really can focus our attention on a past mental phenomenon just as we can upon a present physical phenomenon, and in this way we can, so to speak, observe it. Furthermore, we could say that it is even possible to undertake experimentation on our own mental phenomena in this manner. For we can, by various means, arouse certain mental phenomena in ourselves intentionally, in order to find out whether this or that other phenomenon occurs as a result. We can then contemplate the result of the experiment calmly and attentively in our memory."
-Franz Brentano, "Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint", p. 26.

The this is not a pipe meme shows that images/models/reflections/pixels are not the actual thing:

Last time I checked, Magritte wasn't in the business of making memes. That's a painting called "The Treachery of Images", not something whipped up by some schoolkid. Foucault wrote a book about it btw.

Of course, it's hard to talk about the Tao. Impossible. That's the whole point. — T Clark

... And yet the Daozang (=daoist canon) consists of +/- 1400 texts... The same holds for the "Daodejing" itself; chapter 1 speaks of the ineffable nature of the topic, and it's then followed by 80 more chapters. :grin:

I’m presuming something was lost in translations with this last sentence. — javra

Daoist scholar to the rescue! (sorry, it's saturday)

Here you go, three translations side by side of ch. 1 of the "Daodejing":
https://www.yellowbridge.com/onlinelit/daodejing01.php

Without us, or anything like us, there would be nobody to observe and understand the universe. Worse yet, there couldn't even be a universe in the first place because the concept of a universe is a human invention. — Purple Pond

You're equivocating with the word "universe" there, dude.

>But I was describing the phenomenological mind in the 2nd half of that paragraph, here:
"Or, if you mean psyche is not physically divisible to allow the whole to still function; I think this is not necessarily true either, since some categorized functions could be removed, and there would still be the overall whole of the psyche" — Tyler

What I was getting at is that the psyche as such forms a singularly unified entity. The problem with describing said entity is that this singularly unified status and the interrelationships between mental faculties is hard to express with words. Take sight for example. We might be discussing sight, but it's not an insular mental faculty. It's completely integrated with all the other mental faculties, too. This makes talk about the mind in that way exceedingly difficult.

So. Your comment that certain functions could be removed doesn't really add or detract to what I said.

Yes, gaze and focus shift without attentive direct, but wouldn't that be explained by triggers in the brain guiding reaction (as a result of evolution)? Just as any automatic reaction by preset triggers in animals, which we call instinct. Instinct, or subconscious (if more prevalent) reaction, as I explained, by feedback triggers.

Look. Can you spin your eyes in a circle? Congratulations, you just employed your psychological agency. Otherwise, do tell what instinct is fulfilled by eye spinning.

As for our neurological scaffolding...

Ever heard of the optic tectum? That's a part of the brain responsible for object location. Object identification takes place in the visual cortex. Action potentials pass through the optic tectum before reaching the visual cortex. And here's the kicker. It's possible to make a conscious effort to bypass the visual cortex (object identification) in favor of a faster response time. You can test this yourself btw.

https://www.humanbenchmark.com/tests/reactiontime

More to this than meets the eye. — tim wood

I guess.

"The formulae "perhaps" and "perhaps not," and "possibly" and "possibly not," and "maybe" and "maybe not," we adopt in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not," and "possibly it is and possibly it is not," and "maybe it is and maybe it is not," so that for the sake of conciseness we adopt the phrase "possibly not" instead of "possibly it is not," and "maybe not" instead of "maybe it is not," and "perhaps not" instead of "perhaps it is not." But here again we do not fight about phrases nor do we inquire whether the phrases indicate realities, but we adopt them, as I said, in a loose sense. Still it is evident, as I think, that these expressions are indicative of non-assertion. Certainly the person who says "perhaps it is" is implicitly affirming also the seemingly contradictory phrase "perhaps it is not" by his refusal to make the positive assertion that "it is." And the same applies to all the other cases."
-Sextus Empiricus, "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" book 1, ch. 21.

Do "facts" exist? Well, maybe. Maybe not. You'd think that as a sceptic, I'd rail against the concept. But that would be a misconception of scepticism in general. The name of that game is non-assertion, not denial. Trying to show that "facts" don't exist is a good rhetorical exercise though.

I think I understand what you mean, that all the components are combined and constantly a part of the entire structure. But I dont think that means the parts can't be divisible, since as long as there is a constant distinguishable function, shared between certain components, they could be virtually divided in theory, by categorization. — Tyler

In theory. See, that's a problem. Because one would be describing a hypothetical as opposed to a phenomenological (the way we actually experience ourselves) mind. That's why I prefer a phenomenological approach; abstraction doesn't really work when describing the mind as is, imho.

Is what you describe here, basically the concept of free will?

Are you looking at your computer screen? Notice how the screen becomes posited in a sort of clear foreground while other objects fade into a less defined background? Ever notice how you are constantly shifting this gaze by paying attention to different objects? Yeah, that's not just a peculiarity of your eyes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_space

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Figure%E2%80%93ground_(perception)

But, including guiding-triggers as part of the method, consciousness would still be: but a method of memory access, wouldn't it?

Only if you ignore all other mental faculties present, as I stated already.

Is consciousness nothing more than a particular method of memory access? — Tyler

The psyche is the psyche (according to gestalt psychology anyway). Its not really divisible into it's supposed subcomponents since it forms a unified whole. As such, it's made up of a constant awareness of my body, both in a physical and spatial (relative to my direct environment) sense, my perceptual field and my inner world of thoughts and emotions. But these aren't really divided. All are constants in my awareness. I can focus, causing certain phenomena to become highlighted, but this doesn't mean that the rest isn't there. This is actually somewhat of a problem when trying to describe the mind, since it's easy to lose sight of this issue when trying to describe the mind with words.

Anyway... Memory access. Well, lets discuss some of the various identified memory systems first.

-Iconic memory
A sensory memory buffer, active in our visual field; it's what causes what's called persistence of vision. Another thing it does: When we perceive a scene, we do so in short 200 millisecond bursts called saccades. Iconic memory allows us to piece together a singular scene out of these partial snapshots.

-Echoic memory
Similar to iconic memory in that it's a sensory memory buffer. This one pertains to hearing.

-Working memory
Or short term memory. It's the workbench of memory systems, the one able to retain chunks of information for a limited amount of time. It's also the place where things are transferred to long term memory.

-Episodic memory
What people usually think about when talking about memories; the one that pertains to time and space.

-Semantic memory
Information storage basically.

-Implicit memory
Storage of tacit knowledge. This one is responsible for learning social behavior according to script theory.

-Procedural memory
Pertains to learning tasks.

OK. Going back to your original question. "Is consciousness nothing more than a particular method of memory access?" Well, no. The various memory systems play a fundamental part in our mental faculties, but aren't the sole bearers of cognition. The mind isn't just a passive operator. Directing our attention is a fundamental part of our consciousness (through figure-ground in sensory perception and through modulation of consciousness thresholds when it comes to the other phenomenological regions). As such, our own agency plays an equally important part in how we see and interact with the world.

Note that I distinguish between the psyche, the mind and consciousness. When I talk about the psyche, I'm talking about the whole form, the entire gestalt. I define mind as being the realm where phenomena present themselves to consciousness and consciousness as the acting agent in the center. But like I said earlier, there's no real divide imho (told you, it would get muddy).

From this I can assume that you are all atheists? — Count Radetzky von Radetz

I'm agnostic if you want to call it that. I neither affirm nor deny the existence of a god or gods. Or anything else, for that matter.

Matthew's gospel is perhaps the most definitive if one would like to research the purpose of life.

I prefer having an entire bookshelf worth of books, so I can make up my own mind. Note that my bookshelf contains a copy of the bible too (gifted to me). I also own the collected works of Meister Eckhart, Kierkegaards "Either/Or and "De Beata Vita" by st. Augustine. So it's not like I'm not familiar with Christianity in general.

One should live their life to the best of their ability and then have faith through their actions and belief in the Kingdom of God.

...

"Et in Arcadia ego" by Poussin:


"Cardsharps" by Caravaggio:


"Moses" by Michelangelo:


Ceiling by Salvador Dali, located in his museum. Not sure what it's called:

What currently makes you feel confident and empowered to be your most authentic self? — GBaxter

My giant ego. What else? :p

"Generally speaking, in the dwelling places of Buddhas and Ancestors, taking tea and eating rice is what constitutes Their everyday life. This custom of taking tea and eating rice has been passed on to us and fully manifests itself in the here and now. This is why the taking of tea and the eating of rice by Buddhas and Ancestors has come down to us as a way of living."
-Dogen Zenji, "Shobogenzo", ch. 62, "On Everyday Life".

To me, "life" means being there (Dasein) in everydayness. I could think of it in terms of a singular life as a whole (from birth to death) or human life in general, but these would be abstractions and as such, those tangents would be fairly meaningless when it comes to actually having an impact on my experience. So. Is the mundanity of everyday life worth living? I think so, anyway. But then again, I enjoy both tea and rice.

So I ask you, do you believe speciation occurs? If yes, why? If no, why not? — ProbablyTrue

What? No. Obviously not. And no, speciation isn't the problem to me, here. It's the "believe" part. I don't see how hypotheses and/or theories require belief. Then again, I'm one of those people who distinguishes between conjecture and dogmatism. So. To be perfectly clear: Do I think speciation is a thing? Sure. Am I willing to chuck the notion in light of counter evidence? Uh, yes. Do I think that such counter evidence is likely to surface? No.

The promise of life after death is religion's lure. Freedom from religious dogmas originates from acceptance that there is no life after death. — CuddlyHedgehog

"Man becomes aware of the sacred because it itself, shows itself, as something wholly different from the profane. To designate the act of manifestation of the sacred, we have proposed the term hierophany. It is a fitting term, because it does not imply further; it expresses no more than is implicit in its etymological content, i.e., that something sacred shows itself to us. It could be said that the history of religions - from the most primitive to the most highly developed - is constituted by a great number of hierophanies, by manifestations of sacred realities. From the most elementary hierophany - e.g., manifestation of the sacred in some ordinary object, a stone or a tree-to the supreme hierophany (which, for a Christian, is the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ) there is no solution of continuity. In each case we are confronted by the same mysterious act - the manifestation of something of a wholly different order, a reality that does not belong to our world, in objects that are an integral part of our natural "profane" world.
The modem Occidental experiences a certain uneasiness before many manifestations of the sacred. He finds it difficult to accept the fact that, for many human beings, the sacred can be manifested in stones or trees, for example. But as we shall soon see, what is involved is not a veneration of the stone in itself, a cult of the tree in itself. The sacred tree, the sacred stone are not adored as stone or tree; they are worshipped precisely because they are hierophies, because they show some thing that is no longer stone or tree but the sacred, the ganz andere.
It is impossible to overemphasize the paradox represented by every hierophany, even the most elementary. By manifesting the sacred, any object becomes something else, yet it continues to remain itself, for it continues to participate in its surrounding cosmic milieu. A sacred stone remains a stone; apparently (or, more precisely, from the profane point of view), nothing distinguishes it from all other stones. But for those to whom a stone reveals itself as sacred, its immediate reality is transmuted into a supernatural reality. In other words, for those who have a religious experience all nature is capable of revealing itself as cosmic sacrality. The cosmos in its entirety can become a hierophany.
The man of the archaic societies tends to live as much as possible in the sacred or in close proximity to consecrated objects. The tendency is perfectly understandable, because, for primitives as for the man of all pre modem societies, the sacred is equivalent to a power, and, in the last analysis, to reality. The sacred is saturated with being. Sacred power means reality and at the same time enduringness and efficacity.The polarity sacred-profane is often expressed as an opposition between real and unreal or pseudoreal. (Naturally, we must not expect to find the archaic languages in possession of this philosophical terminology, real-unreal, etc.; but we find the thing.) Thus it is easy to understand that religious man deeply desires to be, to participate in reality, to be saturated with power."
-Mircea Eliade, "The Sacred and the Profane", p. 11 - 13.

"For our purpose it is enough to observe that desacralization pervades the entire experience of the nonreligious man of modem societies and that, in consequence, he finds it increasingly difficult to rediscover the existential dimensions of religious man in the archaic societies."
Ibid. p. 13.

What's falsificationism?

Scholarch during the middle period of the Academy. Ariston described him as "Plato the head of him, Pyrrho the tail, in the midst Diodorus".

In fact, even on this forum, where people are more intelligent, better read, and more cultured than the average man, even here people lack seriousness. — Agustino

Yeah, what can I say? Sorry not sorry, I guess. :)

How do you distinguish between a "conscious self aware AI" and a "p zombie AI"?

really, an egotist. Worse than a parliamentarian in my opinion. — Count Radetzky von Radetz

Oh look, an ad hominem. I wasn't even talking to you, but you felt the kneejerk reaction to say some nonsense. Why is that again? Nevermind, don't answer.

"Touch the fixed idea of such a fool, and you will at once have to guard your back against the lunatic’s stealthy malice. For these great lunatics are like the little so-called lunatics in this point too — that they assail by stealth him who touches their fixed idea."

Imagine you can live the rest of your life immorally and get away with it, societal or otherwise.
Would you still choose to be moral, why or why not? — Ruchi

Who's defining the measure of said "morality"? And how is that measure justified? And what justifies this justification? And so on. I'm not particularly keen on defining my actions/life in terms of "morality" and/or "immorality". Such spooks don't have any particular meaning to me.

What does the regress argument have to say about 'self evident truths'? — Purple Pond

What does argumentative theory say about leading questions? My advise to you is to try such nonsense on someone else.

Well, it's good for getting triggered responses from certain folks...

Anyway, the point? The point of the regress problem? To problematize the whole notion of axioms.