I agree. I re-read Sam's book Free Will last night, his free will argument says that we are essentially self-aware, subjectively conscious biological robots that voluntarily and involuntarily make decisions as a result of our genetic and environmental conditions (which we don't ourselves choose). I keyed in on the 'biological robots' part of this idea and jumped to the question 'does that mean we are all just p-zombies and don't realize it'. Nonsensical because Sam acknowledges we are self-aware and subjectively conscious.

How would it walk if it thought nothing? How would it avoid damaging itself if it felt nothing? — Isaac

A p-zombie could be an atomically and behaviorally perfect replica of you - acts, walks, talks, etc. just as you do, the only difference being this replica does not have subjective/phenomenal experience like you do (and therefore no free will, like you [may] have).

No, Sam’s position is that we do have epiphenomenal consciousness, that is phenomenal subjective experience without any causal effect, just passive observers. — Zelebg

Maybe I misinterpret Sam's position, but I don't understand your interpretation either - could you elaborate? We have phenomenal subjective experience but ultimately only as passive observers (and not as 'active' observers with complete free will)?

There's a short book "Conscious Robots" by Paul Kwatz. It's a light-hearted read that gives an interesting perspective on the argument that there is no free will and other related ideas about happiness and pain. Lots of little thought experiments that are similar to arguments presented in this thread.